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Abstract 
The thesis examines the links between the changes in office work (in 
the insurance industry) causQd by computerisotion and rationalisation, 
and their impact on white-collar employees' work expectations. ft K 
hypothesised that such cmployees have been turning to unions as a way 
of retrieving their unfulfilled expectations either by gaining 
bargaining power over such matters as promotion prospects and work 
content or by achievAg compensatory higher salaries. it is farther 
hypothesised that managements can be expected to resist all attempts 
by unions to extend their bargaining into spheres tra6itionally 
considered as managerial prerogative. 
The bureaucratic organisational context of insurance employees is dus- 
cribed, with particular reference to the way in which tho employor's 
control over career prospects and work porOrmance is strengthened by 
increased bureaucratisation. Consideration is then given to onalgroup 
of employees 
- 
professionals 
- 
whose possession of professional 
expertise minimises the impact of bureaucratic control. The Tirst 
empirical study (a questionaire attitude survey and int2rviews) 
compares work expectations and achievements and attitudes to the 
employer and trade union of professional and non-professional employees. 
It was found that the non-professionals perceive a higher level of 
bureaucratisation in their jobs and also a more pronounced failure of 
expectations in relation to their work content and career achievements. 
This influenced their attitude to their employer but was reflected in 
union membership and their proferred areas of union activity rather 
than an intention to leave the company. 
The process by which a union was recognised for collective bargaining 
in another insurance company is the subject of the second empirical 
study. The case-study highlights the stratogy by which the management 
of that company sought to preserve its authority and to maintain 
control over the conduct of decision-making, partiyularly in areas 
such as work content and prcmotion prospects which have been identified 
a, s the core of employces' unfulfilled expectations. 
The thesis concludes that pressure by white-collar employees 
through their union for greater influence on matters such as work 
content and promotion can be anticipated, and that these matters 
will be the focus of bargaining in the future. 
CHAPTER I
WRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
Development of the Research 
The ideas in this thesis developed from the Researýher's experience 
of employment t,, rith a large British insurance corlipany betý,., ec-n 1966 
and 1975. During this time, VIC Staff Voted in faVOL11' Cf a P. '. erger 
between their staff associations and the Association of Scientific, 
Technical and Managerial Staffs (1henceforward relerred to as ASTMIS), 
and the coimpany then became the first major insurance cor; iIpany to 
recognise a -trade union for the collective representation of its 
office staff. This was one significant factor which guided my 
interests during Subsequent academic study. The other factor 
concerned equally dramatic changes which had taken place during 
L these years, the effects of which were not so immediaZe but no less 
important. Such changes were the introduction of co. mputerisation 
on a large scale and tile widespread rational i saltion of' ;,,, orking 
Fn ethods which was itself prompted partly by computeris. -tion and also 
partly by economic pressures. My experience indicated that. these 
two factors - unionisation and changes in workipg methods - were 
rinked. 
1 cannot, however, claim that theýe latter iý--, ctors are recent 
phenomena or have not been identified in earlier days as sigpilficant 
M the study of white-collar employees. In 1935, Klingender 
reported "two -impor-'Cant changes in the conditions of clerical vrork 
itself which greatly affected the status, rernuneration and chances 
of employment for clerks 
... 
the t%-,, in procosS ses of office 
rationalisation 
- 
large scale amalgamations arid the irritroduction of 
machines" (P. 58). Hwaever, 50 years ago, union weimbershitp was rare 
among office workers, especially in the banks and insurance 
companies that Klingender was particularly referring. -to. But unlop 
rnembe-rship and reCognition has become fairly widespread among 
insurance companies these days, and the whole industry has aiso 
uyidergone major changes in the methods and organisatiop of work as a 
result of' managerial responses to technological devallopments. 
The following few pages are a preliminary statement of the ideas 
which underlie this research and which have just been briefly intro- 
duced. This section then leads to an elaboration of the main 
hypotheses of the research. 
The changes in office work in the last 15 years (taking the general 
introduction of computerisation as a starting point) have had a 
considerable impact on the expectations of white-collar employees. 
Such staff have traditionally had 
.,,, 
or- which uses various mental 
skills and often dettailled knowledge, and for which training iý., as 
frequently eXtensilve. The expectation oil use of abilities has been 
heightened by greater duration and depth of educationt: insurance 
companies have tradition. ally-employed people (especiaily their inale 
staff) from the upper echelonsof educational qualification. Ho%-., ever, 
computerisation tends to routinise work as procedures are split down 
into various sequential processes; administration becomes a 
comparatively undemanding and simplified operation. Only the work 
which needs detailed technical knowledge remains immune from this 
change. 
Apart from the effect on the work itself, technological developments 
have also had a crucial impact on the career structure of companies. 
People recruited to-employers such as the companies in this research 
have expected a career progression upwards through the ranks of th--' 
organisation lasting throughout most ol their working life. 
Promotion affects many aspects of work, apart from status and 
financial reward; it. also affects the level of responsibility, the 
scope for decision-making and the development of personal attributes 
necessary in management. But routinised and rationalised worl, 
permits the mass of jobs to be congregated tit the base o-Ir' the 
hierarchy, with fewer levels of supervision and management to 
control the operation of the work. Narrow hierarchical gradations, 
based on the technical aspects of the work, are substantially 
reduced by computerisation and rationalisa-LiOrl. 
The introduction of computers by itself has not been responsible 
for all these changes in work procedures, although it does 
t2- 
necessitate a standardised format for the processing of documents al-d 
data to be S to ro d. However, the process of rationalisation, whereb., 
jobs are reduced to simple and repetitive procedures, appears to have 
recf i : 4, ved its initial impetus when computerisation paved the t,., ay for 
significant changes in work. Economic considerations have aiso been 
an incentive 
- Iragmentation of jobs reduces the need for training, 
g .1 increases the interchangeability of staff and, by lowerin Che rank 
of many jobs, reduces the burden of salaries. Thus, there has been 
a considerable setback, in recent yKears in the extent to whichi white- 
collar employees, in offices like those of insurance companies, have 
found that their work and future prospects come -up to theiiý 
expectati ons. 
The underlying process has been one of a continuous shift of power 
in the performance of work to the management of such companies, and 
away from employees as individuals. Whilst salaries and terms and 
conditions of employment had always been at the discretion of the 
employer, staff were able to look forward to a steady improvemed 
over the years as their careers progressed. Promotion was seen as a 
way in which an individual could 'get ahead' by his own initiative 
and efforts. The nature of the work was such that personal 
discretion and decision-making, albeit often not very extensive, 
was possible and frequently necessary for the satisfactory 
performance of the work. This element having been considerably 
reduced, and promotion prospects much diminished, the control of the 
employer over the daily work and long-term prospects of employees 
has been much strengthened. 
Understandably, there has been much resentment amonq such employees r- 
about 'the changes that have taken pia-ced. If individual action As 
restricted, and individual uncoordinated protests prove fruitless, 
then collective action will inevitably be considered. Many L 
insurance companies have a history of limited staff collectivity 
thPOUgh staff association but, for reasons discussed later, fliese 
have failed to prove a suitable medium for employees tc) challenge 
effectively managompnt's control over their working lives, The 
empioyoes of many insurance conipanies have eventually turned to 
orthod ox trade unions, especially ASTMS. '' 
It could be argued that if employees turn to unions when their work 
expectations are not fulfilled, that they do so through two possible 
moti vati ons. The union may be seen as a means of providiny some 
form of financial compensation (by negotiating higher salaries) for 
the prospects that have been lost, or it may be seen as a means o-, 
achieving the restoration of an earlier, more satisiactory position 
in which jobs and career prospects were closer to emploýecs' 
expectations. In practice, it is probable that these two are not 
viewted by employees as mutually exclusive courses ol' action, but 
simply that individual priorities will tend to lean one way or the 
other. 
Negotiations on pay and conditions have formed the most obviously 
successful aspect of union action 
- 
at 'least according to the 
employees of Company A. Whilst the union has also turned its 
attention to the regulation of personnel policy (e.. g. job grading 
and evaluation, appraisals, salary structure, dismissal procedures), 
there has been little activity in the area which appears to be the 
heart of employee discontent 
- 
the de-skilling of viorlk I - and reduction 
of promotion prospects. And yet the -survey in Company A shows that 
there is considerable interest among employees in the involvement 
of the union in such matters. 
Having said that the changes wrought by computerisation and the 
rationalisation of work result in a shift of. power away Iro-m the 
individual employee and toi-,, ards management, it could readily be 
anticipated that the increased strength of employees Uhrough 'Eheir 
col lectivisation is perceived by management as a I-hreat LO tt 
power. As such, unionisation within a company is usually resisted 
by management, frequently by covert machinations rather than any 
form of eXplicit hostility. The evidence of the insurarice indus-Lry, 
See Appendix A for a description of the events which led to 
recognition of ASTMS in Company A in 1970. 
-I It - 
though, appears to be that management and union do not spend their 
time in COnStWlt warfare once the union has achieved recognition 
-- 
although, as I-10ted, union involvement has encroached very little on 
matters of 'managerial prerogative' Such as working procedure:, %,,, hich 
are a key issue to employees. The evidence of Company B is that 
such an encroachment would be very vigorously resisted by 
management. 
It car, therefore be arguee that from the perspective of employee 
p4- I mselves as a expectations, battle has yet to be joined b_%. v,, aen Lho, 
collectivit, / (represented by their union) and their management. 
The final outcome of the rapid increase in union membership and 
recognition in the insurance industry in tile last decade is 
therefore still in issue. 
Hypotheses of the Research 
This research is therefore concerned with the effect on employees' 
work expectations of computerisation and office rationalisation, and 
the impact of this on union membership and union/managemeni; 
relations. Three main hypotheses emerge: 
i) That changes in skill and promotion levels at work have led to 
unfulfilled employee expectations concerning both the progress 
of their careers and the suitability of the work to be performed. 
In order to assess the impact of these factors, the research 
should ideally have encompassed an historical perspective to 
enable the changesin working methods to be traced back for scme 
years. However, this was clearly not feasible and only the 
present organisation of work could be examined from the 
employees' perspective. The alternative is to find a group of 
employees whose work has not been affected by these factors over 
the years and, fortunately, the company concerned employs 
several hundred professionals (accountants, actuaries, and 
others) whose work has been largely unaffected by computeri- 
sation and has not been subjected to significant 
ati onal 4, sati on. They i-, -ere used as a florm of control group, as 
they have retained considerable power over their own jobs and 
their attitudes and expectations were compai-ed with the 
non-professional employees. 
The inclusion of professional employees also provides a useful 
opportunity to study such personnel in an organisational 
context other than the wholly professional ppivate practice:, 
which has been the context for many of the other studies of 
professionals. 
ii) That unions are viewed by employees as a means of remedying 
their unfulfilled expectations, either by providing higher 
incomes as a form of compensation, or by putting pressure on 
management to fulfil those traditional expectations. 
iii) That management will resist as a threat to its authority any 
intervention by a union in i,. iatters of 'managerial preroga. 6ve. 
e. g. organisation of work, business policy of the company. 
manpower planning and the career structure. It is precisely 
these areas which contain the seeds of employees' dissatis- 
faction at -the nori-fulfilment of their traditional vwk 
expectations., 
I 
As will shortly be explained, the details of the research had 
inevitably to be adapted somewhat to the constraints imposed by the 
need to find companies who were prepared to cooperat-- in the some- 
%%, hat sensitive realm of industrial relations research. Nevertheless, 
these three hypotheses were at the core of the research as 
originally conceived, and remained its guiding principles. 
Art-anging the Fieldwork 
Problems were encountered as soon as companies were approached for 
research facilities. The difficul V was that those companies which 
- 
16- 
presented the itiost i nteresti ng possi bi ii ti es, i. e. those u, hpre uni on 
, 
membership was a live issue, were precisely those companies whose 
management felt that industrial relations were too delicate to be 
disturbed by the issue of a research questionnaire to staff. The 
intention %-,, as to test the hypotheses by obtaining data on employees' 
attitudes to and perceptions of their work and union affiliation by 
mc means ol a ques-tionnaire, and possibly interviews. The original 
intention was to do a preliminary study in one company follo%ý,, ed by a 
second survey in another company which would develop the findings of 
the first. In the event, this was not possible., although I believe 
the research has gained a wider perspective as a result Of th-2 change 
in plans. 
Altogether, seven of the tep largest insurance companies in Britain 
were approached for research facilities; A short summary of the 
difficulties in arranging the empirical aspects of this study in the 
realm of industrial relations may be instructive. 
The first approach was to a company with a well-established staff 
association with which collective bargaining was conducted, but 
which also had very small pockets of ASKS membership. The contact: 
was made through a personal acquaintance who was one uf the company's 
branch managers. The personnel department was most cooperative and 
eventually offered some research facilities 
- 
provided trade unions 
were not mentioned. I was assured that the employees were entirely 
happy with the staff association and perfectly free to join a trade 
union, but that management did not really wish the subject to be 
aired. These limitations obviously rendered the company unsuitable 
for this research. 
The Chartered Insurance Institute was then approached for assistance 
in arranging introductions to other companies. Their first approach 
was rejected (without explanation) by a company which has had a 
staff association for a number of years, and also a small but 
growing proportion of union members which had already resulted in a 
claim for recognition. The Institute's next approach was to a 
- 
Il 
- 
General Manaqer of 'Company B who invited rile to discuss the research 
proposals with him. However, af-Cer discussions with his colleagues, 
lie decided that the issues involved were too sensitiv. - %-vilthin his 
company at that time, but suggested that I contact him again six 
months later. He also agreed to help in his capacity as Chairiman of 
the Universities Liaison Comaiittee of the British Insurance 
Association and, as a result, another company (which had had a 
recognition agreement with ASTHS for sevcral years) agreed to 
consider my request. This they did for some 't1wo T-111onthis and th-nn 
declined r2search facilities on the grounds that major changes 
(r!; ainiy technologicai) within the company made -it an inappropriate 
time to be involved. 
I then %,., rote direct to another company which had shortly before 
recognised a union (not ASTMS) after its merger with the staff 
association. The Assistant General ilanager (Personnel) was 
enthusiastic and obtained the, permission of his Board. All that 
remained was to gain the cooperation of the union and an interview 
with the chairman of that company's section was at-ranged. This was 
utterly disastrous, the chairman imputing to ý, ip all tile worst 
t earch; I was, possible motives for wanting to undertake the resl 
accused, aimong other things, of being an ASTIMS' spy beicaulsc I had 
been a member of that union when I worked for company A! All plans 
for the research in that company were abandoned. 
Attempt number six was made with a company which had recognised 
ASTMS some years before and which appeared to have a stable 
relationship with the union. They declined facilities because 
consultative procedures, unien representation and an apr, -,. ý4v_nI r 
system acquainted management with areas of dissatisfaction, and -it 
was felt that the results of the research v,, ould be of little 
assistance to them. 
By this time, ali, ýiost six months had elapsed since the interview . -Ath 
the General Manager of Company B and I wrote to him again. 1 was 
informed that the issues of union membership viere still too 
- 
sensitive 
- 
more so, probably, than previously 
- 
and that an 
attitude survey was out of -the question. However, -tile opporLunitY 
was offered to examine the company's employee relations history as a 
form of case-study. The offer was accepted. ASTMIS had been 
attempting to achieve recognition in tile company for nearly five 
years and a comprehensive file had been maintained on all issues 
pertaining to this. Access- to this file was made available and also 
interviews with staff within the personnel sphere. 1 started work 
within this company almost exactly one year after the first attempt 
to arrange research facilities. 
I then approached my old owployers, Company A, the Staff Planager ot 
which oflered me every possible cooperation and assistance with the 
survey and intervie,. %, s and also obtained the agreement of ASTIMS laithin 
the company. After the dilficulties of the preceding twelve months,. 
this phase of the research seemed unbelievably problem-free. The 
company was ideal for the put-pose of the research because it con't. 
-ained 
the large number of professionally qualified staff referred to 
earlier. There was therefore the opportunity to a ssess the impact 
of work changes on jobs and careers, which would have beon much more 
problematic if historical comparisons had beer, the only source of 
information. 
It should be noted that I had not approached this company earlier 
because I felt that nine years of employment there had left me with 
fairly clear ideas which needed at least some preliminary exposure 
to the ethos of another company of the same type. 
Plan of the Thesis 
After this introduction, the thesis continues with discussion of 
various contextual factors, namely the industry in which the 
research is set and the two companies and the union which are 
involved. This is then followed by a more detailed cxamination of 
the immediate organisational (bureaucratic) environment of the 
- 
ICI 
- 
em-,, )ioyees and their work, to v. hicih are related the changes in work 
which are -the bases of the hypotheses. 
The previous literature is then considered, describing the 
characteristics of ýýAiite-collar and professional employment, and the 
growth of unionism in this area. The methiodologicýl foundations of 
wny previous studies appear to hinder, rather than assist, useful 
empirical work and -lessons can be applied to this and future studies. 
Nevertheless, all previous work has to be carefully considered in 
order to determine to i-; halt extent this particular piece of research 
-udies were of adds to the existing stock of 'knowledge, and earlier st 
course used to guide the development of this research. 
The thesis then moves to a discussion of the process whereby a union 
beconles institutionalised within a company, and the manner in which 
this involves tile renegotiation of boundaries of managerial 
authority. There then follows a report of the recognition of AST14S 
in the two companies, with more detailed attention given to Company 
B 
-in the forim of a case-study. As noted earlier, this company vias 
involved in a lengthy (and finally successful) attempt by ASTMIS to 
gain recognition for collective bargaining. Tile case study has been 
condensed in the main body of the thesis to illustrate those aspects P 
which are pertinent to the third hypothesis concerning managerial 
authority, with other aspects included as appendices. Apart from 
the interest of an 'inside view' of manageriai strategy and tactics 
during this process, the study clearly reveals the extent to which 
a union acting on behalf of employees is perceived as a threat to 
tile authority of management over lower levels of the hierairc, -V. 
The second empirical contribution to the thesis is the study of 
employees' expectations and attitudes in Company A, with the results 
of the questionnaire survey. The report of the survey results 
includes comparisons of the professionals' and non-professionals' 
responses in order to illustrate the impact of the changes in work 
which have variously affected the jobs and career prospects of the 
two groups. 
-'), 0 - 
A discussion chapter then reviews some of the major issues, putting 
forward a typology of factors which influenced union recognition 
in Companies A and B. The rejection of Staff Associations as viable 
collectivities is considered and the prospects for inclusion in 
collective bargaining of those factors which are currently within 
managerial prerogative. 
In the conclusions, the results of the studies in both companies 
are suirimarised and considerathn given to the extent to which the 
hypotheses could be considered proven. 
THE DEVELOYMENT OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
The business of insurance has been conducted flor many centuries, 
although -its precise origins have been lost in antiquity. We do--knoi%, 
that contracts of insurance (relating to sea trade) based on similar 
legal principles to those of today ware current in Greece in the 
4th Century B. C. The Romans in about 230 B. C. produced the first 
known table of mortality which was remarkably accurate. N its 
calculations by modern standards. The essentials of insurance as a 
business have therefore been long established, and it can be guessed 
that the need for some form of insurance, i. e. the sharing of risPs, 
was felt as soon as nations or communities began -Lo flepnnd -1001. their 
prosperity on trading, particularly if this involved hazzardous 
expeditions. 
Insurance contracts in an essentially similar form to that known 
today had become established by the 14th centuyy in italy with the 
indemnification of merchants for the accidental destruction of cargo 
and ships. The practice had become well-established in England by 
the end of the 16th century: the wording of an enactment passed ill 
1601 to set up a Court of Arbitration to Val with disputcs on 
-U- 
marine policies refers to the practicc of mari. ne insurance having 
been carried on since "time out of mind". 
Companies began to be established in the early part of the l8th 
century specifically for the issue of insurance policies and, in the 
same period, the owner of a coffee-house frequented by merchants and 
ship-owners 
- 
Edward Lloyd 
- 
began publishing information about 
shipping and associated trade. This gradually developed into Lloyd's 
of London, the leading international institution for insurance, 
especially marine. Also during the 17th and 18th centuries, fire 
insurance began, prompted by the'Great Fire of London in IGGG which 
drew attention to the need for S coordinated method of Fighting 
fires and indemnifying those who lost their property as a result of 
them. Companies dealing in this type of business combined the two 
functions by running their own fire brigades and issuing insurance 
policies. 
The first known life insurance policy is dated 1583, although there 
is evidence of primitive forms of life insurance in England as far 
back as the 13th century. Most of the life policies underwritten 
before the middle of the 18th century were either short-term 
contracts with fixed death benefits or schemes providing for variable 
benefits according to the funds available in any given year. By 
1762, the science of probability had become sufficiently sound for 
lifle assui-ance to be conducted according to actuarially-based 
mortality tables, so that level premiums could be cham-led throughout 
life and assessed according to the calculated risk of mortality. 
Mode-rn life assurence has becolme ever more complex, and increa-s-Ingly 
linked with investment plans, to cater for the differing needs of 
the client, but the principle rettiains the same. 
The insurance industry today is vast and varied, but dominated by a 
com, paratively few major companies which are household names. The 
total assets of insurance companies incorporated in Great Britain 
is F41,025ni with i9corrie from investments of iL-, 848m in 1978. 
i 
-2?. - 
Premium income for that year was 0,45% and claims paid to the total 
of 0,931m. 
1 Altogether more than 800 companies (many of them 
subsidiaries or branches of fore ign companies) are authorised to 
conduct insurance business in this country. 
The major coaipanies are nearly all composite oflices: that - is, they 
conduct various types ol insurance (e. g. Lita and Fire). Compara- 
tively few companies (abOUt a, dozen) conduct Industrial Life 
Assurance, of which Company A is the leading company. The term 
'industrial' is novi a misleading misnomer which originated in the 
primarly purchasers of this type of policy 
- 
industrial working 
classes in the early/middle 19th centu? ýv. It -is sc,: mýLfipes more 
accurately referred to as 'hwile service assurance' 
. 
It is defined by 
the Industrial Assurance Act. 1923, as: 
"the business of effecting assurances upon human life, in 
respect of which premiums are received by collectors. '' 
Tile insurance industry is a labour intensive industry, although -the 
last decade or so has shown a steady increase in the use of computers 
-which has undoubtedly contributed to the ability of companies to shed 
staff. A survey of nine of the largest companies showed that their 
total staff had fallen by nearly 9,000 in the years 1968 to 1978.2 
Despite this trend in the largest companies, the industry as a whole 
is eriiployinq a higher proportion of the employed population as 
indicated by Table 1. The apparent contradiction of trends is 
presumably caused by the overall growth of the industry and the 
increasing number of flourishing"smaller companies which cannot yet 
afford to cot, iiputerise on the scale of the major companies. 
Source: Insurance Business Annual Report 
WSO, 1978 
2 Source: Insurance Staffing and Salaries 
Prof. B. Carter and S. Diacon 
Policy Holder Staff Gazette, 30 November 1979, P. vi 
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Table I Employment in the Insurance IndustU 
June 1974 
June 1975 
June 1976 
June 1.977 
June 1978 
June 1979 
MALES FERLES 
emp I oye d as % of employed as % of in total employed in insurance total employed 
ndus ry population M industry population OO (000s) 
145.9 1.092% 115.7 1.1295% 
143.8 1.086% 
I 
1111.3 1.240% 
143.1 1.093% 115.9 1,295, /ý 
49 
,7 1.144% 119.9 1.32 0'; ',, 
149.1 1.141% 1121.9 1.332% 
152.7 124.6 
bource: Pepartment of Employment Gazette 
As can be seen, the real slump in employment occurred in the early/ 
middle 'seventies, when maintaining reasonable budgets became a 
severe p roblem throughout the industry. At t, his time, both Companies 
A and B resorted to cost-cutting exercises including severe 
restriction on recruitment. The Carter and Diacon study concluded 
that the reduction in the numbers of staff employed in the large 
companies "has probably been caused by the gradual introduction of 
labour-saving devices and the prospects for clerical staff in such 
companies looks less healthy than for more highly trained staff'' 
(P. V. 
The Trend towards Rationalisation 
Reference has been made to two of the most important factors Wich 
have affected the performance of insurance companies in the post-war 
years, namely computerisation and the impact of economic circumstances 
on the use of labour. As a major theme of this thesis concerns the 
effect of rationalisation and computerisation on the jobs and careers 
of. insurancQ company employees, it is necessary to examine the back- 
ground in which decisions such as these were made. 
The British insurance has always had a world-v., ide pre-eminence, and 
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were, however, certain hindrances to the continued health of the 
industry, v., hich took their- toll from the middle 1950's after a decade 
of profitability immediately following the war. Such factors were ItAie 
loss of some international markets, particularly in Ealstern Europe 
and Asia, and the general economic problems, especially concerning 
the balance of payments and inflation, arising from Britain's uias-cive 
financial investment in the war. The American insurance ind-lustry was 
benefited by the comparative economic advantages of the U. S. %,. iar
involvement which had caused an expansion of their exports and an 
increase in their standard of living. By the 1960's, competition 
from the U. S. insurance industry contributed to the general, 
unprofitability of British companies. 
Despite these problems, the U. K. insurance industry managed to break 
all records with the growth in premium income, in what Clayton (1971) 
has described as a 'magnificent response' to the challenges and 
opportunities of the post-war years. It was helped in this by an 
eXtensive spell of-full employment and a steady growth of real 
income. The expansion of life and motor business was particularly 
impressive. 
However, there have been poor underwriting results. for non-life 
business since the mid-1950's, with most companies achieving under- 
writing losses. Other contributory factors can be identified in this, 
apart from the economic background and overseas competition. 
Clayton (op. cit. ) suggests that the industry was slow to react to all 
F the post 
'Yý ý the changes 0'. --%-., ar years, particularly caused by tile 
technological revolution which brought perhaps the greatest challenge 
to general insurance, presenting many new and complex risks for 
insurance. Many companies simply had too high expense ratios and 
insLifficiently stringent financial controls to cope- wi-ICh Athese under- 
writing challenges on a profitable basis. 
However, by 1975 Carter' was able to identify i. mproved efficiency, and 
stated that the industry as a whole showed falling exvense ratio,; 
- 
reflected in a reduction in the nu-nibers of emliployees 
- 
despit: e r- 
subs L. 1ally rising .Ir tanl-4- salaries. Il'o-w Inad icoimipanies ii,, anaged-I tto achieve 
this? One major factor which cannot be ignored, although its impact on 
profitability may be over-estimated, 
. 
is the number of mergers that took 
place during the 1950's and 1960's. There were no fewer than 26 
mergers between 1956 and 19682. 
ý 
which left tile industry dic-mInated by 
eight or nine major c-caiposite companies. Most c-I the companies which 
had substandard profitability in -1956 have since been absorbed arfto tile 
major companies of today 
.3 This has provided the benefit of economies 
of scale and the more efficient application of computerised systems. 
Some doubt about the advantageous impact of mergers on profitability 
can be seen by a comparison of underl. 
-n-itina results ffire. and accident) V-- 
which shows that the two companies not involved in morgers (pre 1962) 
had better results during the years 10.64 
- 
'1967 than tLhe average 
4 
results of those-companies which had been involved in mergers 
. 
The Prospects for British Insurers RL Carter, in the Journal 
of the Chartered Insurance Institute, vol. 72,1975, P. 92-105 
2 Source: Clayton op. cit. P. 219 
3 Insurance Profitabili ty, Past, Present and Future iJ Plymen and 
S Pullan, in the journal of the Chartered Insurance institute 
Vol. 66,1969, P. 131-157. 
4 The Policy-holder, 9 August 1968 
Wether or not the extensive number of mergers did contribute overall to 
profitability in the Unger-term, they certainly had the effect of forcing 
senior managements to take a Pare rigorous view of the productivity of 
their staff. Merged companies needed fewer staff and, once training and 
rotraining programmes had been planned, over-staffing could be coped with 
only by retirement or redundahcy. Thus began the break in a traditionally 
totally secure employment (or is near as any job could tomu to total securi 
and a new approach by insurance companies to staffing. 
This paved the way for further changes in management practice. Kend al I 
i den4t.. ifies two factors, apart from the need for reduccJ trollable expenses I con 
to increase profit margins, which pushed m. an. age-men-ts into action. Firstly, 
he suggests that there was a demand by clerlks for an increase In salaries 
M 
ly 
offset their loss Of StatUs and security vis-a-vis manual workers. Secondly, 
there was less acceptance among employees of authoritarian managemcnts, and 
employees' demands were therefore less easily contairipd.. Kendall (wtho was an 
Assistant General Manager of a major company %%, hen he ! arote his article) 
comments that all aspects of companies' operat-lins came. under the "closest 
scrutiny' and "to concentrate routine procosses of large volume itito One or 
two areas, employing workers and machines for this sole purpose, scQl, -2. d a 
cle. ar step for-ward" (P. 92), He adds thdt '", 
_he dangers of follci,, ý: ing this 
prodUCtion-line process, loss of identification with the enterprise and loss 
of a sense of purpose on the part of those %,., orkinq in'it 
... 
t%iere not fully 
appreciated, although well understood in other industries. " (P. 92'). 
These processes, together with the increased organisational size caused Iýy 
mergers, caused the introduction of work and parforffnan, ce measurem$pnt and job 
evaluation. The greater size of companies, and the increased complexity of 
insurance contracts and processes led also to further specialisation. Six 
out of eight companies questione-& by Kendall confirmed this ond also 
commented on the practical difficulties of r., Dving peoplc for lurther 
exp erience and training. 
It has been shown how various pressures were latent behind the extensive 
rationalisation 2 of the insurance industry. One crucial factor which has 
'Organisational Planning in the Insurance industry 
-FH MAP, in the 
Journal of the Chartered Insurance Industry, vol. 73,1976, P. 71-129. 
2 The term 'rationalisation' is used in this thesis to denote not. only the 
simplification and routinisation of work at the task level, but also the 
greater emphasis on cost-effectiveness which results in the reduction of 
middle-management posts and restricted recruitment, for example. 
-. ?. I 
- 
only been mentioned in passing is the advent on a large scale of 
coinputerised working methods. Computers are ideal touls for 
insurance companies 
., 
Ihich have to process vast numbers of similar 
cases, and also have an immense ainount of information which must be 
stored 2nd readiiy retrievable. The propensity of coil-iputer systems 
to routinise work and brealk doi-in, jobs into a series of simplified 
tasks facilitated and reinforced the trend towards rationalised 
working methods which were already being introduced. The impact of 
this on the employees ol Company A, t,,, ith relerence to their 
unionisation, is discussed in Chapter 6. 
THE COMPANIES A AND B 
Both the companies in this studýý, are composite insurance companies 
(i. e. they deal in more than one branch o-1 insurance 
- 
life, fireý 
accident, etc. ) although they are both predominantly life companies 
and are also the two leading companies it-, t. he realm of pen-i-sions 
management. In financial terms, Company A is the largest insurance 
company in the country, and Company B is the second largest among 
the predominantly life companies. 
Table 2: Assets and Premium income of Predominanti,,, 'Lffe 
Assurance Comoanies 
Ranking of Comp Assets (im) Total Pr mrii Income 
lSt (Company A) 4,671.2 I'l 55.7 
2nd (Company B) 3,795.3 608.6 
3rd 2,249.5 251 
.3 
4th 1,060.9 18-11.1 
5th 1,007.5 163.4 
6th 798.8 114.5 
7th 665.8 92.7 
8th 
_566.6 
106.6 
Source: Insurance Staffin and Salaries Policy Holder Staff 
Gazette 30.11.19N Pro, 
.B Carter and 
'ýS Diacon 
Lf all i. nsurance co,.,, ipanies are compared, Companies PI and A reniabi the 
largest two in temas of assets, although they are then sixth and 1-hi rd 
respectively for prenflum income. 
The major difference between the two companies in business terms is 
that Company A is one of the few major companies %%, Ihich conducts 
industrial life assurance (as well (is ordinary life assurance); 
indeed, this is the type of business on which it was founded in 1848 
and on which it subsequent, y made -its name. Company B, by contrast, 
has never conducted this type of life business sincc its formation in 
1836. The legal obligation to collect preniums from the policy-- 
holders for indUStrial life business necessitates the employment of' 
agents. Company A employs a 'field staff' of about 15,000 for this 
purpose, and they also act as the company's sales staff. This 
company obtains very little businqss through brokerages, which is the 
main method by which Company B sells its policies although a rauch 
smaller speciallsed sales force is also employed. Organisationally, 
therefore, this difference in the types of business conducted by the 
two companies has a major impact. Comptany A is effectively divi'ded 
into two elements 
- 
office staff and field staff 
- 
and the building 
of mutual support and cooperation betý,,,, epn the two has been one of tile 
company's long-standing probiems. Company B, oil th, e other hand, has 
no such division. 
- 
Another major difference between the two companies is in the 
distribution of their office staff between different branchis and 
locations. Company A employed on average 21,046 employees during 
1978,1 making it by far the largest employer in the insurance 
industry. Of these, 15,000 were, as noted, field staff. The 
remaining 6,000 were employed in offices round Great Britain, 2,000 
were employed in 22 Divisional Offices throughout England, Scotland 
and Wales. These offices are in constant contact with the field 
staff for their particular division, and are primarily concerned with 
General Branch business (e. g. fire, motor). 
Source: Company's Annual Report and Accounts, 1918 
.- 
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Oil the reniainder, IL 2100 (68% fe,,, iale) work i. n the Reading Office whi-ch 
is part of the Head Office and i. s concerned with the issue and 
servicing of life policies and with týc payment of' claims on these. 
Much of the work is very routine, as is reflected in the fact that 
-he s- 0 65% of 1. Laff are within the junior clerical grad s. A further 
10% are punched card operators and typists. The work at this office 
has always been in the forefront of the Company's computerisation 
and rationalisation programmes, and may be corilipared with the 
Company B Life Administration Office at Hove (see RIW) where young, 
inexper 4 
-edly a factor in ASTAS' CoNVarative lenced staff were undoubt 
rrc recruiting succcss at that officc, and w1here the devel'O'Pr , nt of 
computerised working methods was the subject of constant debate. 
By comparison, AST14S finds difficuity in recruiting the young, 
predominantly female, staff at the Company A Reading office. 
lhe largest conglomeration of staff in Company A "is -in t. he London T 
Head Office, which has over 2,000 personnel (610/1, inale). ' I This is 
the office on which this study is based, and is concerned not only 
with the insurance aspects of the business (there is a large 
centralised General Branch ofifice and all the pensions business is 
conducted from London), but al-so with all the professional arid 
administrative services (e. g. actuarial, financial, legal, taxation, 
investment etc. ) necessary to maintain a major insurance company. 
Further details of the personnel in this office are given in the 
introduction to the survey in Company A. The senior management of 
the company are also located in this office. 
Company B employed 5,408 employees on average during 1978.2 This 
included approximately 550 sales staff and 1100 o-Ifice services staff 
and similar. By comparison with Company A, the Head Office 
functions are far more fragmented geographically. 
'The discrepancy betv,, een the total of the f*gur,, -s quotc-d and the 
grand total of 21,000 -is account -ed for by about- 7,001 works and office 
services staf-Ir (i. e. craftsmen, messangers eL'C. ); a Belfast office 
and a small speciaiised office in the city. 
2 Source: Company's Annual Report and Accounts, 1,978 
-. ' 
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Table 3_, ýcEit T 
_ýaýy-B 
Head Officos 
Location 1,110. of 
employees Primary function 
Kingsi-., ood (Surrey) 1110D Pensions, CO. -IlIpU ter system 
Hove 410 Life administration 
Temple Court (London) 375 Top Manaqement, Finance, Administration etc. 
Southgate (London) 375 General branch 
us Oil oncon, 290 J ESt3 
Milton Keynes 100 Accounts 
All of these offices w-ere involved to a considerable extent in the 
major relocation programme which 4, , ook. place around P-,, 74. III Lhe 
-his number of empioyees 'league table' of insurance employers, 
places Company B about 9th; for thie si--, e of its business Conpany T1 
B is clearly economical in the elmplb3mient of its staff. 
There are also significant differences between the two companies 
4 
when their grading structures are considered. Company A haU-J, until 
a restructuring scheme in January 1980, a complex graeling structure 
with a total of 24 grades for all its office stall. This e-',,. -ludes 
typists and punched card operators, and also the 218 (one fe-niale) 
officersand management. 
31 k 
Table 4 Company A Hierarchy 
(pre 1.1.1980) 
Chief General. Manager 
General Managers (and equivalent) 
includes 
Field 
Staff Assistant Gen eral Managers (and equivalent) (tS) 
Manage- 
ment 
Mana gers (and eqUilvalent', 
Senior Officers 
Junior 
Execut ive and Data Profess ionals 
General (clerical) Processing 
E6 Lt) D7 Principal (111G) 
E5 6 D  (I&S-) 
D5cni or G 
Office 
Staf f E3 (?., 60 D4 ýK) 
Only 
E2 G6 D3 (6ý; ) Assistant (AG) 
" I I II (w4 , 
EI (S'Ib) G5 (11) D ('ri Junior (JG) 
SS 
I 
(Tit) 
. 
G4 ýWI) Dl (-1) 
G 3 , 
1 
L `2 ,j 1ý 10 6. ) 4 
G11 
. (, Figu res in brackets indicate the numbers in 1 1979) rad - 
-1 
each 
GT 
. . 
g 
, :. 
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Notes to Table 4. 
Special Scale and was intended at its ir i. SS is nception in 1-1he 
late 'sixties as a fast link between the G (Gerieral clerical) 
grades and the E (Executive) grades for the better-than- 
average. By the tii-ile it disappeared with restructuring, it had 
really bccome part of the standard route from G to E grades. 
All gy-1-duates were placed on entry on the Special Scale. 
The G grades above G3 were a relic from a previOUS grade 
restructuring in the 'sixt. ies. TheFe gratles had riot ken used 
for promotion purposes for some years, 
GT is the trainees' grade (except graduates). All new entrants 
(mainly school leavers) were appointed to this gradde for 
-a six 
mionths' probati onary peri od, af ter whi ch they 
.,! ere real i ocated 
Mg to educational attainments. Only to either GI or G2 accordi 
a very few C. we S4-aff re appointed at more senior 'levels, 
especially among the non-professionals, although this trend 
seems to be changing. I 
By contrast with this, the grading structure at Company B appears 
- of the office staff are included mercifully straightforward. The bul 11. L. I 
in 7 Taster grades' 
, 
this again eXClUdilng typists, machfilc--, Operators 
and also part-time staff. 
The ASTMS bargaining group in Company A is all thp office, staff below 
the rank of officer (i. e. excluding field staff and craftsmen) bUl" 
including the ofiFices services staff. The bargaining group in 
Company B is office staff in gradas 01 to 07 and equivalent (i. e. 
including typists etc. ) and also weekly paid staff such as office 
services, v; orks and engineering. 
Having been employed by Company A for nine years and only close]. Y 
involved with Company B for five months, it is difficult for ille to 
give a balanced assessment of the differences beti,. -een the. Vvic 
companies based on my o-vin experience. There are, howover, three 
- 
Table 5 Company B Hierarchy 
Chief Executive 
General Managers (and ecluiv, alent) 
incl udes 
Sales Staff 
Management 
Master grades 
- 
Office Staff 
only 
Assistant Generai Managers (and equivalent)(ý%) 
Managers grade 09) 
Officers (grade 08) 
07 (kslý) 
06 ('Vca) 
05 
04 (Cvn) 
03 
02 
01 (%M") 
(figures in brackets indicate the numbers in each grade 1.1.1979) 
factors which I think are important to note and which may eSpcCially 
give some idea as tO. why the industrial relations developments werc 
so different in the last decade 
- 
albeit with the same eventual 
result of the recognition of ASTMS. 
Firstly, Company A has a pervasive aura of -its histary and 
J)1! 4 traditions, particularly associated with Ithe monumentai ilding in 
which the London Head Office is based. Tt would kn imp-siblo to 
work in this building without acquiring an awareness of times past. 
Along with the general staidness of the insurance industry, which we 
have already noted, this has tended to encourage the persistence of 
somewhat outdated traditions. Both companies (and the other old 
'14 
-I-iC large companies as well) have traditions of paternalISI. Stý, JGS of 
management; Company A seemed less able to find a comfortable 
compromise between this old style and the needs of a modern 
competitive company to make the mus. t economical use ol its major 
- 3t. - 
resource 
- 
i. ts employees.. Th. i. s, I feel 
, 
contributed to the 
-4 apparently insensi. tive handling of innovations such as cle,, cal work 
measurement in the late 'sixt. ies. In Co'mpany B. the management 
.,: as 
able to make a smoother transition, though not without its jolts. 
The second factor lies in the distribution of the staff. Company A 
has two extreNely large Head Offices which overwhelm all the other 
(divisionall offices. The London office has been based on the 
present site for almost a Century; the Reading office is nearly 20 
years old, although there was a smaller office in the same town for 
many years. A major relocation took place during the early 
'seventies to accommodate all life branch personnel in the one 
Reading office. 
The Head Office of Company B, on the other hand, is split into six 
geographical locations, all of which have been involved. in major 
upheavals in the last few years in the course of the relocation 
programme. The fragmented structure of the Company B Office Staff 
has, I believe, hampered any unity of action by employees of tile 
sort which led to the transfer from Staff Association to ASTMS in 
Company A. This is not to suggest that events would have followed 
that pattern after, say, the mortgage issue (see Appendix H) if the 
-ation partially sl-laff had not been fragmented, but that such fragment 
served. to neUtralise the effects of radical managerial action. 
The final point is very subjective and is concerned with the 
composition and style of each company's top management. in Company A 
the top management always appeared tremadously remote in their- 
'management corridor' and quite removed from the reality of O. mployees' 
everyday working 'lives. By contrast, Company 6 appears to make an 
effort to make their senior management seem accessible. Company A 
ii, ianagement does appear to have been making an effort to become more 
accessible in the last few years, though; interviewees, in response 
to a specific question, commented that the style in the company had 
become niore informal and that management had become- less rerilote. 
Apart frort, deliberate policy, I can only assume that this results 
froin the accession of younger men to senior management posts. 
17 the Board of Directors of each I also feel that ilhe compoO. tion ri-i 
company i-,,. ay have had an impact. The Board of Company A is enti. rely 
non-ex-ecutive, although the last retired Chief General 14anager is 
traditionally the Chairman. 
- 
The Board of Co: iipany B, on the other 
hand, comprises various non-executive directors, but the six most 
senior members of management are also e>,. ecu-*Live directors. I feel 
that the daily involvement Of these directors in the business of 
the company, and their contact with their staff, enabled them to 
e gain a better assessment of the climate of opinion in th company or 
the iSS(-IeS SM-rounding the recognition of ASTMS. Had Company A had 
soi'iie executive dit-ectors, there fillight not have been such acute 
misjudgements of employee morale and attitudes as occurred on 
x ti es. several occasions In the 
late 
'si/. 
(All the historical issues referied to in both Company A and Company 
B are discussed more fully later, either in the main text of the 
thesis or in appendices. ) 
THE UNION: ASTM 
The union recognised by both companies in this study is ASTMS 
.! c (Association of Scientific, Techn, a] and Managerial Staffs). It 
was forimed in 1968 after a merger bett,., een the Association of 
Scientific I-A'orkers (A. Sc. W. ) and the Association of Supervisory 
C 17T " arg t Staffs, Executives and Technician-s' (A1). )t_1/. -AST14S is now thE! l"I CS 
and fastest growing white-collar union in the private sector with a 
currerd', (1979) miembership of 471,0-. -DO, I and has been (, 'escribed as a 
"militant and extre! riely effective union of highly qualified persons" 
(Robertson and Sams, 1972, P. 11). Tt is T. U. C. and Labour Party 
*- the union has been affiliated. A great deal of the publicity about 
Source: T. U. C. Yearbook of Industry and Services, 1979/80. 
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achi. eved through i, ts Generall Secretatry,, Cli-ve Jenki, ns, (previously 
with ASSET) who can be quaranteed to attract the attention of the 
media when a union issue needs public airing. 
-he types In the traditional classification of trade unions between IL 
of general, craft and industry, ASTMS must be considered a general 
union with its very diSpikil-ate membership dravin from indusilries such 
as engineering, ship-building and shipping, chemicals and, of course, 
insurance. It is concentrated in the private sector, but does have 
some membership in the public sector, for example, the Health Service 
and the British Steel Corporation. It also cal-ers for all statuses 
of %,,, hite-collar employees fro. m clerks and technicians, through 
foremen and supervisors, to all 11evels of managers and hi ghly- 
qualified professionals. The appeal of ASTV11" has been that of a 
strong union vii-th a record of bargaining successes but. which als-, 
most importantly, respects and defends tradiltional differential sta-- 
tus and rewards. 
ASTMiS clearly caters, for a very wide range of interests among its 
membership, and has been careful to avoid allegations of inability 
to represent effectively any one group because of the heterogeneilly 
of its membership. It has achieved this primarily through a 
--h democratic decisioh-making decentralised structure which perrnits boit. 
and a fair degree of autononly to its constituent sections. he 
importance of Lhis is illustrated by the transfer oF mer.., Ojership 
between the Company A staff associations and the unionj v, Jhich was 
achieved only after AST14S conceded a grt, -at dleal of self-governmant 
to the 'Company A Section' The staff association officials, whilst 
recognising their members' need for the strong representaLioll which 
ASTMS could supply, were afraid of becoming insignificant in the 
welter of interests in the union. 
Company A therefore has its o,,, %tn section of ASTMS, with a system, c), F 
branches- (geographical 1, y based) within this, alict p1icy-makillig is 
Conference. The undertaken at the Company A Annual Delegate ý, 
National Committee puts this policy into practice, meeting 
regularly to run the affairs of the union within tha company. 
Negotiations with management are conducted in the joint CoDmAtee, 
the chairman of-which is always a member of management. Company A 
Section also has a full-time chairman (an employee of the company), 
an arrangement that was agreed by management on the recognition of 
ASTHS. Company B Section also, has a similar autonomous structure, 
but management has steadfastly refused -to perinit a full-time union 
appointment (membership in this company is still much lower than in 
Company A). 
Tile national structure of the union (as opposed to the cc; iipany 
structure) is superimposed on this, and deals with those issues o-P 
policy and administration which apply to all ASTMS membe, rs. Th e 
union's National Officer for Finance, Russell Hiller, emphasised- 
during an interview the importance- and the difficultly 
- 
of 
convincing members that the union's nation-al structurt, could noi; 
dictate to the company structure. ' Further i-ecognition of sectional 
interests in ASTMS is found in thre 
-industry-based 
committees and 
conferences. There is 
-an annual Insurance Conference which is 
attended by ASTMS members from all the companics in the industry, 
and this debates issues pertaining to the entire indlust. ry, rather 
than individual compcinies. Similarly, there are the National 
Insurance Advisory Cound *1 and the Divisional Insu mance Advisory 
Wh4 Commi ttees I ch col I ect i nf ormati on on sal ari es and C: 0-IC1 Li ons 
within the industry and mobilise union recruitmpnt on, respectively, 
national and local levels. 
The democratic nature of the siructure permits the union's 
predominantly conservative membership to balance the left-win, 
tendencies of the leadership. For example, winen the Labour Party 
NEC proposed the nationalisation of the insurence and banking 
industries in 1976, it is unlikely that this Would have been 
personally opposed by the union's leadership, Hot-., ever.. thp ASTMIS 
delegates were instructed by their National ExecuLive Coiri: i1ittee (on 
(, he advice of the Naticnal Insurance Advisory Committee) to vote -1for 
!1A 
transcript of the interview is included as Appendix B. 
.. ýýg 
- 
the recons. i. derati. on of the proposal at the Labour Party Conference 
or, if thi. s was not possi. b-le. to abstain in any vote for the adoption 
of the policy, which is what they actually did. 
This qUCStion of politics is perhaps one of tile most difficult 
problems for any TUC union trying to recruit white-collar cri-iployees. 
Russell Miller acknowledged a resistance oil the part of prospective 
members beCaLlse of the union's affiliatioil to the Labour Party, which 
was only slightly alleviated by the fact -ILhat-mennibers cannoLt be 
forced to pay the political levy. He indicated that the illSOrance 
industry members were the group with the lowest percentage actually 
paying the levy 
- 
about 50% of the total membership does so. To 
further counteract. this obstacle, when the merger between the union 
and the staff association in Company A was negotiated, the usual 
procedure regat-ding the political Aevy was reversed: members had to 
contract in if they wished to pay rather than contr. act. out if they. 
did not. 
Carter comments on ASTMS' oveNy political style of leadership and 
activity and comments that the union "sees progress through political 
connections and lobbying as an alternative to mobilizing its 
membership and engaging in industrial action" (1979, P. 306). Fhe 
union leadership is, well aware that it would not be able to muster 
general support for industrial action over wider social, political 
and economic Usues and it must therefore rely on its party political 
involvement at a national level to promote its interests in this 
sphere. 
For the same reason 
- 
fear of alienating potential and actual 
members 
- 
ASTMS prefers to achieve recognition through legal and 
quasi-legal methods if possible, rather than using obvious pressure 
tactics against reluctant managements. Thus in Company B, it used 
the provisions of the Employment Protection Act, 1975, as the 
primary method of gaining recognition. It also supporK ballots as a 
means of demonstrating its membership and support. it is interesting 
to note that the only industrial action (limited to one office) in 
Company B during the struggle for recognition consisted of short 
walk-outs (, usually with flex-keys out, i,. e. in tLhC c1liployces' own 
ti. me), the main Purpose of which %,,, as to generate publicity and 
embarrass management, rather than to disrupt the company's business. 
The local union group constantly ballo-Ced the membership before 
decisions were taken on the continuation of such action. 
Company A offers similar illustrations: in October 1978 there was a 
dispute over a pay claim and a t%, ork-to--ru*Ie ensul-d. Two ballots of 
members were conducted "to determine the support- for the action avid 
its subsequent escalation. Despite the obvious intenti. on to pujL-. 
pressure on management to concede the pay claim, the union granLed 
dispensations to those memýers who could really have damaged tho 
company's business 
- 
the computer operators and the switchboard 
operators in the investment department. ASTIMS can be seen, therefore, 
to recognilse the fine. line that it must tread between the need for 
rnýinhers from their effective action to win concessions for 
, 
managements, and the need to respect the traditional allegiance of 
such employees for those in authority over themselves. 
UNION-ISM IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Unionism in the insurance industry began at 1. 
-rid of World Ular I -he - 
with the formation of tile Guild of Insurance Officers Duri ng 
the next two decades, membership at first climbed 
, 
StC-dily but then 
declined sharply, following the general, pattern among all unions in 
the 'twenties. Management did not relish having unionised work- 
forces, and one of the tactics employed by companies to combat - the 
GIO %,,, as the formalýl -ion of internal staff associations 
- 
'sweetheart 
unions'. They viere not unsuccessful in that role and, then as now, 
sometimes the initiative for tile formation of these associations 
came frora -the employees themselves rather from management. Doubtless 
the "corporate firm spirit" reported by Klingender (1935) 
- "a 
product, he suggests of company sports clubs and theatrical 
societies 
- 
militated against the intrusion of tile union into 
company life. 
- 
Meintiershi, p of the GIO reached a peak, of ?-1;,, 900 in the late , thi, rtles 
decli-ried sharply duri. ng World I-Iar LL and- theni began to i, ncrease again 
in the late 'forties, although i. t never reachieved its earlier peak. 
It affiliated to the TUC in 1937. During the next tv., o decades the 
numbers employed in the insurance industry- increased rapidly, but 
this was riot reflected in G10 membership -ahich. general iy 
static, with another decline in the late 'sixties. 
It was during 1970 that unionism in the insuYance industry underwent 
a radical development with the recognition of ASTMS by Canpany A. 
This followed the merger between the union and the Company's staff 
association (see C-k1z1pte: T-Q The GIO had recently been renamod the 
Union of Insurance Staffs, and began merger talks with ASTMS during 
1970, which reached fruition by September that year. ASTMY firm 
hold on the industry was confirmed by the achievement of limited 
representation in another major company and the marger with another 
staff association leading to recognition (also in a major company) 
later in 1970. 
Since then, ASITIS' recruiting success in the industy-y has been 
considerable although not without its setbacks, 01 LI-le ter. lara- 
-: st 
companies (in terms of numbers of employees), ASTMS is recognised 
for collective bargaining in seven, but shares recognition with 
23 APEX in one of these. BIFU has achieved recognitlon (after a 
merger %-Ath the staff association) in another one of the ten "largest 
companies, and ASTMS has bargaining righLs it, i-espect of coiaputer 
operators only in this company. Amongst the smaller insurance, 
Source: Trade Unionism and the Insurance Cle--V, P. Crompton 
Sociology, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
-September 1979 
2 Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs 
3 Banking, Insurance and Finan%-e Union 
- 
co-r-tipanies, RIFU is recogni5ed in two and ASTMa in at le ast 33. The 
remaining large companies Qwoj conduct collective bargaining with 
Aheir own internal staff associations. There is some evidence that 
BIFU's less militant image and less overtly political approach with 
consequent avoidance of affiliation to the'Labour Party has won it 
some favour over ASTMS' proven negotiating successes, but ASTMS has 
clearly been far more successful overall. 
Trade unions, and ASTIAIS, in particular, are therefore a noticeable 
presence -in the insurance industry. The evidence available 
kadi-nittedly hearsay and circumstantial on the whole) indiCates 
Lhat managements and unions manage to achieve a relatively Stable 
relationship ir. most instances after the sometimes traumatic 
recognition period is over. The companies in this thesis penmit 
a useful contrast: Company B haý recently recognised ASTIIS after 
a protracted struggle whereas Com-pany A was the first insurance 
company to recognise AST14S and has a decade of experience of un-! on 
involvement in organisational decision-making. 
3 See 'The Colour of White-Collars' by Valerie Pegg 
irt The Post Magazine and Insurance Monitor, 29 November, 1979 
P. 11-451 
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C "Il. APTER 2 
cl, BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATIONS 
Introduction 
The organisational characteristics of the companies in this research 
are important because of the extent to which-they aff, ect I-Aln- fulfil- 
ment of employees' %-,, ork expe. -tations. One of the critical factors in 
the survey in Company A is job design, as experienced by resr-pondents, 
and the structure of the organisation also directly affccts promotion 
prospects, and impacts on questions of decision-making and control. 
The mode of organisation employed. in both coNpanies is bureaucratic: 
indeed, the word 'bureaucracy' has become synonymous with 
'organisation' when talking about large modern companies, both in 
everyday speech and to some extent in academic literature. In oider 
to place the survey results and the case study in this thesis in 
appropriate settings, and to assess what affect that setting had on 
the formation of the attitudes reported, it is therefore necessary 
first to discuss bureaucracy. It is-a subject with a compiex history 
and a vast literature, and only the aspects which are relevant to 
this thesis have been selected for discussion. 
Neither of the tWO StUdies involved any objective measure,,: Vent bly 
the researcher of the bureaucratic features of the companies, 
although many illustrative examples of the relevant features are 
give, - from observations. As already noted, the critical assessment 
is the subjective one given by the respondenlLs in the surve.,,, as 
this is what shapes their attitudes and beha-vioural respooses to 
their environment. But, in turn, their perceptions will. have bc-en 
influenced by the precise Jorm of their environment. 
- Li. 3 - 
Characteristics of Bureaucratti. c Orprii, sations 
Discussion of bureaucracy has developed largely from Weber's analysis 
of the rational/legal type of social administration. The conceptual 
underpinning of his model of bureaucracy was th; theory that 
legitimacy was basic to authority systems (of which he identified 
three 
- 
charismatic, traditional and rational/legal). Legitimacy 
finds its purest expression in the rational/legal authority type, in 
a system of offices which constitute bureaucracy. 
Weber described bureaUcracy follows" 
"Modern officialdom functions in the following specific manner: 
There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional 
areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by 
laws or administrative regulations. 
The regular activities required for the purpose of the 
bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a 
II ties. -fixed way as official dut 
The authority to give the ccmmands required for the dis- 
charge of these duties is di, Jtributed in a stable way and 
is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive 
means, physical, sacredotal, or otherwise, which may be 
placed at the disposal of officials. 
Methodical provision is made for the regular and con- 
-hese duties and fo- the execution tinuous fulfilmont of 4.1 
of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the 
generally regulated qualifications to serve are employed. 
In public and lawful government these three elements constitute 
'bureaucratic authority'. in private economic domination, they 
constitute 'bureaucratic management'. " 
. 
(from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft part III ch. 6 
in 'From Max-Weber' eds. Gerth and Mills, 1948). 
.4 
.- 
1j'At. 
- 
I'le- added other characteristics of h. reaucracy: 
- 
the o-iffice, -is managed by a system of technical r-ules, 
V, (iowledge of vihich is required of all officials', 
- 
officials are appointed on "purely functional points of 
consideration" i. e. their technical competence and 
qualifications, 
-he principle of the organisation, of offices follows. 
hierarchy, so that lower offices are Linder the control of 
t 
. 
ha highet ones, 
the hierarchy offers a career as officials move from luvier 
sections to thigher ones. 
I-Ileber was convinced that this method of organisation would predmmi- 
nate because of its "purely technical superiority over any othler for. ]-. 
of organisation". "Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of -L I le 
C4- - KA 1011 f-iles, continuity, discretion, unilty, stri L. subordination, md I 
Of fil-iCtion and material and personal costs 
- 
these a*r,,,. raise-el, to the 
OPtinlull, POint in the strictly bureaucratic administration" (ibid. 
P. 214). Thus he identified the advantages of bureaucracy and its 
inevitable selection as the predominant forin of 'organisation in tile 
increasingly complex modern world. Despite his belief in its 
inevitability and a certain pride in tile efficiency he predicted, 
Weber had profound misgivings about the effects on the individual 
caught up in the bureaucracy. He'identified "bureaucracy 
,, 
iit 
rationality, and the process of rationalisation with mechanism, 
depersonalisation and oppressive routine" (ibid. P. 50). Many 
employees subject to bureaLlcracy have echoed those sentiments. 
More recently, it has been suggested (e. g. Udy, 
- 
1959), and is now 
generally accepted, that Weber's "ideal typical" formulation cannot 
be used satisfactorily for empirical J)Urposes. Perhaps one of the 
I; forward typologies that has emerged from the attempts nicist straight 
to devise measures of bureaucracy is that developed by Fall 
He condenses Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy and their 
4 implications most popularly used by contemporary authors into 
-1,. S- 
-, i. x dimens. i. ona: 
- 
division of labour (functional specialisation) 
- 
hierarchy of authority 
- 
rules governing rights and duties 
- 
technical procedures for work 
- 
impersonality (disregard of individual qualities) 
- 
promotion based on technical competence. 
fie found that the size and age of the organisation was not related to 
the overall degree of bureaucracy, but he did find that business 
activity may be related to bureaucratisation. Those organisFtions 
, dhich havo a large volume of customers (of which the major 
insurance companies in this study are prime examples) were more 
Ilikely to develop the characteriýstics of impersonality. Some of his 
findings have been contradicted, e. g., Samuel and Mannheim (1970) who 
found that the size o, the organisation was neciatively related to 
the degree of structural control reflected in the hierarchy of -- 
authority, but positively related to formal rulas and procedure,.. 
They also found that the age of the organisation was positively 
related to the degree of impersonality. 
Hall's work on bureaucracy is perhaps most significant for his inter- 
departmental comparisons, resulting in the concept of the , 
'bureaucratic continuum'. Organisations are not necessarily 
monolithic; they may va" in structure and certain 'social skills' 
sub-units (e. g. sales, advertising, research) are particularly likely 
to be less bureaucratic on the dimensions of hierarchy, division of 
labour, and work procedures (Hall, 1963). He concluded that, 
overall, an organisation should be viewed as a set of bureaucratic 
dimensions, each in the form of a continuum, rather than as 
perfectly correlated factors all either present or absent. He found 
that the bureaucratic dimensions were not highly inter-related and 
that, for example, an organisation may have a high 'score' on 
hierarchy of authority but a low one on impersonality. 
I 
Perhaps. the cruc-i. al di. sti. nctionEý beti,: een organi. s, ati-onal smb--Unfts. 
for this thesis are those which affect the design of jobs, speci. fi. c- 
ally the degree Of ftriCtional speci. alisation and the proliferation 
TI 
of technical p, ocedures for work I) the 'lire' departmants of both 
Companies A and B (i. e. those departments dealing with the Mainstream 
insurance business), there is a considerable degree of functional 
spe-cialisation. Jobs have been split into smaller and smaller units, 
with each job-holder in the lowast grades responsible for only a few 
tasks. Frequently, those at a higher level 'are responsible for 
checking a similarly few tasks, and with very narrow limits to the 
amount of decision-making included in their supervisory responsi- 
bilities. On the other hand, those departments 
- 
such as the 
prolfessional departments 
- 
where detailed knowledge is required aliu- 
complex decisions have to be made involving individual judgement, 
remain comparatively free of fundtional specialisation. Even in 
L these departments, though, it is present to some extent and results 
in some degree ol routinisation of the work of the more junior 
grades. 
Allied with this, the extent to which technical procedures are 
applied to jobs varies considerably between departments. Tha line 
departments, with fragmented and routinised work, usually have very 
detailed procedural 
-manuals concerning the performance of work. 
This is usually closely connected with the manner in %%-hich t e 
documentation has to be presented for use by the computer. Again in 
contrast to -this, tl-., e professional and non-line departments -tend to 
have rules as guidelines rather than strict procedural instructions. 
Many of the technical procedures are part of the 'body of knowledge' 
with uhich the professional is occupied 
- 
e. g. tax regulations-, 
actuarial equations. 
Thus, whilst each company 
the e. ltenl- of itl k-c bureauc 
the different departments 
bureaucratised on several 
classified as follows: 
I 
is bureaucratic when viewed as a whole, 
ratisation varies considerably within 
In detail, both companies are highly 
important dimensions, which can be 
j 
i) Career Structure 
The differentiated authority structure of a bureaucracy results 
in the grading of jobs to form the ba,: >is of the career Structure. 
It was t,! ebers contention that the possibil ity of proi-ii0tion -is 
one of the main sources of organisational loyalty, although there 
has been a tendency for modern theorists to underestimate the 
importance of a bureaucratic career structure. Employees are 
induced by the proSpeCtS of increased StaiUS, autho-i-ity and 
I-ejqards to consider long-term association with the orgamsation 
and Lo idenl. iffy closelly milth its goals as they progress through 
the hierarchy. 
Each promotion is viewed as a reward for the employee's 
investment in the company, and'the increase of status is often 
nor(., valued than the larger salary. This was made clear by 
interviewees in Company A arpong the data pi 
- 
el i -ocessing personn 
-iho 
believed that there was very little scope for-promotion within 
their area of the cOm pL any. Th. -y exprossed the opinion tha. 4L - -1 
promotion was a vitally important indication that the employee's 
efforts had b2on noticed and recognised, and that it did not 
matter if the financial increase was marginal. 
T the hierarcy is also, of course, the basis of the authori 
structure with clear lines of accountabili V between superior 
and subordinate. Each job-holder has a specific sphere of 
responsibility and has authori ty sufficient to perform his duties 
and control direct subordinates. It follows that the longer the 
hierarchy, the narrower will be the authori ty differentials 
between each rank and the spheres of responsibility will be 
commensurately more confined. 
Both Companies A and B have very long hierarchies, although 
restructuring in Compaoy A has somewhat reduced VA. Both 
companies also encourage their employees to think in tents of a 
'career', i. e. of commitmont to the company for their future 
A 
and, the posAbility of an almost unibolted progress through 
the hierarchy. This in particularly emphaAsed in tha recruit- 
ment literature. Ib practice, of course, possiklities for 
promotion are not all that readily available, especially in 
recent years when posts have been elibinated in cost-cutting and 
rationalisation exercises. 
For example, posts have been eliminated or combined w-ith another, 
especially when the post-holder (usually in middle management', 
reti res. The succession of promotions which %-,, ould normally 
follow a retirement therefore do not take place. Neither are all 
employees equally able to avail themselves of the advaniages of 
the career structure: for example, in Company A the professionals r 
have far higher chances of reaching the top of their grades than 
the non-professionals have of reaching the top of the executive 
grades. In Corinpany B, changes in the operations of the pensions 
business adversely affected the promotion prospects of ennployees 
engaged on that work to the extent that voluntary redundancy was 
introduced. 
Both companies recruit mainly from school-leavers although each 
has a yearly intake of graduates. Only very few posts are filled 
by external applicants at more senior levels, and these are 
usually specialist jobs. Company A seems to have been changing 
this policy in the last year or two by recruiting a gre6ter 
number of people at more senior levels. Whilst people who 
mentioned this in the interviews thought that it could well be of 
benefit to the organisation, they were concerned that promotions 
were b1ccked as a result. The promotions that do take place are 
dependent upon, firstly, the availability of a vacant post or the 
upgrading of a job as a result of job evaluation, and secondly, 
the individual's annual appraisal. Whilst both of these lead A 
theory to the rational promotion of the most able to the posts 
in which they are required, experience of promotion among members 
of both companies indicates that the bases of promotion decisions 
are actually very subjective and often shrouded in mystery. 
ii) Division of Labour 
Work i. s fragmented i. nto clusters of tasks and employees tend to 
acquire specialist knoviledge of a small sphere of the viork rather 
than across a broad spectrum of the business. It WOUld clearly 
be impossible lor one employee to have a detailed kno, illedge of 
the work ol more than a comparatively small part of a large 
complex organisation, and therefore -Lhe work must be broken down 
into more manageable pori-Itions, both for its performance and in 
order to maintain control. The effect of this is to promote 
efficiency by thorough practice ol each individual in the viork 
involved and is, to a certain extent, necessitated by the 
requirement of boundariled areas of responsibility and clear lines 
of accountability. 
Specialisation can take two forms: 
- 
the delineation of a complete body of knowledge (e. a. law) 
- 
the fragmentation of a series of routines and processes into 
narrowly defined groups of tasks. 
The latter, fragmentation, conforms more readily with the other 
demands of bureaucracy. The more simplified and isolated the 
tasks to be performed, the more easily their performance can be 
subjected to spe6ific rules. The 'body of knowledge'-type of 
specialisation is less likely to be further bureaucratised in 
this manner. It tends to be concerned with principles and to 
rely heavily on judgement, rather than rationally calculated 
outcomes. It also tends to be the province of groups who are 
powerful within the organisation, because their knowledge is both 
important to the orgdnisation and available from only a few, 
practitioners. The professionals are a clear example of this. 
In both Companies A and B much of the work that is concerned 
with the mass processes (particularly the issue of life assurance 
policies) has been much more subject to the division of labour 
in the. fonp of fragmentation. Departments of this type are 
heavily weighted towards the junior grades as the work requires 
little skill, Company B. does not employ the large numbers of 
professionals that are found in Company A (although there are 
- 
'r, C) 
- 
sonn, especially actuaries) but in the areas of both companies 
where a broad range of knowledge K required, the work is 
considerably less closely regulatad. 
iii) "Tethilical Rbleý*ahd Proted(Wes 
These rules are normally written and are incorporated in docu- 
ments zind manuals which cover most aspects of the day-to-day 
work. This maintains uniformity of performance by ensuring that 
similar cases are dealt with by the same standards even though 
by different emplo., 
, 
rules and procedures are a yees. As SUch 
very effective means of controlling the behaviour cj,: omanisation 
- manuals and members. It seems to be 'Che ustial practice that 
procedure books fall into disuse once practitioners are conver- 
san-t'. wi-, -. h the work (Terry, 1977). They are usually consulted 
when something goes wrong, both to provide the employee V. "ith a 
defence and also obviously to find a solution to the proble;,, i. 
In Company A, comprehensive manuals were provided after tile 
work of the industrial life assurance departments bad been t-Ile 
subject of a work study programme, but emplQyees rapidly 
developed their own individual methods of doing the 
However, there-are limits to the extent to which employees have 
the power to circumvent the prescribed procedures, especially Q 
computer processes are involved. Machines, including cunputers, 
are very effective methods of controlling behaviour, as they can 
only be made effective by compliance with the rules under which 
they operate. e 
iv) Rules governing Rights and Duties, I 
These are applied on a universal, non-particularistic basis. 
Conditions of employment, standards of behaviour and so on are 
applied uniformly throughout the organisation and not varied 
at the discretion of superiors. However, such rules are a 
reflection of the power distribution within the organisation, 
and 
-may 
End the 'recei. vers. ' ra the)- 
-more 
than the 
. 
'qiýyers, ' I. n 
Company B-, for example., one rule decreed that all e-ioployees 
eligible for a company car could only select a Rritish-make. 
However, the General Manager responsible for the administration 
of the fleet of compaw,, cars and the operation of the rule was 
known to have chosen a Si%, edish car for himself. ' 14hen I expressed 
surprise to various Company B employees on learning this fact, 
their rosponse was not one of resentMent but simply an acceptance 
of what was seen as the ineviltable privilege of high 
organisational status. 
It is also true that the duties of employees tend to be specified 
more comprehensively than their rights. Employees' -work is bound 
by rules, and other aspeCt-') of their employment such as general 
discipline are also made known clearly to them. In return, 
their salaries, holidays and various other rights such as pensions 
and sick leave are specified. But there are very important 
areas 
- 
Such as career prospects and wort, content 
- 
which aFe 
unspecified and which remain completely within the discretion of 
the employer. Whilst these areas are affected by bureaucrati- 
-atic a, d sation in one sense, as a result of increased flragmOnt ý MI -1 
rules, they are not bureaucratised -in the sense of being 
determined by rýles regulating the behaviour of both parties 
- 
employer and employee. 
One of the questions that this thesis is conmrned with 'is the 
extent to which management's use of bureaucratic control over 
work content has affected career prospects. A corollary of this 
is the extent to which the employees' reactions to the 
bureaucratisation of work content has (or may in the future) 
lead them to press for the bureaucratisation of the career 
structure in the form of union involvement in regulating pro- 
motion procedures and prospects. The survey results suggest 
that the will is there, but it is a very long way from that to 
deliberate action. 
- 
There are jTiany exceptions. tO the bureaucrati. c i, deal of 
universali. ty, although. il, i. s. 
-most unusual to Ti. nd an e! iiployee on 
an individually-negoti'ated contract in the large insurance 
companies. Employees- are appointed -co a specific hierarchial 
status and position on the corresponding salary scale; this 
position then determines various aspects of the contract of 
employment which may vary between the hierarchical levels. For 
example, for many years more senior rr.,, ý . iibers of staff in Coirlipany A 
had had time concessions regarding their. arrival and departure 
hours. These were carried over into the flex-time system so that 
different grades now, have different, 'standard hours'. S-Iffli I arlY, 
fringe benefits vary to some extent (e. g. company cars in Company 
B) according to grade. In Company A, professional employees have 
a 'mark up' on their salary scales to allow for their higher 
market value. 
It should be noted that one of the fears often voiced by white- 
collar/professional employees about trade unions concerns their 
tendency towards undifferentiated treatment of their members. 
This point was raised several times during the interviews in 
Ccmpany A by people who stated their relief that ASTMS in the 
Company had not behaved in this tradition but had striven to 
maintain differentials between the grades. One interviewee (a 
professional, surprisingly) criticised the union for being far 
too elitist, and had refused to join for that reason. 
Impersonality 
The idea of bureaucratic impersonality 
--stemi-iling from Weber 
maintained that relationships bett%reen employee-s were governed 
by their posi-Lions as office-holders rather than as individual 
persons. Similarly, relationships w-ith clients and others 
outside the organisation were affectively Peutral, and decisions 
made on rational criteria only. Emotions and personal feelings Z) 
should not intcrfere -, with the perlormance oi duties Oc-ii-tg the 
A 
- 
i2 
- 
technical lines laid down. People, of course, do not Lecome 
automata that easily, and Anyone who has worked in an office will 
know that personal relationships, of all varieties, flourish. 
In Company A, employees seem to be able to cope with the 
impersonality of a large bureaucratic organisation by focussing 
their Ottention on their immediate set of relationships. Duri rig 
the interviews, J askQd how they felt about working in a large 
office with 2,000 staff, whether they -felt this affected their 
relationships tviith their colleagues, and whether it made the 
company seem impersonal and themselves insignifiCarit. The cor. - 
sistent response showed that departments were seen as self- 
contained units, and that employees formed friendships and 
satisfactory working relatiogships with colleagues in their own 
departments and. with a lew people who -16hey frequently had to deal 
with in other departments. They ware able to avoid any demoti- 
vating effects of organisation-wide impersonality by identifying 
With their oý-,, n SUb-unit. This may not be without -'[! -. S 
dysfunctional effects because 1 remember during my involvement 
with training programnes in that company that there was a 
.C Irequent plea for training to emphasise the inter-dependence of 
departments. It seemed that many staff were unaware of how 
their work impacted on other departments and that this often 
caused technical problems. 
The impersonali ty of dealings with clients is probably more 
evident, although employers attempt to discourage the expression 
of this when personal contact between an employee and a client 
is involved. It is not good for business for a client to feel 
like merely one of millions, when he will undoubtedly believe 
himself to be a special case. 
The principle of universality demands that office-holders are 
appointed and subsequently treated on rational and functional 
criteria. Thus, nepotism offends the bureaucratic idealas does 
any other form of purely personal preference in respect of 
- 
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promotion or appoi. titment. Gouldner (1952) discusses t1ii. s. point 
and suggests, that where eimployi-nent matters. are concerned, 
employe. ý-s still know, very little about the b-ases on ý,,, hIch such 
rational decisions are-wade. There may well be rules but those 
subject to them do not know what they are 
- 
possibly, Gouldner 
suggests, because the insecurity and anxiety resulting from 'the 
inability to predict are considered to be motivating factors. 
That is, if the employee does not know the level of competence 
required for promotion, then lie %-: ill strive to achie-ve as high a 
level as possible rather than simply the minimum acceptable 
level. Organisations have been much bureaucratised un such 
matters as dismissal procedures by the emploý, inent legislation of 
recent years, but the crucial matter of promotion is one solely 
for the Company's management (with some constraints imposed by 
sex discrimination ! aws). 
Promotion procedures in the two companies under study do deviate 
from the bureaucratic standard of universalilty, which vioulCi 
probably be exemplified by a boarding system allowing employees 
to put themselves forward for promotion (as happens to, a limited 
extent in the Civil Service). Neither Company A-nor Cotmpany B 
operate a boarding system as such; promotion is primarily based 
on an appraisal-system through which employees are assessed on 
various criteria by an immediate superior,, with the report 
ratified at a higher level. Employees can record disagreement 
with an appraisal, b4 cannot enforce its amend-ment. Promoti on 
is therefore very much a result of a superior's personal 
judgement; the availability of a post at the higher level -is, of 
course, a crucial issue. The only exception in Company A are 
certain, almost automatic promotions (at fairly low levels) on 
the attain! i,, ent of some profess, onal qualifications. There is, 
however, in both companies one element of a bureaucratic 
promotion procedure in that certain vacancies, within the lower 
and middle grades, are advertised throughout the company and 
all suitably qualified employees can apply For these posts. 
Appointment does not necessarily include a promotion; a 
'sideways' step is often involved in these transfers. In Company 
A, this system was introduced some years ago on the request of 
ASTMS, but it was in practice in Company B before the recognition 
of the union. 
Bureaucratic Rules 
A have now examined the main features of bureaucracy and shown the 
ways in which they are manifested in the two companies in this study. 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect for our purposes is the constant 
regulation of behaviour by technical rules and procedures. This has 
had a great impact on the traditional work expectations of white- 
collar and professional employees. 
The primary purpose of bureaucratic rules is to set-. out 
-a serie-s of 
defined procedures by which the work is conducted In order to main- 
tain control over employees' activities, As noted, by fragmenting 
and routinising work, it is made more amenable to the application 
of rules. Work which is concerned with a mass or a constant 
repetition of a tew. simple tasks is thus more readily bureau. -ratised 
than work which -is non-routine, complex and varied. This latter type 
of work normally calls for certain levels ol k=-., Iedqe and the 
qualities of initiative, intelligpnce and analytical ability and the 
employees possessing them are traditionall, l accorded a greater ly 
degree of autonomy and higher, organisational status. The refore, those 
with the least bureaucratised jobs are the most likelly to achieve the 
chief reward ot bureauciatic organisations 
-a series ol promotions 
throughout a career. The work of employees V. -ho supervise others is 
inevitably more varied and non-rout. Hne; the longer the chain of 
command over which an employee is the head, the more this will be the 
case. Invariabll, y, therefore, work is more closely regulated and 
procedural rules riiore abundant amorig, employees at the 'DOILL-LOM of -the 
organisai-Jonal hierarchy. 
- 
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Rules may be dysfuncti. onal, however, leading to unantic%ated* 
consequences rather than the expected increase in eas-1.1y-con-Crol led 
effi. ci. ency. One e. xample from my own experience of Company A wi-11 
illustrate this. For a ti. me- during my employment there.. I %--ias 
involved with the recruitment and training of staff for a -oumber of 
life assurance departments., which were mainly line depar-tments dealing 
with very large quantities of new policies, claims and policy 
enquiries. The bulk of the recruits i-,, ere school-leavers, usually at 
'0' level/CSE Stage, and predominantly female. The work of many of 
the departments was routine and of a 'mass production' nature; many 
of the new staff t-ý, ere occupied primarily with processing colliputer 
input and output. 
The turnover of staff in these departments was very high, with a 
severe 'induction crisis' after about five or six months. There were 
many complaints from these staff about the boring, repetitive nature 
of the work. There were also many complaints from the departmental 
managers about the standard of the young staff who were, it was 
alleged, incapable of thinking about a case when this was required. 
T his was invariably attributbd to declining standard; of education. 
There seemed to be little recognition of an alternative cause of the 
problem 
- 
i. e. that if employees are expected to spend 95% of their 
time on routine work for which exact procedures are prescribed, then 
any inclination to use initiative on the occasional non-routine 
cases will be stultified. If reliance on rules is emphasised at all 
times(as is especially the case with computer-oriented work); then 
employees cannot be blamed if they become incapable of acting unless 
there are procedures to guide them. 
Over the years, as computerisation was extended, work became more 
and more dependent on rigid procedural behaviour and the usual 
response of those responsible for the management of work was to 
relieve junior staff of any ccmplexities and to fragment their work 
into simplffied routines as far as possible. Thus the solution to 
the problems caused by high dependence on technical rules and 
A 
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procedures was seen in 'kerms of even greater emphas. i. s. on sjjch 
regulated behaviour. 
That emiployees, parti. cularly those whose work, is highly regulated, 
should appear to be uninterested in their work is. a natural conse- 
quence ol bureaucratisation, in Weber's view. He described the 
bureaucractic official as performing his duties in "... a spirit of 
Eudio' 
, 
without hat formalistic impersonality, 'Sine ira et St Lred or 
passion and hence. without affection or enthusiasm", (cited in Blau and 
Heyer, 1971). All that is required oil the bureaucratic em., ployee is 
the neutrai application of rational rules; those with Iless bureau- 
cratised work which still uses the attributes of personal creativity 
would do well to remember that when they criticise the 'couldn't care 
less' attitude of younger staff. 
This does not ma-ari that viork at the higher levels cannot be regulated. 
Blau (1955) noted that when the supervisors in the sociai work agency 
na he studied v: ere instructed to assess the performance of subordl, 
-tes 
on a wore scientific, statisticai bas-is, they complained that their 
work had become less interesting. It appeared to thom 11hat -they had 
lost a degree of discretion over the perforvance off their supervisory 
duties. This finding was replicated in a Study coneiuct, ý, 
-d by Scott (Blau and Scott, 1963) in a similar environment. lie also found that 
where there was an absence of rules, the experience of more senior 
members of the staff increased their informal status because it was 
highly valued by colleagues who needed their guidance. When formal, 
rules were introduced, the basis of' informal status was altered and 
more account was taken Of SUCII factors as purely personal 
pepularity. 
It should not be considered that, because rules exist, they are 
followed blindiy. Rules may offer valued security in such circum- 
stances as inexperience or lack of knowledge or in dealings with a 
difficult client. In practice, though, rules are seen as guidelines 
kalthough of-I'Len very rigid ones) rather than specifying tile minutiae 
of procedure- aithough the demands of a computerised system are such 
- U 
that eyen the deta-l-la are specified. 
. 
Zimmerman, in Yet'- another 
s. tudy of an American Welfare. Agency, found that eriployees. 
prepared to break the rules qui te often jqhen to do so was c1carly a 
Toore effective way oil achieving their objectives. He suggests that 
"the notion of action-in-acco)-darice-i%, ith-a-rule is a matter not of 
compliance or non-compiiance per se but of the various ways in %,., hich 
persons satisfy themselves and othersconcerning what is or is not 
'reasonablo' compliance in particular circumstances" (1973, P. 261). 
It may be that pressures from these external to the organisation 
, 
welfare clients, in the exar. 
-ý, ple quoted above) may make emptjoyees 
more receptive to the idea of breaking the rules. Whilst to do this 
did achie, 
,e the desired objectivP - dealing with the clients as 
quickly as possible 
- 
-21, t also involved the employees in additional 
i-: ork. 14here this direct client. contact is missing, it may be that 
t %. he organisational emphasis on procedure will P, -ean that the ruies 
are eventually internalised and the 'means' then becomes more 
important than the 'end'. It the 'end', i. e. a satisfied customer, 
is not visibie to the employee (as for instance in the case of most 
of the emploývees of Companies A and S), attention is inevitably 
focussed simiply on the task in hand. 
The use of rules, or their avoidance, in order to gain power over 
others has been noted by several authors. The absence of rules gives 
rise to areas of uncertainty which can be exploited by groups able 
to monopolise the sources of information. Crozier (1964) noted 
how mechanics were able to manipulate their knowledge of machinery 
in order to preserve their own discretion over their work and to 
increase the dependence of others on them. This was facilitated 
by the fact that the mechanics were coping with uncertainty; that is, 
machinery breakdowns were unpredictable. Because their role was to 
this extent unprograirmiable, the mechanics had a lar-ge element of 
discretion over their jobs 
- 
and powers over others who relied on 
their skills 
- 
which they strove to maximise. 
I.., f 
Other authors have note-4 that power accrues to thosýe who inake rules 
for appli-cati. on to others., and -that grosups wtithin an organisation 
fight to preserve their di. scretion and limit their dependence oil 
others. Thompson (1967) states that the very existence of the 
division of labour creates an fi-iterdependency among groups and that 
any imbalance in a reciprocal relationship gives rise to power 
relations. Hickson et al (1971) discuss this and Crozier's state- 
ments about power, disputing that it is simply undertainty that gives 
rise to power and maintaining that it is coping with uncertainty that 
gives power: those sub--un-1-ts which can relieve the unQertainty for 
other sub-units perform a vi-*Lal ' shock- absorber' function and 
achieve power. It is, perhaps, not, the simple reduction of uncer- 
tainty which gives poýý,, er because that then restores the status quo 
(i. e. levels out the power imbalance) but rather the ability to 
determine the outcome of uncertainty in one's own favour or against 
another group which allows one group (-through rule-making) to 
dominate others. 
An illustration of this cart be taken from Company A. The company 
embarked on a programme of rationalisation of the work of the 
Industrial Branch where 1 was working at the end of the 1960's. A 
firm of consultants was hired, an Organisatiop and Mellhous depart- 
ment established and, with very little infori-nation given to those 
whose work was affected, a programme of work study %-., as begun. An 
atmosphere of intense suspicion and resentment was quickly generated 
because we knew that our work ý.,! as to be radically altered without 
our involvemeitt or consent, and we suspected that the end-result 
would be most undesirable in terins of' job satisfaction. Much of the 
bitterness was focussed not directly or. -management but a - on the group 
(co. mprising consultants and O&M staff) who ,,. ýere seen as having our 
futures entirely in their hands. The cessation of uncertainty 
(i. e. the completion of the work-study programme) did not give power 
to consultants 
- 
although it could be seen as an expression of their 
power 
- 
but it was their abil ity to control Our aCtAVIties by making 
new rules to govern our work which did so. 
- 
UO 
- 
similar circumstances, althouch nothing 'Jilke as. &xtreme, occ-urre-d 
during various computeri. s. ati, on L-x(-, rci. sez (J, n one of i-ihicli. I waa 
Those who were in di. rectly involved but on the 
. 
otnL,. )- si. do'),. 
possession of esoteric, computer-oriented kno;, fledge 
.- 
and whose 
primary function was to change the work of others in accordance wilth 
that knowledge 
- 
were resented precisely because they directed 
changes and caused dependence. Gradually t. he organisational pro- 
cedures shaping such exercises have been niodified, in order to create 
a more balanced interdepepderice betýý; een the-tivio groups - computer 
-he - tei personnel and client departi,. leniC. During tine coui-se of 'L int -views 
at Company A, I spoke tto severai people who were involved in. a 
computerisation exercise in one particular area of the company. A 
th- technical changes and Special Urli L had been seit tip, -egulat('_ L' 
which comprised representatives seconded orl a full-tim. 
---, 
basis from 
the client departments and also-systems analysts and program. m. lers 
working on thalt project. This, and other planned exchanges of 
information, has complef be'LWeell Lila -ely changed the balance of power, 
two groups to one more equitable a,, -,. d productive in terms cif 
organisational objectives. 
t4 In the situa bon just described, the organisational regulation over 
both groups involved became greater luntil they i-. iere both -fairly 
evenly bound by procedure. I am no. aware of all tha dc-tails of 
this development over several years, and whether policy dacisions 
for such circumstances were made at a high level (which I imiagine to 
- occasions, as a result have been the case) at least on signiffican-IL. 
of pressure rom the departments concerned and the obvious dys- 
I er changes. Thus, it appears functional ill-%%, ill arising f1rom eali, ,c 
that it is necessary to have ru"Ies regulat'ling the rule-mmaking 
to be avoided. The procedure if conflict bet-ween sub-unifs is t 
bureaucratisation of such change processes in Company A was 
undoubtedly furthered by the stablisation of the hierarchical 
authority structure in the management services area (i. e. O&M, data 
processing) which had been much more fluid it! earlier years, 
A 
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Child (1977) attacks bureaucracy as "an inefficient. model of 
oryanisation in the conditiona of unprecedented change, complex 
technology and an Rhos of personal individuality which prevails 
today" (P. 12), and othur writers have concluded that the technolo- 
gical revolution does not reside easily in an organisation alongside 
bureaucra, ic procedures. Galbraith (1974) considers that the 
development of technology is a dynamic process, and both a cause of 
and a response to change, whereas bureaucratic procedures are 
designed for static, uniform processes which vary little over time. 
However, the reliance o, the 1;. 
--Lrge insurance coinpanies in Fecent 
years on computerised worlring methods has coincided happily with the 
need fOý' Uniforri-i processing of many similar cases. 'Mechanisation has 
the same effect as the application of written or any other type of 
I-Liles. Machines are simply the. embodinient of procedures, but are 
more rigid because the scope for breaking the rules is virtually taken 
out of the hands of the employee. This is particularly true in the 
case of computerisation where the employee cannot.. manipulalUe the 
mechanical (or rather, electronic) process itself. Coi-iiputerisat-lon 
has widely affected the routinisall-Jon of work in organisations such 
as Companies A and B, although not all employees are affected to Che 
same extent. If computer personnial SLICh as prograwniers and 
analysts are excluded, employees. can be divided in a computerised 
office into those who receive the information provided by Llhe 
computer and make decisions on that basis, and those whose function 
is to supply the information to the computer system. The latter are 
very heavily restricted by the lifflitations and defined procedures, 
associated with a computer system. And bureaucracy does not appear 
to have inhibited technological development: Company A, in 
particular, has a reputation for extensive technological innovation. 
All this, however, refers to organisation goyls 
- 
for uniform, fast 
processing of many cases 
- 
which contradict many individuals' goals. 
White-collar workers have traditionally expected to be able to use 
their own skills and knowledge, rather than relying always on 
4 
electronically-controlled procedures which are programined to make 
.. 
ý)i 
- 
decisions, and have also eypected a long-ter. 
-M. career which will 
progressively increase their reward and status. The effect of 
bureaucrati. c rules is to reduce the eytent to whi. ch, individual sHlls 
are required and to minimi. 'se the scope for qradations of skill and 
responsibili4ty in the areas affected. 
To sujuglarise Me effects of managerially designed bureaucratic rules 
on behaviour at work, we can qay that they: 
reduce the employee's discretion and the need for init-lative 
and individuality; 
give power to those who have the knowledge required for rule- 
making and create dependence among those who are denied 
access to that knowledge; 
- 
are designed to fragment and routinise %,., ork so that specific 
procedures can b-- more readily applied to it; 
- 
reduce the level of commit, 
, 
nent because decision-making and 
the exercise of personal responsibility are removed from the 
job; 
-he perceived status of those perforiiiing the work 
- 
reduce -11.
because personal ly-val Lied attributes such as experience and 
skill are not required; 
- 
reduce the motivational effect of achieving goals by 
specifying readily attainable (minimum) standards; 
-4 increase the lev6l of control over the performance of work 
which can be exercised by those who make the rules. 
Union Involvement in Rule-Making 
Discrepancy bptwpen individual and organisational goals is never 
likely to Wcompletely resolved, and some degree of organisational 
conflict is inevitable. In Company B, the Hove office, which had 
been most affected by technological change and where the work was most 
- 
routinised, was the. one which-gave most consWent upport for 
ASMT calls for demonstrations of loyal V to the union. In a 
similar vein, the. Staff Manager of Company A considered that such 
of the support for the work-to-rule in October 1978 had coma from 
junior staff who welcomed a break from the routine of their work. 
It seems possible therefore that overt expressions of conflict - in 
1401, both these cases channel 1 ed through a ur 
,- 
may at least relieve 
1pe of the 4-eiIS40- SO' ILL, its arising from a clash of individu"-l and organi- 
sational goals, possibly by giving the employees at least the 
illusion oiF po-vier. But trade unions, it has bCýen n0t--d lke. g. 
LoCkwood, 1958; Blackburii and Prandy, 1965) tend to increase the 
level of bureaucracy by their involvement in rule-making. However, 
unions stress the bureaucratisation of personnel policies and pro- 
cedures rather than the technica) aspects (e. g. job design) of 
organisationai life. 
In Company A, for example, recognition of ASTHS was followed by-the 
introduction of a new job evaluation system including the r ight of 
appeal involving Union representation. It was widely held among 
personncl specialists in Company B that their more recent recognition 
of ASTIMIS would b- follovied in due course by union demands for a new 
job evaluation L-ystem to supersede the current system. They 
believed that ASTMS would object to the lack of the right to appeal 
and the non-publication of the bases of decisions. ASTMS' pressure 
in Company A increased the level of bureaucratisation in job grading 
and evaluation by codifying procedures and principles, and made the 
individual's position more favourable by giving the information to 
him, as well as to those who were making the decision, and allowing 
a process for redress in the event of disagreement. I 
It would appear at first sight, though, that ASTMS' involvement with 
and approval of ithe salary restructuring scheme in Company A (. see 
Appendix B) had resulted in a de-bureaucratisation process. That is, 
tho rew strVcture has sev. -ral fev., er organisation levels i-Jlich 
contradicts the classic bureaucratic demands for an exlt. -ended 
- 
t, Lý 
- 
hierarchy as both a sysýtem of differentiated authori, ty and a career 
I adder. Both obvious. 1y s. ti. *Il exi-st, bu-,, have been Llimpi. nished. From 
management's, poi. nt of viet-.,, the main advantage of the change was a 
vastly &implifi. ed salary and gradi. ng structure (which IT assume would 
cost less in s. alari. es in the long-teri-i-t) and greater emphasis on the 
link between performance and immediate financial reward. Union 
advocacy tended to emphasise the il million tha-'(- was going into the 
salary 'Idt-ty' on the implementation of the scheme. Both management 
and union denied that promotion prospects would be diminished (al- 
though all -the staff 1 interviewed. were totally unconvinced)., arid 
drew atten"Hor, to the 'dual career ladder' which allowed progress 
througheither technical o-r supervisory/i-P. anagerial roies. 
Although the ballot of staff came out in favour of the scheme, ithe 
overwhelming impression given by ihe interviewees was of scepticism 
as to w'hether the changes v: ere actually in their -1favour. Many felt 
that, as individuals, they v., ould be disadvantaged in the long-term 
by reduced prospects, although the employees as a group would 
certainly be financiallY better off on the introduction of the 
scheme. In one sense, therefore, the new scheme extended the 
bureaucratic standard of universality even if in the process it 
reduced the presence of other bureaucratic features. That is, the 
emphasis of the scheme was on an overall benef; 't to the employees 
- 
treating them as homogeneous and uniform. As unique individuals 
each striving after their, ov,, n ends through promotion they appeared 
to be disadvantaged by the scheme. It is worth noting that this was 
not in 'Keeping with ASTIMS' record of respecting differentials, as 
several of the interviewees pointed out. 
The experience of the last ten years in Company A has shown that the 
pressure of ASTHS has increased the level of buyeaucratisation of the 
personnel sphere. All aspects 
- 
appraisal, job evaluation, salary 
structure etc. 
- 
have Wen thoroughly regulated and the union is 
included in discussions on all changes affecting such matters. 
- 
('45 
- 
Pressure for change, certainly in the period immediately after 
recognition in 1970, came from the union. There is little evidence 
that this increased hureaucratisation has been the source of conflict 
that other aspects have been shown to be; the difference is that 
personnel procedures have been Bureaucratised in employees' favour 
(with the possible exception of salary restructuring) rather than as 
a means of giving further control to the management, as is the case 
with bureaucratisation of technical aspects of the work. 
BUreaucracy can be seen as merely a tool in the hands of those who 
have polv., er wit-hin an organisation, enablipq 'them to control the 
behaviour of other organisation members according to their intended 
ob, jectives. in the past, urganisatiot-ial objectives have been 
decided by management, and bureaucratisation has been one method of 
achieving them. Recognition of*a trade union has meant a limited 
sharing of-that pow. ar and there-Fore some managerial objectives have 
been tempered, if not exactly changed. An indication ol management's 
power is the extent to which -they are, or will be, able to resist.. 
any pressure frum a unio n to bureaucral: ise the derision-maki n. 9 
processes in areas over which they have most closely guarded their 
discretion, e. g. design and perfoi-n-ance ol jobs. 
As yet, ASTMS' inclusion in rule-making has stopped short of these 
areas, although they affect all aspects of employees' expectations 
including those of promotion. It remains to be seen if, and how 
easily, the union will be able to move into this area. To anticipate 
the results of the Company A survey, there is certainly an indication 
that employees (especially the non-professionals) are beginning to 
think that these are suitable topics for negotiation between 
management and union. I 
- 
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Bath the Companies. in thi-s research. appear to be hisghly bureaucrati. sed 
in many respects, but i. t i. s- essentially m anageri al ly-deternd lied 
bureaucracy. The crucial. aspect which rervains non-bureaucratised is 
the nexus. of the relationship betiveen the employer and the en. -Iployee 
- 
the effortireward bargain. Whereas the hohaviour by employees is 
controlled by rules-and procedures, the contribution by the employer 
.n II i Ulated. It should be noted, i 'ei-ii-is of career prospects remains -unreg, 
hownyer., that the salary restructuring scheme takes one step in this 
direction as HL. contacns provision for emplloyecs' salaries. to vary 
according to their performance during the year. Even so, the 
decision-making in respect of the application of the scheme is not 
bureaucratised 
- 
the di. stribution of increased salaries (and also 
reduced salari. es. ) remains at thq discretion of management and only 
Yetly general cri. teria ha-ve been published on the bases of the 
decisions that vAll be made. 
One flaw of the res, tructuring scheme may be the extent to which i. t 
underestimates the weight of employees' expectations in terms of 
promotion and the gradations of status.. The study i, n Company A 
- 
to which employees perceive that their jobs investigates the extent 
bear the effects of. bureaucratisation and, if so, whether this 
results. in a sense of thwarted expectations and resentment against 
the employer. Tile Tnost important aspect is the effect on careers, 
which is the keystone of white-collar expectations. The question 
whi, ch remains as yet unanswered in these companies is the way in 
which employees are able to respond to the attack of bureau- 
crati. sation. Are unions seen as a means of restoring the earlier 
state of affairs with regard to careers? Do they do so by further 
bureaucratisation, this time regulat-ing the decision-making of 
management in areas where they currently have sole discretion? 
One aspect of all these questions can be stated with some certainty. 
That is, attempts to wrest control from management in such 
- 
(3,1 
- 
organisati. onal areas. as, job. desi. qn or career prospects are. likely 
to iDeet with some consi, derab. le resistance from inanagement. The case- 
study of managementfuni. on relati, ons in Company B goes. soime way in 
sholaing the extent to whi, ch. union involvemerl t in rule-making is 
-hei r perceived by gianagem. ent. as a threat to their authority over, t 
employees. The management of this company fought persistently to 
refute all union claims to a right to become involved in decision- 
11 
-* making, most especially in areas ol managerial prerogative such as 
job design and career structure. 
-1ý,,, 
- 
CHAPTER 3 
THE LITERATURE ON 1,01HITE-COLLAR El'. 11PLOYMENT 
Introdtirtion 
It is necessary to discuss in some detail the terms 'white-collar 
workcr' and 'professional employee' and -the various features of their 
employment and %,., ork experience. * One of tile major problems encountered 
is that there seems to be a dearth of recent empirical work in this 
area, and most of what there is concentrates on groups of clerical and 
administrative empioyees in an industrial environment. This is 
particutarly the case when the studies relate also to the unionisation 
of the employees concerned. The most frequently cited studies of 
professionals (Prandy, 1965) and. commercial employees (Blackburn, 1967) 
were condUCLed before the dramatic upsurge of white-collar union 
memnbership in the last decade. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to clcýrify our understanding 
of what is characteristic of white-collar and professional employees, 
introdLICing aspects of their unionisation which are explored in more 
in il-he next chapter. 
The Heterogeneity of White-Collar Workers 
There is still a tendency to regard 'ýIlhite-collar workers' as a 
homogeneous group, whose similarities outweigh their differences, 
This often arises, of course, in comparisons with 'blue-collar workers' 
who are undoubtedly another mythically homogeneous group. The danger, 
is that certain recognisable and objectively observable distinctions 
betivieen verious membZrs df the working population are emphasised to tho 
exclusion of dissimilarities between people allegedly in the same 
category. Throughout this study, emphasis is placed on the 
differences between various sub. 
-groups within the organis. ation - 
especially professionals and non-professionals 
- 
in order to understand 
the' impact of their differing work experiences on their attitudes. 
it is unwise to assum. - that becaus. e JL; he term 'iýihite-collar, has 
suffici. ently generally accepted ineaning to be useful i*n everyday 
speech, and to a much iflore limited extent in academic literature, 
that. i. t denotes various characteristics %-,, hich can be applied Without 
further disti-nctfon to all people assumed to be in this category. 
This indiscriminating categorisation has done a lot to produce the 
underlying assumptibn in n-.: uch of the literature that 'white-collar 
employees' are a homogeneous group. Tine search for unifying factors 
has biýen noted by Bain and Price (1972). They attempt*to identify 
the criteria on which a definition of 'white-collar' could be based, 
but reject all examined theories b3cause "they are evasive: they 
ý. hift the definitional problem from the concept of 'white-collar' 
or 1manual' employee to other equally vague concepts 
... 
Moreover, 
(#ey) are ambigulous: on the basis of the criteria proposed, many 
occupations can be argued to belong to either the white-collar or 
the TnanuL,. l group.... Fi. nally, their analytical usefulness is 
limited in that they classify large numbers Of OCCUpaltions to what 
would gerierally be perceived to be the 'wrong' category" (-P. 337). 
Perhaps I s1hould explain at this point the meaning that I attach to 
the term 'whi. te-col I ar worker' ;I use it only as a convenient 
handle and in i-Ills gonerally understood sense to describe those 
people who wor k in offices or similar environments rather than on 
11he shop-floor. This is not intended to be a rigid definition; 
it is simply a statement that the term can be useful in broadly 
denoting certain types of employee who are too diverse to be 
specified more accurately. 
I agree with Bain and Price's conclusion that the absence of a precise 
definition is no bad thi. ng. rf a defi. ni-tion is to be made, it 
should reflect empirical evidence and not act as a theoretical 
ýtraightjacket. Variou5 attempts have been made to reclassify 
whi. -Le-collar workers (-or sections thereof) as the rew working class 
(pallet, 1975), a managerial class (Purnham, 1966), a technological 
class (Palbraith, lR74) and Areaucrats (Dahrendorf, 059) among 
other&. WhAst concentration of those facets of white-collar work 
and society which are likely to predominate in future generations is 
useful, such theories still emphasise shared characteristics and 
deal as wi. th a homogeneous group. 
Some writei-r have been moving in the direction of questioning the 
view of the working population as a si. -i-ict. ý, 
-, lii-ite-collar/blu,, -collar, 
dichotomy. Eledderburn (1,969), for has suggested that 
concepts like i,, ianual and non-manual do not in any real sense reflect 
sociological groupings in society. Sfinilarly, Cook et ; 11 (1975/76), 
in their study of attitudes towards unions, conclude 
- 
albeit some- 
what half-heartedly 
- 
that "to regard the concepts of white (Ind blue 
collar as really tapping significant cleavages in %-,, orker orientations 
towards unionism may be a little unsound" (P. 58). They sugjgest that 
these concepts can be given analytical utility by identifying "sub- 
groups within the two main groupings %-,, hich seem to share com-11O. on 
behavioural and attitudinal patterns" (P. 58). Similarly, Roberts et 
al (1972) also concluded from their study of technicians that the 
white-collar/blue-collar dichotomy "does not always fit reality"; 
some of the technicians did routine, dirty %%, ork, but still considered 
themselves to be of. higher status than those labelled 'mianual 
workers'. 
This points the way to a much more fruitful approach to the study of 
any group of workers, and one which was adopted in the Study of 
employees in Company A. Although similarities of behaviour and 
attitude indicate some common characteristics, the differences 
within the main groull can be even more revealing. In this research, 
comparisons were made between professionally qualified personnel 
-Architects) and insurance generaliStS, (e. g. accountantS, actuaries, L 
and also b, 
-ýtween those at the lower and higher ends of the hierarchy. 
We are thule able to observe the d4ifferences b-ctk,,, ecn various groups 
who are in very simflar viork-ing environii: ents. 1 am convinced that 
to concentrate on comparisons within the group of employees in - 
1 
Company A has been more., seful in understanding theivinotiyatiqns 
and attitudes than would a study between the whole group and q group 
of manual workera. 
However, even ! f1people seem to an observer to share a common 
characteristic, this may have no relevance at all in understanding 
their behaviour. For example, Bovien et al (1974) in -their study of 
clerical workers in the steel inriustry found Ithat people of object-- 
ively similar social status perceived their statuses as being quite 
different- becaUSP they tised different. reference groups. It is -their 
perceptions that guide lChleir belhaviour and %-Clhich should be di-iScovered, 
not those of an 'objective' observer. This is not to denly that the 
environmeilt of tha individual is important, as it will be from this 
that the individual gains some of the substance of his perceptions. 
It is frequently suggested that the class and/or status position of 
white-collar workers has considerable impact on their unionisati 
- 
on. 
This has been labelled 'the sociological approach' (Crompton, 1976) 
which seems an unnecessarily restricted interpretation of the 
contribution of sociologists to this area of study. However, it is 
particularly the practice of equating 'white-collar' employees with 
the 'middle class' which is unhelpful; the myth of the homogeneous 
group has been based on the suggestion that they comprise an 
identifiable political and social class. The implication is that 
this 'middle class' has a sense of its own identity, holds similar 
and expressible values and shares common social and occupational 
experiences. 
Prandy (op. ci t. refers to the engi neers and sci enti sts in hi s 
study as being members of the middle cl'ass because they neither 
identify vdth manual workers and nor are they part of the employing 
class. The temptation is to concentrate on itthe distinctions between 
this group of employees and, say, assembly-line workers, and ignore 
the heterogeneity among them. Ira Prandy's sample, there, was much 
- 
'I'-) 
- 
diversity in the fi. elds. of poli, tical beliefs., job. satisfacti.. on and 
perceived status. 
- 
none of which- can be explai, ned by thetr shared 
'middle classness-'. Ho-we. ver, a s. Prandy does point out, such. people 
do adopt for themselves the ti, tle 'mi, ddle class' and it clearly 
reflects some idea of the position in society and a corresponding set 
of values with which these people at least partially identify. So, 
as with the terin "white collar', it is really only a reflection of 
inexplicit-ideas contained in the popular consciousness. 
The problem is that both terus 
- 
white-collar and middle class 
- 
may 
have different meanings to the many people who use them. if a certain 
class position is held to be a behavioural influence, then I would 
argue that it is the understanding of the person in that position 
which is crucial. The efforts to take a more subjective view and 
find in more detail what people-unders"tand by their class position 
has been an acknowledgement of this (e. g. Cook A al op. cit.; Bowen 
and Shaw, 1972; Mercer and Heir, 1972), but they are still too often 
oriented towards a 'white-collar/status' and 'blue-collar/dichotomous 
class' approach. However, the idea of a dichotomous class system 
does have some recognition in society and, as such, cannot he dismis- 
sed out of hand. 
Class theory stemming from Marx,, and also many avowedly non-Marxist 
theories, have tended to identify one criterion of class mem. bership 
and dichotomis, e society on that basis. Society is divided, we are 
L. old, into two main classes - those to whom the criterion applies and 
those to whom it does not. We are thus back to the criticism aimed 
at the division of society into white-collar and blue-collar: all 
di 
vers'l Ity and heterog-eneity is suppressed in --;. he concent-ra-16-ion 
between groups. Emphasis is placed overwhelmingly on the uniting 
criterion, and dilferences within each class areeclipsed by the 
predo., ainart and opposing interests between the two classes. 
It. 
follows that dichotomous theories of class based on the presence or 
absence of a single factor must be oriented to an-objective view of 
- 
-I 
society. The relevant factor must be identi. fi, ab-le and objecti. ve; -I. t 
mus-t be pos. -i. ble to obserye the presence or absence of that factor 
and thus. determnine the class to vdhi, ch any individual belongs. These 
theories are therefore based on an imposed vievi of society rather f, 
than one which is experienced by individuals; people's own percep- 
tions play. a subordinate part. 
One of the most *recent attempts to interpret white-collar unionism 
through the class approach has come from Crompton (1979,. It is, as 
it happens, a study of the union membership of insurance clerks, 
-11though Crompton ad. ro. its that her evidence is "highly impressional- 
istic" and it appears to hdve consisted of a fela intervieýas with 
- 
been ASTMS' activists. She argues that 1-he insurance clerk has 
through a process of 'double proletarianisation' as a result of the 
de-skilling of their work (primarily through cor,, iputerisation) and 
the redUc 1ý ed 'function of capital' element in theil jobs (i. e. the 
nianagerial element has diminished). The implication of this is that 
ties with capital through the managetilent, or controllers of capital, 
liave ceased and the insurance clerk has joined the ýranks of the 
traditional blue-collar proletariat. The precise link with unionism 
is left unstated by Crompton; it is to be assumed that unions are 
seen as an instrument of the class struggle which the insurance 
clerk embraces when-recognising his new class position. 
My specific objections to this interpretation are three-fold: 
- 
there is no evidence that those who are most 'proletarian- 
ised' on the criteria used are those who are most likely to 
join unions. Crompton admits that the 'office proletariat' 
consists mainly ol women who have very limited careers and 
also the most routinised work, but that they often do not 
- 
-ant + I Io join the union. 
- 
it could be argued that it is precisely because. white-collar 
and professionals 'class' loyalty has not changed that such 
. 
employees are increasingly joining unions. They still value 
- 
'I I? C - 
their traditional privi i6ges, Most particularly promoti. on 
and career prospects., whi. ch gives. them theiij, 'agents of 
capital' class position in Mlarxis. t terms.. They see uni. ems 
as a way of restoriq theili, power and reversing their 
'proletarianisation'. 
- 
ASTVIS (the union Crompton is writing about) has achieved its 
rapid growth in membership by wi, *, ntaining a highly elitist, 
status-conscious approach %-,! hich empt 
, 
iasises v,, Ihite-collar 
employees' differences from blue-collar workers and their 
rights to higher rewards. 
This suggests that white-collar wor'Kers do riot see either their wor- 
king relationships (with management and other, groups of workers) or, 
changes in their work in the OEýss terms that Crompton describes. I 
think it is signilicant that -, ', he exQ-ct link between a chanae in 
class situation and union membership is left unspecified; it is 
merely suggested that they have both OCCUrred over the same peri-Od 
of time (or that de-skilling of jobs occurred at t fie same time as 
u. nion growth, as I would prefer to put it). The crux of the matter 
is that we gain nothing by superimposing the Marxist class 
framework that dould not be more fruitfully achieved by examining 
those changes- in jobs and the working environv!:! nt which have been 
identified, as pe rceived by the employees themselves. 
If the purpose of such sociological study is to gain understanding 
of the reasons why groups of people behave as they do, t-hen careful 
attention must surely be paid. to the subjects' perceptions if we 
are to gain any insight into the forces that guide their behaviour. 
As Sil verman says: "Sociology derives its data from the meanings 
which men attach to social life" (1970, P. 226). The research in 
this thesis has not, however, ignored the cont(-., xtual and social 
pressures on the actors; considerable attention has been given to 
the organisational environment in which the actors' perceptions are 
formed. It is, though, their perceptions of the environment and 
their responses to it which will give insight to their behaviour, 
and not the context itself. 
-ig- 
The Professional Ethic 
When discussing professionals, similar problems of definition to those 
'discussed about 'white-collar' employees are encountered. This term 
also has wide and debatable boundaries so that there can be no 
categorial statement that certain occupations are professional and 
others are hot. In their seminal work, Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933) 
stated that the acknowledged professions display a 'complex of 
characteristics', and that many other occupations have some, but not 
all, of these characteristics. They identified the essential elements 
of a true profession as: 
-a prolonged and specialised intellectual training; 
- 
techniques derived from the training which represent a 
speciali-sed service to the COMMUllity'. 
- 
associations which test the competence Of PraCL-it, I- i oners and 
enforce standards of practice. 
Derived from this, they noted the importance of the sense of 
professional responsibility towards those uho re ceive the services, 
stating that Ithe more the practice of the "Lechnique' arouses a sense 
of responsibil ity, the closer the occupation comes to being a true 
profession. The most common method that has been developed of 
applying criteria of professionalism to occupations 17ollows 
Carr-Saunders and Wilson in identifying certain characteristics of 
lactors along continua, so that when they are present to a considerable 
degree then that occupation is regarded as being highly professionalised. 
This approach has been used by many authors and researchers although 
there is some variety in the criteria which are selected. 
I 
Greenwood (1957) presents an 'ideal type' model of a profession 
-eri- which he states is charact 
-)ed by five factors: 
-a systematic body of knowledge which serves as the basis 
for all professional activity; 
--Ib - 
- 
authority which springs from the professional's abili V to 
exercise a monopoly of judgement over a particular area 
of knowledge; 
- 
the sanction of the communi ty which is in effect the 
communi ty's acceptance of the professional's monopoly; 
a*regulative code of ethics necessitated by the professionais 
potential ability to abuse the pov., er of his monopoiy, and 
enforced both informally through colleague control and 
fomially through sanctions exercised by the professional 
associations; 
-a professional 'culture' emanating from both the formal 
activities in the prDfessional association and client 
contacts, and informal colleague relationships: "the 
interaction of social rples required by these fomal and 
informal groups generate a social configuration unique to 
the profession, viz. a professional culture" (P. 12). 
Although these factors are presented by Greenwood in 'ideal type' 
terms, he emphasises that in practice such clear-cut distinctions 
cannot be made between different occupation, and a 'professionali- 
sation continuum'is more realistic. Despite this, professions are 
distinguishable, Greenwood maintains, from other occupations in the 
sense that they are a 'calling'; "self-seeking motives feature 
minimally in the choice of a profession; of maximum importance is 
affinity for the work" (P. 17). 
Elliott's (1972) approach involves a more detailed analysis of the 
professional role, ' and concludes that an essential part of 
professionalism is that role expectations extend beyond a strict 
4 definition of work to encompass the individual's place in ider 
society. He points out that at the higher end of the professional 
Elliott's continum of professionalism is based on factors of 
knowledge, tasks, decision-making, authority, identity, work, career, 
education, combined with a usual interpretation of social role. 
- 
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continuum, people are less subject to the compartnentalisation or 
segmentation of roles which occurs in modern society. The ideology 
of professionalism causes a binding or merging of roles pertaining 
to work and non-work, which is not 
-found as a rule among non- 
professional people. He does suggest, howaver, that this may ba 
common to most members of the 'middle class'. ff this was so, we 
would not expect to find many significant differences between the 
expectations of the professional and non-professional groups 
(especially the older members) in Company A. on the premise that 
their similar ideologies and orientations to their central work role 
would provoke similar attitudes to their jobs. This is not entirely 
supported by the data from this survey, especially in the areas of 
trade union members and activities, as it appears that the varying 
promotion prospects open to each group has a significant effect oil 
their attitudes, their work and their employer 
Hall (1968) has identified five attitudinal a0ributes which contri- 
bute to the professional ideoloty or work ethic: 
- 
use of professional organisations and proFessional 
colleagues as reference groups; 
- 
belief in the valuable contribution of the i,. tork to socieky; 
belief in sellf-regulation and the judgement of v,, orl, standards 
only by other professionalls; 
a sense of 'calling' and value of work itself rather than 
extrinsic rewards; 
autonomous decision-making -without presSure from external 
sources such as employers or clients. 
Hall comments that any study of professionals could expect to find 
two types of variations. Firstly, occupations vary according to the 
degree to which they are professionalised (i. e. the continuum 
principle), and secondly, members of any one occupation or profession 
may vary in the degree A their commitment to the professional 
ideology. This was reflected by the Company A professionals most 
- 
Ta 
- 
noticeably in the divergence of opinions about the need for trade 
unions: some maintained that they had as much need as non- 
professionals for union support and others maintained that their 
professional status greatly diminished this need. 
The idea that all occupations move inexorably towards professionali- 
sation is dismissed as "a bit of sociological nonsense" by Wilensky 
(1964). He does not dispute that professionalism offers ideals of 
occupational control and prestige which members of many occupations 
strive to achieve, but suggests that there are various barriers, 
e. g. inadequate bases of knowledge and organisational constraints,, 
which prevent those ideals from being reached in most cases. However, 
even if the structural attributes of professionalism never fully 
emerge, it is perhaps unwise to underestimate the strivings in that 
direction. They may well represent significant attitudinal develop- 
ments among an occupational groip which have repercussions in st! 61 
areas as trade union membership. 
Professionals' Nfork, Expectations 
Certain attributes of the professional work, ethic have be2n identified. 
and these would obviously be expected to have an impact on 
expectations. These expectations can be summarised Under three 
headings: 
A. Use of Knowledqe 
A body of knowledge over which members of a profession maintain as 
near as possible a monopoly is the fundamental basis of profes- 
sionalism. The grasp of this knowledge is the primary means by which 
the professional claims his more exalted status, and in industrial 
settings is probably the most apt example of the tenet that 
'knowledge is power'. It 
-would therefore be expected that the 
professional would attach considerable importanceto the knowledge 
/ 
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of which he is the master, resent any intrusions into his realm of 
competence by others, and expect the 
-work he is required to do to be- 
worthy of his intellectual abilities. 
Professionals develop a great deal of posses-siven. ess and jealousy of 
their knowledge 
- 
what Mloore (1970) describes as a 'property right' 
over it. One method oF maintaining an exclusive right over this 
knowledge is to keep it as unintelligible as possible to Ithe layman, 
a function most effectively performed hy the development of 
professional jargon. This presentation of exclusivity Is not simyly 
a result' of cussedness, but results from the power that accrues to 
'nowlerige and sVill of sc-n-- uti lity; the the holdel of eso+e, ic kS&U.. 
professional can supply infoymation of use to but bUond 1, he reach of 
others. This 'aura of mysterýy' tends to surround the area of 
professional skills 
- 
as in other areas characterilsed by their 
unknowableness to the uninitiatid, (Wilensky, op. cit. ). 
The statusigiving effect of knowledge is not confined to client- 
relationships, but permeates the infoynal grading of occupations or, 
specialisms within any one organisation. Moore (op. cit. ) noted that 
"the differential command over the techniques for solving human 
problems rcsults in a prestigious position for the supplier of Wat 
knowledge and skill, " (P. 152). Less universal problems confined 
to one organisation or industry are subject to the some tendency, 
although more tangible rewards may be seen as the expression of 
prestige. During the interviews in Company A, Vepresentatives of 
each profession, one after the other, referred to the central 
importance to the_success of the company of their particular areas of 
expertise, which was seen as a justification for the greater reward 
of their profession. 
Professional knowledge is the key not only to prestige and greater 
financial rewards, but also to intellectual stimulation. During the 
professional training, usually of several years' duration, the 
fledgling professional gradually acquires mastea over the basis 
of professional knowledge. Development is continued by the exchange 
i 
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of information, research data and theoretical advancements facilitated 
by the professional associations. The professional is thus required , 
to maintain his critical faculties if he is to receive the recognition 
of his fellows. Thus, challenging work 
- 
that which extends his 
professional expertise 
- 
becomes a means to an end and not simply a 
satisfying experience for its own sake. During professional 
training, a desire-for mastery of the subject and competence in its 
practice is inculcated into the trainee, and pursuit of professional 
goals occurs through continued expansion of the individual's store 
of knowledge, (Sharaf and Levinson, 1964). 
Use of knowledge and skills in the job would therefore L-C expected 
to be a high priority of a professional employee. It represents hi-s 
claim to higher status and higher rewards than his non-pro-Fessional 
colleagues, and is the basis on which hils competence and the respect 
of his fellow-professionals is founded. Work which did not use 
professional knowledge to any great extent wmld be considered 
demeaning and an indication that the employor (or a more im.... -nediitte 
boss) did not value -Lhe professional's expertise. Accordingly, the 
continuing development of skills and knowledge is likely to be of 
particular 
-significance among professionals given the value 
attributed by their, to their distinctive knowledge. 
B. Career Prospects 
Professional work is seen not merely as a job, but as a career. 
That is, the professional's current work is judged not only by 
immediate satisfaction but also by its potential for offering useful 
experience and skill development. Future work is seen in terms of 
continuous improvement of status, financial reward and intrinsic 
job satisfaction. 
Some professions (especially those connected with mediche and other 
forms of social service) encourage a moral commitment, such that an 
individual leaving the profession for some reason is regarded as 
- 
ill I- 
committing an unethical action. Such judgeii-, ents are less likely to 
bp made in the business professions but, even so, a high degree of 
commitment is expected and -is reinforced by the heavy investment in 
terms of time, intellectual effort and 'loss of earnings that occurs 
in the lengthy training period. Professional socialisation also 
encourages a pursuit of progress in terais Of knowledge vilhich -leads 
to a desire to emulate those in more respected positions in the r 
profession. 
In private practice or independent work by professionals, careers 
built in less hierarchical terms than in organisations Iv., hcrc 
professionals are only one group of employees amony memy. Tradi ti onal 
professional careers may be advanced by the publication of research 
v. ork, a lengthening list of prestigious clients or a general 
reputat. ion tor competence among. fellow prof essi onal s. In organi- 
sations such as Company A, career advancementL is seein primarfly ill 
terms of promotion to higher grades. 
Goldner and Ritti (11967) coln-ment that whilst success ir. organisations 
is seen in terms of progress upwards to managcment status, this leads 
away from the technical areas of work on which Ihe professioncal bases I 
his clainis -Lo competence. The ideology of professionalism -includes 
"assumptions stating that upward mobility in tile power hierarchy is 
of no importance compared to autonomy in the practicc of one's 
special compett*. nce and that §uccess for the professionai iS indepen- 
dent of such mobility" (P. 464). This suggests an inherent contra- 
diction in t1he career prospects of a professional in a large, 
primarily non-professional, organisation. Ile must choose betý,,! een 
either his technical competence or formal status in the hierarchy 
- 
two alternative sources and expressions of poý.,! or and prestige. 
In practice, the dilemma is unlikely to be quite as stark as that, 
especially in an organisation which has as many steps in the 
hierarchical ladder as Company A (although the salaty and grade 
restructuring scheme considerably diminishes this). In this company, 
'general' management is found only among the top few managers (and 
.- 
ý11 ý- 
- 
even these retain specific areas of responsibility), and he'low this 
level responsibility for various aroas of special competence is 
clearly delineated with a gradual wideni'ng of responsi bi 1i ties upwards 
through the hierarchy. However, certainly at-the Officer level and 
in some cases at AGIM. level (see table 4, P.? >! ), technical expertiso 
is one ol the primary components of the job 
- 
especially in the 
professional areas. The creation of the 'dual career ladder' under 
the restructuring scheme indicates that the development of non- 
technical skills will be encouraged in the, heavily technical 
-- 
i. e. 
professional 
- 
areas, although the innovation has been PUblicised as 
being d career boost for those employees who wish to retain their 
technicai jobs without jeopardising their promotion prospects. 
One essential point to make in discussing t,, ie potential conflict oF 
interests in careers is that the professionals -in this study had 
actually chosen to %-. rork for Comliany A as opposed to it consultancy, 
private practice or a specialist -Firm. Those rc! -Iently qtualified may 
well have made the choice for reasons which will not Icluide future 
career decisions, i. e. they may have chosen a large comptany because 
ft J- offered security, reasonable pay and facilities -1co,. - study dun, ing 
their training. However, those who have been qualified for some 
time have clearly had to make further decisions about their carears. 
A number oil professionals 
- 
especially accountants and actuaries 
- 
indicated during the intervievis that they had con-sidlered, i,,, Orking 
for a consultancy or private practice, or in a coupie of cases had 
actually done so in the past. They all had friends or acquaintances 
in such jobs and had Sufficient knowledge with which to make the 
decision. 
The conunent made again and again was that 
consultancy and private practice could be 
pressure of work, was extremely high. The 
times of preferring 'working to live, not 
basis of this admittedly flimsy evidence, 
to predict that professionals who choose 
the financial rewards in 
cGris. derable, but that the 
comment was made several 
living to work'. On the 
it V., Mlld seerp. reasonable 
to work in orga ni sati ons 
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such as Company A have a weaker conception of their professional 
ideology than others in that their work role is less centrol and 
less dominant in their lives. 
pt4 I -imarily ins ra ce- With the exce on of actuaiies, whose work is pi u ri  
oriented, the professionals had strayed from the mainstream of their 
profession. This may not only be -t-. o avoid the pressure; one young 
accountant spoke bitterly of his disappoi; itment in discovering that 
Company A was not, in his opinion, at the forefront of develop-ments 
in his particular professional field. 
C. Autonoqy and Responsibility 
A consideration of professional autonomy raises fUndamental questions 
about the role of the professional in bureaucratic organisations, and 
%,,, hich is examined in greater detail in the next section. Hoviever, 
the effect of professional autonomy is relevant to. a discussion of 
work expectations. 
Professional autonomy and collegiate control are fundamental aspects 
of professional i sm, stemming from i-iionopoly overt a body of kno"vfledge 
and the need to protect this source of power. Only others sharing a 
similar expertise are lit persons to judge the performance of a 
professional. Professionalism therefore involves belief in self- 
regulation and control through the scrutiny of work by colleagues 
-ed system of control: the profes- rather than any externally impos 
sional believes himself to be in a position of trust vis-a-vis who- 
ever requires his professional knowledgle, be it client or employer. 
How, ever, assessment and control by fellow professionals may not 
necessarily be the most effective form of control. Tile knowledge of 
being a minority group and above the criticism of outsiders may 
encourage a form, of defensiveness or protectiveness of professional 
interests ý,., hich is not conducive to high standards of service to 
CliP_nt. S and employers. Moore (op. cit. ) points out another danger of 
I 
Stt. 
collegiate control: "Identification with peers may become sub- 
servience to peers, and that ends the effective sense of personal 
responsibility" (P. 130). 
, 
Dpspitp these possible hazards, professionals in an organisation 
%-vould be expected to be averse to supervision by those less highly 
qualified in the particuiar area of expertise, and certainly antago- 
nistic to control by someone ccmpliýtely outside the profession. 
Close supervision tends to be-rejected by members of any occupation, 
how-ever highly or lowly skilled, but it is I ikely to be greater 
among those who have acquire6 a belief in their olval compeLence as 
-a 
C4 result of spe ! alist training. Such employees are also better 
placed to resist or evade close supervision because of their personal 
commr--ind of specialised knowledge. 
I al conflic+ for Autonomy therefote presents ano6er potent-ic 
professionals in companies 
- 
that brek-ieert their i-ieed for Freedom and 
the organisation's need for control and coordination of all employees' 
acti vi -ti e. s. 14ilensky (op. cit. ) suggests that "the crux of the issue 
of autono.; jly for salaried pro-Fessions is whether the organisation 
itself is infused wit-h professionals 
... 
and whether the services of 
the professionals involved are scarce 
... 
" (P. 4911). If the answer to 
both these questions is positive, the professional is gran-Ged as much 
autonomy as is practicablý. In Company A, the most imperaLive 
-9 professionals would be their individual autononly, i. e. question t 
the a-mount of personal supervision, rather than the freedom granted 
to the entire group of professionals. As departments of professionals, 
e. g. ac-tuaries, accounts, are supervised hierarchically by those 
within the same, profession, at least both supervised and supervisor 
share an understanding of the problem. It ý-., ould be expected, 
howaver, that the professional %-: ould be more sensitive to the 
question of supervision than his non-professional colleague. 
Whilst most discussion of professional autoncRy willhin organisations 
concentrates on negat-, ve aspects, Kornhauser (1962) believes that 
the pluralist system of relations between the various subdivisions 
- 
of an organisation serve to create a constructive balance between 
coercion and creativity: "-L.. he tension bet1ween the autonomy and 
integration of professional groups, production gMLIps and other 
participan Us tends to summon a more effective structure than is 
attained One-re they are isolated from, one another or where one 
absorbs the other" (P. 197). '41hilst this may k%ell advance organi- 
sational goals, it may well be detrimental to professional goals, 
although thiý tý. 
-; o cannot be ultimately diEsociated from each other 
t4 in an organisa onal seetting. V 
Generally speaking, professionals are more likely to be more acutely 
aware than non- professi or al employees of discrepancies bet-ween their 
need for autonomy and the need to subject themselves to organisational 
control. This applies uhether the control takes a personal form 
(direct advice or instruction from a supervisor) or in the application 
of impersonal rules. The effect is to deny the capacity of the 
professional to make decisions based on his knowledge, and to detract 
from his responsibility for his ovni performance at work. 
The Professional in the Bureaucratic Orynisation 
ý, ro- th- discussion on profpssionalism so far has emerged the view 
of professionals as persons who must accommodate various facets of 
their traditional ideology to organisational constraints if they take 
employment in companies such as those in this study. The use of 
other professionals as a reference group for assessing p-erfoymance 
and determining behaviOUral norms may result in conflict with 
requirements for the efficiency of the organisation; the dependence 
on technical cxpertise may not coincide wdtlh th" managerial qualities 
required f, ))' prOMOtion; and tile professional's desire for autonomy 
must be accommodated to the need for organisational control over 
all employees. 
- 
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The organisational model used in this discussion is that of bureau- 
cracy, as discussed in an earlier chapter, and it will be implicit 
in the following discussion that the concept of bureaucracy and its 
connotations are as expounded in that chapter. 
t4 One of the mos-It. influen jal theore-fl. ical contributions ir. this area 
of professionals in organisations has come froin Gouldner (111-57) in 
his discussion of 'cosmopolitans' and 'lecals'. lie suggests that as 
we"ll as manifest roles 
- 
"social identities of group members which 
are consensually regarded as relevant to them in a given settingif 
(i. e. an orthodox interpretation of social role) 
- 
latent roles call 
be identified. These dep--Y)d on three, inter-related factorls: loyaltY 
to the organiSation, comimitment to proFessional skills arid reference 
'- organi- group orientations. From these emerge two polarised laterit 
ties: sational ident, 
'cosmopolitans' who are low on loyalty to the organisation, 
high on commitment to'professional skills and use extra- 
organisational reference groups; 
- 
'locals' (or 'company men') who are high on loyalty to the 
organisation, low on commitment to professional skills and 
use an intra-organisational reference group. 
It could be -that professional employees in Company A would be nearer 
to tile cosmopolitan model than their non-professional colleagues 
because of the formal and informal social bonds established Detween 
-resses loyalty to professional, the rileri-ibers o, each prolession which st 
principles rather than organisational criteria. Dependence on tile 
level 0 marketable organisaft. lon is also discouraged by the higli-I I 
skills acquired by the professional who is not then obliged to secure 
his fUture within only one company. He has greater scope for 
horizontal viobi lity to enable him to extend his skills and experience 
and also identify organisations which offer the best, prospects. The 
non-professional (especiaily tile non-graduate) may find hifi-iself after 
- 
ý-l 
- 
a few years with skills and experience which have little relevance 
outside that one organisation 
- 
even to other insurance companies 
unless he has acquired an almost 'professional' expertise in one 
aspect of the business. 
However, it is worth reiterating a point made earlier, namely that 
the professionals had chosen to be employed in a large insurance 
company or to stay in that company after qualification. To a certain 
extent, therefore, these professionals must. have been prepared to 
accept some compromise on ideological clashes and may well be 'locals' 
themselves when compared with othar members of their profession in, 
say, private practice. 
Scott (1966) has identified four areas where conflict is likelY to 
result from the professional's i. nvolvement in two systems (the 
professional association and the bureaucratic employing organisation) 
which are based on funda. mentally different principles. The bureau- 
cratic organisation is based oin pr, nciples of universally observ-ed 
tules of behaviour, an impersonal control of work activity, imposed 
standard's oriented to organisatioral goals and an intra-urganisationall 
career path for employees. In contrast to that, the Professional 
ideology fsil. s -'the professional for lvlork which is an end in itse-if and 
not merely a path tq organisa-tional goals and which is controllpd by 
the individual and his fellow professionals. Mlobili-ty betý,,., -een jobs 
within the same professional sphere is encouraged and not restricted 
to one organisation. Scott suggests that as a result of this con- 
flict betlaeen the two s, /stems, professionals develop resistance to 
bureaucratic rules and imposed methods of supervision, reject imposed 
bureaucratic standards and feel only a conditional loyalty to the 
ei, iiploying organisation. 
Scott does suggest that conflict in these areas is likely to be 
reduced if the professional performs a central function in the 
organisation. As mentioned earlier, the professionals were anxious 
to tell me in their interviews of the critical importance of their 
work to the organisation. Having been socialised during training to 
- 
fl, iý 
- 
belief in the indispensibility of their professional skills, to find 
that they were not a major cont ribution to the efficiency of the 
business would have caused dissonance (see Festinger, 1962). This 
could be rectified either by leaving the organisation or finding 
evidence of the key role of their skills. Those who give no indi- 
cation of leaving have presumably at least attempted to work out an 
acceptance of the priori V of their work within the company. 
The collegiate basis of professional control and authority is attacked 
by a bureaucratic characteristic linked with problems of supervision. 
A well-defined and extensive hierarchy contribuLes to the division of 
tasks and boundaries of responsibilities which often leads to a some- 
what narrow view of a job and a restriction of cooperation between 
colleagues. Aiken and Hage (1966) commented on this alienSion 
between fellow workers which stemmed from the rigid hierarchies in 
the social work agencies which they studied. They found that the 
more highly centralised and formalised organisation structures 
correlated positively with. higher levels of both work and colleague 
alienation. 
Ficult to assess how inuch -'(. his ýýiould apply to Company A, It. is dif-! 
which is on a much larger scale than the agencies studied, with more 
obvious'divisions between occupational groups in different 
departments. A common comment during the interviews ffro,. i-i hoth the 
professionals P. nd the non-professionals) was that the individual had 
little perception of the organisation beyond his ov. 1n department and 
those with which he had immediate contact. Thus the alienation 
. 
(perhaps too strong a word in this case) is more likely to be -felt 
towards other occupational or work groups, rather than towards 
immediate colleagues. 
Uhatever the degree of identification and association with colleagues, 
"pinfessionals in different fields working for the same employer are 
likely to recognise that they have more in common-than any of them 
has with adninistrators" (Moore op. cit. P. 202). In this case, 
.. 
2 1ý 
- 
personnel working in the mainstream insurance departments can be 
substituted for administrators. Moore's comment is substantiated by 
the fact that Wing the interviews none of the professionals 
disputed my refeAnces to the professional group collectively. The 
idea of a collective professional identi V appears instantly recog- 
Asable and many concurred with suggestions that the interests of 
this collectivity were sometimes divergent from those of the non. 
- 
professional employees. 
Other writers have acknowledged that conflict is not always inevilt- 
able betv., cen, tI the professional and the eminploying org3tilisation. Mi I ler 
(1967) isolates a basic oiqanisaticnal choice between autonomny a. nd 
-ion, but suggests that so. -iie professional groups exi integrat aJerien ce 
less difficulty in this area than others. He studied scientists and 
engineers employed in bUreaucratic organ isations, and, noted that the 
engineers were less professional and more bureaucra-tiC in their 
orientation to their work than the scientists. This could be at 
least partly attributed to the fact that the engineers realised 
during their training that their ful. 
-ure may well, be in industry, and 
they were therefore bijsi ness-oriented before -'(. hey took up employment. 
It would follvq from this that as the professionals -in ConMpany A ware 
all in areas which are spFcillically geared to business., if riot 
especially to the insurance industry (with the exception of actuaries), 
then employment in large companies is clearly an opticn to be con-- 
sidered seriously from the start of traininci. 
Hall's (op. cit. ) study of the relationship between professionalism 
and bureaucratic modes of organisation also led him to the conclusion 
that professionals working in large organisations are not, 
necessarily, confronted with situations which reduce the level of 
professionalisation. He measured degrees of professional commitment 
and found, for instance, that lawyers employed in the legal 
departments of large organisations were more professibnalised than 
those who worked in law firms. 
- 
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The conflict be-LBý., Cen individual professional kno-viledge and bureau- 
cratic universality may also be more apparent than real. The values 
attached to professional knowledge prompt a continuous process of 
absoi, ption and testing of knowledge by members of the prolessional 
group. The knowledge has a value for its o-wn sake, as the justifi- 
cation of prOfessional status, and is systematically pursued. Mloore 
has noted -"the rational spirit as a cause of tile cotitinuous quest for 
new knowledge" (op 
. 
cit. P. 189) with consequential specialisation in 
professional fields. This is-congruent with two of the prim: ary 
characteris 
-aucratic organisations - the division ol -tics of bure 
labour so that ea1. pIo%,, e-es undertake specialist tasks, and all overall 
rationality di. Cta-Ws activities free fro-. m any considerations 
personal tc mý, -! mbers of the organisation. Thus professional work may 
be conductted in a spirit which is riot entirely alien to a bureau- 
cratic mode of organisation. 
Even the need for supervision, or some form of organisational control.:, 
may have bepn absorbed during the course of professional -training. 
The bUdding professional has been required to submit his efforts to 
sci-utiijy (incluUing formially through examinations) and acci? p-L-, s 
progress actuated by the concession of superiors in the field. The 
"do-Ference patterns" built into professional training (Moore, op. cit. ) 
as a result of this accreditation process accustoms the professional 
to acknowledging that sanctions are necessary. The proble. n. i, as noted, 
arises when tile person operating those sanctions is a non-professional 
and therefore not accorded a legitimate status in that role by the 
professional. 
Abrahamson (1964) 
-in his study of scientists noted that even the 
professionals' desire for autonomy could be catered foý in bureau- 
cra-,, -, i-. organisations. He found that as the scientists proved their 
ability, so the autonomy granted to them in their work increased. 
A certain lessening of control could be expected as an individual 
progresses upward in the hierarchy, but the combined %-, ieight of all 
- rung does nor. the other grades to the person on the lowest. 
necessarily appear more irksome than one 'intrusive' superior does 
- 
ql 
- 
to a senior manager. The degree of autonomy accorded is often at the 
discretion of the individual supervisors and managers, who may choose 
to trust the individual's judgment and expertise as the primary means 
of control. In Company A, professional ability as measured by 
success in professional examinations is rewarded financially and by 
increased status in the form of promotion. In this sense, an 
increase of autonomy in the form of wider responsibility was a direct 
concomitant of proven professional abilities. 
Remuneration is an area where rigid bureaucratic practice could 
create conflict., in so far as a strictly enforced set of salary 
It va scales might not allo-w deviations for such flaactors as `..: L,, rLKeLý 
." 
or traditiconal professionals' di-Ifferentials. This might appear 
justifiable to the nori-prof. essionals who may well value practical 
contributions i. o the business and ability to do -the job above 
theoretical Vnowledge and book- icarni ng, but i-muld cause difficulty 
in the retention and motivation of -the prolessionals. Commpany A 
accommodates professional expect-ations by pa, )ment of a sui-ii above 
basic salaries to bring their remuneration in line with professionals 
in private practice or independent finns. Bureaucratic rationality 
therefore gives way on occasion to the rationale oil the market-place. 
In conclusion, it appears that the ostensibly fundamental conflicts 
between the manifestations of the professional ideology and the needs 
of bureaucratic organisations are not, in fact, completely unrecon- 
cilable in many respects. What appears to be necessvry is the 
recognition by the employer that some flexibility must be allowed to 
accommodate professional requirements for autonomy and self-direction. 
Those areas in which professionals are employed are precisely those 
where such flexibility can most easily be permitted, and indeed 
encouraged, because the work is generally of a more innovative and 
less routine nature than that of the line departments dealing with 
the central function of the organisation. Equally importantly, the 
professional employees themselves can adjust their work perceptions 
to a nearer congruence with organisational demands with relatively 
.. 
01 1- 
little ideological compromise, because they are working in a 
professional environment within the larger organisation. 
The implicall 
-ions of previous research for the survey in Company A 
seem to be that professional training and ethics will increase 
professionals' expectations of their %,., ork, particularly in the use to 
which their knowledge and qualifications can be put, and also greater 
rewards (especically promotion) as a return for the investment of 
their training. The professional employee has been tun, 
_: -d by his 
training to pursue advancement both in terms of knowledgc and pre. - 
tige; career progress is therefore iikely to be of considerable 
concern. However, none of these factors distinguishes the professional 
emplolvee from other white-collar employees in anything other than 
degree. It could therefore be anticipated that the profes,, ionais and 
non-professionals in Company A will have broadly similar I"A'PeCtations 
of their work, but with the professionals generally aiming higher. 
The Professionals in Company A 
The study in Company A offered an excellent opportunity to identify 
diflerences in work expectations and-attitudes of professional and 
non-prolessional employees in the. same organisai. ion, and their varying 
responses to trade unionism. Most of the published work on 
professionals is concerned those within the mainstream oil their 
profession, i. e. private practice. There is comparatively little 
work on the employment of professionals in other organisations, and 
4 
certainly a dearth of studies concerning such professionals and union 
membership (particularly outside the engineering profession). 
Additionally, an important aspect of the study is that the professionals 
in Company A were used as a control group to help determine the impact 
of work de-skilling and restricted career prospects on the non- 
professional employees (who comprise the large majority of the work 
force). A major empirical problem encountered in the study was that 
it related to the impact of ghanginj work methods and career prospects 
- 
Tý 
- 
on employees' expectations and attitudes, but that ilt, could describe 
only their current situation. The general methodology of the 
, 
research was of quantitative data suppiied by the questionnaire Survey, 
With Lhe ýddition of interview data, and supported by inatevIal from 
the researcher's working experience in the Company and observation 
dUring the research. 
The historical perspective necessary to assess the impact over time of 
factors such as computerisation and rationalisation was provided by 
the inclusion of the professionals in the survey. Their work has been 
little affected by the impact of cornputerisation; this aas confirined 
during the interviews by the professionals who were unari-H-uous iff the 
opinion that the computer had had no impiact on the specialist, 
technical etements of their work and served only to provide improved 
information storage and retrieval facilities. They also confiriped 
that it did not aflect their pr6motion opportunities in any -way. 
in contrast to this, the work of virtually all the non-professional 
departments (especially the line department) has been changed by- 
computerisation, the effects of which have been discussed earlier. 
T the lower clerical grades, -who form, a Ihis is especially true ol 
substantial proportion of the total staff. 
Both the perceived expectations and achievements of the two groups of 
employees were established in the questionnaire survey. Whilst 
perceived achievements will primarily reflect the work situation and 
the impact of organisation constraints and opportunities, expectations 
are a reflection more of work values pertaining to the perceived 
status, ability and so on of the individual. It would be anticipated 
that both groups of employees have a similar ideological orientation 
to their work and have many shared values, this being particularlX the 
case with the older non-professionals and the professionals. Such 
values would likely be more pronounced among the professionals, 
reinforced as they are by professional training and the internalisation 
of the professional ethic. 
'The 
relevant question asked respondents to "indicate what you think 
you could reasonably expect from the Company". 
- 
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- 
Therefore, whilst both groups would he anticipated to feel that they 
could 'reasonably expect' similar (though not identical) promotion 
prospecLs, levels of responsibility and quality of work etc., the 
extent to which these have actually been achieved should be. loý.,. Ter among 
the non-professionals, as a reflection of the increased bureaucratic 
control exe. rcised on their work and careers, facilitated by 
computerisation and rationalisation. 
It should be notcd, ýowever, that the iMpaCt of Co:. nnuterisation has not 
been uniform throughoult the non-professional departments and that som 
Jobs have been comparatively little affected. One interviewee (grade 
suggested Lhat DiS L L. I L, job was possibly less routine as al result, Of 'asks 
perfom-, ýed by the 
. 
o; P. pu-Ler, although another (grade E5) believed that jobs 
were eliminated at lower levels by computerisation and that the interest 
of -the remainder deteriorated. This latter vi&., %-,, as supported by another 
interviewee (also grade E5), who also believed that a significant loss of 
jobs had beer, avoided by an increase in business. 
The junior clerical grades were reluctant- to be interviewed, bUt* -those 
who were all reported a lack of interest in their jobs, describing then, 
as routine and undemanding. Computerisation was sometimes identified as 
a contributory factor and sometimes not. It is important to remember 
that these Young cierical staff had only been with the Company for a 
short time (perhaps tlao or three years) and that they had no experience 
of tile work as 4, t was before computerisation (not that I would suggest 
that it was particularly exciting ever. -then). They would therefore be in 
a worse position to identify the impact of computerisation than tile older, 
more senior staff who had seen all the changes taking place. These older 
employees had moved up in -tile hierarchy during the last 10 
- 
15. years 
to jobs which are somewhat less affected, and the younger staff still 
look forward to progressicn and more interesting work. It could v. -ell be 
that the greatest impact of failed expectations could --on., e in a fei,., years 
when significant promotion fails to materialise for many young staff, and 
tile escape route upwards is closed. The importance of promotion was 
emphasised by a young i'n-terviewee (grade SS). who complained of the routine 
nature of his work, but said that he would rather Ue promoted to similarly 
bori)-ig wrork than stay In -the same grade, withiýnore in-teresting viorrk. 
The importance of promotion; especially relating to its effect oil 
nnionisation, is one of the vajor thones of the next. chapter. 
CIS 
CHAPTER 4 
WHITE-COLLAR UNIONISATION 
Introduction 
'rhe previous chapter discussed. the t,. fork situation of white-collar 
and professional employees.. and the values dnd expectations iý, lhich 
ley bring to thei r jobs. in this research. the impact of thc 
cýaracteristics of white-collar employ. ment, particularly resulting 
from computerisation and rationalisation, are studied in relation 
t 'he inionisation of the employees in both con. ipanies. 11 tis oLL 
suggested that the consequent, changes in career patterns, namely a 
substantial reduction in promotibn prospects for large sections of 
the staff, are an especially significant factor in union miembership 
aod activity. 
This chapter therefore looks at the unionisation of white-collar 
and professional employees, primarily with a view to ascertaining 
from the literature the light that previous studies throw on the 
importance of the issues under consideration. The likely 
differences in attitudes to unionism between the professional 
employees in Company A and the non-professionals are also 
consi dered. 
The chapter begins with a general discussion of the relevant 
literature, focussing on one common feature, i. e. the 
tendency to isolate specific factors when attempting to 
determine why white-collar employees join unions, without 
giving due attention to the inter-dependence of a number of 
factors. 
- 
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'Single-Factor' Approach. to I. J. hi, te-Collar Unionism 
Mly criticism of the literature is the tendency to isolate specific 
factors when attempting to determine lvihy tinite-collar workers join 
unions. CoEimonsense indicates that peoples' mo-Itives towards trade 
unions are likely to be as diverse and complex as they are towards 
anything else, and attempts to pinpoint single crucial factors are 
doomed to failure, although I do not dispute the usefulness of 
test. ing various factors for significance in particular circumstances. 
Tihe dangers, cf cver-emphasiis of factor analysis are abundantly 
illustrated in the literature: for every study which finds a factor 
t,,, ) be positively related to union membership, another study finds 
that it is a n-egative influence or simply of no relevance at all 
- 
and virtually every feasible factor. seems to have been tested. For 
example, Goldstein and Indik (1963) found in a study of professional 
engineers that union members were significantly more likely than non- 
members to have had fathers who were also union members. However 
in his study of engineers and technicians, Kleingartner (1968) found 
Hiat union riembiers were no more likely to have had fathers who were 
also union members. Bain's (1970) work has indicated that there is 
no statistical evidence for the universal significance of most of 
the factors which are usually mooted as important in Union t,, iember- 
ship, although they may well be crUcial in combination with others 
in particular circumstances. 
This points to the importance of examining any factor in its context 
in order to avoid misleading conclusions. For example, Blackburn 
(op. cit. ) in his study of union and staff association membarship 
in a clearing bank noted that women were less interested than men 
in staff representation (P. 218), had a lower rate of union membership 
than men (P. 121) and that this was linked with their low-status 
routinc jobs with virtually no prospect of promotion (P. 120). 
However, he also notes that during World War 11, union membershjp 
among women in banking was comparatively high and suggests that as 
- 
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predominantly temporary lahur, they had no promotion prospects to 
jeopardise by union. membership and were therefore not afraid to join 
P. 163). Thene two apparently contradictory conclusions about the 
effect of one factor 
- 
the sex of employees 
- 
would not have occurred 
if the factor had been balanced with all the many others which make 
up the context, rather than being given undue weight. 
The danger of arriving at a general theory through a process of 
induction from a single situation is that its explanatory force is 
overestimated and can lead to false conclusions applied to 
other circu,, listatices. One example of this can be found from this 
study. AST14S achieved considerably more support in one office in 
Company B than in any of the others; this seems to have bcýen largely 
attributable to the presence of many yowig, inexperienced and 
predominantly female staff engaged on very routine, mechanised, %,, fork. 
Company A has an office which is very similar in rf,, any waylt (including 
those mentioned) and deals with the same type of business. However, 
tile union there has great difficulty in recruiting that type of 
employee who were its most active supporters in Company B. Clearly 
other factors are involved, but it would have been very te. mpting to 
generalise about ail young, low status clerical worPers from t-he 
experience of just the offce in Company B if contrary evidence had 
not been available,. and to have overlooked that other 'Factors nay be 
nceded as catalysts in the observed behaviour. 
Thus, theories based on isolated specific factors are unreliable 
for predictive purposes. Many writers have suggested that the 
increasing tendency towards concentration of white-collar workers in 
large organisations has encouraged union membership (e. g. Bain, op. cit.; 
Lockwood, 1958; Paterson, 1975); that is an opinion with which I 
largely concur and which is explored in more detail elsewhere. The 
difficulty is that there are some notable exceptions 
- 
bureaucratic 
organisations where union membership has not developed despite 
determined efforts by unions which have been very successful in other 
companies (ASTMS' failure in Kodak and IBM, for example). Clearly, 
.- 
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there is more to it than junt the size of the organisation. it also 
does. not explain why tha laryst insurance canpanies have had 
strongly contrasting histories, of union development A the last 
decade, despite the strong similarities of their organisational 
structure, working methods and numbers of Ymployees. ARMS has been 
able to recruit epsily in some, with difficulty in others and hardly 
at all in yet others. So it is important to attribute significance 
to one factor only conditionally; i. e. to recognise that it is 
contingent upon others. 
Bain (op. cir. ) con-t -ends that "most white-collar union recognition 
in private industry has come about, directly or indirectly, as a 
result 0, -f government puiicies and Ue favourable climate they create 
for unionism" (P. 181). The 'seventies have certainly seen an overall 
advancement of trade union interests by legislation, (particularly, 
as Bain points out, in the ia%!., relating to recognition), but this 
does not confront the essenti-al- irony that the 'favourable climata, 
sees unions at probably their least popular in their ch. equered 
history, but with mei-iibership increasing most rapidly aif,, o-. -ig those 
groups who contain their fiercest critics. The recognition laws 
may enable unions to capitalise on recruiUiient success bN. - r-'pening the 
way to negotiations with employers, bUL easing the obstacles to 
effective representation would have no impact if peopl. - did- not feel 
the need for that representation in te first place. 
As I said earlier, I do not dispute the importance of testing the 
significance of various factors, and neither do I disagree with all 
the 'answers. What appears to be unproductive in a lot of the 
literature is the idea that somewhere there is an answer to the 
question of iý. lhtte-collar union membership 
- 
the idea that it is 
possible to identify certain factors which lead to union membership. 
This is, ol course, oversimplifying the work undertaken in many 
stulies, but it is still a distinct tendency. The really crucial 
aspect of factor analysis is therefore to remain aware of the inter- 
dependence of the factors, and 4 hn way in which their significancc can 
be significantly varied by involvement with other factors. 
ý- '11- 
Iri,, plications, for this Research- 
The study in Company A gi. vesc attention to a variety of factors, 
which may be sub. 
-divided into contextual and attitudinal : 
A. Contextual (or objective factors): 
- 
age 
- 
sex 
organisational rank 
-length oil service 
union membership 
B. Attitudinal (or subjective) factors: 
- 
employees' perceptions of design and alk-Allributes of jobs, 
- 
employees' expectations olf jobs and extent to v., hich they 
are: 
currenti-Y fulfilled 
ii. likely to be fulfilled in the fUtUre, 
- 
employees' satisfaction wilth rewards provided by 
employer, 
- 
spheres of trade union activity favoured by employees, 
- 
employees' reasons for membership (or non-imembership) of 
ASTMIS. 
(Each of these attitUdinal factors -is divided into various sub- 
factors. ) 
This study therefore attempts to avoid the pitfalls in the literature 
previously mentioned, i. e. the tendencies to concentrate on objective 
criteria and thus categorise people into homogemus groups by 
ignoring their differing perceptions of and reactions to their cir- 
cumstances, and also over-zealous attempts to identi fy single critical 
factors. By placing emphasis on the subjects' perceptions of their 
situation and the interplay between personal and environmental factors, 
it is hoped that a more raliable interpretation of the observed 
behaviour will result. 
130- 
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Changos in Office Work: OPPO_I't. Llrlit'iE! S for Unions 
We now proceed to a survey of the empirical studies in this area. 
The main emphasis Of the work on white-collar unionism until 
fairly recently has been on lower status employees such as 
clerks, rather than with managers or professional employees. 
ParL of the change in em. phasis which has occurred recently may 
be somewhat ar-tificial in so far as 'clerks' used to be a term 
used loosely to describe all administrative or office workers, 
including the lo%,., er levels of managefnent. These days, the term 
denotes only the most juniur office staff and ter-ids to be almost 
a term of abuse if applied to soii,, eone of a miore senior stal'us. 
It should be borne in mind, therelore, that references in older 
studies to 'clerks' may not alwatys bear direct comparison with 
more recent studies. 
Lockwood (1958) has made perhaps the most influcntial of all 
studies of clerical workers, and traced the history of the 
clerk from the 'counting house' in the middle of the 19th 
century to the (then) present day. He concluded that the 
persistently higher-status of clerks over manual workers 
prevented them from identifying with the proletariat and froill 
developing a collective consciousness as an occupational 
group. He suggested that the two main sources of their 
status were: 
- 
market situation: clerks have traditionally had 
employment security, good pay and the possibility 
of progression to managerial posts. 
-t (31 - 
- 
work situation: clerks have traditionally worked in wall 
offices with close personal contact with-management and have 
used skills which are indbidualised and particular to one 
organisation. 
The combined effect of these two factors has been to prohibit the 
development both of a sense of common interest among office-workers 
as a whole, and also any identification with blue-collar workers. All 
individual orientation to work has been fostered by the ready 
availability of promotion as a means of improving an individuaYs 
status and rewards, and by the tendency to rely on personal patronage 
as a means of achieving it. All this has resulted in the disinterest 
of white-collar workers in any forN A collective action through 
tivade unions. 
However, the changes in the office environment during the present 
century have been immense, and the loss of many of the factors high-- 
lighted by Lockwood 
- 
close contact with management, individualised 
skills, promotion prospects 
- 
has been accelerating in recent ycars. 
This has been particularly through technological change which has 
reduced the level of discretion available to many office workers over 
the performance of their work. It must therefore be agreed with 
Braverman that if we ascribe to "the millions of present-day 
clerical workers the 'middle-class' or semi-managerial Woction of 
that tiny and long-vanished stratum of early capitalists, the result 
can only be a drastic misconception of modern socieV". (1974, P. 
293). Despite this, many values have tended to be retained by such 
workers, even though their basis may long since have virtually 
disappeared. 
Thus, office workers (especially men) have expectations of promotion 
prospects and skills requirements which are no longer justified by 
experience in today's modorn commerical offices. The deskilling of 
work, facilitatcd by computerisation, has both reduced the scope for 
the clerk's individualised contribution to the job and increased the 
level of day-to-day control over the performance of the work exercised 
- 
by those running the company. The scale of burcaucratic control to 
which many office workers are now subject presents a major hindrance 
to the maintenance of their traditional status and fulfillment 
of their traditional expectations. 
Lock%,,, ood recognised thall one of the factors which would be crucial 
for the future dev elopment of unionisation among clerks iý,, as the 
increased size of units of office workers. The emphasis has changed 
from small isolated groups of clerks to large conglomeratts of 
administrative iv., orkers. This aspect, often describr_-d as the 
bffl, eaucratisaýion of white-colildr workers' eii-i-ployi-i-iEnt (somilewhat 
misleadingly because bureaucracy is not simply a function of organi- 
- authors sational size) has been coriLmented upon by mainy subsequent 11 
(e. g. Kleingartner, 1968; Bain, 1972; LU111ley, 1973, among many 
others). There are several rea6ns winy this Should havla an effect on 
white-collar union membership, both directly and indirectly- It, is 
easier for unions to recruit amonq a large body of i%iorlke-rs because 
there is a stable core of long-term em-ployees and-a sense of security 
in numbers. Larger groups olf emp-joyaes are ais-V more likely to have 
developed, or be able to develop, a collective identity and perceive 
that collective action could be effective. A couple of dozen office 
workers in a factory. must surely feel less able to bring pressur2 
upon their employer-by collective action, compare-d with the ru. mpri- 
cally superior manual workers, and also have ail P. ý%, dreness of. greater 
-he large administrative vulnerability to reprisals. However, -11 
groups in both industrial and commerical firms often have as much 
disruptive power in collecLive action as their blue 
-collar counter- 
parts. 
In addition, union officials favour large groups of employees for 
recruiting purposes because they obtain more return in terms of 
numbers of members for the same amount of effort. Exactly the same 
factors of fragmented work-groups have long inhibited the recruit- 
ment of workers in the distributive and retailing trades, but to an 
even greater extent. 
A corollary of the increased size of work-groups is the loss of 
individuality resulting from being one member of a large group all 
engaged in similar wort Traditionally, Afices have been small units 
and clerks have had close contact with their manageis. They have 
viewed their progress (status and standard of living) as being 
dependent 
-on 
their individual efforts and their employer's willingness 
to reward these efforts favourably. This is becoming less and less 
the case as increased organisqtioDal size has led to an estrangement 
from members of senior management. Computerisation and rationali- 
sation have also encouraged the diminution of the hierarchy in the 
cause of economy and efficiency. Thus the scope for both individual 
influence and advancement has tended to be decreased. 
Blum (1971) maintains that office workers are losing St%; ýItUS because 
of the devaluation of their jobs through routinisation and mechalii- 
sation. He states that this could result in conservatism (quo-Cing. 
the German middle classes in the 1920's as, an example) which would 
in turn inhibit union membership. There is little evidence to 
support this in Britain in recent years. Cert-ainly, ASTMS attributes 
its substantial growth in the insurance industry in large reasure to 
the uncer-Itain-IJes caused by computerisation (Sherman, 1979). Sherman 
anticipates that the new micro-processor technology will cause the 
'industrialisation of i nsurance', aligning the insurance employee 
with the industrial worker who is, however skilled, "conscious of 
his insecurity and total dependence on machinen, hL, doesn't own, 
and could never buy" (P. 20). 
The growith of separate unions for vihite-collar v,, orkors in recent 
years SUgOeStS titat it is the close identification with blue-collar I t, L 11 1 
workers which may be feared, rather than a loss of status brought 
about simply by associations with trade unions per se. This is 
borne out by studies of Clerks in both the steel and coal-miping 
industries (Bowen and Shaw, 1972; Bo-vjen et a!, 1974). The coal 
industry clerks believed that union membership was necessary, but 
the majority wan-Led a separate clerical workers' union (rather 
than being part of the NUM)l because they felt that clerks formed 
'National Union of Mineworkers 
a distinctive occupational group, the interests of whiM could best 
be served by a union catering for that group alone. The clerW were 
also aggrieved by what they perceived to be their low level of 
influence with management compared to the manual workers. 
The clerks in the steel industry k-,, ere also members of the industry 
union (ISTC)l and similarly believed that clerks, had as much need as 
other worke:, s for a union to negotiate wii-h nanagen)ent on their 
-w -2 -1 Uer behalf. Some of them (50^,, U), hov., ever, were content ILh their r1lern' - 
ship of tile industry union, ý,,, hereas the other 50% i,.? o1j1d have preferred 
to be ii,, embers of a separate union for- clerks. Those ý,, rho wantetj a 
clerical union were found to be less satisfied than the others oil 
such matters as their pay, the intrinsic quali-ty of their %,., ork and 
-'-heir relationship with management. This may be an indication that L 
dissatisfaction with work by employees in insurance coimpanies could 
rebound against the union (ASITIS) in future years, if that union 
continues to spread its membership net yet wider and draw in k-ihite- 
collar workers from an even greater diversity ol wor1king and social 
backgrounds than is already "Aie case. It iý, Jll not the seer, as being 
able to cater adequately -for the needs of one specific group ol- 
members, i. e. the insurance employees. The high degree of autonomy 
accorded to individual insurance company memberships, and the 
special Insurance Conference, are deliberate atternp-ts on tile part 
of the union to avoid allegations of this sort. 
The deteriorating status position of o1fice workers has become a 
constant theme in the literature. Lockwood attributed the declining 
prestige of clerical work not only to b ureaucratisation but also to 
clerks' reduced economic and educational advantage over manual 
-ions being further Iblui, red by the fact that workers, the distinC 4L L 
young clerks are increasingly the offspring of manual ý, 
-,, orkers. 
Additionally, he suggests that with the inilux of wo. men into 
clerical uork, the status of these jobs has sunk to correspond with 
the gen2ral status of vs, om. en in society. As we noted from Crompton 
'Iron 
and Steel Trades Confederation 
-Io 's" - 
(1979) earlier, v,, omen could now be cons. idered the 'office 
proletariat' vii, th the. lovlest status jobs and few prospects of 
advancement. 
The increased employment of women in offices may have a two-fold 
effect, however. Not only has it led to overall loss of prestige for 
that category of employees, but several autnors have suggested that 
it has acted as a more direct impediment to union menbership. 
Lumley (op. cit. ) confidently asserts, and With no attempt at justi- 
fication, that 
-women are more conservative than men and also develop 
more loyalty to their employer (a view shared by Blum, op. cit. 
Both these features 
- 
if true 
- 
would clearly militate against union 
membership. Blackburn (op. cit. ) found among bank clerks that men 
were more interested than women in staff representation and attrib- 
uted this to a general lack of commitment among the women to their 
jobs because they rarely had long-term employment. prospects. This 
seemed to be a more feasible interpretation and is one shared Q. the 
union officials in Company A. They mentioned the difficulty in 
recruiting young female clerks and put this down to a lack of long-- 
term interest in their jobs. However, we have already noted the 
apparently contradictory evidence from Company B. 
From the point of view of the relatively unskilled female office 
worker, two considerations ma y assurne more importance than for her 
male colleagues. Firstly, her time horizons are often shorter 
(specifically for young women) and therefore the immediate questions 
of cost and benefit of union membership are put into sharper relief r 
(often placed against the background of the lowest salary levels in 
the organisation). Secondly, a woman who is not thinking in terms 
of a longer-term career may be more inclined to express dissatis- 
faction by moving to another employer, rather than voicing a protest 
- 
through union activity 
- 
within the current employer. The scope 
X ior job mobility for young people (of either sex) is greater, of 
course, than fol- older employees who are predominantly male. 
.. 
10 b- 
Dale (1963) noted that routina clerical duties and machýnery operatinq 
were being taken oyer by women, and-he resoryed his sympathy for the 
"real clerical proletariat" i. e. the male clerk missing promotton by 
being retained 
-on routine work. He suggested that clerks in that 
position are increasingly likely to turn to trade unions and take 
collective action as their individual advancement becomes more 
difficult. He noted that the clerks in his study (in a manufacturing 
industry in Liverpool in the early 'sixties) considered their status, 
salary and promotion prospects to be poor, and also claimcd a lack of 
job satisfaction. Despite this, very few had at that time considered 
joining a trade union; only nine out of 193'believed that cullective 
action through a union was more likely to improve their own position 
than personal training and qualification. The majority did not emen 
want a staff association in their company, the most common reason 
being that it would spoil existing good relations between employees 
and management. 
An emphasis or! the extrinsic rewards of work, was found by Vlerceiý; - and 
Wei r (1972) in thei r study of %%1hi te-col 1 ar 
-workers ina vari ety of 
medium to large companies in Hull, 41% of the clerks said that they 
would consider taking a mtanual job for more money 
-a far cry frCm 
the status-con-rciOUS clr-rks suggested by other studies. This 
instrumentalism was-echoed in their attitudes : -. owards unions, %ýAth 
the tangible benefits such as increased pay being emphasised. Union 
membership was low, however, (M), and the main reasons given for 
not joiniýq were that management's generosity made a union's 
negotiating skill unnecessary and that promotion prospecLs ware 
available to improve the individual's position. 
Promotion Prospects 
- 
Barrier to Unionisation 
The pre--c', ence of promotion prospects is seen by many authors as a 
barrier to unionism: "... a specific kind of job dissatisfaction 
the feeling that as ar -individual lie cannot get ahead in 'his work 
is the job factor that predisposes the white-collar employee to go 
pro-union. " Thus 1,11-ills (1951, P. 307) identifies the reduction of 
promotion prospects as the chief factor that turns white-collar 
empl oyees. to uniona, for which wa shall find evidence in Company A. 
However, there is little reason why an ethic of individuality, based 
on the presencc of a carcer laddor, should by itself prohibit or 
ideologically contradict collective action. Employees could, at one 
and the same time, both advance their individual careers and also 
seek to impiove the general stAtus and circumstances of the group of. 
employees to which they belong. The results of the study in Company 
A suggest that these employees would sanction collective action 
through their union in order to achieve an improvement in the scope 
for taking individual action, i. e. improved promotion chances. Any 
possible contradiction is likely to creep in when empl Uees perceive 
that their individual career prospects are endangered by collective 
action 
- 
but that is a pragmatic, not an ideological, problem. The 
'danger' of collective action also varies according to the type of 
collective organisation and how it is viewed by management. For 
example, an employee in Company B May have felt less secure (although 
not necessurily justifiably) about his promotion prospects if ho 
became involved with the staff association rathar than an active 
campaigner lorl AST1,11S. 
It is noi, however, necessarily an ideological objection to 
collective action that has hindered white-collar unionisation in the 
past (although the objections may have been given an ethical bia; ), 
but rather the fact that while employees could got what they wanted 
from their jobs through promotion, there was very little incentive 
to consider the possible advantages of'collective action. Silverman 
(1968) found contrasting attitudes about promotion as the primary 
source of rewards from the clerks he studied. Some subscribed to 
the belief in individual efforts and also maintained that their union 
should 
-cooperate with management to make th. - office more efficient 
t should respe, ct managerial prerogatives. Others believed and that i 
that clerks should 'stick together' and saw tile union as an aggressive 
organisaticii prepared to defend workers' rights. 
The most important feature influencing the clerks' attitudes in 
Silveman's study appeared to be tha degree of contact with manual 
workers who were used as a comparative reference group, and caused 
discomfort to the clerks who became aware of their diminishing 
differentials. This has been discussed by various authors and the 
assumed effects of contact with manual workers vary from that 
implicit in Silverman's work, i. e. that it will restrict white- 
collar unic6ism because of fearsof 'status contamination' (see also 
Blum, 1963; Sykes, 1964) to the suggestion that office workers arc- 
convinced of the efficacy of collective action by their observation 
-of mnanual workers' unions (Strauss, 1954; Kassalow, 1966; Paterson, 
1975). 
Sykes (1964) claims that whereas both manual workers and clerks view 
management as the 'other side', clerks are in the position of having 
the opportuni V to change sides: That is, many clerks do not expect 
to remain clerks for ever but to move into the ranks of manayooenL, 
and this colours their whole perception of the employment relation- 
ship. However, in the insurance industry, the day, of steady career 
progressions have receded. This view has been expressed by a 
General Manager cf Company B during a 'cost containment' exercise 
in 1975 (seu Appendix H), and was also an inevitable and apparently 
resented outcome of the salary restructuring scheme in Company A. 
An appreciable-number of middle managers in both these companies 
were offered and accepted early retirement during the early and 
middle 'seventies, and their vacant posts were not filled. The 
opportunity offered by widespread computerisation for rationalisation 
of jobs enabled the number of lower management posts to be further 
reduced through the lowiering of skill (and therefore status) levels. 
The basis of the ethic of individualism 
- 
the career ladder 
- 
has 
recei-vred a resoundling knock during the last d,, --cade, and those who 
have suffered have often also had new,, computer-oriented, rivals 
for pre-eminance in the decision-making processes of the 
oroani sati on. 
otl 
ASTI-IS believes that tile process of career stagnati. ori. will accelerate 
s. ti, l I further as. th& 'si. 1 i. con chi. p reyol uti. on'. qet_-ý 
-undo), way, 
jobs outside the insurance industry ivifll become -more acarce, slowi. ng 
down staff turnover, and even with policies of no redundancies 
"career opportunities must inevitably diminish for, some holders of 
special insurance skills".. (Sherman, op. cit. P. 23). Even for those- 
who are abl e to retain security of employment, the new technology 
4 
may bring a change for the workers, partlicularly in terins of 
decreased job satisfaction (Curran, 1979) among managerial st. all 
as well as routine clerical workers. The unions 
- 
or at least ASTMIS 
- 
are prepared to accept the i nev-i tabi 1, i Ly of 'Lechnol c-9-1 cal devel op-- 
ment, and cooperate with in its introduction 
- 
provided 
that their members are beneficiaries of the new technoloqy and not 
its casualtIE: S. 
Managerial Unionism 
As we noted earlier, attention has been shifting in recent years 
from the clerk as the important white-collar trade unionist to 
managers and other higher level professional employees. Union 
membership has become something that applies to managers personally 
and not simply a potential problem among the people they manage. 
The fact that this state of affairs exists indicates the non-arrival 
of the 'managerial revolution' when "managers will exercise their 
control over-the instruments of production and gain preference in 
the distribution of products, not directly through property rights 
... 
but indirectly, through their control of the state" (Burnham, 
1966, P. 72). Industry has not reached this manayerial Garden of 
Eden and many managers would be more in sympathy with Elliott's 
diagnosis that managers are in danger of "being lost in the middle 
of a gradual carve-up of power between the industrialist, the 
share-holders and the unions" (1978, P. 105). 
Ito 
Fiddle managers particularly are currently faced AS a dilemma. On 
the. one hand, they are-aware-of a need for a united YAce in order 
that their views- shall not be overlooked in the decisiontuaking 
process, as may happen when top management consults with industrial 
workers and their unions. On the other hand, the means by which 
they can make their views known (of which union membership is one 
of the most obvious) are perceived as presenting conflict with a 
fundamental tenet of the managerial ideology 
- 
that consensus of 
interest is inherent in industrial organisati6ns 
... 
and unions 
represent conflict of interests. 
This conflict may be partially resolved by the development of an 
For itl depend so miuch on, senior management I identity which does not 
legitimacy. That is, middle managers i-, )ay coma to accept that they 
do have special -interests, as do other groups of employees, which 
may -involve some form of opposition to top management. Hartmann 
(1974), in a study of German managers, found that they displayed- 
a strong group identity despite being heterogeneous in terms of 
income, educational and social background and occupationa-1 possition. 
They believed that some form of group organisation was necessary in 
order to obtain their fair share of participation in decision-makinn 
However, they were committed to a 'strategy of legitimation' i. e. 
avoidance of overt conflict. HarlLmann concluded that unless such 
managers developed a greater appreciation of the importance of power 
in collective bargaining, any managerial intervention would be 
doomed to ineffectiveness. These managers were committed to 
obtaining their demands by discussion and were L. Otally opposed to 
the use of sanctions. Such attitudes have also been found among 
professionals (Dickens, 1972). Development of a stroi! g gII-OUP 
identify and agreement on special interests does not therefore lead 
automatically to an abandonment of earlier. values; the conflict 
between means arid ends remains. 
Another way of resolving this conflict is by the formation of 
managers' associations which are often more akin to traditional 
profeasional associations than orthodox trade unions. An interes- 
ting insight into the-supporc for these associations comes from the 
PreNdent of the Association of Professional Scientists and 
Technologists in a letter to. the Financial Tim2s (28 January 1977): 
"The fact is that managers are neither employer's men nor 
followers of the po 
- 
licies of unions represcRing other 
grades. They are their own men, with their own distinctive 
and informed views on the ways their firms should he 
run. They certainly identi Q themselves with the interests 
of their companies and wish to do all they can to promote 
the efficiency and prosperi V of these since this is the 
only way in which they or any of the other employees in. 
the firm 
- 
can hope to increase their rewards and 
standards of living. But they also have the expert 
knowledge and readiness to criticise the way in which 
their companies are being. run and, if necessai 'Y' to iden-11"Ify 
themselves also with organisations which will enable them 
to make that criticism more effective. '' 
Membership of such an organisation is seen as complementing loyalty 
to the employer by Winforcing the special position of managers which, 
it is claimed, demands more overt. acknowledgement. 
A further inducement to membership of an association composed 
exclusively of managers is that it could be seen as leading to an 
extension of managerial prerogative 
- 
as hinted at in the letter 
quoted above. In theory, the 'dual loyalty' 
- 
to both the employer 
and the managers' association 
- 
which enables the managar to criti- 
cise the company more effectively, stems from and encourages a. 
deeper involvement in the company's affairs (Fogarty, 19Y6). Many 
managers are highly qualified and possess specialist knowledge of 
their company's business; this would enable the managers' association 
to engage not only in the usual bargaining about pay and conditions 
- 
of service, but also abomt wider aspects of the. managavent of the 
business, e. g, product design and investment-policy. In practice,, 
ho, vi, ever, if this wav. attempted with any leval*of serious intent, the 
members of the managers' association may discover that the prerogative 
in which they believed they shared was restricted to an even more 
exclusive circle at the top of the organisation. 
-interests Whatever disillusionment may await manage, s who trust their 
to this form of quasi-professi6na: 1 association, there is considerable 
resistance to be overcome before niembership of an orthodox, TUC- 
affiliated trade union becomes an acceptable form of manageriii-I 
behaviour, especially in the private sector. Volker (1913-5), in a 
study of NALGO, l noted that as it became more like a union and less 
like a wellare association, so the me-mbership became drawn i-riore from 
the junior levels rather than the high- rank-i ng manaq! ý,rs who had 
previously been the staliý., arts. It was thc loss of senior officials 
which led the Association to more aiiilitan-'C bargaining tactics 
-as a 
result of pressure from the loý. 
-,, cr ranks who ultimately constitutiý. sd 
the bulk of the membership. Somewhat contradictory conclusions are 
offered by Blackburn (op. cit. ) in his study of union and staff 
association members in a clearing bank.. He found that branch 
managers did prefer to join the staff association but that, overall, 
hierarchical status was not an important factor in determining the 
membership uf the two types of rep resentative organisation. 
Weir (1976) detected clearly unfavourable attitudes towards unions 
among his sample of managers. They believed that unions "had too 
much power" and preferred to be members of a staff association. 
Despite this, they believed that unions should not necessarily 
bargain only over the usual areas of pay and conditions of service, 
but should extend their activities to more direct involvement in 
the management of companies 
- 
which finds a strong echo in the 
results of the survey in Company A. Weir found evidence that the 
. ....... ..................................... 
National Association of Local Government Officers 
non-unionists. among the managers were more satisfied with their pay 
etc., and also identified more strongly with the company than the 
union members. There was no evidence to suggest which factor 
-- 
satisfactionlidentification and union membership 
- 
had a causal 
effect in the relationship. It could just as plausibly be argued 
that people became dissatisfied and less committed after having 
joined and been influenced by the union as that dissatisfaction led 
to union membership. 
There would clearly be considerable difficulties to be overcome if 
managers joined tho same union as those they manage. if the 
insecurity which prompts their need for such associations is perceived 
as a threatened loss of status, then jAning other, subordinate, 
grades of workers in a union could result in even further 'status 
contamination' (Bamber, 1976). There are also other difficulties; 
conflicts of loyalty could develop in the event of a call for 
industrial action given. the widespread antipathy among white-collar 
workers generally and managers in particular for any form of mili- 
tancy. In addition, managers would experience further threats to 
their authori V in a practical day-to-day sense with difficulties 
in the realms of discipline 
- 
manager disciplining subordinate 
becomes union member disciplining fellow-member. 
Managers and subordinates in the same union does not alv,, ays lead to 
such conflict, 'though. Fogarty (op. cit. ) found that when managers 
in the Irish banks went on strike alongside other grades who were in 
the same union, discipline and other aspects ot imanagerial 
efficiency were unimpaired in the long-term. It' anything, the 
united action carried over into. the problems of catching up with the 
backlog of work after the strike, and erizbled this to be done with 
greater effectiveness. There is, hcaovor, th-. cqually important 
consideration that the presence of- managers in the spFlie union would 
seem to many workers to be a complete negation of trade union 
principles. All these issues are probably jair more serious impedi- 
ments in industrial organisations (i. e. blue-collar workers and 
- 
liý. 
- 
management) than in organisations like the insurance companies which 
comprise solely white-collar and professional employees, and where 
there is n clear boundary between 'manager' and 'managed'. 
The emergence' of sometimes divergent interests even among managers 
has been one of the results of computerisation, especially in 
companks such as those in the insurance industry. Many managers 
who had already spent the greater part of their carvers in the 
industry 
-were confronted with the need to be familiar with at least 
the immediate effects of computerisation on their own work and that 
of their staff. Suddenly, they had to accept and depenj upon the 
expert knowledge of the new 'profession' of data processing experts. 
Prior to this, a middle manager in the insurance inclustry needed to 
master only -the knowledge relating to the SUbject-matter of hie-, 
area of the business. It is not necessary. of course, for an 
insurance manager to have anything like the same depth of spe, ýia_list 
ccinputer knowledge as experts in that fielid. but most have had the 
work ol theirl departmon-ts radicaily rcorganised and lCotally 
different daily work practices established. Neýý., deadlines and 
procedures, new standards necessitated by computerisation h, -: Iv, 
-, 
altered most 'line' departments beyond recognition in the last -10 - 
een tile 'line' departments - those dealing with 15 years. It has be 
the mass processes of policy issuing, claims payii; q and so on - which 
have been at the forefront of technological innova-tion. Thus, many 
middle managers have had to come to terms with a technological revo- 
lution over which they had no control but the consequences of whlich 
they have had to cope with. 
There appear therefore to be many reasons both for the emergence of 
a collective identity among the broad band of middle managers and 
also the pers-iistence of traditional values which inhibits its 
expression in any radical form. A study of iiianagernent unionisation 
in eleven countries in Western Europe (EAPM, 1979) has cowie to 
various interesting, though tentative, conclusions about the forces 
- 
us 
11 
. 
9orial unions, and it is worth conducive to the forniati. on of mana k 
citing them in some detail. It was. found that 
- 
there uas little dixect relationship between the density of 
management unionisation and overall union density; 
- 
good national economic perfor-mance (leading to high standards 
.L of living) militated against manag-ement unionisation, but 
poo*(- perfomance did riot necessarily encourage it; 
som, -- form of national consultative arrangeiments in the spherp. 
of incomes (employers' organisation/unions or government/ 
unions/employcr, s) en-.,,,, ura-. j,, d managcm-2nt unionisation, but the, 
performance of the arrangements was more importaitt than their 
- 
legal regulation of industrial relations (particularly in the 
spheres of Union organiation and recognition, employee 
participation in decision-making, and job protection) acted 
as an incentive to managers to form and join their own unions; 
- 
managers were reluctant to join unions which professed an 
egalitarian philosophy and had direct party political 
affiliations (presumably because these wei -e bound to be 
left-wing, although the report doas not say so). 
The Institute of Personnel Management undertook a survey of British 
managers as part of the international study, and found that the 
three main reasons given for joining a management union were: 
- 
collective bargaining; 
- 
more participation in organisational matters; 
a tendency to follow the trend i ri a company once other 
manaqers had started joining a union. 
The main roason for not joining was a re. jection of the general 
ethos of unionism and the political convictions with which it is 
associated, and also the desire to retain individual freedom 
(associated with a belief in achieving desired ends through promotion). 
-11o, - 
The-reasons for joining a unin focuaved on matter; within the workplace, 
wherew the. focus. of sopAni, Q tha reasons for not joining ware exteryal 
to the workplace. The report concludes- that "workplace factors are 
realistically aeen to be the notivation for unionisation and that 
resistance is more ideological", (P. 90), and suggests that managers must 
surrender some form of belief in order to protect their managerial interests 
in the workplace. This could also be said of many other union members, 
given the dominant Aeology of antagonism to unions, but it is reinforced 
among managers by the alternative ideology A individualism. However, it 
could be argued that "the special relationship with the owners of the 
business which made (managers) especially loyal to the owners' interests" 
( ibid. PA) pertains to an ideology which has long since lost its claim to 
majority adherence. It is a reasonable assumption that the growth ill 
managerial unionism has occurred in the largest organisations, whera the 
ties between employer and employee (including managers) are less close and 
visible. Possibly, a new 'breed'-of manager has grown up which does not 
subscribe to the ailegadly dominant ethic of mutual interest with the 
employer. Rather than a surrendering of beliefs in order to protyct 
material interests, wanagers' instrumentalism takes effect in the same way 
as other employees, i. e. they join unions because they believe that through 
them they will be able to achieve things that would othnrwise be denied them, 
Professionals and Trade Unions 
It is frequently suggestod -that the professional ildeology prompts an 
antipathy towards trade unions, and that. professional cinployees have 
I-ant than other -white-collar emplones to Lhere-lore been even more reluct 
.1 L' join unions. It could be arqUed that prof-essionals have less. need of 
unions because their interests are already adequately protected by their 
professional associations, This may well be so in some cases (ifie BMA, 
for example), but it probably does riot apply to the business professions. 
Only one of the professionals inte-rviewed believed that his 
-radC Union, (by restricting association performed the functions of a 1. 
entry to the profession and thus keeping economic pressure on 
-1 . hose %,. -, Iio maintained that theY had no ne-ed employers and clielits). 
-i- 
for a union generally qave the reason that ýLheir 'market value' 
sustained good promotion ppospects arid ready mobility to olt-jhar 
employers. Both of these factors are, Of COLIrse, -the result of 
control on the profession operated by the professional association. 
One of the main arguments used to explain professionals' reluctance 
to join unions is that the pursuit of prestige which accompanies 
professionalism is hindered by association with trade unions 
- 
organisations which are supported mainly by, workers in low status 
occupations. Blum (1971) found among the engineers he studied that 
a fear of 'contamination' by traditional unions Aterred proFessionals 
from union membership, and Amilar ideasrun through much of the 
discussion on the role of professional associations in preserving 
the status of particular occupations. 
Howeýer, it has also been suggested that concern to protect status 
may also have the reverse effect and push professionals towards, unions. 
Kassalow (1966), in a survey ol the development of white-collar 
unionism in the United States, comments that professionals may join 
unions because they feel their professional status is being 
infringed by constraints within the eimploying organisation. This 
suggests that the confli(A between pro. ': essional values and organi- 
sational control tha. t has been referred to earlier may result in a 
compromise -involving loss of professional prestige 
-a threat to the 
very core of professional-ism. 
This suggestion has been corroborated in the findings of a study by 
Dvorak (1966) of union grow-th in the engineering profession. He found 
that union membership increased rapitily during the 19-50's when the 
mass 
' 
employment of engineers in industry resulted in what was inter- 
preted in the profession as a loss of proiess-Iona"I status. Dvoralk 
F also suggests that the single most important factor contributing -to 
- of being engulfed the unionisation of engineers has been the threat 
by large bargaining units of production workers. Again, union 
membership was seen as a m2ans of re-establishing professional 
identity and status. 
- 
llý, 
- 
However. the effect of status, o)- the loss of i. t., on un4loni. s. ati. on is 
too complex to be reduced to a single fort-w1a. To soime circuri-istances. 
unions may be seen as a means of protecting stajL-. us; in other cases I 
it will be found 
- 
as in Prandy (1965) 
- 
that status-consciousness 
militates against union membership. 
Professional associations clearly play a vital role in the area of 
'prestige manufacture'. Generally speaking, professional associations 
are seen as being primarily concerned with Yhe continuation of 
professional ideals, which uphold economic considerations, but they 
do not nonvally have a bargaining role like trade unions. An 
economic impact cannot be avoided because professionalism is derived 
fyom a monopoly of knowledge which has utility 
- 
and therefore a 
market value. By restricting the supply of this knowledge (lengthy 
training periods, low examinatign pass rates, certification for 
practice), the professional associations ensure that the market value 
of their members remains at an acceptable level. 
In any event, it is misleading to draw too clear a distinction 
between prestige and economic goals; claims to prestige are not taken 
seriously if they are not backed up by economic status (Lansbury, 
1974). Professional objectives (i. e. those directly connected with 
prestige) and economic objectives are often inLertwined, and "to 
allot the first to professional associations and the second to trade 
unions is to be misled by different formulaMons of basically similar 
preoccupations". (Bain et al, 1973, P. 74). Nevertheless, whilst 
agreeing that the protective motive 
- 
both towards status and, less 
directly, money 
- 
is important among professional associations, there 
are strongly-held reservations among. professionals about unions. 
That this could result in a clash of values is shown in a statement 
issued by the Institute of Civil Engineers when it announced its 
approval of union membership as a means of improving 'pay and status'. 
The Institution said that "if a conflict arose between union and 
institution, then the professional body must come first. In such 
cases, however, the Institution's president would be prepared to write 
to the employer to seek his intervention with the union to prevent -a 
conflict of interests. " 
1 
Reported in the Financial Tinies, 17 February 1977. 
.- tig 
- 
The concern of profeavionals. forlmore than-money is a theme which runs 
through much of the literature. Prandy (pp. cit. 1 noted that his 
engineers were as much concerned with the content of their work as 
with their salaries and that they wanted their professional associa- 
tions to become more involved in the employment sphere. There was 
virtually ny support for this among the professionals interviewed in 
Company A. They appeared to be content with their professional 
associations' activities as disseminators of information and arbiters 
o-f professional standards. There was some support for the involvement 
of the union (ASTiMIS) in wider spheres Within -11-he Company (Other thar. 
simply pay and conditions),, although not as pronounced as arnong the 
non-professionals. 
Lan sbUI-Y (Op. cit. ), in his study of management s(D-. vices special is ts 
identiflied three groups of employees whose attitude towards their 
union and professional association was associated with their general 
ori'entation toaards their work: 
- 
'careerists' (those who intended to stay in their specialism, 
but move tip the organisational hierarchy), emphasised the 
benefits in their reasons for union membership and emphasised 
principle or obligation in connection with membership of, 
the professional association; 
'academic' (those primarily concerned %-. 1ith research either 
within or outside the cmploying organisation), supported 
unions in principle and joined professional associations to 
pursue specialised interests; 
'functionaries' (those who saw present specialist jobs as 
stepping stonesto line management) joined unionsin order to 
influence managerial decisions but took an instrum3ntal 
attitude to professional associations. 
Kleingartner (1967) quotes authors writing about professional 
associations who suggest that the difficulties between profe, sional 
- 
III-0- 
associations and unions can be eliminated by a union which is sensi- 
tive to the purely professional interests of its constituents. He 
goes on to dispute the feasibility of this suggestion because it 
: would result in a union which deliberately restricted its own 
bargaining power, most likely through a refusal to strike. If any 
one factor is raised to argue against professionals joining unions, 
if is this- question of the strike. 
I 
Stri kes: the Ideological Deterrent? 
In her study of UIKAPE, 
I Dickens (1972) comments that "strilkes are 
thought to be prejudicial Lto the public in-'Cerest to %,,, hich the 
professionals engineer's code bid's him have full regard" (P. 6'). 
Strikes are tile Most obvious inaMfestation of the clash bet%-Men union 
values 
- 
seen expressed as a power struggle betWeen wcrkers and 
- and--a employer 
- 
and the professionai-ethic of service to clients 
trust relationship with those who depend on the professionals' skill. 
I'llot only this, but strikes represent - to those members (if L'. he 
on the receiving end 
- 
trade unions at their most strident expression 
of the pursuit of self-interest. To emulate unions in this respect 
would involve professionals in the loss of their clain, to be uncon- 
cerned with purely extrinsic features of employment. 
Conflicting evidence was found in a study of APST 2 by Gill et al 
(1977). They noted "objectives designed to appeal to the upper 
echelons of the pay and status hierarchy" (P. 50), with little stress 
put on the ethical anti-strike argument (but note the letter 
reported in the Financial Times 
- 
RM). APST's objectives were 
listed as: 
- 
recognition of professional responsibilities; 
'United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers 
2Association 
of Professional Scientists and Technologists 
- 
at 
- 
- 
remuneration to reflect members' increasing contri. bution to 
society; 
- 
suitable reviards for the attainment of the professional 
qualification; 
with less sonsibility than has traditionally been the case about how 
those objectives could be achieved. 
The degrading impact of strikes as perceived by professionals is most 
astringently expressed by Moore (op. cit. ): 
V. the failure of the normal presumption of primary service 
to clients puts in doubt the claims of professionalism by 
the groups involved 
... 
A physicians or iak%, yers or 
professors choose to withhold services from needful clients 
to enforce economic demands, one is permitted to compare 
- 
that behaviour and their status with, say, plumbers and 
electricians; the result of such ccmparison would not be 
clearly favourable to the superior positon of those who 
claim professionals' status. " (P. 206). 
Strikes threaten professionals with loss of status iin various ways, 
but they also constitute another conflict, 
- 
with what "I'lle Professional 
Engineer' describes as the "loyalty that professional engInears 
instinctively feel for their employeIr" (quoted in Dickens op. cit. ). 
UKAPE maintains that 'it would rely oil 'reasonable behaviour' in its 
4- 
negotiations with empioyers in order to achieve its objecIlives, 
although a veiled threat is issued in the comment 
--that loyalty 
'tan 
, 
not persist indefinitely if loyalty is riot offered in re-turn 
... 
It need-not always be interpreted in the employer's favour" (ibid. 
P. 7, emphasis in original). As Dickens says, any union, 110 Mtltel- 
how concerned with professional ethics, mUSt 'deliver the. goods' if -it 
is to survive, especially if other unions are waiting to recruit 
disillusioned members. 
- 
ta 7). 
- 
This emergence Of loyalty to the employer in the face of a strike is 
interesting when, as we have seen, lack, of commiftment to the employer 
has often been deemed to be a more likely problem. Quite possibly, 
it is in many cases simply a good excuse 
-a legitimation of the 
refusal to strike. On the other hand, it is possible that the pro- 
fassional employee, deprived of clients as such, perceives his 
employer in*a client relationship to himself. The basis of 
professionalism is, after all, the need of the layman for the 
knowledge and skills that only the professional can supply. If there 
is no client, then the professional must experience certain diffi- 
culties in claiming his traditional status. in many respects, the 
employer is similar to a client: receiving professional skills for a 
price and dependent on the professional's abili V to perform those 
skills to the required standard. There are differences, of course, 
in so tr as most employers have far more control over the salary paid 
than most clients do over the feb, and rarely is there only one 
professional in an Organisation (or recruitable from elsewhere), thus 
diminishing the power which the'professional's knowledge not-mally 
gives him. over the client. 
The professionals in Company A took, little interest in union affairs 
tle ft could obtain for them that because -they felt that there was lit, LI- 
would not be granted anyway by the employer; they were also more 
inclined than the non-professionalis to give objections to industrial 
action as the reason for not joining. However, many expressed their 
sympathy for the non-professionals whom they recognised as being in a 
MUCh weaker, position and at the mercy of the economic sanctions of the 
employer. 141ost professionals are powerfUl enough to obtai n thei r 
rewards as a result of their control over a scarce resource (pro- 
fessional knowledge); only those employees who do not have this 
economic advantage have to resort to the final sanction of striking. 
Despite all these influences militating against strikes, evidence in 
Britain in recent years has shown that professionals of alrr., ost evcry 
description can be persuaded to strike in the end. In his historýv of 
the National Union of Teachers, Roy (1969) demonstrated that teachers 
despite believing that professional people "must display an 
- 
V2. % 
- 
impartiality and integrity whi, ch i, s beyond doubt" (P. 121) 
- 
were A- 
prepai, ed to strike tO ptýOtect thei, r seýcti-onal interoStS. Sectionalism 
was also noti, ced by Dickens (op. cit. ) in LIKAPE's activities because 
it expressed its willingness to suppart any political party in any 
i-i)easure that appears to advance the position of engineering in society. 
The suspicion lurks that professionals are as much motivated by self- 
Mterest 4 as other employees, although it is more effectively disguised. 
After all, status and prestige are rewards -0-2- same as money 
- 
and if 
the forimer result from a commitment to the public good and a service 
ethic, then professionals are not b6ing exactly disinterested in their 
adherence to these particular aspects ol the professionpi ethic. 
S umni ary 
Perhaps Hie single most signifi6nt area identified in pas-( sl. -udies 
is. career prospects, which haVe been continually noted as a crucial 
aspect of white-collar employment. it is the possibility of eeach 
employee moving up into senior man. agement levels i. n due course which 
gi, ves- the relati. onsh-ips. among organi. s. ation members, their di'stinctive 
emphasis 
- 
by all parti'es i-ri shared i. ntLerests and cooperation, it 
also gives rise to the traditional preference for individual act-ion 
to increase rewards rather than collective action through a trade 
union. 'Preference' may be a misleading word as promotion was 
comparatively easily gained (even if it did need a little patience), 
and the need for any other route to increased occupational status 
and rewards was hardly required until fairly recent years. 
Any appreciable attack on the career structure will therefore have 
profound and long-term repercussions on the whole organisational 
ethos, This concern about promotion is not likely to be restricted 
to those at the beginning of their careers; many managers are likely 
to believe that they could and should progress further. Promotion 
is, in fact, the key aspect of white-collar employees' expectations 
and a great deal more is dependent on W With promotion comes 
the opportunity for more responsibility, more interesting work and 
the greater use of skills and abilities, all of which have been 
I-I It. t. - 
valued aspects of white-collar employment.. The deskilling of jobs 
brought about by computerisation, and the loss of discretion and 
inte rest as a result, has been compounded by the loss of formal 
status through reduced promotion prospicts. Expectations at all 
levels are thwarted by the current conditions of office work. 
The threats of routinised office procedures have, however, been 
felt predominantly in the lower and non-professional ranks of 
companies; many lower-grade clirical jobs are now basically 
restricted to the servicing of computer processes. it would 
therefore be expected that significant differences would be shown 
by the extremes of hierarchical rank in the survey in Company A, 
with the non-fulfilment of expectations being more sharply felt 
among the more junior grades. 
c -'-; ii e The des. 1,1111ing of work. and the inidermi. ning of the career strU LL 
place tho traditional employeeýjemployer elati-onshJ-p under stress 
by challenging the basis of whit6-collar expectations. Mally authors 
- onslaughts on their have suggested that such employees can resist 
'ent be-Fure traditional status and expectations only to a certain ext 
theY turn to collective action in their own defence 
- 
indi-vidual 
haV4 
"r action 4ng cleaH. ) become less effective. That this has alreadY 
been the case in Company A was indicated by the events leading to 
the merger of the staff associations with ASTMIS. 
The survey results should give some insight into the extent to 
which those at opposite poles of their careers believe thei'--iselves 
to have been deprived of rewards in various areas and the extent 
to which they expect their union to defend their interests in the 
future. 
There are a number of factors which are likely to inhibit union 
membership and activity among professional employees. Whilst, as iý., e 
have seen, their expectations tend to be high, SO tOO are their 
achievements. Their control over a valuable resource 
- 
their 
professional expertise 
- 
ensures that they are %,, ell-rewarded with 
both status and maney. Should an employer fail thom in either 
respect, then they have greater mobility than those who have no pro- 
fessional qualifications to trade in the job market, and can move. 
more readily to a more satis', Facýory job. 
-0-S-t 
All this suggests that the professionals in Company A will have less, 
need for the support of a trade union, although there may be a 
greater interest among older (and therefore less mobile) persennel. 
They are more likeiy than the non-professionals to be sensitive , 
tov,, ards anything v. 1hich makes their status more ambiguous, and trade 
unions (es'pecially if tWe is a risk of action against their 
employer) mlay well be seen in this light. 
CHAPTER 5 
UNIONS: CHALLENGE 10 MINNAGERIAL UTHORITY 
IntrodUCti on 
The crucial difference between the two companies in this study in the 
sphere of industrial relations is that Company A recognised ASTMS for 
collective bargaining in 1970 after the Staff AssociatAns' merger 
with the union, and a stable relationship has been maintained since 
that date with union membership currently exceeding 80%. Company B, 
on the other hand, whilst having had a slowly growing number of ASTMS 
members since at least 1972, did not grant recognition until April 
1979 after a protracted and at times bitter struggle with the union. 
This latter company therefore offers an excellent opportunity to 
observe the changes in values and organisational relationships that 
take place as a union assumes an increasingly significant role within 
a company. 
The survey in Company A provides. data to test 
the hypothesis that a union may be seen by employees as a way of 
achieving expectations about work content and career prospects which 
have been thwarted by the increased bureaucratisation of work. To do 
this, a union would have to attain involvement in rule-making in areas 
which have traditionally been regarded as the sole prerogative of 
management. It could be predicted that management 
-would thoroughly 
resist any such initiative by a union. as a threat to its authority 
over its employees. 
The second study of the thesis concerns the way in which the manage- 
ment of Company B endeavoured to minimise the impact of ASIMS on 
managerial authority and decision-making. To do this, management had 
to retain as Much cont, ol as possible over events because every 
facility and coilcession granted to the union en route to recognition 
operates on a sort of 'ratchet' principle 
- 
once granted, it becrimes 
very difficult to return to an-earlier position. From the nianagement 
- 
point of view, therefore, every stop has to be carefully considered 
and timed in ordep to consolidate its advantage over the union and 
maintain clear authority over the employees of the company. 
Union Institutionalisation 
The decreasing resistance of white-collar 2mployees to trade unions 
has been attributed, at leist in part, to union institutionalisation 
in modern. industrial society. For example, RuthArnhauser (1961) 
states that "under certain conditions, unions become institutionaliscd; 
that is, they are accepted as legitimate participants in industrial 
rule-making" (P. 51). She indicates that this leads to the situation 
where "conformi ty tends to become obligatoy" and union membership is 
no longer restricted to those with especially favourable attitudes 
towards trade unions. However, 
Ve 
offers little explanation for the 
dynamics A union institutionalisation, although implying that it has 
its roots in the working conditions of manual labour with non-mabual 
membership rates. varying jointly, ipfluenced by the strength of manual 
unions. 
What is frequentlY meant. by institutionalisation in the literaLure is 
an acceptance of -Mons as a permanent facet of industrial life. In 
the wider social and political context, 
-unions have become inStitUtion- 
alised in the s'ense that their national leadership is novu, consulted 
and accepted as a legitimate voice in national econor.. -dc policy-making. 
Unions are also represented in many quasi-govarnmental indust-rial 
bodies. This process has developed erratically for roany years, with 
the gains made during favourable adri-iinistrations and war-years 
subsequently lost. The 'sixties and 'severities saw trade union 
involvement in governmnent-level polic. -T-n-king =11--isively increased, 
although that has received a set-back recently. It does seem unlikely, 
though, that the union voice 1will go unheard in the- future 
- 
even if 
regularly ignored. 
However, institutionalisation for our purposes is a process confined 
primarily to one organisation, in this case Company B, although union 
- 
activities in one company may well have an indirect affect on 
activity in another. To place this in the context of the insurance 
industry, it seems entirely feasible that employees in other companies 
were influenced by early union achievements in those few companies 
(e. g. Company A) which first-granted recognition in the early 'seven- 
ties. Negotiating successes were certainly used by ARMS in their 
recruitment campaigns in Company B as an enticement to membership. 
So while formal authority and legitimaticn had been achieved V 
recognition in only three of the major companies by the end of 1972, 
the consequence of that could have affected the perception of 
employees, as they made their decisions about union membership, in 
other companies in the industry. 
Institutionalisation is, to quottle Perrow (11972) "the process of 
organic growth, wherein the Organisation adapts to the strivings of 
internal groups and the values if external society" (P. 190). The 
union aims to participate -in the coiiipany's decisiloin-making processe's 
and develop procedures -For brinýing the demands and actiVitieS Of its 9 
members within the fraýmewol`k Of CSt3blished relations beltv: een employer 
and employees. In other words, the union must gain access to the 
bureaucratic rule-making process if it is to succeed in putting forward 
the interests of its members against thoso of management. - This 'is what 
it achieves in some limited sense wher it is r-2cognised for collective 
bargaining. What is more diflicult to achieve (and certainly does nol, 
seem to have been tackled by the unions in insurance companies) is being 
in a position to regulate on the matters to which rUleS shall apply 
(e. g. salaries or job design), and framing procedural rules for such 
subtantive rule-inaking. In this area, managrement's authority is 
virtually unchallenged. 
The unions work starts much earlier than recognition, when it gains 
the acceptance of the first employee, and decision-making by indivi- 
duals on membership becomes part of the process of changing norms 
within the organisation. Blau (1964) refers to institutionalisation 
as "the emergence of social mechanisms through which social values 
and norms, organising principles, and knowledge and skills are 
transmitted 
... 
" (P. 26). It is a continuous process of the 
- riet 
crystallisation of predominant nonBs and values, which serve to 
legitimate changing patterns of behaviour. in due course, actions 
which had originally been statements of personal motives by the 
individual actor become part of the institutional framework; that is, 
they become 'objective' and potentially repeatable by other actors 
without changing the commonly-held understanding of that act, rather 
than part of an individual's 'subjective world'. Therefore 
for example, the actions of the first few union members can really 
only be ubderstood in the light of those inoividuals' personal 
circumstances and motivations: when there are several hundred members, 
each individual is less importaDt as an explanatory factor in the 
phcnomenon and the institutional setting achieves greater 
significance. 
As the values and behaviour associated with union membership become 
more extensively shared among employees, pressure develops for associ- 
ation vith the established channels of authority and the formalisation 
of procedure. In Company B, this can be seen in the way in which 
constant attempts were made by the union to establish lormal recognition 
of various facilities (e. g. use of noticeboards, meetings on company 
premises, distribution of literature in the office) which ý,; ere origi. 
- 
nallly granted on a discretionary basis, and viewed by management as 
privileges rathe-r than rights. Similarly, the Staff Association 
constantly tried to obtain facilities correspondinq to those granted 
L, to ASTMS. Management controlled this situation by establishing minimum 
levels of membership to be achieved before facilities would be granted. 
This also constrained management, of course, who were then obliged to 
comply with their o%-In rules when such membership levels were reached. 
When the decision was made to grant facilities (depending on the level 
of support in each office), legitimacy was bestowed by management on 
union activities. But by increasing the foiTaallsation of union 
activities in this way and applying certain rules of procedure to them, 
management gained some control over behaviour from which they had 
previously been excluded. Union activities were originally conducted 
only in non-working hours away from office premises, and communications 
relied much more on word of mo uth and irregular memoranda. By granting 
- 
foriDal facilities, management increased their level of kmowl edge of 
the Situation and therefore their control over it; the union c1hallenge 
to managerial aUVIOrity was made wore visible and therefore easier to 
cope with. It had in effect been brought w, ithin tile scope of 
managerially-deterim, ined bureaucratisation. 
ASTMS also tried for some time during 197617 to obtain management's 
agreement to the enshrinement of all existing facilities in a formal 
document. This, however, was constantly refused; such Pgreement would 
have effectively annulled management's right, as they perceived it, to 
rescind the 'privileges'. In other words, it would havc become a 
matter of joint determination rather than solely that of management. 
All along, then, the union's interface with tho organisation was 
bureaucratised by management and rational criteria established for the 
formal role to be played by the. union. The union was basically 
sy1ject to bureaucratic Pule-making, rather than being a part of it, 
although this is not to dispute that it was also a beneficiary. 
As the union's role in the organisation was moire formalised, it became 
part of -the bureaucratic structure. But the union is not only subject to 
orqanisationa-lly-imposed rules I- 
- 
it intends also to assuiiiie a role in the 
rule-making process. This process does, however. 'have certain conse- 
quences which are no_t intended and which serve -co inhibit iýiiembers' 
involvement in union activity. Authority -within the union tends to 
become concentrated in a few people 
- 
those connected with the 
-he behaviour of the majoritty organisation decision-making 
- 
whereas 'I 
of the members is conStrained by the outcoi-ýia of the rule-making pro- 
tedures as in any other bureaucratic process. Union activities tend 
to become as impersonalised as other aspects of bureaucratic orqani- 
sation, with the majority of members participating very little in 
matters of general importance to the membe rs hi 41p. 
Flanders suggests that the primary objective of a union in obtaining 
recognition and engaging in collecHve bargaining is to become part of 
the formal authority Structure and to share in rule-making PrevioUS1.1p, 
restricted to management alone (1975). However, this is restricted 
after recognition in insurance companies to such areas as pay and 
conditions of service, although the union may attempt to "tend its 
influence furthor. At preseot, it remains far short of the 'job 
regulation' suggested by Flanders (or. ). cit. P. 221). fn Company B, 
management was very anxious to enAre that the most crucial areas of 
their prerogative, e. g. working methods, were excluded from the 
procedural agreement which detailed ASTMS' bargaining rights. However, 
the union is not in a position before recognition to offer any 
imm2diate rewards to its members, even Mse rewards which are often 
assumed to be most desired by union members, i. e. negotiated higher 
pay, and which are often accepted by management as legitimate bargain- 
ing areas. The union inability to provide these rewards therefore 
retards the development of its own authori q as a legitimate 
representative of emplUees in bargaining with management. 
This can again he illustrated by events in Company B. By 1976; 
management was concerned that union membership remained comparatively 
low and wanted it to be increased, preferably to an appreciable 
majority, before recognition was granted. The union, on the other 
hand, argued that people would only be interested in joining after the 
union had been recognised for collective bargaining and was in a 
position to negotiate on terms and conditions of service. That is, 
until the union was able to offer some 'rewards' for the required 
behaviour (taking out union membership), then that behaviour could not 
be expected to occur. And, in turn, the rewards would not be offered 
until the uniod was legitimated by the achievement of organisational 
authority. 
Managerial Authority 
In Weber's concept of legal/rational authority, logitimacy is claimed 
from obedience to an established impersonal hierarchy of positions 
within an organisation, and the allocation of spheres of Vesponsibili 
to office-holders. Authority results from the compliance of organi- 
sation members to group norms rather than the coercive power of one 
particular individual or group (e. g. management). Blau (op. cit. ) 
- 
1,6?. 
- 
states that the "distinctive feature of authority is that social norms 
accepted and enforced by the collectivity of subordinates constrain 
its individual members to comply with the directives of a superior'' 
(P. 200). So certain people in an organisation have authority because 
shared val"es result in a distribution of rights and duties according 
to hierarchical status. 
However, authority may be diminished, or is at least threatened, if 
a the expression of it is challenged by those subject to it. Legitimzcy 
- 
the author, f others is accepied as a righ' r, eans Uat -IIC by those LLL. sty o 
at that subject to it, and therefore any challenge to it indicates Itht 
1- right is -Ill 0, UUStiOn. For example, i-iiianageman-IL. 's authori-ty over one 
aspect of remuneration in Company B- the house pUrCha. Se scheme (see 
Appendix V., )- was challenged by employees. The legitimac., y, oll 
manageiment's proposals to reduce the value of the scýeme t,, Pas widely 
questioned, because existing art-ýangenients had been unaltered For so 
long that they had acquired the Status of a right to employees. 
The greatest danger from management's point of viev., in this instance 
was that the union would recognise 
- 
as indleed it did 
- 
4-he %ve-kening %. I LI 
(ho, v,, ever temporary) of managerial authority over their employees on 
iSSUeS such as this, and uso it to -11hpir own advantage. lv; horeas thn 
crisis for management would not necessarily last for long (although 
in fact the aftermath of the mortgage issue lingered for years), tile 
in creased authority of the union %-, 'ould not correspondingly diminish. 
This 'does not mean, however, that people within the organisation m6st 
make a fundamental choice between union and management. What happens 
is a shift in values to allow an accommodation by individuals of a 
new expression of authority over employees (the union) so that 
management's authority must be constantly reafffirmied and the extent 
of it renegotiated in its dealing with employees and union officials. 
Blau suggests that the "sanctioning power of management which rests 
on the organisation's resources 
... 
enable it to provide recurrent 
rewards to its members (which will) greatly Facilitate the individual 
manager's task of winning his subordinates' legitmating approval 
- 
of his authority" (op. cit. P. 222). That is, because nianagers' 
authority enables them to grant reuards (e. g. promotion, pay rises) 
to subordinates, this reinforces their subordinates' acceptance of 
or, at least, acquiescencein their authority. Thus, whilst management 
continues to 'deliver the goods' in terms of salaries and career 
prospects etc., ei-iiployees will riot dispute their authority. VIlien the 
management side of -j', he bargain is seen as failing, or threatens to 
fail, so employees (regardless of whether they are unionised) less 
readily accept managerial Interpretations ofthe situation. The 
fundamental basis of P.,, anageriai authority is not so readily challenged 
'be-cause of deeply rooted social values, but i-tierely its expression in 
one particular sphere, e. g. remuneration, at one particular tiai2. 
Indeed, the c'nallenge to managerial authority apparent-ly represented 
by union membership and activity. can be over-estimated, For example, 
in the instance of Company B's house purchase scheme (see AppendiX H), 
it would perhaps be more accurate to say that employees Lbe-r-eved that 
they had a right to dispute management's decision, rather thall 6at 
management had no right to ILIjake that decision in the first place. Thý- 
legitirriacyof authority does not bind the office-holders to an 
absolute POSitiori on all issues (of superiority and subordination) but 
allows some discretion; parameters exist for decision-making and 
- 
to challenges occur within those parameters. The fundamental right 
make those decisions is rarely challenged because the va-wes under- 
pinning the emp loyee/employer relationship are so internalised in our 
society. It is the limits of discretion that must be negotiated and 
fought for by management (and union), either, through some formal 
. 
means (e. g. collective bargaining) or by more informal judgments 
about employee reactions and cooperation, in order to retain or n gain 
authority over employees. Management and union become engaged in 
constdrit attepipts to swing the balance of poi%ter Further in their own 
favour. 
However, union membership does imply the acceptance (pr at least the 
passive reception) of certain values at odds with the traditional and 
authoritarian perception of the employer/employee relationship. As 
these values become more commonly accepted among organisation members, 
I- 
tatr 
so pressures for change will emerge, affecting all aspects of organi-. 
sational behaviour and the authority with which it is supported. This 
is not simply an inexorable transition from one set of values to 
another with no accommodatio. n of dissidence. It is more a precarious 
and compromising process, usually with various groups within the 
organisatign fighting to ensure the continued existence and preferably 
dominance of their preferred norms of behaviour. In Company B. this 
is illustrated by the Staff Association which represented a number of 
employees with certain values in opposition-to those of the union 
members. In the end, though, it was managesent that finally ended 
the Staff Association's aspirations, even though the personally-hek 
views of management and Staff Association members were much more 
congruent with each other than with ASTMS. 
I 
By eventually abandoning the Stafl Association, manage-men-t 4-asfil-eed 
Lions with ASTMS. The union to shore up its authority by its negotiat 
would clearly continue to challýenge management: s authority in every 
way it could, and these challenges threatened that. authority if 
supported by employees, By formally recognising the union's role in 
the organisation and sharing ccert. Ain decisions --with it, i-management in 
lact preserved its authority and made its legitimacy easier to sustain. 
I ted and channelled into mutually agreed 1he union challenge was limit 
sphere s, and rules for the operation of the relationship were 
established in the procedural agreement. Management wer. -, incidentally, 
convinced that JL-. ne union %,,, ould break these rules alt every possible 
opportunity, which is probably a misjudgment given the union's need to 
maintain the legitimacy of its own authority by acting in accordance 
with the values of its membership 
- 
i, ihich would include keeping the 
rulos. U'llien thc. unicn 
.,. 
as finally recognised by managei-ii. -nt for 
collective bargaining, it undoubtedly achieved an increased legitimacy 
in the eyes of employees, especially being the 'iriddle class' 
professional employees who identify with management on ideological 
grounds. 
ý- 1ýýs - 
CHAPTER 6
THE RECOGNITION OF ASTMS 
I ntroduc-ti on 
This Chapter provides a comparison of thp process by which ASTI-IS 
was recognispd in hoth Companies. Whilst this occurred in 
Cwtipany A in 1970 after a series of circuinstances led to the 
staff association and union merger, it was only eventually 
achieved in Compaoy B -in 1979 after a lengthy struggle by tile 
union. Because of the time that has passed since recognition 
in Company A, it has not been possible to provide a detailed 
description or analysis of events, although the main factors are 
highlighted in the lollowing section. The study of uhion 
recognition in Comipany B is far more de-Cailied, for reasons 
-o do with its later occurrence, and provides a good partly f, 
opportunity to observe the ways in which, the management attermpted 
to preserve their authority against erosion by the union. 
Despite the dissimilarities in the procedure by i-,, hich union 
recognition was achieved in the two companies, the organisational 
background is Much the same in each. The experience of 
-ion and the impact of computerisation had upset rat-lonalisall t, 
employee expectations especially concerning career prospects. 
However, the manner in which -these changes i-grere implemented arid 
the handling o-F other issues by the managements of each company 
affected the collective reactions of the employees. Some other 
Ny in the conclusions to this chapter and factors (considered brie-i 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8) i-,, ere also influential, of 
which the concentration of staff into varying numbers of 
administrative centres was probably the most important. 
- 
I? % 
- 
The Recognition of ASTMIS in Company A 
The Company's staff had been represented since the 1920's by thrce 
staff associations, (Chief Office male staff, C. O. female staff and 
Divisionaf Office staff) which formed a Liaison Committee after World 
War 11 to consider items of mutual intercst. This committee had 
access to the Company's senior management, but did not have formal 
negotiating rights; management retained the right to refuse to accede 
to any request without further consultation with the committee. 
Major pay issues were dealt with by ad hoc committees. 
A consultative system was developed in 1960 which involved the 
formation of the Office Staff Joint Committee. The staff associations, 
Liaison Committee elected five 6presentatives to the Joint Committee 
to meet management approximately once a quarter, with the use of ad 
hoe committees being retained for the more important issues suQ as 
pay. This system, which certainly involved a nmre openly acknow- 
ledged element of negoLiation than_previously, continued for a decade, 
although evidence of widespread apathy among the staff associations' 
membership put a brake on any power they might have Maloped. 
Towards the end of the 'sixties, the need for change was emphasised 
by various fattors, some pertinent to white-collar and professional 
employees generally, and others relating specifically to the staff 
of this company. The major factor in the first category was the 
national economic climate and particularly the series of incomes 
policies which restricted salary increases. Company A employees 
received increases of 2.5% 
- 
3%, but were able to see the strong 
manual unions override the incomes policies and gain increases of 
twice that size and more. This caused discontent in the company, 
A cl,, nc%-., I edgemen tt : The data for this section have been drawn 
largely from a paper prepared in 1973 by NJ Mortimer, at that time 
a member of the Coi-iipany's personnel depal'tment. 
- 
VYI 
- 
as it did among many traditionally highly-paid white-collar groups 
v4hc saw their earnin t, 
_qs 
differenti. als being eroded. 
In 1969, the feeling emerged during a protracted struggle over a pay 
offer that the staff association, were inherently unable to act 
effectively against management in such negotiations. Members of the 
Liaison Committee, who visited the Department of Employment and 
Productivity for advice during the dispute, returned feeling that 
they had not been taken seriously because they were 'only staff 
associations'. Despite this, morale and interest among the membership 
rose to an all-time high. The possibility of union representation 
began to be discussed. 
Three main events, internal to the company, increased the unsettled 
feelings among the staff. All pf these caused insecurity and an 
alienation from the top management. In 1908, job evaluation was 
introduced with inadequate prior explanation and the l'ack cf inform- 
ation created an air of suspicion awong the staff... The following 
year, the staffs' apprehension was compounded by the introduction of 
clerical 
.,., 
o-rk measurement with the aid of a firm of manage. -Pent 
cons ul tants. The declared intention of this exercise 
. 
%,,, as to reduce 
the comqpany's office staff by 25%; the virtual lack of any other 
detailed information caused considerable anxiety about job security. 
Finally, at about the same time, the company's computerisation 
programme got into full swing and this brought (to the surface furthpr 
fears of redundancy and unappetising changes in job content. 
All in all, then, the late 'sixties brought a battery of problems 
for Vic staff asseciations to cope with, and an increasirg awareness 
of their inability to do so effectively. The fact that top manage- 
ment was abie to introduce radical new working Methods without 
consultation highlighted the weakness of the 'gentlemen's agreemnent, 
formula of neaotiation between staff associations and manaaement. 
in the light of these real Isations, a sub-comimittee of the Chief 
Office i,, iale staff association (the leading force of the three) was 
forr; ied in-February 1969 to co nsider alternative COUrses of action. 
I- 
The possibi iity of strengthenIng the existing ý-taff associatior 
structure by increased fundin 
.9 
and the appointment of a ful I-ti, mie 
General Secretary was mooted, but this was rejected by management 
despite king offered the prerogatilve oljý-' nominating the candidates 
for the full-time post. 
the sourco of the needed extra strength for staff representation would T 
therefore have to be some organisation external to the company. There 
were three possibilities 
- 
the Guild of Insurance Officers (GIO), the 
National Union of Insuran"ce Workers (NUIR) and ASKS. The first of 
these, the GIO, had little to recommend it. It had a reputation for 
being left-wing, although this cannot have been a'major stumbling 
block as ASTMS, the eventual choice, did not exactly hide its own 
left-wing political tendencies. More importantly, then, the GIO had 
failed to prove in over 50 years of existence that it could be an 
effective organisation for chambioning employees' rights and interests. 
It seemed unlikely that the staff would support a transfer to such 
an obviously weak body at a We when they needed a determined-- 
advocate. The GIO was therefore ruled out. 
The NEW was a Plore likely choice and was favoured by several of thia. 
commi ttee. It had represented the company's fileld staff for some 
years, and therefore offered the prospect of a unified front against 
management. However, there ý%, ere several major draý,, backs t-ý, hich 
eventually caused its rejection. There was the feat, that tile 
interests oil the office staff would be Subordinated to thwze of the 
numerically superior field staff. In addition, the union had 
concentrated on the representation of the lower-paid and lower status 
members of the field staff, there was little evidence that it could 
adequately protect the interests of the more senior members. And in 
any event, it had little in the way of recent. negotiating success 
%,., ith which to impress the staff associations. 
Their eyes therefore turned to ASTMS. The imuge of the union 
- 
militant and somewhat elitist in its championing of the special 
interests of white-collar employees 
- 
accorded well with the mood 
of the staff. It offered strength in the form of a broadly-based 
-I i0l 
- 
organisation with considerable expertise and experience, but was 
also prepared to grant an unusual degree of autonomy to the 'Company. 
A Section', should it materiallse. No doubt it was the concessions 
of 'self-government' which eventually overcame the reservations of 
the members of the committee who were basically opposed to mainstream 
trade unionism. To AAMS, just turning its attention to the finance 
sector, the prospect of sudden substantial membership in the 
country's largest insurance company must have seemed an extra. 
- 
ordinarily exciting prospect.. 
The committee finally agreed on AsTMS and their task became the 
persuasion of the staff to the same choice. This was made easier by 
the fact that during the preliminary discussions about representation, 
management had made the pay offer reterred to earlier and which had 
caused widespread dissatisfaction among employees. ASTMS were, in 
the end, given the opportunity to sell themselves at mass mcetings 
held in the theatre in the London Head Office. The first was for the 
G. O. male staff and attracted a capacity audience of 1,500. 
--- 
Clive Jenkins, General Secretary of ASTMS, addressed the meeting and 
quickly calmed the fears of those who were mistrustful of his 
colourful and aggressive personality. No doubt he had little diffi-- 
culty in telling them what he knew they wanted to hear. At the end 
of the meeting, the motion that a ballot be held for transference. 
to ASTMS was passed almost unanimously. 
The second meeting was for C. O. female staff, although there was by 
this time a feeling that the male staff had, by their vote, already 
decided on the holding-of the ballot. As it happened, Clive jenkins 
could have caused a backlash among the women voters by turning up 
very late for their meeting. I recall sitting in the theatre and 
sharing the sentiments of the hundreds of other women around me 
- 
he wouldn't have dared be this late for the men! In the end, we 
forgave him and also voted overwhelmingly for tha ballot. 
It is worth pointing out that during all the disturbance cau-sed 
by the organisation of the mass meetings, there was no sic-in of any 
obstruction (or indeed, life) from management. 
- 1.0- 
The preparations and publicity for the ballot. began. Thare t-; ere to 
be three separate votes for the membership of'each o-F tile three 
staff associations. On the Friday before the first vote, 
employees arrived at work to find on each desk a circular frorm 
management detailing a pay increase of M4 
- 
extremely large by 
the standards of the day. There was no explana-tion and the offer 
was totally unexpected. The circulars were read with incredulity 
and more than a certain amount of darisior;. The general feeling 
- 
at least among the people with whom I utas working 
- 
aas that 
it was a last minute attempt to 'buy oif' the sltafif belfore the 
ballot anet dreamed up, we assumed, at the %-Ieekly Board T11--etin. 9 
held the previous afternoon. The chances of the Stilff -rejecting 
ASTMS in the ballot plummetted. 
The staff associations were takhig no chances however. After tne 
weekend, staff returned to work to find another circular (in their 
desks, this time arguing that the 10% pay increase* (which had been 
4 immediately accepted by the associations) was intended as a bribe 
and was an insult to the intelligence of the employees. In the 
ballot later that week, the members of all three staff associations 
voted overwhelmingly for a transfer to ASITIS. Tile poll. V, as v, 
-, 
ry 
high, with 88.4% of tile C. O. male staff, 76.3% C. O. female staff 
and 91.5% Divisional Office staff having voted. The perceptagfý, s 
of voters in favour was 91.3%, 83.8% and 93.9.,., respectively. 
The date was May 1970. The procedural agreement betwcen the union 
and the company (management having agreed to recognise ASTHS 
for collective bargaining after the ballot) was negotiated 
during the succeeding few months and signed in August that year. 
- 
tý, O 
- 
THE RECOGNITION '017 ASUIS IN COI%IPAI,. 'Y B 
Introduction 
The study in Company B was conducted during the months January to May 
1979, which included the eventual recognitipn if ASTAS in April of 
that year. The primary source of information was the very compre- 
hensive file of documents relating to union and staff associatQn, 
activities which had been maintained by the Personnel Department. 
This procedure was instigated by the (then)Assistant General Manager 
(Personnel) shortly after his appointment to that post at about the 
time (1974) it became clear that ASTMS was going to begin a sustained 
attempt to gain recognition for collective bargaining in the 
Company. 
This file contained reports prepared for senior managemeant and the 
Board on various issues relating to ASTMS' and staff association 
activity; reports of conversations and telephono calls -wi th anyone 
connected in or outside the Company with eilther the union or 11he 
staff association, and also details of the curr---rit rumours. it also 
contained copies of official circulars from managem-, 
-ýnl. tue Staff and 
copies of WINS and staff association literature which had b, ýen 
generally released. The information contained in the file therefore 
represented a management perspective of events oil the ý-, Aholiee; this is 
inherent in tile narrative of the case-stucly which constitutes the 
tribution to this thc-sis. 1.4herever possible, second empirical con'. 
quotations have been made from relevant docuwents; where it is 
j, ta L 4, their correct Interp LI , 
t1he MICIE, 
considered essential foi i? DII
nature of the source has been sta-11, ed. Other unattributed Quotations 
have been taken from the various management documents and memoranda, 
aind their general source should be obvious irom tho contexi.. 
-Hj.. ')- - 
Apart from being able to gain W own opinions by watching events 
that went on around me as I worked in the Personnel Department and 
talked with the staff there, I was also able to have extensive 
interviews with about a dozen key members of the Personnel management. 
These included the General Manager (Adminiqtration) previously 
Assistant General Manager (Fersonnel); Personnel Managers at the 
[love, KingWood and Temple Court head offices; the Chairman of 
the management team involved in the negotiation of the procedural 
agreement and the manager responsible for mqch of the work which 
led to the introduction of the Consultative System. Again, they 
obviously reflected a primarily management viewpoint, Out gavo 
valuable personal interpretations and also helped throw light on 
the different stylas of working life in the various offices. 
The report which follows is a study of management's response to 
an apparent challenge to its authority 
- 
an external agent wishing 
to become involved in internal decision-making. Only gradually 
over five years did the union achieve the status of legitimate 
representative of the company's employees, and during this time 
management worked to lesson the impact of this threat to its control 
of the Company and its employees. The final recognition of ASTMS 
can be seen as an accommodation of this threat, the boundaries of 
which will have to be constantly renegotiated in the future. 
Chronology 
1971 August 
1974 Plovember 
1975 June 
July 
1976 February 
14 
. 1arch 
1977 April 
August 
19118 February 
March 
May 
June 
June 
September 
November 
1979 January 
February 
Febraury 
March 
Apri I 
- 
Consultative System established 
- 
ASTI-. S claims sole bargaining rights 
Staff Association fot-m3d 
Referendum on recognicion of ASTMS 
A, )T!, 'S' Section II reference SULAIii Ueel to ACAS 
ASP, VS granted certificatc of indpendence 
Staff Association High Court case 
ACAS SUrvey 
F First ACAS draft report 
- 
Staff Association granted certificate of 
i ndependence 
- 
ASTIMIS inforwied recouition will be granted, 
,JL 
subject to certain provisos 
- 
ASTMS' management sponsored rec-ruitumen-It. 
campaign beg-ins 
Staff Association Section I! reference 
submitted to Ar. AS 
ASTMS/Company procedural agreement negotiated 
'ion changes Section I-I reference Staff Associat 
to claim for joint bargaining rights with ASTIMS 
- 
ACAS refuse to proceed with Staff Association 
reference 
- 
Second ACAS draft report 
- 
Company's Board decides to recogn"Ise ASTMS 
- 
ASTMS/Cowpany procedural agreem2nt signed 
- 
First Joint Consultative and Negotiating 
Coiraiittee meeting. 
ASTIMS' Claim for Sole Bargaining Rights: ', rile_ Referendum. 
(November 1974 to July 1975) 
The Staff Consultative System had been created in 1971 in Company B as 
a result of management's awareness that staff wanted greater involve- 
ment in decision-making about matters which affected them (see Appendix 
Q The years immediately following this had then seen a number of 
major issues 
- 
relocation, the house purchaVe scheme, redundancy and 
early retirement (see Appendix P) 
- 
in which the interests of the 
staff had been represented by their delegates to the Staff 
Consultative Council (SCC). it was against this background that ASTHS 
began to emerge in the Company as a force to be reckoned with. 
Towards the end of 1974, ASTMS meiiithership began to iricroase.. partiCU11- 
arly at the Kingswood office and was claimed ýy the lunion to be 
several hundreds (see Appendix(-., ). 1n November -1974, ASTHIS submitted 
)ts within the Company; this wa-ý a request for sole bargaining riglý 11 
rejected but management agreed that the time was right for a 'dcb. -te' 
a6oUtL employee relations to obtain the wiev., s of the stafic. opi ni Oil 
crystallised in lavour of a formal survey or referc-ndum - for 
(, Viý4 "R e 'L 0A". ) NS, management's benefit, but the reSLIUS also to be 
In October 1974, a report was issued by a study group which had been 
set up by management to examine all aspects of the Staff COYISUltitiVC, 
System and to take into account possible Future developments. The 
report recommended the transition from consultation to neirlotilat. -Ion, 
with the formation of a staff association to facilitate thiS.. This 
advice was based on the conclusion that. tile consultative system had 
lost its impact and that staff wanted to be 
-, ore Involved, in all 
decisions concerning their Jobs. The rising ASTHS rn-mbersh, p was scen 
tative as an indication of "the increasing distrust of 'Uhe Consult 
System", but negoti'ation through an external trade union was rejected 
by the Study group on grounds of militancy and a disi-A-ust of' union 
power 
- 
and the fear-of an adverse reaction from tvanagement. A staff 
d knowledge of the association, on the other hand, would have a detailed 
Company and possibly a more harmonious relationship with, managei-rient. 
I 
-. 
- 
It was conceded, however, that a staff association (introducing a 
. 
major future consideration) posed the problem of multi-snionism. 
ASTMS could not be expected to simply give up and go away if a staff 
association was formed. 
In February 1975, a report from City University Business School 
offered contrary advice. This report had been coomissioned by manage- 
ment and was based on a study of the consultative system and extensive 
interviews with managers and those involved-with the SCC. This report 
also offered the conclusion that the consultative system was not 
functioning satisfactorily and recommended certain changes. it did, 
however, suggest that a staff association was not a viable proposition 
at that time, mainly because of an apparent general lack of support 
for the idea. 
There are indications that amcing senior ipianagemient -the S%, C study group 
report 
- 
with its recommendations of a staff association 
- 
struck a 
wel come note. However, opinion in the employee relations teami was to 
"agree 
... 
that at this stage an independent staff association is not 
a viable alternative". it is clear, though, that from, the beginning 
of the 'debate', a staff association was seen as a possibility for the 
UtUre. 
ASTMS wanted to refer the proposed survey to ACAS: rianagemenL did not. 
Instead, the advice of the Industrial Society w1as sought and discus- 
-her staff should be asked a straight- sion began to centre around wheil 
forward question about ASPIS' claim for recognition. To begin with, 
management %,., as not in favour of a 'YES/NO to ASTMS' bailot as it "might 
have the eflect, of eliminating a staff association from, the list of 
possibilities". However, as the industrial Society pointed out, if a 
staff association was mentioned in the referendum, staff %-, rould be 
voting for sonieLhing which did not even exist. By April, management 
was coming round to the idea that a straight 'YEESjNO' ballot would 
afford the "best opportunity of demonstrating an anti-ASTIMS -attitude 
amongst staff", hoping that th-is would provide the "defirliti. ve answer 
from the Company to the ASTMiS claim". 
. 
-. 
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- 
In March, management had proposed that a tripartite committee to plan 
the survey should he established with representatives of managemont, 
the SCC and ASTMS.. ASTNS objected to the presence of tha SCC and 
refused to take part, The Assistant General Manager (Personnel) 
suspected that ASTMS was indulging in delaying tactics in view A 
impending legislation (the Employment Protection Act) which could he 
used to fuhher their cause. However, some progress was made until 
management decided to insist on a minimum poll of 7OZ before a positiva 
vote would be given effect, a 'YES/NO to ASTMS' ballot having been 
agreed by this time. 
By May, management had agrPed to recommend that ASTMS ShOUld 11-_)e 
recognised if 51% of all staff VOýLed in ýýheir favour. This was then 
amended to recognition if 51% of those voting were in favou r, %-,, i itih -I- h, ý 
proviso that there must be a minimu-, ii pol"I of 70Z; iff the poll was less 
than 70% (and 515/1'1 of those voting laere in favour) then. recognition 
uould be reCIVommended when actual, MhorM. bership ren-hed 40%. Thiis ýsome- 
wh at complex plan was designed to prevent AS'[,,, ', ', ) achieving recognition 
as a result of the apathy of the staff rather th. an* a maJorilPy, of 
positive support. The management view was "that in order Lo fi!! plei-eient 
a change in the system of staff representation, it had to be dernon- 
strated that a majority of the staff wanted such a chance". It was 
also noted that ASTMS' comparatively low membership i,, -is an obstacle 
-he Company) to recognition 
- 
"if ASTMS membership were sufficient, it (11,1 
would recognise ASTMS and the SCC would be relegated to 'tea and 
biscuits', " said the AGM (Personnel). 
ASTMS refused to accept any proviso about minimum polls and %ý,, anted 
agreement that they would be recognised if they achieved 51% of t-he 
poll, not the electorate. In the middle of Miay, the question %,., as
referred jointly by management and the union 6 to ACAS, the AGN 
(Personnel) stressing that he was prepared to accept, independent 
advice that it was unreasonab. le to insist or, 51% of the electorate. 
In due course, ACAS advised management that "it was conimon prac-11-Jece 
lor ballots on the question of trade union recognition to be 
determ, ned on the basis of a 'simple majoritý- of those voting". 
In accordance with their undertaking, management then recomwanded to 
the Board that negotiating rights should be granted to ASTMS if 
51% of those voting in the referendum were in favour. 
The referendum was set for 8 July 1975, and the scope of the debate 
was wideneq in the preceding few weeks to enable all the Company's 
staff to express their views. The Company's policy remained one of 
overt neutrality on the part of management 
- 
"the question of represen- 
tation of staff must be resolved by the choice of the staff 
themselves". Whilst management used the term 'neutrality' to describe 
their role in the debate, they were not without either the opportunity 
or the intention to influence the longer-term course of ovents. There 
can be no doubt that it was a sincere tenet of management philosophy 
that each employee had an unchallengeable right to join or not to join 
a trade union, and that any indixidual who chose to join would not be 
disadvantaged within the Company as a consequence. However, an 
identifiable policy on trade union membership among the staff was 
actively pursued. The AGM (Personnel), referring back to the mortgage 
issue in 1974 (see Appendix 1), commented in April 1975 that "manage- 
ment policy has been to contain, as far as possible, escalation in 
nunbers of ASTMS members by not stimulating issues which might be used 
as controversial debating points". This point was rviterated by the 
General Manager (Administration) in a Board paper the following month. 
Management neutrali ty, then, was limited to non-intervention in staff 
decisions on specific issues (e. g. the 1975 referendum), but a more 
general policy of discouraging union membership influenced management 
strategy in a broader context. 
Whilst management remained 'neutral', all other sections of the staff 
were encouraged to form opinions on the-subject of ASTMS' claim for 
recognition. The monthly Company staff newspaper contained many 
letters on the subject in the issue before the referendum and a 
variety of articles giving all possible views on the subject. ASTMS 
issued circulars and held meetings under special arrangements granted 
on a 'one-off' basis. Ihe role of the SCC and those holding office 
within the consultative system remained a contentious issue. Manage- 
ment had Adertaken to ensure that literature emanating from the SCC 
or staff delega-Les would noz. contain anti-AST! IS mwllerial ; any such 
could only be expres, sed by an employee exerci. sing his riqht a, c 
an individual member of staff and not in an offi. cial capacity within 
the consultative system. ' However, management's undertaking proved 
to be difficult to enlorce 
- 
and it is not entirely clear how hard 
they tried. 
On 30 June, a broadsheet called DARN (Delegates' and Representatives' 
News) reviewed both AST14S and a newly formed staff association and 
came down in favour of ithe latter. By 7 July, the authors had 
obviously been fired by the heat of the debate; staff v., ere a"arned that 
if they voted 'YESS to ASSIMS', "never again in your lifetitno C, tv i 11 y)t. 
have a choice on tile method of staff representation" in the Compan%/. 
whereas a 'NO' vote meant that "a whole range of optiot,.! ý, reina-in open 
to be developed into a tailor-made System". A positively desperate 
note was sounded in a 'INO to ASIIIS' bulletin, "Produced and fincnced a 
entirely -independent (sic) of Company facilities" oil behalf of staff 
delegates. Amongst tile horrors that awaited staff if ASTMS achieved 
recognition were a "hardening of attitudes of management", 
tation instead of consulLati "ei-ý, -, broilrfient in political conf ront Ion". 
issues" and, of course, the closed shop. 
Needless to say, ASTMS' opinion of the SCC sank to a new low. The 
union's own campaign" concentrated on emphasising that the "working 
middle class have fallen behind other employees" and that "their 
skills and responsibilities are undervalued and underprivilegcd". 
The theme was developed by pointing to the success of ASTMS in 
negotiations on behalf of employees in other companies. Attempts 
were made to allay fears about the closed shop by assuring staff that 
it would only be introduced if members wanted it 
- 
and it was 
acknowledged that this was a very remote possibility. Indeed, con- 
siderable pains were taken to stress the democratic nature of the 
union's structure and the autonomy of each company unit. 
f-Janagement, at least, were not impressed by ASTMS' cainnpa-ign, opining 
that "the posturings of the union, and more particularly its General 
Srecretary, were not acceptable to the majority of staff". There is 
- 
no reason to cloubt: that they ivere right. 
In the event, a very high poll 
- 
907, 
- 
was achieved, indi, cating that 
the debate had st. irflulated a considerable degree ol interest in the 
issue of staff representation. In response IV to a question asking 
whether staff wanted ASTM IS to be granted sole bargaining ri, qhts 
1,976 (41%) voted YES 
2,805 (59, ', Il) voted HIO 
ASTMS was consequently advised that, having failed to achieve 51% of 
the vote, they would not ba granted recognition. 
Formation of t1he Staff Association 
(June 1975 to February 11076) 
As early as April 1975, management were aware that at least 1. L. -wo 
members of staff were willing to establish themselves as Chairman of a, 
staff, association, but were at that tfimee unable to obta-in suffiCIfflIt 
support. This support obviously materialised t1iring the ensuing -Few 
months 
- 
or was believed to be developing 
- 
because on 1*2 Juroea 
- who had formed the Staff meeting was held between management and thosl 
"onfederat I Ci f Association. These included Paul Nicolson of the LI Io 
Office Employees. who had been appointed a General Secretary of the 
Association. An understanding was immediately forthcoming betwCen 
management and the Staff Association regarding 1-1he relaLionship 
between the two parties. At this 'Initial ineeting, the AGM, (Personnel) 
made the point that "management would have to b,: 
-ý extremely caut Jous 
' facilities, in order to avoid any - concerning the giving o-I Impression 
Bat the staff associa-f-ion had been formed by Managemen-11. 
. 
This 
appears to have been quite acceptable to 4%, -hose concerned. 
The staff association quickly took an active part in the debate; it 
was clearly opposed to AST1,15 6ut also wanted to proceed beyond the 
limitations of the consultative system. It affiri-aad this in its 
first bulletin issued on 13 June: "The Staff Association does not 
believe that it is the wish of the majority to be represented by ASTMS, ' 
although it does believe that a majority of staff wish to have nego- 
tiations with management in preference to consultation". This same 
bulletin informed staff that "firm and constructive, rather than militant, 
relationships with the Emp! oyer", were sought. in advising middle 
management of the fonpation of the Staff Association, the AGM (Personnel) 
commented that it "seems to have been formed with the objective, on the 
short term, of debating the middle ground between a consultative arrange- 
went and an independent Trade Union like ASTMS". On the long term, its 
objectives were somewhat obscure. 
The contribution of the staff association to the roferenduir, debate wzas 
a strident anti-ASTM. S campaign, with a certain hesitancy concerning its 
own role in employee relations. It had little choice m, -the tactics it 
could adopt before the referendum ý. s it had been formed too late to he 
offered as an alternative to -the union. only by encouraging a majority 
of the staff to vote against AST14S could it keep open -the possibility 
of a viable luture for itself. it atte,,,, ipted to ch-allenge the basis of 
the-referendum by asserting that the criteri on for recognition should 
be membership and not support in a ballot, but the AG14 (Personnel) 
advised that Such action i-muld not conform wnth standard practice., 
and also comented that "management has the duty -JO t8kC into account 
the wishes of all staff while a Union or a Staff Association hasa duty 
to take into account only the wishes of its own members". 
It is impossible to assess accurately what effect the formation of the 
staff association had on the outcome of the referendum. It certainly 
attracted support from those closely involved with the consultative 
system but the actual membership did not encompass more than a very 
small proportion of the staff at the time of the referendum, It 
would hardly have attracted the support (i. e. induced a 'NO' vote) 
of many who would have voted 'YES' to ARMS if the staff association 
had not been formed 
- 
an antipathy towards ASTMS would generally 
have outweighed a desire for a move towards collective bargaining 
amongst those people who emerged as supporters of the staff associ- 
ation and they would have voted ''NO' in any case. 
-A reasonable 
conclusion, therefore, 5eems to be that the staff association had 
only a qegliqible effect on tho outcome of the referendum, although 
it did reprosent the possibility of an alternative to ASKS. 
However, the staff association was not merely concerned with opposing 
ASTMS in the referendum, and the AGM (Personnel) was warned shortly 
after its formation that it would consider seeking recognition through 
the procedures to be established under the Employnent Protection Act. 
Clearly the staff association at that stage wished to achieve recog. 
- 
nition itself and not just prevent ASTNS from doing so, although 
a hint of hypocrisy crept into a newsletter in August which warned 
staff that ASIMS "would not take no for an answer" 
- 
it would &ctually 
take advantage of legislation to achieve its amibitions! 
The understanding between staff association off lici ; J. ss and managernen. 1- 
regarding facilities came under*a certain strain iII'MedifdJ! IIV. 
The distribution of leaflets and a imeeting on CoT,, iplany premises with art 
external speaker elicitled a gentle sla-p on the from man Igement. 
The association i,,, as infori-P. --d by the AGM (Personnel) -that "inanagerpenit-I 
(Ly cannot support a liberal interpretdtiOll Of Staff 1'eOUlatiOns 1) t"Ie 
frequent granting of such facilities) in order to aLsilst in any wa. -. 1, 
the development of the staff association". A request for fairl-y 
e, xtensive facilities at Kingswood following immediately on this re- 
buff was quashed on the grounds that it Vlas not rnlerited by the known 
support in terms of membership. However, such admonitions were given 
much more in sorrow than in anger as ni,, anagement had the int. erlsts of 
the association at heart 
- 
"it is in the interests of the staff 
association that management do not act in any way which might pre- 
judice the independent status of the association". The granting of 
faciiities ito the association on a location basis as justified by 
membership (in exactly the same manner as ASTMS had been granted 
facilities) was seen as the "only way to be fait, to all parties 
concerned while allowing the staff association to present itself as 
a body Inde: pendent Of management", There could "be no suggestion of 
dependence on management if it can be shown that the stallf association 
has been given only what 1PSTMS theirs ., v d in similar selves rece- C 
circumstances". 
There were two fad. ors i,: M. ch caused management's. determination not to 
jeopardi. se the -independence of the staff associ. ation. 
- 
There t%, as 
certainly a desire to prevent any opportunit. Xf for ASTMS, or any other 
PartYý to use seemingly partisan activities of management as air"Dunition 
to destroy, the ct-'edibility Of Lhe staff association as a poLe tially 
effective bargaining agent. Secondly, and of overriding importance. 
was the need for the staff association to gain a certificate of 
independence (under the Employment Protection Ac-111) in order to achi 
-eve 
statutory rights and present itself to staff as a 'genuine' trade 
union. If the staff association Could not perSL; ade the Certification 
Officer of its total independence of managpmen-iC, then it. had no future 
Li in stal I Yepresentatio in the Compally. it is doubtful if all 
officers of th. - staff association saw this as clearly as i-iianagement. 
This issue coloured the management/staff association relationship 
during the following months. TO association continued to apply for 
facilities and continued to be turned down on the grounds that they 
were not merited by its membershp, which ivtas growing only at a-very 
moderate rate although the referendum result had given grounds for 
believing that a membership of the majority of the staff was within 
its reach. Management deviloped its. employee relations strategy 
during this tiny to include a possible future role for the staff 
association. The GM (Administration) confirmed that independence 
from management was important for the "question of eligibility for 
recognition". An explicit indication of management's hope for the 
future of the staff association is shown in the comment that "all our 
dealings i-., ith the Staff Association, formal or informal, have been 
strategically planned on the basis of the above policy", i. e. -that 
of ensuring the indisputable independence of the association. This, 
coupled with the policy of not providing ASTMS with contentious issues 
with which tn demonstrate its effectiveness, indicates that manage- 
inent 
- 
not sui-prisingly 
- 
were hoping to facilitate the Hse of the 
.. 
I- I 
staff association and the eclipse of ASTIAS. 
A question which must be asked In considering the formation of the 
staff association is whether i-iianagemell'L did actually take some 
- 
Ic") 
- 
i 13 j. 
active part, homer small. A policy document in 1976 confi med 
management's decision "not to recommend to staff the setting up of 
a staff association, since forthcoming legislation seemed likely to 
weaken the status of a staff association promoted by an employer". 
This may w; ll have been lost on some members of management who were 
less politically aware in the industrial relations field, and there 
was certainly strong support at the top of the hierarchy for a staff 
association. No conclusivo evidence is available but it seems unlikely 
that those members of management who were directly responsible for 
employee relations (specifically the GM (Administration) and the AGM 
(Personnel)) took a direct part in instigating the formation of the 
staff association. 
Given the less than overwhelming. support, for ASTIMS among the staff 
- even before the referendLIM) and the widespread feeling that (apparent 
a move should be made from consiýltaMon to negotiation, then it becom. es 
almost inevi table -11-hat someone among the Company's 5,000 st3ff %-,, ould 
take the initiative and form. a staff association knowing that the move 
would be unlikely to antagonise management. The employee relations 
management could afford to wait and let events take their course; no 
doubt the 'grapevine' ensured that they were 'Kept abreast Of develop- 
ments. This does not exclude the likelihood that the founding members 
of the staff associat-lon were given some discreet and informal 
encouragement by other members of management with whom they were in 
more direct contact, and that these managers received indications fyom 
thpir emploype relations colleagues that tile move would not be opposed. 
In addition, the employee relations management had much contact with 
aiid influence on t1le SCC i-ii-e-inhers, and much of the active support lor 
the s-taff association came from those most closely involved with tile 
consultative system. 
Throughout all these developments management was anxious to keep 
stri. ctly willhin the limitations imposed by their employee rela-tions 
policy. Ihis had been formialised in a document issued in November 
1975 (see Appendix J) following a suggestion from ACAS. during di. scus- 
sions after the referendum, and committed the Company to support of 
,- 
IGLý 
- 
"industrial relations arrangements. vihich 'have the clear backi'ng of 
a majority of staff". 
ASTIMS' Section II Reference 
(February to December 1976) 
After the referendum 
- 
but before the result was [! no%-,,. q 
- 
ll. SlMS lhad 
complained of unfair management influence. The anti-ASTMS bias of 
the SCC literature and the appearance of the staff association were 
regarded by the union as particularly iniquitous and lOnly to affect 
the ballot result. Management felt its conscience to be clear on all 
counts and the only concession ARMS gained was the formalisation of' 
union facilities throughout the Company. ASTHS activi P subsequently 
was low-key and management assumed that it was "geared to the union's 
desire to achieve a platform whereby they can persuode staff and ACAS 
of the influence they are capable of exerting on managamant. 
decisions". 
ACAS maintained contact with -the Company after the referendum, and 
management agreed to-meet the Service in September to have "a general 
talk about the situation". ACAS was particularly conceriied -to hear 
management's rebuttal of, ASTMS' allegations of in, luence on the 
referendum, and appeared satisfied with management's comment's. Both 
pat-ties agreed that ASTMS was likely -to invoke the procedures of the 
-Employnaent Protection Act to further t heir recognition clachn. Manage- 
ment also saw "strong evidence" that the referendum v. ras regarded "as 
having settled the representation question for the time being". 
On I February 1976, the provisions of the EPA enabling a union to 
submit a reference on recognition (under Section II) were duly enacted 
and ASTMS immediately submitted a reference claimihg recognVion at 
Company B. 1n the same month, the staff association submitted a 
claim for recognition to management. It was refused. The Staff 
Association chairman described the claim as a "tactical move" to 
ensure involvemant in discussions with ACAS over thQ ASTIS Section 11 
claim 
- 
he quite expected management to reject it, The staff 
association appears to have been in the habit of discussing tactics 
with management; in March, the AGM (Personnel) reported having been 
told by the chairman that there was "disillusionment" with ASTMS at 
Cardiff 
- 
"in his view, the staff association could pick up Cardiff 
as soon as someone gets down to talk to them". 
In dealing wil-1h the ASTMS reference, ACAS had first to attempt to 
resolve. tile issue by consul iation with al-I interested partie's; f 
this failed, there wouid have to be a formal enquiry. PiU6 advised 
tile staff associatir)n that it tv., as accepted as a party to the consul- 
tations, and discussionsbetween all parties (ASTHIS, managem-ent and tile 
SA) and ACAS ensued. in May, ACAS suggested to the staff association 
that ii. might form an alliance with ASTIMS in order -*Lo achieve joint 
bargaining right-s. This received an "unqualilled rejection" from the 
I: tra ry to staff association and was also, of course, diredlly con  
management's stated policy of avoiding multi-unionism. The staff 
association also refused to at-tend a meeting with AST. HS under the 
chairmanship of ACAS "to see if a joint solution could be found"; 
ASPAIS had been willing to do so. 
There are indications that some doubts about the staff association 
were beginning to occur to management du! ing the ACAS consultations. 
For example, the fear was expressed that ACAS 
, 
? ould have been given 
11 4 tion" a a strong impression of an anti-unlon staff ; alssocia-_ riel cculd 
conclude that the associationS motives were unconstructive. There 
was also some concern because the staff association did not apply 
for a certificate of independence, preferring to hope that ACAS 
would request an application in the course of thcir enquiries into 
ASTMS' reference and thus enable them to queue-junnp. It was sug- 
gested by the e, mployee relations team that this strategy was "some-- 
what of a gamble". Despite these doubts about' the. staf-ifassocia-tion's 
judgment, management's eSPOLISal of its cause was not seriously 
reconsidered at that stage. In May the SA chairman was told that 
- 
it was "management's policy that it cannot support the staff asso-- 
ciaLion"s chance of achieving the status of an independent trade 
union". Shortly afterwards, the AGM (Personnel) was dissuaded 
members of his team from having an informal discussion with the 
SA chairman with the advice that he "may find it very difficult 
to maintain an independent 'union' line when he has received some 
informal words from you". The inclination of the AGM (Personnel) 
seems to have been to maintain a very close informal relationship 
with the staff association. 
Doubts about the staff association were occurring to ACAS as well. 
The GM (Administration) and the AGM (Personnel) realised that ACAS 
were "clearly wordedabout the Company's attitude to the staff 
association". However, the policy of strict overt impartiali Y paid 
off 
- 
"The question th4y put to (GM (Administration)) forimally was 
whether or not the Company ha& provided any financial support to 
the staff association. We were able to say that we had not given 
any financial support". A distinction began to emerge between one 
or two SA officials and their colleagues; in particular, Paul Nicolson 
became more noticeaNy a strong force behind the staff association's 
tactics and general poli U. Management had received from ACAS the 
impression that staff association representatives did not "realise 
that they were acting as an independent trade union themselves in 
contesting the ASTMS Section II reference". The exception to this, 
it was noted, were Nicolson and the chai man of the association. 
by June, ACAS had conciuded that the reference could not be. resolved 
by consultation, all parties having irr-econCilable differences. A 
-formal enquiry was therefore necessary involving a survey of staff 
opinion. It %-., as the inethod by which sta-f-11 opinion should be obtained, 
or more specifically, the options to be offerLd on the questionnaire 
that determined the course of events for the next year. Whilst ACAS 
had accepted the staff association for consult the question it 
had to decide %-., as whether ASTMS could be recommended for recognition. 
11. t %.,, as there-fore with ASTMS that ACAS was primarily concerned, being 
prepared only to keep the staff association informed during the 
- 
enquiry and consider any material evidence it had to offer. This, 
however,. was not adequate for the staff association 
- 
and especially 
Paul Nicolson 
- 
who felt that they should be on a near equal footing 
wi th ASTMIS. 
In the following months, ACAS finalised the questionnaire in 
consultation with ASKS and management, the latter having agreed 
to facilitate its distribution to staff. The staff association 
were given the opportunity to comment on several occasions. The 
suggested final draft asked respondents if they: 
were members of ASTMS or any other union, 
wished their pay and conditions to be determined by 
negotiation with a trade union, 
wished ASTMS to represent them, 
would join ASTMS if it was recognised. 
Additional com-ments v., ere also invitl-d. 
ACAS of course incurred the wrath of the staff association by failing 
to mention it on the questionnaire. At the beginning of November, 
the SA chairman wrote to ACAS complaining that an "impartial quos- 
tionnaire would give equal treatment to the trade unions which are 
parties to the enquiries". In the same letter, he showed himself 
to be somewhat confused about the Company's employee relations policy, 
claiming that it allowed "progressive recognition location by 
location as trade union membership grows". Or maybe he simply demon- 
strated confusion about the nature of recognition. 
It was clear that the whole issue was becoming clouded by factors 
other than staff. representation in the Company. in particular, 
there were the political connotations of a small, non-TUC staff 
association 
- 
as yet without a certificate of independence 
- 
muscling 
in on the recognition claim of a major TUC union (which had by 
now received its certificate of Adapendancel and claiming parity 
- 
Is"ll- 
with that union. It was the AM (personnel)'s opinion that the 
"polltics of this situation were seen at the top of ACAS to be more 
important than the representation arrangements for the Company's 
staff". The 'top of ACAS' was the Council (caqposed in practice of 
equal numbers of TUC and CBf nominated members and independents) 
which had to ratify all recommendations made in ACAS reports and 
decide general questions of policy. it was clear by this stage that 
the TUC representatives were far from happy with the staff 
association's activities. 
The- ACCAS officials conducting the enquiry faced uncertainty fr0iii 
two sources, one being their o;. 
-, n brief as enshrined -in the EPA 
and emphasising generalised objectives (particularly the extension, 
of collective bargaining) rather than procedural details. The 
second was the limit to which the staff association was prepared 
to go in order to defend its interests 
- 
or disrupt the enquiry, 
depending oil one's point of view. By the middle of Nlovember 1976, 
ACAS had decided that the staWassociation should submit its OWIl 
Section II reference so that it Would be legaliy on an equal footing 
with ASTMS and could be included on the questionnaire. Hov., ever, 
it seemed "quite likely" to both ACAS and the AGMI (Personnel) that 
'; a reference F1 s 
4- io n- re, 
t, he staff associat I ter the q. j- LI ca 4? 
J; 
-ion would submit 
had been issued 
- 
and thus invalidate the surve., /. The staff 
association [lad, incidentally, obtained a Section N relýerence 
application form from ACAS as far back as Aprii that year. 
From this point onwards, Paul Nicolson became the dominant SA figure. 
There, had beer, a marked tendency for him to write tile nore important 
letters 
-- 
to the Company, ACAS and ASTI-IS 
- 
in the past; now the 
question was what %,,, ould Nicolson, rather than the stai"f association, 
do next. By tile end of November, the Ml (Personnel) had altered 
his opinion about the possibility of a staff association Section H 
reference. For the staff association to submit their ovin reference, 
would, he thought, "remove one of Paul Nicolson's bases for complaint 
which was that it is a mi. suse of the Section 11 procedur es for a 
union with a iow membership to Use them to obtain recogal-'Gion In a 
-I Scl - 
situation where the employer, to some extent, already provides 
facilities for joint discussions". That is, the staff association 
(with a membership certainly no higher than that of ASTMS and probably 
substantially lower) could not accuse ASTMS of undemocraticilly using 
legislation to achieve recognition if they took the same action. 
However, non-one could be sure of the extent to which the staff 
association 
- 
or Hicolson 
- 
was prepared to compromise its principles 
in order to prevent ASTMS from. achieving recognition. After all, the 
very future of the staff association depended on this, and Nicolson 
was undoubtedly also using the staff association for wider political 
nioti ves. 
The apparent exercise of prerogative by Nicolson was dsmonstrated 
when the SA chairman informed the AGM (Personnel) on 8 November 
that the association would not Nke any further action on the ACAS 
enquiry other than a formal letter of complaint which had already 
been despatched. He also claimed that Nicolson would not take a ny 
action independently of the SA executive. On that same day, the 
AGM (Personnel) was inform2d by Nicolson that the Confederation of 
Office Employees wanted to refer the whole issue to the Central 
Arbitration Committee on behalf of the staff association. A week 
later, confiriation was received that the COE was "lodging a formal 
complaint with the CAC of ACAS on the way the Service was handling 
the ASTMS Section II claim". 
Certainly INicolson made an appearance oil opentiess %-, ith tha AGM 
(Personnel); in a series of telephone conversations in late November 
and early December there w. as a cordia 1 exchange of -information between 
the two. Subsequent to one such discussion on the COE complaint, the 
AGM (Personnel) commented that "we agreed that the information which 
had been exchanged was 'on the record' and, in the circumstances, was 
that which -could be exchanged between a recognised trade union, i. e. 
the staff association, and the employer which recognised it';. It seems 
to me that this is a very significant remark. However, a. long talk 
with the ARM, (Personnel) did not yield any light op. this, particular 
area. Presumably it was clear to the AGM (Personnel)- that by tilat 
stage Nicolson had definite plans to prevent the questionnaire being, 
distributed, and he had no AS to impede the staff association. 
Management strategy had been to. plan for the recognition of the SOD 
Association, if possible, and proof of its support through the 
questionnaire yesponses, would facilitate this. Concessions of 
'recognition' would, if it was necessary to use them, make the staff 
association's case so much the stronger. 
Nitcolson's intention to take the matter to Court emerged during 
November. On 17 November, the SA chairman corimilented th;. -At Nicolson 
intended to apply to the Courts "as soon as it becar: ie obvious that 
the Council were not prepared to stay the proceedings-". This 
decision had-finally been made by ACAS on 5 November. By 13 December, 
both ACAS arid the AGIM (Personnei) were agreed that an capplication 
for a writ was likely, there being no other i--.; ay In which the stalf 
association could prevent the issue of the questionnaire (without 
Uie AGM submwitting its own Section H reference). On 15 December, t 
(Personnel) confirmed that the que-s-tt-lonnaire %-Iould lie. distributed o" 
7 January; ACAS had been pressing for an eariier date but had been 
t problems connected w -he told that theree were adiminiSti-atiVe it 
-h 
F, 
provision of an Up - 
to 
'i 
-date payroll. On 17 December, the AGM 
-ill discussing tactics with Illicolson and record-nd (Personnel) was sit 1ý 
that "M asked me the latest date on which I could stop distribution 
of the questionnaire-, to which I replied that I COUld stop It as late 
as () January 
.... 
two or three days prior to this %,., ould be easier". 
ACAS Survey 
(May 1977 to February 1978) 
The ACAS questionnaire was not issued, but a writ was 
- 
on Friday, 
31 December 1976 at 5.00 p. m. ACAS lost the subsequent court case 
(see Appendix 1) and it was ruled that the staff association must 
be included on the questionaire. 
ý- 
IbI 
- 
A hiatus followed the court case. ACAS decided not to appeal 
although ASTMS as third defendant proposed to do so (LA reversed 
this decision some time later). However, in June, Jim Mortimer, 
Chairman of the Council of ACAS, was encouraged by the Company's 
Chief Executive to expedite he survey 
- 
"the long delays over this 
enquiry are causing considerable uncertainty amongst our staff 
both our Board and our Staff Consultative Council are most anxious 
that discussions about a revised questionnaire should connence 
immediately and be pursued energetically". ACAS agreed and work 
began on a new questionnaire. 
If the staff association were ever to prove their potential, it 
should have been after their success in court. However, apart from 
circulars proclaiming the victory, the only attempt to capitalise oil 
it was a rather naive salary and terms of employment claim suNnitted 
to management on 9 May. The ingenuous absence of argument indicated. 
that the association had neither the political sense nor technical 
skill necessary for effective representation. The AGM (Personnel) 
has identified this as the point at which Management finally lost 
confidence in the staff association, and management strategy 
subsequently placed a diminishing emphasis on the staff association. 
I 
However, ARMS had now decided to claim de facto recognition for 
the purposes of the Social Security Pensions Act, 1975, This Act 
required employers either to participate in a Government pension 
scheme or contract out by providing a scheme of its own which would 
meet Government requirements. The empl oyer was obliged "to give a 
notice of his intentions" to "any independent trade union recognised 
to any extent for the purpose of collective bargaining" in relation 
to the employees concerned) ASTMS claimed that "the Company's 
actions 
... 
amount to a recognition to some extent for collective 
bargaining purposes". The Company maintained that it had "throughout 
attempted t9-deal with the Union in accordance with the best 
industrial relations practice 
... 
These have not been intended to 
amount to recognition for any purpose connected with collective 
'Social Security (Pensions. ) Act, 1975 
bargaining". 
This situation had been developing since February 1977 when staff had 
been advised of the Company's intention to contract out. ASKS alleged 
the following month that they were recognised to the extent required 
by the Act and should have been consulted; shortly afterwards, a 
formal complaint was made to the Occupational Pensions Board (OPQ 
The problem then for -the Company was that it could not obtain a 
certificate enabling it to contract out until the OPB wos satisfied 
that ASTHS was not recognised and therefore not entitled to consul- 
tation. This issue could only be decided by an Mdustrial Tribunal 
and ASTMS duly proceeded wich an application. If the process becane 
protracted 
- 
or ASTAS won and had then to be consulted 
- 
there was a 
danger that the Company would not obtain tha necessary cortificate ill 
time to contract out. The union-also did not wish this to happen as 
they had made it clear that they had no intention of arguing against 
the decision to contract out. 
The Tribunal hearing was fixed for 10 August 1977 and was expected 
to be lengthy and complex; the Company was vigorously contesting the 
ASTMS claim. However, at the end of July, ASKS withdrew their 
action. The union circular which notified members of this decision 
stated that "pressure that both ourselves and the Company have 
put on ACAS have brought their long awaited Attitude Survey Orward 
considerably and we are confident that full Pecognition will follow 
in the near future". The management view all along had been that 
the union regarded the issue solely as a means of obtaining recogn- 
ition; ARMS had presumably decided that the "possibly long and 
costly court case" was an unnecessairy siedge-hwioier i-o crack a nut. 
On 16 August 1977, the Chief Executive informed staff that queskon- 
naires would be distributed three days later. Two reasons were given 
for the survey: ACAS had a statutory obligation to determine staff 
opinion and it would "also assist management in deciding what weight 
to give to a recommendation by ACAS". This should have been a warning 
to ASAS that management would not automatically comply with an ACAS 
recommendation of recognition. The staff association, of course, 
.-i(;,: i - 
had s. ti. 11 not submitted ftsý own Section IT. reference and ACAS wa, 
-i 
therefore not empouared to recombnend i. ts recognition. 
The ACAS recommendations (including-the results of the survey) were 
not revealed for six months 
- 
until February 1978. In the meantime, 
various further discussions took placi 
- 
particularly betwaen ACAS 
and management 
- 
to assist the Service in its deliberations. ASKS 
helped to pass the time by beginning what was seen by the AGM 
(Personnel) as another manoeuv re to gain recognition. On 16 August, 
Russell Miller of ASTMS 
- 
"significant" said the AGH (Personnel) 
''that a National Officor has written to us for the first time in 
nearly two years" 
- 
stated that some of his members were concerned 
that redundancies would follow a propesed reorganisation of the 
Company's sales structure. The AGM (Personnel) interpreted this as a 
corollary of the threatened refqrence to an industrial Tribunal oyer 
the pensions issue 
- 
"It is likely that they have decided that to 
argue that they are recognised for consultation on redundancies offerý; 
a better chance of 'back door recognition' and less damage to their 
image if they lose". 
Management decided against a meeting with Russell Miller because this 
could provide "sufficient ammunition to go to a tribunal under the 
Employment Protection Act, 1975, and argue that they have been 
recognised under the provisions of that Act". But if the letter was 
just 'brushed off', the AGM (Personnel) thought that the union would 
still take the Company to tribunal and claim de facto recognition. 
Eventually, it was decided to impose "short-term constraints on 
future actions such as deferring statements on redundancies" in order 
to minimise the possibility of a tribunal hearing which would be 
costly in money and top management 
-time. ASKS were then infonved 
that all relevant information had been communicated to the staff 
concerned and that consultation had taken place through the SCC. 
No more was heard from the union on this topic. 
This incident may illustrate the apparently different tactics 
adopted by ASKS and management. The A04 (Personnel) responded 
to each move from the union as if playing chess with. a particularly 
cunning opponent. Maybe the ingenuity and deviousness of ASMS was 
somewhat overestimated; they certainly seem to have been more 
inclined to the view that 'constant dripping wears away a stone'. 
The union literature frequently indicated that recognition could not 
bo denied forever, especially by an employer which was anxious to be 
seen as complying with modern and effective employee relations 
practices. 
And so the waiting continued. ASTMS became impatient and tried to 
pressurise ACAS into releasing the report. Discussions continued 
between ACAS and management. mainly it seems in attempts to test the 
acceptabilityof possible reco; -, imendations. 
Management became as anxious as ASTMS to have some definite recom- 
m, endations, but understood more clearly than the union the difficulties 
faced by ACAS. Apart from a very heavy work load, ACAS officials were 
increasingly concerned about the political sensitivity of their work. 
Management learned from various sources that the Service was disturbed 
that the goodwill earned by effective conciliation work, was being 
"destroyed by the Press and public reaction to tile political aspects 
of their recognition operations". (This was at the height of the 
Grunw, ick case. ) Clearly the Service would be vcry waryindeed in their 
recommendations for such a well-known company as Coi-iipany B- in a 
reference which had already brought them to grief in tile courts. 
Whillst management saw and appreciated the causes of ACAS's caution, 
they nevertheless began to chafe at the delay. After a meeting with 
ACAS on 17 October, they concluded that it. was still "unclear vphether 
or not the survey has been analysed. The suspicion exists that it has". 
ASTMS, especially the lay officials, -were less equivocal about. -the 
reason for the delay. The union committee at Hove advised their 
Personnel Manager t that "many are of the opinion that the Company's 
management have no parti. cular desire to hurry the resolve. of the union 
recognition proble-ii". They seem to have had little idea of the 
comparatively small proportion of their time that ACAS officials were 
able to devoLe to Company B, or of the continuing requests for 
information made to management. 
.- 
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- 
First ACAS Report 
(Parch 1978 to Septembar 1978) 
The first draft report was finally sent Q ACAS to ASTMS and the 
Company's management on, 14 February 1978; (a COPY was sent shortly 
afterwards to the staff association "for any co!,. igients they inay wish 
to make. ") All parties were asked to keep the Contents confidential. 
The questionnaire data led ACAS to the conclusion that: 
- 
the majority of the staff' wanted collective bargaining. 
- 
ASTHS should be recognised for this purpose as the staff 
association has insufficient support and the Company 
would not consider multi-Linion representation. 
Both managerrient and ASTMS were invited by ACAS to conlinent, on the 
report. ASTMS' reaction was simple and predictable: ACAS vias told 
that the union "unreservedly accepts the reconir-nendation". The. staff 
association was also predictable, i. e. strongly antagonistic to tile 
recommendation. Both ASTMS and the staff association disregarded the 
tv and the latter also diStHbUted an request for confidentiali-t. 
extract from the report to its members. Senior staff therefore 
learned of the recommenda-tions from subordinates who i,,, ere members of 
either ASTHS or the staff association, and the AGN (Personnel) was 
obliged to advise ACAS that management could no longer comply with the 
request for confidentiality. 
On 23 February, AST14S wrote to tile AGM (Personnel) to "formally 
request an opportunity of meeting With (the Company B) to discuss 
the recognition and procedural agreement ý,., hich is now necessary, 
following 
-the ACAS recommendation"; management however, had other 
i deas. 
The course of action open to the Company appeared to be threefold: 
- 
accept the recommendation and recognise ASTMS, 
- 
refuse to accept the recomendation either overtly or 
simply taking no-action The likely consequences of this 
were the issue by ACAS of a final report identical to the 
draft which would lead ultimately to an appeal by ASTMS to 
the CAC under the provisions of the Employment Protection - 
Act, A survey of pay and conditions would eventually follow, 
possibly resulting in certain (probably minor) enforceable 
ame"dments to the employmant contracts of the Company's staff. 
- 
discuss with ACAS the possibility of a 'middle course' i. e. 
the granting of individual representation rights and an under- 
taking to recognise ASTHS fur collective bargaining when they 
achieved 50% membership. 
Whilst this 'middle course' was seen to be fraught with difficulties 
- 
ACAS might issue a final report anyway, or ASTMS might plead de 
facto recognition 
- 
management decided that it was the action most in 
accordance'with the formal employee relations polic. y. 
ACAS was therefore advised that %. Jhilst their recommtndation could not 
be accepted as it stood, a positive response would be made on the 
--hat: basis 4%, 
- 
the Company recognised that the majority of the staff favoured 
collective bargaining, 
- 
collective bargaining should be undertaken with a single union, 
and curren-L. membership indicated that this union would be ASSTIMS, 
curm. 
-mil, ASTHIS moinbership of 20Z was inadequate but the Company 
was prepared to recommend membership to its eniployees and to 
assist ASTMIS with their recruitment, 
individual, representation to be negotiatpd immediately, 
further recognition rights would be conceded to ASTMS as 
menibership increased, culminating in recognition for 
collective bargaining, 
the pos, ion of certain more senior staff should be reviewed * tS 
as they would be involved in receiving representations from 
the union wheo it was recognised. 
ACAS appear to have been somawhat perplexed by suM a comprehensive 
compromi: se. On being advised that. m3nagement "would prefer to reach 
the full collective bargaining position by a process of smooth- and 
ccntrolled development", ACAS replied that their role was to decid(! 
whether recognition should be recommended 
- 
"with little scope for 
compromise".. They considered it improbable that their Council would 
be prepared to restrict the recommendation and accept instead an 
"intermediate approach". However, if management could agree this 
approach with ASTMS, ACAS would feel under no obligation to issue a 
final report. 
A certain confusion is evi(ýenL; in the following weeks, mi(ainly because 
ASTI-IS do not, seeril to have realised that management did riot accept tile 
ACAS recommendations 
- 
although this could well have been bluff in an 
attempt to make managei-tient's pos. ition untenable. r", certain responsi- 
bility lips with management for not statinig their position direct to 
ASTMS and relying iristoad on the decision being transmitted by ACAS. 
Certainly ASTMS told ACAS on 17 March that they wo. uld like a ciear 
"indication of intent", and ACAS advised the AGH (Personnel) on 
20 March that the "ASTMS view was that they had won recognition and 
had got full, bargaining rights". Literature issued by thO locat 
committees gives -'Ehe ir. 11-1-Ossion that they believed recognition to be P 
imininent. It could also be that lay officials did not realise that 
management cogsidered an appeal to the CAC. to be a somewhat empty 
threat. 
On 29 March, six weeks after the release of the draft reporL, staff 
were advised of the six-point basis of the Company's reply to the 
--Cc, -,. - lati ons. I%Ihilst management accepted the need for collective &ý aýi 
bargaining 
- 
"we regard the 611% vote in favour of collective bargaining 
as the most significant finding of the survey" 
- 
ASTFJS current member- 
- 
to support viable collective bargaining. On the ship was insufficien-t 
same day, ASTRIS foiiiially requested ACAS to publish the report in final 
form. i., ith the reco-mmendations unchanged, in order that a complaint 
could be made fir, due course to the CAC. The staff associati. on also 
briefly re-entered the arena, having just been awarded i, ts 
certificate of independence. According to the Financial Times, 
"Er Paul Nicolson 
... 
said that this made the inquixýy irrelevant". 
Apparently nobody heard him. 
Discussions then began between the GM (Administration) and Muriel 
Turner, ASTMS Assistant General Secretary, to find some workable 
solution. Naturally ASTMS were most anxious that they should be 
recognised on a 'no strings' basis. They feared that the pron-iised 
individual representation agreement would not lead to fitcreased 
inembership as it did not invoive negotiations on tern)s and conditions 
- 
that being the reason, in their opinion., why people jnined unions. 
And nothing short of Sole bargaining rights, they hinted dýrkly, CGUid 
protect a union from competition by another TUC affiliate. adding that 
t they were "sure you will appreciate the significance of this in the 
light of current developments elsewhere in the industry" 
- 
referring, 
presumably, to their running battles %,,, ith NUIBE (now the Banking, 
Insurance and Finance Union), The threat of inter-union rivalry did 
not deter management from pursuing their chosen 'middle course; they 
probably had little to fear by this stage from intervention b.,,, another 
TUC union. NUBE was known to have been interested in a possible. mer-ger 
with the staff association. in earlier years but appears not to have 
done anything concrete to achieve this 
- 
although overtures may have 
been made to the SA and been rejected. it seems possible -'that if NUBE 
had contrived to be offered as an alternative to ASTIMS, they could 
have achieved substantial support. However, by 1978 such a possibility 
was remote. 
Discussions between the Company and ASTMS lasted for several weeks 
with Wther side prepared to make concessions. The management problem 
was td persuade ASTMS that it was in their own interest to delay 
recognition until it could be based on substantial membership, and to 
do this whilst limiting, the opportunity for the union to claim de facto 
recognition. ACAS had confirmed that the Company "might already have 
moved towards de facto recognition of the union by its discussions 
with it". 
- 
16ci 
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Within these limitation&, management pressed on. Before a meeting 
with ASAS at ACAS the AGM (personnel) advised his Colleagues that 
the "trick is to lead the opposition to expect concessions and, there- 
fore, be prepared to give thy, and to attempt to get the concessions 
whilst not shifting ground, " He may have oveiTstimatcd the scope 
for manaeuvre actually open to ASTMS; they had very little ammunition 
with which to defend their demand for recognition. Recognition had 
been virtually promised in the 'six-point plan' with the only proviso 
that membership should be increased 
- 
and they were also promisad 
cooperation with this. Now often is a union given the offer of a 
recruitment campaign sponsored by an employer? This must surely have 
seemed a better option to ASTMS than either a claim to the CAC or ail 
attempt to prove A facto recognition for limited statutory purposes. 
- 
They would still be denied the ultimate prize of negotiating for 
terms and conditions of employment. 
By 8 I-lay, discussions had proceeded to the po-Int where t. he (3411 
(Administ. ration) was able to advise Muriel Turner that "fir-ovided AS'INS 
can achieve a substantial increase in member. ship, and provided v,, e are 
able to agree the terms of a procedure agreervient, it is OUr i, itention 
to recognise ASTMS for sole bargaining purposes later this year". 
Staff were advised of this decision by the 'Chief Executive who 
encouraged them to join the union. - it must have sttrong iiz-a-iaber-shiip to 
ensure that "the views put forward are genuinely representative and 
to encourage acceptance of the union's position by the remaining 
members of staff who prefer not to become directly associated iJth it. " 
Plans were drawn up for the recruitment campaign and management began 
drafting a procedural agreement. 
The staff association had by this time submitted its ow. 
--, 
Section II 
reference on which ACAS took legal advice and then told AS#TPIS 11-. hat the 
issue of a final report would enable the staff association to start 
legal proceedings which could stop progress on the ASTMIS reference for 
ot over a year. It seems unlikely that AST11S nc. e%--', - d this adviC (lo be 
persuaded to comply with the Company: -s plans. However, the union 
still made a few defiant gestqres. On 7 June, it subm-Itied a 
- 
"'ic, 
- 
caiiprehensive claim on pay and terms of service, although they 
acknowledged that there was no formal. agreement on collective 
bargaining. It pronounced itself not bound by "any improvements 
promulgated through the SCO 
- 
thn union would "reserve its right to 
initiate negotiations on the claim after formal agreement has been 
agreed. " The AGM (Personnel) told ASTMS that he had noted the claim 
but was not prepared to discuss it. 
ASTMS membership appears to have been around 1,000 at tha beginning 
of the recruitment campaign in June. In April, the AGN (Personnel) had 
noted that "the grapevine is telling us that the Union have grave 
doubts about achieving a mtmbership of 50% staff even with management 
help" 
- 
that would, of course, have meant more than doubling the 
membership in a few months with little new incentive to potential 
members. 
During the recrui tment campaign; staff were encouraged to attend 
meetings arranged by ASTMS with the cooperation of-management, but the 
degree of interest did not compare with that shown in either the ACAS 
survey the previous year or the referendum in 1975. In july, the 
GM (Administration) expressed concern at the "ganoral picture of lack 
of staff interest" and wondered whether there was a case for a 
"further test of staff opinion". The definition of "substantial'' 
membership remained unresolved. 
The other proviso 
- 
the negotiation of a procedural agreement - had 
also to be fulfilled. Management produced a draft procedural agree- 
ment and negotiations with ASTMS began in July. By August, the 
following major points remained unresolved: 
- 
The exclusion of the most senior grade which had until then 
been included in the potential bargaining unit. These staff 
then pre-empted the issue by fonning the Middle Managers 
Association. ARMS were afraid that this would have a 
'knock-on' effect, with the grades immediately below feeling 
less secure about union wembership. 
- 
'n I- 
- 
The Company's, insistence on a inariageniont Chairman fOl- the 
Joint Consultat-ion and Negoti. ation Committee- 
- 
The inclusion of a 'status quo' clause to prevent management 
from introducing any-changes in those spheres covered by the 
agreement until all procedures had been exhausted. This was 
demanded by ASTHS in exchange for agreement that no action 
(by either party) should be taken until all procedures had 
been exhausted. 
The status quo clause was the main bon& of contention. Mianagement 
understood there to be an ASTHS directive that all prucedural agree- 
ments negotiated by the union should contain such a claUSC--, a 
conference of tCompdny AST14S representatives "Unanii-nously rejected any 
polssibility of the negotiators signing a Procedural Agreement with- 
out a status quo clauself. ASTMS referred the matter to ACAIS) but 
macnage, rilaant refused at first to be "pressurised" into attending a 
meet I ng. They did, however, agree to meet ACAS without the presence 
of ASTHS and subsequently a tripartite meeting was'arranged. The 
position was eventually reached vilhere managercient -would agree to 
discuss the inclusion of a status quo clause (with an appendix listing 
provided agreem2nt those itemis to i, Jhich it referred 
- 
see Apperdix-11) 
was reached on the JCHC Chairman and two other minor points of dis- 
agreement. At a furiher meeting, ASTMS conceded all points and 
attained their objective of a status quo clause. The appendix 
ensured that matters of 'management prerogative' (e. g. work methods) 
were not subject to the clause, and thus prevented the danger foreseen 
by management that their 'right to manage' would be restricted. The 
solution seems reasonable and obvious; ASTMIS' eagerness for a status 
quo clause enabied concessions to be gained by management or, all 
F disagreement. points ol 
On 26 September, AS'NPIS advised mpmbers that'"agreernant was reached 
on this Trade Union's right to negotiate on your behalf". 11 Managemen 
more accurately noted ithat "agreement has now been reached 
... 
on the 
worlding of a procedural agreement wthich will operate if the Company 
- 
1-1 1), 
- 
recognises ASTIMS forcollecti-ve bargaining purposes, ". If Ahe Company 
,, ecogrini. ses ASTIMS 
... i 
It seems that nanagement then began to get cold feet about the fact 
that they had virtually agreed to recognise ARMS, the conditions 
arguably haying been fulfilled 
-Ahe definition of "substantial'' 
membership being still open to doubt. it was always understood by 
the Company Mt recognition would have to be a Board decision, but 
perhaps this should also have been made perfectly clear to ASTHS. 
The subject was on the agenda of Board meetings for the next several 
months, but at the September meeting it was decided that a final 
decision on the ASKS claim could not be made until the staff 
association Section II reference had been resolved by ACAS. 
The staff association had made a. Section II reference in june, and ACAS 
took legal advice on their obligation to proceed, as their duties under 
Section 12 (2) of the Employment Protection Act were not precisely 
defined. By July no action had been taken by ACAS and Paul Nicolsorl 
advised that a writ was to be sought for a High Court declaration that 
ACAS had a duty to proceed. ACAS appeared unperturbed and inform2d 
the AGM (Personnel) that they saw the writ as no more than "a shot 
across their bows". They appearedvery reluctant to take any action 
which could delay an. agreement between the Company and ASTMS. In 
August, the staff association repeated its request for joint bargaining 
rights but they were informed that the "employee relations policy seeks 
to avoid a multiplicity of collective bargaining arrangements". 
ACAS decided in September that they would be legally safer in refusing 
greed that the situlation to process the reference if all parties acre an 
was substantially the same as when the ASTMS reference was submitted. 
It miust be assumed that ASTVIS concurred jqith this and that tile staff 
association took the opposite view. The GM (Administrati. on) told ACAS 
that "the passage of time and events may well have chariged some staff 
attitudes" and conimented on the fact that ASTMS membership had not 
Jally as had been hoped. tie also noted that the grown as substant 
staff association had received its certificate of i. ndependence si. nce 
the ACAS draft report had been issued 
- 
"the Company 
, 
having 
reached agreement with ASTMI on the terma of a procedure agreement, 
now has to consider, in the. context of its Oployee Ralations policy, 
the effects of entering into a sole bargaining agreement on those 
members of staff who have remained, and may remain, members of another 
Certified Trade Union 
- 
the 
... 
Staff Association". This could not 
have been an unanticipated problem: management had planned for the 
independence of the staff association, and in any event, the certifi- 
cate had been issued in March 1978 
- 
two 
-1donths before the G-1 
(Administration) had informed ASTMS that My would be recognised for 
collective bargaining purposes subject to the two provisos. 
From 1 October 1978, the AGIII (Personnel ) was promotad to tile 
position of GM (Adifinistration), R new Are las 'Grl (Per-so n1) ký 
appointed and tile previous GM (Administration) tou'r, other 
duties at Generai Manager level. After this date, therefore, 
the persons referred to as AGM (Personnel) and GM (Admir-is-l'.. ration" 
are not those -in earl ler references. 
Recognition of ASTMS 
(October 1978 to April 1979) 
A m2eting between management and ACAS was'-held on 4 October. [11 lanage- 
ment felt that to recognise ASTMIS at that stage IVIOLIld be contrary to 
the employee relations policy. The possibility of a further ballot 
was raised, this being the course of action that managemen-It. "wouid 
most favour as furthcring good Employee Relations and would the seen 
as being equitable and containing a degree of natural justice in 
allb%iing the 'silent majority' to express their views again in the 
light of the additional information they have acquired since +. he 
last ballot, particularly through the ASTMS recruiting campaign". 
This. campaign, they said, had "polarised views though riot in fayour 
of the Union, raLher that in the light of the displayed incompetence 
they shouid go away and stop bothering the Company ". ACAS 
- t14. 
- 
thought that their Council. would object to reopening tha reference on 
behalf of the staff association, although management. guessed that ACAS 
might look for "legal justification" for a Arther survey. 
Jt seems that management were in a situation where principle and prag- 
matic consideration 
's 
were at odds, although this possibility had been 
foreseen for some considerable time. By August 1976, it had been 
recognised that "the time may come (in the absence of any firm indica- 
tion by staff) when management has to decide'which body it will 
recognise for the purpose of negotiating staff terms of service". The 
formal employee relations policy committed management to acting on the 
views of the majority of the staff. The majority favoured collective 
bargaining'- but did not favour either ASTMS or the staff association 
and the policy precluded the possibility of joint arrangements. 
Therefore arguments both for and Igainst recognition of ASIMS could be 
offered on the grounds that this was in compliance with majority staff 
opinion. 
The most immediate issue had always been whether to recognise ASKS 
rather than whether to introduce collective bargaining; the pragmatic 
approach 
- 
to grant recognition once a workable basis for a future 
Company/ASTMS relationship had been achieved 
- 
foundered on the more 
rigid principles of the Employee Relations policy. It seems that the 
employee relations management 
- 
or at least the (new) GM (Adminis- 
tration) 
- 
assumed the inevitability of ASTMS recognition and was more 
concerned ý-., itth obtaining themost favourable basis of recognition for 
the Companv. However, other rin. cmbers of management Ljk, I (especially line 
management) and the non-executive directors seem not to have been, so 
convinced. Maybe the degree of antagonism to ASTHS at, senior leveis 
within the Company had not fully been appreciated; in, )ybe more 
emphasis stlould have been placed on negotiations within management. 
Management tended to rely on the response that the matter was in the 
hands of the Board; the Board in turn refused to move until ACAS had 
come to a final deci. sion on the staff association Section I. I. 
reference. 
""1 E 
On 12 October, t1he ACAS, Council deferred a decision becauso 4A, had 
been formally notified of the views. of thE sitaff associ not yet. I. ation 
on whether i't regarded the situizati-on to be the same as at '-the t1ric 
of the ori, ginal ASTMS reference. On 31 October, the union requested 
time off wi-th pay fcr representatives to attend a course (which was 
granted) and management noted that they "appeared to be assuming that 
the Co-mpany viould recognise ASTMS for collective bargaining 
put-poses onc, 3 the formal matter c-IF the staff association's Section I! 
reference was resolved". Hard ly surprising-in the circu-nistances, 
although the union's confidence may have been dampened on heai-ing 
that there "was no possibility of antiCiDat-rl( the decision the 
Board might make when it was in a position to do so". 
On 7 November, the Company was told by ACAS that, Paul Nicolson had 
informed them that in view of UP- "bias" of ACAS, an extraordill'ary 
general meeting of the still extant staff association was to be 
held at which -the executive would recommend the withdrawal of both 
the Section II reference and the li tigation (presumably the 
S4 threatened writ). The next ACAS Council then deferred a de. -J 0y. 011 
IS became the SA reference pending the decision of that meeting. AST111 
more impatient claiming that ACAS appeared to be assu m ing that the 
staf-I association reference would be withdrawn and that tthie Company 
should therefore sign the agreed procedural agreement. ASTMS wember- 
)hip i,,, as claimed to be around 1600 (and still rising by about 100 
per month) but the Company continued its non-committal vieýý., 
- 
"it is 
Of little VflUe to Speculate whether the Board would regard this as 
being an adequate level of membership for collective bargaining 
purposes, since membership levels might be affected by any developments 
-aore told again at It. ' on -the sjt-. a-, 'f associa-Ition front. " And so ASTIE-11S -he 
A 
end of November that the Board would not decide ASTFIS' case until ACAS 
had made a decision about the staff association. 
At the SA extraordinary meeting (held at Kingswood where there 
were most members), the approximately 30 people who attended agreed 
to terminate the legal action but not to withdraw the Section 11 
reference. They did, howeAr, change this to a claim for joint 
negotiating rights with ASTMS, and ACAS subsequently advised the 
ý ... 
1-1 to 
- 
GM (Administration) that ACAS' inclination was to "accept that the 
bald claim from the staff association for joint bargaining rights is 
not the same issue as was previously suiweyed. " The technical view 
was-that ACAS oight therefore have no choice but to proceed 
- 
the 
political considerations would be left to the Council. The Company 
Board meeting in December again deferred a decision until the 
following month when the ACAS Council would have reached a judgment 
on the 'political considerations', and have received further legal 
advice "on the status of joint recognition igreements within the 
context of the Employce Relations Act". 
During the course of all these postponements, management and the 
Board were considering the consequences of all possible outcomes which 
were summed up by the GM (Administration) in a paper for the Board. 
if ASTMS was recognised, there vilould be dissatisfaction among staff 
association members (numbers of whom were thought by managenent to be 
Psignificantly lower" than at the time of the ACAS survey) and o1her 
anti-trade union staff. Neither group was considered likely to take 
industrial action. Problems could also be expected within the Yanks- 
of middle management who would have to go through a "difficult 
adjustment period". A pay claim had already been submitted by Lhe 
union whilh "is likely to take any steps within its power to 
demonstrate that it is a force to be reckoned with". it was, 
however, some qonsolation that it would be constrained by a member- 
ship of only 30%. It was also noted that if management had to cope 
with industrial action, it would be preferable to do so with a signed 
procedural agreemcnt 
- 
although "while management would be expected 
to adhere to all its conditions, the union can be expected to 
disregard them as and when it suits them. '' 
If recognition was not granted, the ACAS report would be issued ill 
final form and ASTMS would then make a claim to the CAC; this does 
not appear to have caused undue concern to the Company. Whilst 
refusal of recognition would please anti-union staff, ASTHS would 
claim that the Company had reneged on its promise, and might well 
begin industrial action with the possibility that the Company might 
eventually be forced to renegotiate a procedural agreement with less 
favourable terms. 
- 
The staff association would also continue to 
press its claim and it was felt that "both unions would feel no 
constraints in the absence of a procedural agreement and undoubtedly 
both would seek opportunities for exploiting errors in the way 
management were managing". JR does seem highly unlikely that the 
staff association would be able to stir its members sufficiently to 
cause more'than minor irritation. ) All in all, though, refusal of 
recognition would leave a vacuum as the "present consultative 
machine" is not strong because of the uncertainty about possible 
recognition". 
The GM (Administration) therefore favoured recognising ASKS on the 
grounds that both the conditions (i. e. a substantial increase in 
membership and negotiation of a procedural agreement) had been 
fulfilled. If recognition was refused on the grounds that the 
increase in membership was not shfficiently substantial, he suggested 
that "it is arguable that this approach is inconsistent with the 
Company's published formal polky statements. 
The ACAS Council then decided (at their meeting on 24 January 1979) 
that the staff association's Section II reference was substantially 
tile same aS tha+ already considored and , -V, o. jld therefore not be 
proceeded with. ' Thi s obliged the Company -to mý-ike a definite decision 
oil ASTMS' claim, with the added incentive that ACAS intý? ndk, 
_d to -issue 
a final report on tile case 
- 
although this alone v,, ould not have 
materially influenced management. The pos-sibility of a further test 
of staff opinion was again discussed by management, but this time to 
be conducted by the Company itself as another ACAS survey was 
ObViOLISly Out of the question. 
This was put to the Board as a third possible course of action, 
along with unconditional decisions to recognise or not to recognise 
ASTMS for collective bargaining. The GM (Administration) still 
advocated recognition; to refuse "would cause disruption in the 
short-term and an evaporation of such goodwill as still exists 
between ASTMS and the Company I He also considered the large number 
of staff who had remained uncommitted, noting that it was "difficult 
- 
III Z- 
to assess the feelings of those staff who support neither ASTMS nor 
the weaker staff association. it is possible that they genuinely do 
not mind what decision the (Company) makes 
- 
there is no evidence 
either way". The Board considered the issue for the last time on 
21 Februay. 
The following day the staff were informed that ASTMS was to be 
recognised for collective bargaining. Ths advantages of recognition 
of a single union were pointed out: it would reprcsent employees' 
interests more effectively and joint bargaining arrangements were 
"time consuming and inefficient" from the management point of view. 
ACAS confirmed that it was now unlikely to issue a final report -a 
second draft report had been issued shortly before the Board decision 
(in response to the Company's proposals after the first report). it. 
contained certain more-or-less cosmetic changes and the same 
recommendation. 
The staff association advised tile Company the day Wore the crucial 
Board m. -eting that they were considering referring the "obvious bias" 
of ACAS to tile Ombudsman. They also claim. -d to be seeking financial 
assistance from the COE and "other interested organisations" iti orf-ler 
to take legal action against ACAS for not proceeding with their, 
Section II claim. They were assured by the AGI. ', (Personnel) that thelr 
letter had been shown to the Board who "tý,, ere thpl-efore able to take 
-o recoagnise your views into account before coming to tile decision I. 
ASTMS11. They were also advised that all their facilities would be. 
withdrawn when the procedural agreement was signed with ASTIMS. The 
SCC was finally disbanded in March, having been comparatively 
inactive during the preceding few months. 
The procedural agreement was signed 
- 
with the minimum of ceremony 
- 
by the AGMI (Personnel ) for the Company and 1--lur-I el Turner for ASTMS 
on 19 March, and rom Ithat date the union was recogilised by tile 
Company for collective bargaining purposes. Negotiations on the 
first jointly determined pay and conditions ol service review 
began at the JCNC in April. 
Hove Office: ASTIMS troncihold 
The Hove office was the one area in which ASTHS achieved a bigh level 
of membership at any early stage, and provides an interesting 
contrast to the rest of the CGmpany. it was a new office, acquired 
in 1974 as. the Life Administration office, and staffed by relocated 
personnel from London and Brighton, and a consiVerable numbyr of 
local young recruits. Total staff was around 420 in 1979. 
Morale was fairly high to begin with 
- 
staff were prapared to worl', 
hard to cope with the problems of a new office and a hiqh proportion 
of inexperienced personnel. However, even by the end of 1974 there 
were distinct rumblings of discontent, mainly directed at the SCC, 
as the problems remained unsurmounted. At a consultative committee 
meeting in October 1974, staff representatives reported that "there 
was a general feeling that the existing Staff Consultative System 
was totally ineffective and that communications between Management 
and staff were appalling". The Manager (Life Administration) 
attributed the problems to the mortgage issue, suggesting that staff 
reaction had been "One of dismay and a feeling that the Consultative 
Council system has broken down. " By the beginning of 1975, ASTNS 
membership at Hove had risen to nearly 150, but the aspiraKons oF 
local members became fused into the wider Company context by the 
'debate' leading up to the referendum in July 1975, There was acute 
disappointment at the referendum result among ASKS supporters at 
Hove, where membership (it was claimed) had risen to around 200 by 
this time 
- 
almost 50 per cent of the staff and substantially higher 
than elsewhere in the Company. 
A month after the referendum, management had an indication of the way 
events were to transpire at Hove when an ASTNS meeting decided that 
an application should be made for local representation rights. The 
first major step was taken the following May (1976) when a request 
for "full recognition and negotiating rights" at Hove was submitted. 
The justific, tion given was that ASIMS now represented the majori V 
view at Hove and that the staff had thus rejected the SCC. 
-I WO - 
Management refusod recognition pending the outcome of the ACAS 
enquiries, the ASTMS Section 11 rcference having been submitted in 
February that year. 
ASTMS denied the relevance of the ACAS investigations to the 
situation at Hove; feelings ran high and there begin in October 1976 
a series of demonstrations and minor stoppages of work. The sit- 
uation was strictly monitored by central personnel management; 
local line managers were instructed not to 7coinent in any provo- 
cative manner" or note the names of any individuals. taking part in 
stoppages or alter flex-time records. "Singling out individuals, 
or the entire group, for what appears to be vindictive action will 
be counter-productive. " At the beginning of November 1976, the 
industrial action was suspended pending the ACAS survey 
- 
in the 
hope that recognition would follow Company-wide. By early February 
1977, hopes of an early resolution of the reference had been dashed 
by the staff association's High, Court case and the claim for local 
rights at Hove was reopened. 
Union activities continued with sporadic stoppages of work, and meetings 
tive system had held during office hours. By May 1977, the consultat 
. 
fallen 
-into such disreg-ard at Hove that all the staff representatives 
resigned fro5l the committee. Local management believed that indivi- 
dual ASTMiS committee members were prepared to stand for election, but 
they refused to cooperate when approached collectively. The 
consultative committee was, however, fairly rapidly reconstituted or. 
management. 's initiative. Events accelerated in the next month with 
a mass meel-ing in the office car park, a march through the town and 
coverage in the local media. The ASTMS committee sent a letter to 
t LIhe Company's Board repeating the request for local recognition 
rights; they did "not expect any form of nati-onal recognition on the 
strength of only a local majority. (i tis a) cl ain-, f or a local 
representation agreement that will not in any way prejudice the 
national situaition". 
The union did not claim the right to negotiate on those aspects 
of tems and conditions of employment (pay being the most obvious 
ý -. 1001 - 
example) that affected all the Company's staff. It wished to be 
able to negotiate with local management on local issu2s, which were 
mainly those which affected the organisation of work, e. g. staffing 
levels and working methods, on which management were not prepared 
to negotiate under any circumstances. In May 1976 the ASTMS group 
attempted to discuss computeris ation with management, or, as it was 
put, to "dilcuss he full implications of machines taking over from 
Man in this office". Management were not to he persuaded. Also, 
members of the ASTMS committee gave as their main reason for 
refusing to stand for election as SCC reprosentatives. that it "had 
bcen represented to management previously that matters such as 
working methods had caused the greatest concern to the members, and 
management would not expect in any circumstances to agree with the 
proposition that these were matters for negotiation". 
The request for local rights might seen-, "easonable, but regard-less 
of the conten-tious nature of the, proposed subjects for negotiation,, 
management had to be mindful of the fact that should ASTMIS decide 
to claim de facto recognition, the fact that they had achieved 
negotiating rights (even of a limited nature) at' one of the Company's 
Head Offices would no doubt assist the un. -ion cause. In addition, 
the Employee Relations Policy stated t1hat the Commpany "regards all 
%ity for the purposes of representation and U staff as a single-ent 
seeks to avoid, a iq, *tjl tipl i city of employee relations arrangem-ents". 
The G14 (Adminisi ration) decidedthat the employee relations policy 
should not be altered to accommodate ASTMIS aspirations at. Hove 
- 
it 
-ending would then lose all credibility. The possibility of ext 
facilities was rejected on the grounds that it might suggest that 
11militancy pays". 
In June 1977, the union member-s at Hove voted on the continuance 
of industrial action. 77% (199) voted YES; 8% (21) voted NO. At 
tho same time, management were assured that the staff at Hove 
were "very satisfied 
, -., 
ith the Company as an employer-. with 
their terms o, service and COnditions and were happy with local 
management". There v. ere no specific grievances over which 11-he 
union members i,; ished to take issue wilth the Company 
-- 
it was 
simply that they wished to have their identi V recognised. They 
were noticeably vague as to what they would do aftetwards. That 
appears to have been the orientation of the ordina, members; some 
of the leaders may well have seen their activities more specifically 
in the context of the wider union struggle for recognition 
- 
both 
within the Company Ad beyond. Indeed, the activities may have been 
seen as an end in themselves (as the matter for negotiation seemad, 
to be beyond reach) 
- 
maintaining interest until such time as the 
union really was a force to be considered within the whole Company. 
The AGM (Life) 
- 
the most senior manager at Hove - isolated various 
factors which he felt contributed to ASTMS' strength at Hove which 
was conspicuously absent at every other major office. - These factors 
i nCl Uded: 
the uE)heaval followina relocation, 
the Youthfulness of tile majority of staff (with average-_ 
length of service around 2/3 years), 
tile ineffectiveness of the SCC (at Hove), 
the remoteness of Hove from other Head 01fices, 
the weaken6d authority of line management 3s a result 
of the central personnel control of ASTMIS matters. 
Of these, only the second (and possibly the last) is likely to have 
had any real significance although the others may have had some r. flnor 
effect. The staff were very young on. the whole 
- 
mere impress i onabl e 
and less likely to hold the traditional views of trade unions held by 
I -s who predominat their longer-serving calleague -ed in other offices. 
No doubt for these young staff the disruptions in the tedium of their 
frequently routine jobs which were caused by union activities were a 
welcome enlivei-np-htof office life. Of undoubted importance was the 
presence of a small group of union enthusiasts who astutely used 
opportunities to turn management decisions -to their own advantage , 
and maintained a high level of interest in union affairs. It must be 
rerneibbered that while union membership was high (260 out of 420 staff) 
I-I In - 
conmpared with other offices, it still represented only 60 per cent 
of employees at Hove. 
This may well have been to ASTMS' favour to some extent, certainly 
for the motivation of members. It made the division in the staff 
quite noticeable and heightened awareness of the ASTMS' members' 
identity as a special group. 
The claim for separate recognition at Hove persisted on a stop-go 
basis 
- 
being dropped when it appeared that the overall claim for 
recognition would be settled and picked up again when delay 
occurred. The management iTsponse always vnemained the same, and 
the strength of feeling engendered in the members does not appear 
Lo have retUrned to the peak of suaimer 1977. 
Sumi-mary 
The descriptions of events leading to ASTMS' recognition in both 
companies illustrates both the factors which led to this and also 
the strategies of the companies' managements in dealing wilth 
them. In Company A, a series of changes to job content and 
career prospects resulting from rational i sation (job evaluation, 
clerical work measurement etc. ) and computeri. sation led to a 
dramatic expression of collective discontent. The comparatively 
rapid process by which union recognition occurred in this 
Company 
-ý, n be attributed primarily to three re4sons (not 
stated in any order of importance): 
the concentration of a substan'llial-proportion 
of employees in t%qo large administrative centres, 
which facilitated co-ordinated action and the 
fermentation of discontent among many staff. 
- 
the i 
-ing by n, --anagement of -. inny warnil, n 
sAgns- about the. level of feeling among the 
staff. 
the existence of well-supported staff 
associations, which enabled employees to speak 
collectively to management and to determine 
their oven future course of action. 
In Company B, on thp other hand, management appeared to be more 
SCIISitiVe LO the reactions of their staff to both sociufl and t 
organisational changes, and took an initiative in maintaining 
their authority and the support. of their employees'at an early 
stage. Yhey were helped in this by the comparativVy fragmentY 
nature of their administrative Head Offices, and the fact that 
no staff organisation existed before the management-controlled- 
Consultative Council. 
These studies have shown, therefore, that even in similar 
companies experiencing similar organisational changes, other 
factors must be taken into consideration in the unionisation 
of their employees. Chapter 8 gives more attention to these 
issues, after the data from the questionnaire survey has been 
revievied. 
-I Cý, ; - 
CHAPTER 7 
THE C01MIPJANY A SURVEY 
Introduction 
As outlined in the introduction to the thesis, two trends in the 
insurance industry have guided the plans for the attitude survey 
- 
the rapid growth of union membership in the last decade, and the de- 
skilling of work and loss of career opportunities as a result of 
computerisation and rationalised working methods. The main proposal 
was to identi Q links betwaen the changes in jobs and union member- 
ship. The essential point of focussing on the changes in work is 
that they impede the fulfilment of employees' expectations of career 
progression and work which uses valued skills and abilities. It was 
further hypothesised that employees view unions as a possible means 
of remedying these failed expectations. 
The professionally qualified employees in Company A have been used as 
i means of controlling for the effect of the deskilling of jobs, as 
their work has remained predominantly free from fragniantal-Jon and 
detailed procedural control. COMPU'Lerisation has also hardly affect-ed 
professional work for the same reasons 
- 
the jcbs are primarily 
concerned v., ith non-routine cases rather than the mass processes ol 
issuing and ad! i1inistering insurance policies with which the non- 
professional departi, ients are primarily concerned, alithough It. 1he work 
of -L. he lcýver status profesSionals can be fairly predictable. The 
professionals' jobs are therefore performed on the basis of professional 
knov., ledge arid expertise as interpreted by individual judgment, rather 
than kv the application of procedures determined by people Other than 
the job-pcrform,, ý, r as is the case with the non-professionals. 
The London office in which the study was conducted employees a little 
over 2,000 office staff; of these, just over 200 were excluded from 
the sample (by the Company) because they were officers and management. 
The remainder were therefore the General, Executive, Data Processing 
and Professional gradea (gee table 4, PAO 180 of these were 
professionally qualified employees. To match the sample of profes- 
sionals with an equal number of'non-professionals meant selecting 
one-tenth A the remaining staff (excluding typists and punched card 
operators). The Company supplied a computer print of all staff at 
the London office, as at I January 1979, with the names of tho 
employees listed in strict hierarchical order. Order within grades 
was detenvived by seniori ty, i. e. length of time within that grade. 
Males and females were included without distinction. 
'All 180 professional employees were then included in the survey, and 
a stratified sample (one in ten) of the non-professionals were added 
to give an accurate representation of all the non-professional, non- 
management empl oyees in that office, This made a total of 353 emp- 
loyees to whom questionnaires were sent. The questionnaires were 
despatched (through the Company'; internal mail) in June 1979, by 
which time the staff list from which the names had been obtained was 
some six months out of date. To check for resignations during that 
period would have involved a very laborious manual search through 
printed records, and was not undertaken. In the event, six 
questionnaires were returned because the employees to whom they were 
addressed had resigned (two were grade G!, two G2, one G3, one jG), 
thus reducing the size of the final sample to 347. 
The 180 profes5ionals in the survey belonged to seven different 
professional groups; 93 completed questionnaires wer, returned (a 
response rite of 51.6%). It was not possible to detennine from the 
. 
completed questionnaires to which profession the respondents belonged 
as they were required to state only their grade. 
Investment analysts are included in the professional grades by the 
Company because of the high standard of ability and education 
requi red for the work. They are often economics Or mal. thematics 
graduates, and sometimes have actuarial training.. Engineers. 
architects and survoyors are employed because the company owns, for 
investment purposes, substantial amounts of property. 
- 
liz-1 
- 
Table 6 Professional Employees included in the 
_Company 
A Study 
Actuaries 73 
Survevors 45 
Accountants 29 
Investment Analysts 18 
Engineers 5 
4 Arch Lects 5 
'ýol i ci + Ilors 
- FOTAL - 
5d 
180 
Altogether, 242 completed questilonnaires i%, ere returned over a leng-thy 
period (nearly t%-., o months) giving a response rateof 69.7/%-,. The 
questionnaire had been sent out-with a covering letter from U-je-Stal F 
Manager together with stamped envelopes" for their 
-return to City 
Un i ve rs i ty. About three or four t-., eeks afLer their despatch when the 
first rush of repiies had Subsided, letters were sent to each indivi- 
dual in the sample, thanking them for responding if they had done so 
and urging them to return the completed questionnaire if they had not 
already done so. As the questionnairesý,,, ere unsigned, I obviously did 
not know which of these commenls applied to any particular individual. 
Two points 
-require comment on the response rate (table 7). F; rstly, 
Lhere is the much. low, ýr response of the professionals -- 51.6% as t 
opposed to 67.8% among the non-professionals. It is not possible, of 
stinguishad the respondents from the non- course, to tell. what diS 
respondents, but it is possible that the response i-, as reduced by the 
knowle, dge that many others among the professionals had also received 
questi onnai res. This would both reduce the apparent significance of 
any. one response and also reduce the feeling of personal prestige in 
being involved in something from which most otherswere excluded. he 
second point is the low response rate of the lower grades among the 
non-professionals 
- 
G!, G2 and G3. Again, explanations can only be 
- 
guess-work, but might include apathy through a lack of commitment to 
the job and all things pertaining to it, and also a greater fear of 
being identified and victimised than their seniors would perhaps 
feel. 
I lable 7 Questionnaire Response Rate by Grade of LE-Inployee 
Quest. I %i !- 1 QLIeSt. %7 Gradr. Despat- 
ched 
I. Responses Responsei 
Ra 
l Grade I Despat- 
ched 
Responsc Response' 
Iat C- 
GI/GT I 15 3 DI 
G2 20 o 2 50 
G3 16 4 25 D3 8 5 5,2. 5j 
G4 4 2 50 D4 2 
.2 
_ 100 
D5 3 66 
I ss 13 10 76.9 D6 2 
_2 
100 
-1 El 24 14 58.3 
..........  ....   
1 D7 I 
E2 20 16 . 8 0   JG 43 26 1 60.4 
E3 '16 11 68.7 1 AG 41 23 1 56 
10 
-13 100 
F 
1 SG 
- 
39 
-- 
--- -- 
I 
-1 1 43ý5 
6 9 100 PG 57 27 47*3 
4 5 100 
Notes to Table 7: 
Many of those graded G1' (general trainee) on the staff list 
would have been regraded GI or G2 by the time the questionn a 41 re s 
were sent out. Thus, whilst they were included as Gl in the 
sample, their responses might have given the grade G2, which 
would explain the disproportionately high response -for that 
grade. 
The discrepancy between the numbers of rasponses and 
questionnai), -ýes despatched for grades E4, E5 and E6 can be 
accounted for by promotiens at th2 turn of the ye3-r v., Mch had 
not been reflected on the staff list' for 1.1.1979. 
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29 quostionnaires viere returned without the grade oil the 
respondent being stated. 
The Interviews 
150 (62%) respondents ansv., ered af-IFirmatively the question about i, nter- 
views which had been asked in order to assess the feasibility of a 
series of b', -erviews. 104 people Ilater supplicd their narjiýý, s (vlith 
somewhat greater support coming from the professionals compared with 
their lovmr response raille to the questionnaires). All the internews 
"lates about 45 minutes. 
CoLqýany_ý_Jnterviewees by Cirtide 
General Executive Data Processing Professional 
G2 
-3 El 
-3 D3 
-3 JG 
-5 
G3 
-2 E2 4 D5 
-I AG-4 
SS 
-3 E3 
-3 
E4 
-4 
D6 
-I SG 
-4 
PG 
-6 
E5 
-4 
_ 1 
it is possible, of course, that the interviewees were not representaLWO 
of the whole group of respondents and there are indications that this 
was the case. Two assumptions have to be made in any event: 
i) that those who stated on their questionnaire their willingness 
to be interviewed included those who supplied their names later; 
ii) that no inadvertent biasing of the sample took place when i 
selected people for interview. Re main criterion for 
selection was the achievement of as wide a range of grades and 
departments as possible. 
Subject to these two provisos, we can state that the Aterviewees were 
marginally more likely to come from the older age groups (p = 
. 
0596). 
There are several signs which initially suggest that those who were 
less satisfied with various aspects of their jobs tended to be the 
ones who were prepared to he interviewed. Thus, those who believed that 
.- 
Ick I- 
(TIL, 
the Company was worse than other companies for its working conditions 
(p 
= 
. 
0237) and the interest of the work (p = 
. 
0588). Thoy also showed 
a slight tendency to have been more likely to have applied for another 
job in the last five years (p = 
. 
0599). They were also niore likely than 
those who did not want to be interviewed to have very high expectations 
of their jobs (p = 
. 
0109). 
The aspects jjot-2d above iý; ere typical of the professionals, who utere Plore 
inclined to ! ie interviewed, and dij nut necessarily denote any particulýr 
di ssatisf action within thal, gro up. II only the non-professionals who 
were k-; illing to be int-, rvie,. 
-,, 
-,, 
-' are, considered, t1here, is a bias towards 
the older staff (p = 
. 
0218) i-Jth longer sarvic. e (p'= 
. 
0405). There "is 
also some evidence that those who viera less content with their lot in the 
Company viere willing to be interviewed as I-Ahere was a dependence with 
regret at having joined the Company (p = 
. 
0306) 
- 
although there had been 
no dependence in the full sarimple bett,, reen this variable and age or Jength 
of service. There was no dependence bettieen any other variable and 
willingness to be interviewed. 
The put-pose of the intervievisvas two-fold: 
i) to obtain information in a more anecdotal form in order to provide 
a background for the data obtained from the questionnaire; 
to obtain illustrative material on areas 
,,, 
lhich were not direct7l, 
referred to in the questionnaire. 
A flexible interview plan was used which differed for professionals and 
non-professionals, and also for senior and junior grades. This developed 
variations during the course of the interviews as a result of discarding 
aspects which appeared to bc yielding little useful information, and also 
elaborating on those aspects which became more fruitful. 
Because of the lack of a rigidly-structured interview format. 
it is not possible to provide exact details of the numbers expressing 
certain opinions, but detailed interview notes enable an accurate 
assessment of the support or otherwise for various opinions. 
Rather than provide a separate report of the interview data, the most 
important aspects have been incorporated into the summaPies given at 
the end of each section of this chapter. In this way, some of the 
"I- 
respondents" ovai words. car, be used to elaborate on the significance 
of the questionnaire results. 
The QUestionnaire 
4 ts I- so -eqUiring respondent The questiconaire was divided nto foui :, ctions, i 
to give informa-tion cn: 
their hierarchical grade, age, length of service and sex, 
V. details of the characteristics of their work, their expectations 
of their jobs and the extent to which these expectations were 
currently fulfilled and likely to be fulfilled in the near 
future; 
their satisfaction vifth, Itheir jobs and with the Company's 
perfonriance as an employer; 
iv. trade union activity and support, and, thei r reasons for 
membership or non-membership of ASTMS. 
The chi-squared test of dependence was used to ascertain significant 
4, e -ious iteins on the relationships betr, en responses to the vai 
- 
has been questionnaire (Siegel, 1956); in most instances, comment 
restricted to those items i,,, here dependence is at or above the 
. 
05 
level. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendi. -I F, but 
each question is shown in full in the text. 
The questionnairc was tested in a pilot scheme before it was 
. despatched to the main sample. Because of time pressures, it was not 
possible to replicate the main sample in the pilot scheme, but instead 
about twenty questionnairei were given to employees in the personnel 
sphere covering the whole range of hierarchical grades among the 
non-professionals (but no professionals). The main purpose of the 
pilot scheme was to ensure that the questions were unambiguous and 
clearly comprehensible by all grades of staff. As a result of 
commonts from participants in the pilot scheme 
- 
all of whom were 
. 
.. 
Iq "3 
- 
interviewed about their I-esponses - ri. inor anicandments r. ere made to the 
v,, ording of ttwo of the quostions. 
The Company's grading structure has been shown in full on P. 26. The 
abbreviated table below shows those grades which wore included in the 
study and which are referred to in this report of the survey results. 
When comparisons are made between the professionals and non- 
professionals, the DP staff have been excluded. Thus, the profes- 
sionals referred to in the text are all four profcssional grades, and 
the non-professionalsare the six E grades, four G grades and SS. 
Table 8 Grades of Ennployee included in 
Company A Study 
General/ 
Clerical Executive 
Data 
Processi fig 
Professional 
E6 
F, 
E4 
N 
D, 
D5 
D4 
PG 
SG 
E*2 AG 
G5 E1 D2 j 
SS/G4 D1 
G3 
G2 
GI 
The Survey Results 
The responses by grade have already been shown in table 7. The age 
ranges within grade followed a predictable pattern, e. g. 94% of the 
junior grades GI, G2, G3 and SS were under age 27, and 78% of the 
senior grades A, E5 and E6 were over age 36. The professionals 
followed the same pattern although they tended to be younger; 89Z 
were under age 36 as opposed to 52% of the non-professionals. They 
-. 
also had less years of serAce, 66% having been with the Company for 
less than 11 years (pon-professionals 32%). There uere 31 females 
in the respondentsi one was a JG professional, eight were in grades 
El to E4 and the rest were G grade or SS. 
Table 9 Classiffication of Questionnaire Responses by Age 
16-18 19-22 23-27 
. 
28-35 36-45 over 45 
4.2% 7.2% 21.2% 39.5% 9.3% 18.2%, 
I 
- 
L 
Table 10 Classification of Questionnaire Responses by 
Length of Service o 
'less than 1-3 4-6 7"10 - 11-15 over 151 year 
8.3% 13.7% 16.6% 17.9% 17.9% 25.4, s' 
Respondents' Jobs__(Q. 1 
- 
Q. 5) 
The aim of the first five questions was to obtain respondents' 
LI their work, and Perceptions of the qualities and characteristics of 
of other attributes of their jobs (e. g. promotion prospects, 
relaCionships with luoss and colleagues). The items chosen for Q. 1 
were selected with particular reference to those factors which have 
,e traditionally been characteristic of white-collar work and also thol, 
which are most likely to reflect the impact of computerisation and 
rationali. sation. Respondents were also requfreJ to assess both their 
current position the 
-1 i eved I e. their achievements) and what ty be 
they could 'reasonably expect' from their employer. By comparing the 
two, vie are able to see how far short expectations fali of achievements* 
- 
lqs 
- 
or the extent to which they have been Fulfilled. Respondents also 
s' tiwie, ý, assessed the extent of their likely achievement in five year 41 
Finally, a general question about satis-i"action with the job was asked 
in order to-identify which factors mentioned in the previous four 
questions are most significant. 
In each case, an eight point scale was used. The direction of the 
scales was randomised in order to discourage the temptation for res-- 
pondents to tick in a consistent pattern without giving the items 
individual consideration (Oppenheim, 1966). Each factor was then 
given a score from one to eight, and the total scores for each of the 
first four questions were also computed. The figures W and V used 
for scoring questions 1-5 were not printed on th2 questionnaire. 
Q-1 "How, wculd you describe the work you do? " 
Complex 
-L 
IIIII Simple 
Predictable 8 Unpredictable 
Needs much thought 
8 LLj LJ Needs no thought 
Needs initiative 8 Needs no initiative 
8 
Few tasks LI Many different tasks 
Closely supervised Minimal supervision 
8 Needs close attention Needs little attention 
Not significant to the 8 Crucial to the Company's Access Company's success 
Table 11 Total Scores for Question 1 (Work Attoibutes) by Grade 
Total 
Scores G and 
A El E2, E3 E4, LE'5, E6 D JG , -'. G SG, PG 
0-44 63% 20% 4% 22% 28% 12% 
45-54 31% 40'% 55% 57% 57 
-^Z 40Y 
55-64 6% 34% 41% 21 "-q lg. -/ 
- 
Irk b- 
Table 12 Individual Factors of Ovestion 1 
Complexity 
1-4 
9% 
5-6 7--8 
45%' 
Predictability 26% 43% 31% 
Thouaht 7% 3 5,, 'ý, 58% 
1nitiative 90/1' 42 Z' 49% 
Tasks 14% 35 0/, 511/1, 
Supervision 17% 2,7`1'. 56% 
Attention 1 57% 
Significance 24% 48% 2 8'/0' 
11 
= 
242 
The junior grades account for the bulk of the lolt. jer scores, the link 
I between grade and Q. 1 (total score and all the individual factors) 
being statistically significant (p=. 0001). The jun-ior non-profession- 
-itive and als, especially appear to perceive their work as repc4L, 
routine, whillst there is much less distinction between the hierarchical 
extremes of the professional grades. Somewhat more of the non- 
professionals (57%) gave lower overall ratings (0 
- 
50) ýO this 
question than the professionals (514)) although this was not'statis- 
tically significant at 
. 
05 level. There %%, ere significant differences 
between the two groups on two individual factors, with the profession- 
al, giving higher ratings to the amount of thought required (p=. 0125) 
and the level of complexity in their work (p=. 0417). 
Reference to dependence between grade and other variables has been 
based on a hierarchicial division by grade as fo'llo-. -., s: 
i. Gl, G2, G3, G4, SS, DI, JG 
ii. EI, E2, D2, D3, AG 
iii. E3, E4, D4, D5, SG 
iv. E5, E6, DG, D7, PG 
- 
Q-2 "How i-muld you describe ýIOLir job at present? " 
I am given no 
resý onsibility for 
my iork 
1--ly knowledge and 
abilities are used 
to the full 
My work is totally 
uni nteresti ng 
1 ap,.,. given total 
responsibility fo, ill%,, ' 
None of knov, 11edge and 
11 abilities are used Lt-L-, 
-- 
L 
--- 
L.. LIi 
11, %,,, ork could noL be 181, II 
-j-j-L-I-j-I-j i9ore 
interesting 
I have the complete 811 lly boss does not 
respect of my boss 
--Lj respect ine 
at all 
I have no pro-inotion. 01 have vor. ),, good 
nrospects 1_1" promotion prospacts 
I do not enjoy the I thor-ougiNy enjoy the 
company of my company of rii. v 
colleagues colleagues 
Table 13 Total Scores for Question 22 (Job Achievements) by Grade 
otal T 
Scores G and SS EI, E2, E3 E4, E5, E6 D jG2AG SG, PG 
0-34 71% 34% 18% 57% 28% 23"o 
35-39 
- 
16% 34% 55% 29% 45% 32% 
[40 
- 
4: 8] 13% 32% 26% 14 26%__ 44% 
- 
Table 14 Individual Factors of Question 2 
1-4 5--6 7-8 
Responsibili 12% 40% 48% 
Knowledge 2 0,, 45 0%, 35% 
Interest 18% 53% 30% 
Boss 11% 42%, 47% 
Promotion 30% A 3 6% 33 
Colleagues 5'/0 24% 70% 
1-4=242 
10 4o. 
The scores for Q. 2 cannot simply be equated with satisfaction with the 
job as, for example, a man nearing retirement may rate his promotion , 
prospects as being verT low, but acccpt this as being perfectly justi- 
fiable. The lower grades rated their achievements less highly than 
the senior grades (p=. 0023), and again this was far more noticeable 
among the non-professionals than among the professionals. 
Promotion is the area which stands out as that in vinich achievem-!, nts 
receive the poorest assessment throughout all the grades. The 
professionals appears to believe that they had achieved moro overall 
than the non-professionals (p=. 0049), particularly in the realm of 
promotion prospccts (p=. 0002) and responsibility for their work 
'(p=. 0028). The professionals also rated more highly the respect 
accorded to them by their boss Qw. 0385), which suggists that shared 
professional training and experience may cultivate a less divisive 
relationship between boss and sobordinate. There was a strong 
tendency to give high ratings in all grades for enjoyment of the 
company of colleagues, with the notable exception of the senior_pro- 
fessional grades SG and PG where 26% gave 5 or less. The only 
explanation I can offer is that competition for promotion becomes 
more intense when officer level is Q sight, and that this may affect 
the interpersonal relationships aniong illnese gradles. 
Altogether the respondents do not appear to rate their achievemants 
within the Company particularly highly. This is felt most strongly 
by the non-professional grades, especially the junior grades G1 to SS 
who make up approximately 37% of the total staff in the London office. 
Pranotion prospects are the sphere in which discontent with achieve- 
ments seems to be most concentrated. 
Q3. "Please now complete the same set of scaleS 
to indica"L2 what you think you could reasonably 
expect from the Company. " 
(factors repeated as in Q2 but with 'colleaguos' 
omi -tte d. ) 
- 
N-11, 
-- 
Table 15 Total Scores for Question 3 (job Expecta', Lojj. ý' j by Grade 
G and SS 
I 
Elf 
, 
E2, E3 E4 D JG, A fG, S C, 
,pG 
0-30 42% 
- 
24% 4% 28% 14 % 5% 
31-34 
[ 
18% 197" 27 36% 2 927 
35-40 1)9 56% 69V, 36% 49 ýZ 66% 
Table 16 Individual Factors of Ouestion 3 
1-4 5-6 7-8 
Respons 1 bil i ty 5% 26% 70% 
Kno-vil edge 8, Z) 15% 7 7% 
Interest 4 cz, 
+ 
30% 66% 
Boss 5% 24Z 707, 
Promotion 7%, 24% 6 5.17 8' 
11=4 Ii 
The scores for all Ithe factors in Q. 31 were appreciably higher than for 
Q. 2 and the senior grades recorded higher expectat, 
-, 
le In 4 -on,; than tI ore 
junior grades (p=. 0079). This pattern among thc grades was consistcn-'Lly 
maintained, the only exception being promotion prospects where the 
junior grades gave some evidence of higher expectations (although this 
v. ras not statistically significant). There aas no sigoificatit 
difference bett-,, een the professional and. non-pro-F-essional groups for the 
total scores for this question, but the professionals did have higher 
expectations in respect of promotion prospccts (p=. 03919) and the amount 
of responsibility they should have for their ol.,., n 
.,! ork (p=. 0207). 
Questions relating to both achievements arid expectations have been 
asked and considerable differences bet%,,, er--n the responses vp. rea, pp a rent 
.. ). 00- 
Q. 2 scores (achievements) were, as noted, lower on tha whole than the 
scores for Q. 3 (expeCtdtiODS) and were therefore deducted from these. 
The 'colleagues' factor in Q. 2 was omitted from the calculation. The 
scores arrived at by this method are henceforward referred to as 
Q3LESSQ2. 
Table 17 Q3LFSSQ2 (Expect Scores by Gi 
-ations less Achievements) -ades 
G and Sl 
N=38 
E-1, E2,, E3 
N, 
=4 
lE4,, E5, E6 
N= 2- 7 
D 
N= 14 
JGPIG 
11=49 
§GPG 
J=, N /' 4 
a C. 11. <exP, 
Me 8 7% 73% 85% 79% 7 7,1101 86%, 
ach. =-E: xp i 
ach.:, exp 
8% 
ýýz 12% 
11% 7, ', U 
14% 
18 C//) 
6% 
7% 
7% 
Table 18 Individual Factors of Q3LESSQ2 
Responsibiiity 
ach. < exp. (Q2) (Q3) 
- 43% 
ach. = exp- 11 
51% 
Tacli. 
> exp. 
6% 
Knowledge 62% 31% 7% 
Interest 56% 38% 6% 
Boss 41% 50% 8cl h 
Prcmotion 58% 38% 4% 
Promotion prospects, use of knowledge and interesting work aye the 
factors for which expectations are most notably in excess of achieve- 
ments. There was no significant overall dependence between grade and 
Q3LESSQ2, although the discrepancy between achievements and expMations 
was significantly greater for the non-professionals than for the profes- 
sionals (p=. 0277). The non-professionals were particularly more likely 
- 
to believe that they could 'reasonably expect' more promotion than they 
had actually reccived'(p=. 0026). The gencral picture is that there is. 
a widespread feeling among employees that they could 'reasonably 
expect' more from We Company than they have actually achieved in all 
the factors mentioned. The deskilling of work is apparently experi- 
enced through the lack of interest and scope for the use of knowledge 
and abilities in the job, but promotion emerges as the key area of 
unfulfilled expectations. 
Q4. "The same scalps appear again below. Thi-s- 
LAme please indicate how you- vroulc! 
-, Ipect 
to be able to ansiver these questions -in five 
years time. " 
(factors repeated as in Q311. 
Table 19 Total Scores fGY' QUestion 4 (Future Expectations) by Gradee 
G and SS El, E2, E3 E4, E5, E6 D JG, AG SG, PG 
0-30 32% 30% 39% 46% 23S 22% 
31-34 19% 27% 39% 23% 21% 26% 
35-40 48% 42% 22% 311,5 6 5273 
Table 20 Indi-%',; Idiml Factors of Question 4 
Responsibility 
1-4 
3% 
5-6 
16% 
7-8 
81% 
Knowledge 10% 1) u 70% 
Interest 6% 32% 61% 
Boss 7% 20% 73% 
Promotion 
II 
24% 30% I 46% 
--- 
- 
'). ra 
- 
Among most grades (senior E grades being the exception), estimation of 
future prospects (Q. 4) is appreciably higher than assessment of current 
achievements (Q. 2). The non-professionals have steadily docroasing 
expectations for the future as they progress in seniority, whereas all 
the professionals appear to be fairly optimistic about their future 
prospects (although there was no significant overall depender, ý., -_betu'een 
hierarchical grade and Q. 4). However, the junior grades among both 
professional and non-professional groups gave a higher rating for their 
expcctations of the future (Q. 4) than their current expectations (Q. 3). 
The belief in a bQhter future would help to explain why dissatis- 
faction among these grades about their ewployment in the Company 
frequently does not lead them to leave the Company (see Q. 7-11), 
iespite their currently unfulfilled expectations. 
The professionals' generally higher anticipated achievements within the 
next five years (p=. 0068) are a rhalistic reflection of the different 
career prospects between the two groups. The professionals were 
particularly more likely to haveohigher expectations of their future 
promotion prospects (p=. 0311) and the level of responsibility they 
should have for their own work (p=. 0188). 
A gloomy view of the future is reflected in the responses & the data 
processing personnel. In the intervi6ws, the DP staff voiced strong 
complaints about the lack of promotion prospects, which obviously most 
concerned those at the lower end of the hierarchy. This was attributed 
several times to anabundance of older staff (within about ten years of 
retirement) in the senior grades who had originally been moved over 
from insurance departments when compuLerisation began in the 'sixties, 
and it was also suggested that such people were having difficulty in 
coping with rapid technological developments. Interviewees stated that 
this was demoralising to younger staff who felt themselves to be more 
capable than their seniors. 
- 
Q5. "Would you say that, overall, you are happy 
with your job? " 
1 Not at all 8 Completely 
Table 21 Scores for Question 5 (Satisfaction with Job 
. 
1-4 5 6 7- 3 
I 42o 191/0, 32% n rj n" 
I 
1) 
AS With Othel- Studies (e. g. Dale, -1962; Morse, 1966), satisfaction with 
the job 'increases with age (p=. 0346) but not with grade. 'Happ i ncss' 
was positively linked with the total scores for Q. 1 
- 
Q. 11 (in all Cascis 
, 
p, > 
. 
0002). Thi s dependence occurred with al I th. e J ndi vidual -f act, rs 
in %, "aI.. i ty 
. 
Q. 1 and Q. 2; in Q. 3 (expe tations) the 'level of responsibill 
-t-,, een achievc the only factor which was not signilFicant. The gap bet 
ments and expectations (Q3LESSQ, 2-) was significant on all facturs except 
stently promotion prospects. Q. 11 (future prospects) had the consilc 
highest levels of dependence with 'happiness' or all the first four 
questions, confirming what was Suggested about current dissatislacll-ion 
being counteracted by hope of a better future. 
Summary (Q. 
_l - 
Q. 5) 
The responses to these questions reflect employees' perceptions of the 
type of work they do, and the various characteristics of their jobs. 
There is evidence that there is a widespread failure of expectations 
among the staff and, as predicted, this is particularly so among the 
non-professionals. These staff are more likely to describe their jobs 
with attributes that suggest routinisation and to give low ratings of 
their general level of achievements. 
- 
The junior staff, especially among the non-professionals, are those 
whose jobs are perceived as being most highly rcutinised and fragmented. 
These grades form a high proportion of the total staff in the Company 
and their jobs have borne the brunt of changes through computerisation 
and earlier rationalisation wercises. Whilst their expectations were 
lower than those of older staff, it appears from the consistently high 
levels at which they exceed achievements that the younger generation of 
white-collar employees is still entering office employment with out- 
dated expectations of the work. 
Promotion prospects are emphatically the single most important issue 
in expectations, and appear to be the main focus of current dissatis- 
faction among the non-professionals. Despite this, many believe that 
they have good future prospects; if the next five years do not live up 
to expectations, serious reappraisals of loyalties within the Company 
could take place. Promotion is i1portant not only as a reward in 
itself, and a source of status and money, but also as a means of 
achieving greater use of knowlehe and abilities, more responsibility 9 
and more interesting work. Reduced promotion prospects therefore nave 
a very wide impact. 
The interviewees viere asked about the impact o) computerisation on 
their work and their opinions of promotion prospect-s withill the Company. 
The professionals, without exception, stated that coiiiputerisa. tion 
- 
if 
it affected their wwlk at all 
- 
served only to remove some of -the 
routine elements and did not affect the profe3sion-a-11 asp. -cts. None of 
them believed that it had, or would have, any adverse affect. on their 
promotion prospects. The professionals' only worries about careers 
came from the rumour that the junior CIFficer grade 
. 
vas to be abolished 
as a reSL! It Of the salary restruct. 6ring schern-? ý This rumour was denied 
at the -'time, but has since been confirmed. This appears to be one of 
the few occasions in ivinich the jobs of all groups o-F employees, 
including the professionals, are affected by rationalisation. 
The professionals were asked for their opinions on the ways (if any) in 
which they differed from their non-professional colleagues in their work 
expectations, and also the extent to which the company rewarded their 
expertise and qualifications. Their expectations can apparently be summed 
up in one word 
- 
more. More money, responsibility, promotion and job 
interest are what they expect in return for their professional 
qualifications. This was virtually a universally held opinion. There, 
was less unanimity on the question of whether the company was able 
to fulfil those expectationz Money did not appear to be a problem, 
with a large majori V believing their salaries to be satisfactory, 
although several suggested that the professional 'mark-up' should be 
11 ig 11 e r. 
Promoti on prospects al so general ly met wi th approval 
, 
parti CUl arlY 
among the actuaries. However, a notable minority (mainly actuaries 
and accountants) compla, ned that they i,, lere given insufficient 
opportunities to use their professional expertise and to -Cake on neil 
responsibilities. Both these groups claimed that the company employed 
far too many of their parl., icular profession and that, as a result, 
they did not have the scope to use their skills to the full. 
Balancing this, a number of professionals claimed that they enjoyed 
working for the company because the demands %%, ere not too great; 
such persons suggested that higher financial rewards could be 
gained elsewhere (especially in consultancy and private practice) 
but that the costs in terms of stress and the loss of leisure time 
were not worth it. 
The non-professionals were far more ambivalent about both 
COMPLI-terisation and their career prospects. It was difficult to 
find a pattern in their responses. Several (various grades) 
suggested that the long-teni) effect of computerisation would be 
to reduce the number of jobs, especially at tile lower grades, 
whereas several others said that'. they had seen no evidence of this 
although tile cot-iipany had been using computers for years. Again, 
some said that computerisation made the work (not, only of tile lower 
grades) more boring, whereas others said that increasing computerisation 
had had no impact on the overall interest of the work. Virtually 
all the lower E grades and the G grades described a lack of interest - 
in their work, bUt this was frequently riot explicitly related to 
computerisation. 
- 
)ýCu 
- 
As- ha-' poirUed otr! kl bef(,., re, most of the lol.,; er clerical grades (and, 
4,1V &I cc. U 
., 
L. Nosp 1" : 
_i .! t_ , 
have bee L I, - aa 1_1 f -I-,, ,. -rc i 1), 1 1-1 working for the 
a r, v for only -k ciý--, 1;1_1, aratively short H! 1-2. It t%tould there-Fore be 
very, difficult for thcm to assoss the impact that conipluters 'have had 
on thireir work over Lhe last' ten years. They Could oniy report 
their prese. pt reactions to their v., ork, which tended to be that 
it %was routine and unfulifilling. On 
- 
the subject of careers 
, 
most of 
the older-, more senior E grades (E4 and E5) appeared to be fairly 
compJacent and suggested that promotion prospects were probably still 
the same as vihen tthcy had joinrEd the Company, perhaps 20 or 330 years ago. 
Une E5 vias of the opinion that prospects v. iere fevier no. 'i and that Job 
satisfaction had become very low. An E3 said thaL proriioýion deperided 
on uhich department an individual happened tto b--, i..., orking, 
., 
in, an d 
several interviet.. 
-2es (of v, arious non-professionel grades) complained 
thali; it wais ver y easy to be passad over. The younger and more junior, 
grad-, s t-lere more clearly discontented with their promotion prospects, 
;, ihich ware variously described. cis 'not good' , 'bad' , 'difficult' and 
: not all they're cracked up to be'. One clerý co, niplain. -d that he ý, 
-: oluld 
still have to wai-t 'Buggin's tijrnt even though he had been oil the 
Special Scale for several years. 
B. The Company as Employer (Q. 7 
- 
Q. 13) 
These questions were intended as measurements of satisfaction with the 
job in general and the Company as an employer, If an employee is 
dissatisfied with a job, he will presumably regret having joined the 
Company (Q. 7), consider resigning from the Company (Q. 8), and have 
begun looking for another job (Q. 9). Q. 10 was intended to cover those 
staff for whom the option of leaving for another job is curtailed by 
age (and thus reduced chances in the employment market) or by financial 
ties with the Company (e. g. mortgage). However, it must be remembered 
that saveons might want a new job just for the sake of a change rather 
than through dissatisfaction with the current one. Similarly, another 
job might be seen as offering even better prospects than already good 
ones with the present employer. On the other hand, many people might 
like to apply for another job, but can find none available for which 
they are suitably qualified. In other words, various considcrations 
other than dissatisfaction will deturyine how many employees actually 
attempt to leave the Company. Also, there are ways of expressing dis- 
content other tharn by leaving the employer. 
Respondents were also asked to compare the Company with other similar 
large companies on several aspects of employent. Most of these people 
will have had no first-hand knowledge of 'other similar large companies', 
although many may have friends and acquaintances working in them. 
During the pilot study, respondents were asked if they had any diffi- 
culty A answering this question. They nearly all declared a lack A 
personal experience of comparable companies, and had answered the 
question from accumulated hearsay evidence. Nona professed having had 
any difficulty with the question. 
Q7. "Do you ever reqret hav. ng joined the (Comipany)? '
ve ry qui te LO ]"I,, sometimes 0 
L. 7% 
, 
much often 
rarely 
F20-, 
not at all 
Table 22 Responses to Question 7 (Join) by Grade 
G and SS EI, E2, E3 E4. F. 5-E6 D JG, AG SG, PG 
very much 0 0 0 1 0 
quite often 3 3 2 0 5 1 
Sometimes 15 18 14 6 14 20 
rarely 11 10 8 7 16 17 
not at all 9 10 3 1 13 6 
- 
. 
Q8. "Do you think you will ever resign from the Company? " 
71 132; definitely not F4 -2'1, probably not m --iY b 
probably d eI ini tely 
INI = 240 
Table 23 Res ses to Question 8 (Res-ign) by Grade 
I 
'd-ef iTli-t-eTY--- 
not 
G and SS 
- 
EI, E2, E3 1 
- 
-4, E5, E6 
-- 
D 
1 
JG, Al,, 
-' 
-- 
2 
2fl-l"GI 
4 
---- 
probably nDt 
1 
maybe 
probably 
tely 
7 
12 
7 
18 
15 
2 
1 '1 
L 10 
L5 
2 
0 
8 
3 
-0 
1 
22 
17 
5 
3 
26 
11 
3 
1. 
--c 
Not surprisingly, junior grades were more likely to believe that they 
would resign (p = 
. 
0001) as were the female respondents (p=. 035911- 
There was, however, no dependence betwaen regret at having joined the 
Cumpany and either sex or grade. The professionals were more likely 
than the non-professionals to believe that they would resign (p=. 0066), 
indicating an awareness of the greater mobility provided by professional 
qualifications. 
Respondents with lower scores for Q. 1 to Q. 4 and whose Pxpectatinns 
most exccedcd achievements (Q3LESSQ2) were more likely to regret 
joining Lhe Company and to believe that they would resign (p > 
. 
03 in 
all instances). Apparently, some at least of those who are 
dissatisfied with their work and their unfulfilled expectations are 
likely to deal with the situation by leaving the Company, rather than 
staying and taking some form of action to achieve an improvement. 
The driving force in applying for another job appears to be the non- 
fulfilment of expectations, i. e. Q3LESSQ2 (p=. 0275); there was no 
statistically significant link with any other of Q. 1 to Q-4. 
)CI 
Q9. "Have you in the last five years (or since you 
joined the Company if you have less than five 
years' service) considered getting another 
jOb? II 
rover I have idly. considered it 
I have given it I have applied 
serious thought 
EJ 
for another job 
N= 240 
Table 24 Responses to Question 9 (Other jobs) by Grade 
G an Lill SS E I, E2 135 E4 , E5 , E6 
I D jGJkG I SGPG 
never 
I have idly 
10 
F--- 
6 
'- - 
12 
- 
2 9 
F 
6 
10 15 5 G 
,8 17 considered it 
i have oiven it 
Lsserýousss 
-thought 
9 12 14 5 9 
I have applited for Laýnoth r job 9 8 6 14 
Thero was no dependence between grade and having looked for another 
job, although there was with age (p=. 0014) with the young staff having 
been most likely to have appliad for another job in the last five 
years. The greater mobili Q of the professionals was again shown in 
the higher proportion"who had applied for another job, and the fact 
that fewer of the professionals (44%) than the non-professionals (62%) 
felt that they were restricted from leaving the Company (which is also 
a function of their typically younger ages). 
There was no dependence between Q. 10 and either age or grade, although 
it might perhaps have been expected that there would be. Again, 
unfulfilled expectations (Q3LESSQ2) was a significant factor (p=. 0016) 
- 
especially having the respect of the boss (p=. 0124) and promotion 
prospacts (p=. 0190) 
- 
but there was no link with any other aspect of 
Q. 1 to Q. 4. 
- 
Qlq. "UOUICI YOU look for another job if age! pension 
rights/company mortgage did not restrict you-, 
(Only ansvier this question if you feel that these 
factors restrict you from changing jobs. ): ' 
i would start looking 3-3) ' 
]Z7 1 wouid probably see if 
straight a,.,., ay th2re are SUitable job---- 
FI might think I would not wan't 7- about itu 16 to leave 
_! 
]
=121 
Table 25 Responses to_Question 10 (Restrict) by Grade 
IG 
and Sý E-I E2, E3 
1 E4, E5, E 0 JG, /kG IG 
, 
IG 
1 ý. 
-Iould start lookin( 
, 
straight away 2 3 2 1 3 
I would probably see 
if there are suitabl jobs 
-I 
3 10 1 5 3 
- 
I riiight think about 
it 3 4 9 
i VIOLIld not want 
to leave 1 3 3 
0 5 1 
Ql 1. "How do you think the (Company) compares as an 
employer with other similar large companies? " 
much somevihat about 
worse v,, ors e the same 
sal ary 1% 39ý 
security 
- 
37% 
interesting worl, ll%j 
-68% 
promotion prospects 3% 29% 55% 
0/ 
working conditions 510 16% 45% 
fringe benefits 3% 32% 
consideration from 
top management L8! A E2! jl 5 5% 
J 
somew-hat, much 
better better 
5W, 3 0Z 
17 L; /' , 2% 
3 0% 
31 9% 
2 C4, 
N 233 
- 
')-Il 
- 
This question enabled respondents to isolate ayeas of satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction with their employer, by enabling then to state Aere 
they felt that they would be better or worse off with another employer, 
It also introduced various extrinsic aspects of employment, such as 
salary, which have not been mentioned before. Four factors 
- 
promotion 
prospects, working conditions, fringe benefits and consideration from 
top management 
- 
bach show an appreciable minori P who believed that 
the Company compares unfavourably with other similar companies. The 
poor rating for these four factors was given-equally by professionals 
and non-professionals. The fact that 32% of the respcndents balioved 
that Company A offers worse promotion prospects than other similar 
companies suggests that they do not attribute their low promotion 
chances to considerations applying to the 'insurance industry as a 
result of general economic conditions. 
Some areas of dissatisfaction vary with grade. The junior grajes Yore 
more likely to give consideration from top management a 'worse' r; tipg 
(p=. 0019), whereas the senior grades rated the Company worse for 
working conditions (p=. 0311) and fringe benefits (p=. 0072). The 
professionals were more likely to give a 'better' rating for salar 'ry 
than the non-professionals (p=. 0080). 
There were links between all the itenis in this question and Q. 7 Q. 10 
- 
in each case, a 'worse' rating is related to regret at joining, 
intention to resign, having looked for another job, and intention to 
resign if not restricted from doing so. 
There is evidence that respondents tended, naturally, to generalise 
4 j, from their experience of their own work , imaking of 
Company. Lower scores for Q. 1, Q. 2 and Q. 4 and expectations exceeding 
achievements (Q3LESSQ2) were significantly linked with %. j""rse, ratings 
for interesting work and promotion prospects. Ihe antagonism which 
this causes towards the Company is reflected in the '%-., orse' rating 
for consideration from top management. Those whos'e expectlations most 
exceeded achievements were also more 'likeiy to give loiý,, er ratings for 
salary (p=. 041512). 
Table 26 Dependence between Rating off Emplo'yer and Regret 
a lt-, Li o -;, ji"i Tq tc 
JOIN RES I GN OTHER JOB RESTRICT 
sa *1 ary 
security P=. 0511 
interesting -.., -ork P=. 0003 P=. 00-, ýo p=. 0424 
pro-motion prospects D=. 000 p=, 0021 p=. 0007 p=, 0100 
working conditions p=, 0313 
fringe b0nefits 
nt -top managem. 1 P=. 0008 i D=. 0000 
p=. 0218 
P-. 0001 P__. 0103 
Table 27 Dependence between Uork Attributes, Job Achievements etc. 
Employer 
uestion I job attributes) 
I I'TEREST I NG 
U'ORK 
p=. 0004 
PRONIOTION 
PROSPEMS 
p=. 0173 
TOP MANAGEMENT 
Question 2 (achievements)' P=. 0000 p=. 0001 p=. 0138 
Question 3 
(expectations) 
- 
Question 4 
(Future prospec., 41-S) P=. n 0000 P=. 0003 
JQ3LESSQ2 p=. 0037 p 0006 p=. 0149 
Q. 12 and Q. 13 concerned the dissemination of information within the 
Company. They were included on the questionnaire at the request of 
the Company's management but, whilst not relating d irectly to the 
hypotheses, some of the responses can usefully be recorded. 
- 
12. "In which areas is it i-itiost -important to have 
information from management? " 
(please do nott tick, inore than three ansvlers) 
individual performance 16AZ 
career prospects 176% 
comipany's perforimance 114% 
loriger-term company policy 1 430Z 
dealings with ASTINIS 113, ", 
q4 changes affectin, jobs 
Other (please Specify) L-J 
N=? 42 
After the concern atbout prutio-ition prospects reflected in resporise, r to 
Q. 4, and the evident dissatisfaction expressed in Q. 11, it is not 
surprising to discover that over three-quarters of respondetits consider 
t 'ion on career prospects is of primary importance. ' It Lhat informal 
appears that this is particularly so among junior staff with fetter 
years' service (p---. 0350). On the other hand, there is some evidence 
that those i-, lho believe thal', information on individual performance to 
be most important are older staff as they are more likely not to have 
applied for another job -in t-he past five years (p=. 0293). Aga-In, it 
appears to be older staff who 
--re r. no-, t concerned about cormpany policy 
(letigth of service, p=. 0482). 1--lost importan-'Lly, the 64% who believe 
that information on changcs affecting jobs is important appear to be 
drat--in primarily from the non-professionals, as there is a dependence 
with ASTMS' membership (p=. 0014). 
There is a slight change of emphasis vChen improvement of communi cations 
is considere, 111. Changes -affecting jobs, is the area where improvement 
a ppears to be most required, and this appears to be a general -feeling 
as there is no dependence with-any other variable to indicate one 
particular group of employees. Those who wish to see improved 
I 
I ro, 
4 o. Ql 3. "In which of these areas is improved nrimnicatUi n 
MOSt nceded? " 
(please do not tick wore than three answers) 
---I 
individual porformance 36% 
career prospects 57% 
company's performance 5% 
longer-term company policy 49% 
dealings with ASTMS 14% 
changes affecting jobs 61% 
other (as specified in Q12 above) 
- 
21.2 
-com-uiunication on company policy are older employees, as was the case 
v. li th Q. 12. However, those v,, ho viant'better communi cation on individual 
performance are younger staff (p=. 0008) 
- 
note the change fran Q. 12 
- 
indicating that there is some concern at this level about the assess- 
mcnt and reward or individual effort. Not surprisingly, those who 
want better communication on carEer prospects are those who rate the 
Company 'worse' on promotion prosPects in Q. 11 (p=. 0199). 
Summary---(Q. 7 
- 
Q. 13) 
These questions have probed. employees' opinions of their employer and 
their satisfaction with their jobs in the Company. Taken as a whole, 
there is little indication that employees intend to express any dis- 
satisfaction by leaving the Company, although various aspects of their 
employment do clearly cause concern to certain groups of the staff. As 
with most things, 'satisfaction' (or otherwise) must be seen in compara- 
tive terms; that is, employees may be satisfied with their jobs because 
they meet expectations and requirement, or it may be a case of 
accepting that thoy are unlikely to be Utter off overall with another 
ein pI oyeý r. 
-. 
'! ý s- 
Promotion prospects are confi med as a major source of discontent within 
the Company among all grades and both the professionals and non- 
professionals. 
All interviewees were asked for their opinions on the style of manage- 
ment Within the company, and on any changes which had takcn place 
within their period of employment. 
It was with no great surprise that I heard the word 'paternalistic' 
used over and over again. Most believed that the company was still a 
paternalistic employer, although at least half believed this to he 
less than in the past 
- 
and this was almost universally regretted. 
There was a strong feeling that, the company was a good employer when 
it came to individual 'welfare' issues (e. g. prolonged illness), but 
that there had been a hardening of attitudes towards the employees as 
a group. This was attributed to a variety of factors 
- 
ASTHS' role in 
bargaining and general economic pressures for the company to 'got its 
money's worth' being the two main ones. A high proportion also 
believed that the atmosphere within the company had become less formal 
in recent years and that senior staff and management were less inclined 
to keep their distance from the lower grades. This was welcomed by all 
who mentioned it. 
A number of senior staff, especially professionals, referred to the 
fact that the company had re. ccntly been breaking its long-st-anding 
practice of 'growing its own tfinber' and had begun to recruit personnel 
into higher grades. Whilst this was resented by several who mentioned 
it because of the obvious reduction in promotion chances, it 
.,., 
as also 
A gh t recognised as a way of bringing new ideas into the company, and il 
"shake th-inLIS LIP a bit, as one person put it. 
Tradejhjjýý 
The last group of questions concerns respondents' views on trade 
unions generally and also patticularly membership of ASTHS within 
the Company. By asking respondents to select various areas to 
which they believe trade union activi Q should bc restricted 
- 
or 
extended 
- 
and comparing this with their comments about their jobs 
and employer, we can make some assessment of the extent to which 
dissatisfaction with certain factors is related to a wish for these 
matters to be negotiated between management and the union. The 
reasons given for membership/non-membership of ASIMS can also be 
compared with responses which show indications of dissatisfaction 
to see whether the union may be viewed by staff as a means of improving 
their positions vis-a-vis their employer on matters of wider implication 
than salaries. Leaving the Comp; ny has already been shown to be a 
means of expressing dissatisfaction; the question yet to be answered 
is whether the majority who remain have any intention of using their 
collective voice through the union to make changes'S areas of 
dissatisfaction. 
45% of the respond,, ýnts statcd that they had been memiDers thie 
Staff Associations (Q. 16); 92% of those with 11 or r. rjore years of 
service had been members. 59% of the professionals and 89', /C of the 
non-professionals stated that they were currently members of ASTMS 
(Q. 17). The difference 
-in the typical length qf service of the 
two groups has to be considered; as ASTHS was recognised in 1970, 
far more of the non-professionals would have simply transferred 
their membership from the Staff Associations to the union. Mcost of 
the professionals have therefore had to make individual decisions 
about union membership without any experience of the hiStM-ical 
reasons for ASTMS' presence in 
-the Company or any involvemment in that 
col iective choice. 
of 4thrý, younnner a ge-groups twil 
-,,. i I ii n the Pro Foss ion a Is is 
Aso typical of the younger non-professionals. This lowar rate of 
mambuiThip amung junior staff indicates that ASTMS may have difFiculp ty 
in maintaining its current high level of support in the future. There 
was no evidence that females were less likely to join the union: both 
sexes in the junior non-professionals were less likely to be ASTMS' 
members than their older colleagues. 
Ql 5. "In which areas do yolu think trade unions should 
I Coil C Cýfitr- a tC- -L 1) 2 it r energ i es? 
definitely 
not 
pay and conditions of empl oyment 2% 
security 5% 
career structure/promotion pros" 11% 
pects 
work content/job interest 21% 
ccmpany policy 
152% 
national and political issues 
[-ý9ýz 
1-!! avbe def i nittle I 
913 F, 
ý91 
37 Z 57% 
3% 
5 7%/ 21% LTC, I 
a6% 
)CI I 19% 11 
Therc is a predictable and steady decline of interest in union activi-- 
ties from the narrowest confines of pay and conditions to the widest 
areas of national and political issues. What is surprising, though, 
is the extent to which there is still considerable interest in union 
invclvcm2nt in such non-traditional areas as career prospects, work 
content and even company policy. Much of this interest in the latter 
two categories is tentative, in that respondents feel that 'maybe' 
unions should be involved in these areas. But the majori Q do not give 
the resounding 'no' that would have been expected from past studies of 
- 
7, \ ý11, 
-- 
v., hite-collar and professional employees' attitUdes to unions. Grads 
vias related to interes in union au" `ies in i cases 
- 
.. 
ecurity I -w, V L 
(p=. 0341) and work content (p=. 0334) with the Junior grades being 
against union, involvem. ent in security bul-I in favour of involvemnt in 
11"Orp Content. 
The non-professionals were more likely than the professionals to 
favour wider union involvement (p=. 0303) 
- 
particularly in career 
prospects (p=. 0107), company policy (p=. 0170) and national and 
political issues (p=. 0239). The significahe of career prospects 
suggests that the comparatively low achievements of the non-profess- 
ionals in this sphere and the larger gap between their expectations 
and achievements leads them to favour union intervention on their 
behalf. 
Table 28 Dependence between Sopport for Union Activity and 
ASTMS bjemb&-Fýh-i o 
pay and conditions of employment P=. 0000 
security P=. 0000 
career structure/promotion prospects P=. 0000 
work content/job interest l p=. 0169 
company policy. p=. 0420 
national and political issues p=. 1882 (n. s. ), f 
The extent of support for union activity varied with union membership, 
with the union members being more likely to be in favour of union 
activity in the various areas. This distinction between members and 
non-members gradually Womes less as the activity broadens from the 
traditional sphere of pay and conditions until it disappears entirely 
with almost total disagreement with union involvement in national and 
political issues. There is, however, no definite evidence for 
establishing causal relationships between preferred areas of union 
- 
ý. Iq 
- 
activity and membership of the union. It may be that those with a more 
sympathetic attitude to unions joined ASTMS in the first place, or it, 
could be that those who joined for whatever reason have been encouraged 
, 
by their experience of the union to a belief that it could be usefully 
employed in wider spheres of activity. It is more likely to be this 
latter way round, though, as the majority of the members joined in 
1970 for reasons related entirely to the circumstances in the Company 
and not to do with personal commitment to the union movement. Also, 
verT few people indicated that they joined ARMS as a result of a 
'principled belief' in trade unions. In other words, we can deduce 
that most people joined ASTMS because they had definite ideas about 
what they wanted the union to achieve for them. 
Comparisons were made between the preferred areas of union activity 
and the responses to Q. 11 (rating of the Company on various aspects of 
employment), as a means of testing whether respondents believed that 
union action should be taken on those itemsvore dissatisfaction A 
felt. There is evidence that Qis is the case. Respondents who 
- 
rated 
the Company 'worse' for promotion prospects were more likely to favour 
union involvement in matters affecting the career structure (p=. 0450), 
suggesting a very direct response by employees to dissatisfaction 
with promotion prospects within the Company. Similarly, those who 
felt that the Company was 'worse' for security were more likely to 
favour union involvement in the career structure (p=. 0093). 
Union involvement in work content was more likely to be favoured by 
respondents whose expectations most exceeded their achievemen's than 
by those with a nearer match (p=. 0563). This suggests that the union 
may be used by employees as a method of achieving career. expectations 
whi-h havc so far been thwarted. In an apparent contrast to this, 
those who rated the Company 'better' on interesting work viere also 
more likely -to want the union to be involved in work content (p=. 0490). 
It appears, therefore, that personal dissatisfaction with one 
particular area of employment need not necessarily exist for there to 
bE., a desire for union involvement in that at-ea. There were, in fact, 
a number of senior non-professionals who indicated during the 
interviews that they believed t. hat the junior grades had worse 
- 
2.0 
- 
prospects than they had had when starting their own careers in the 
Company. For example, in response to a question. about th3 advice he 
might give his son if he was considering entering the Company, one E5 
told me that he would say: "What, haven't you got any ambition? ". 
It is therefore possible that the more senior staff, whilst reasonably 
satisfied with their own achievements, see that their subordinates 
have a morb difficult future, and believe that action by ASTHS could 
help to improve matters. 
Union'involvement in the career structure was also favoured by those 
who felt that-the Company was 'worse' for consideration from top 
management (p=. 0255). It was the junior graoes who gave top manage- 
ment the 'worse' ratings, and their wish for the intcrvention of the 
union in promotion prospects suggests that despite their lower ASTHS 
membership levels, the youngar generation of employees does not have 
a more restricted view of union activities even if they decide not to 
become directly involved through union membership. 
Questions 18 and 19 asked for the respondents' reasons for joining or 
not joining ASTMS. For many employees, membership was very much bound 
up with the events in the Company preceding ASTMS' recoghition in 1970, 
and this question is therefore somawhat hypothetical. They did not 
necessarily, at that time, make the decision on the basis of any of 
the reasons given in these two questions. Nevertheless, these 
questions give respondents the opportunity to state their major points 
of agreement with or objections to ASTMS in the Company. Each 
respondent was allowed to give three reasons for membership/non- 
membership (not ranked in order). 
Amongst the members, the traditional occupation of unions 
- 
negotiating 
pay 
- 
is most frequently given as a rea'son for joining ASKS, although 
30% (even allowed three reasons) did not consider this activity to have 
prompted their decision to join ASTHS. This reason for membership 
gained support equally from the professionals and the non-professionals. 
Almost half the members gave as a reason for joining that a union 
makes managemynt consider employees' interest in changes affecting 
jobs. This was more pronounced among the non-professionals, 49% of 
8. "If you are a meriber, of AS-TMS, vihy did you join? " 
(please do not tick more than three ansv,, ers) 
It seemed to be die 'dorte thing' 
I felt it increased n-ýy security 
A union can negoltialte better pay etc. than 
-the Company -,,,, ou'ld otherwise give 
1 have a rwincipled belief in trade unions 
uanted to in-fluence the union towards moderation 
It gives me soiiie involvement irt decisions 
concerning -, '. he Company 
A union, makes management consider employees' 
interes-ýs in changes affecting JODS 
Other (please specify) N'= 16 9 
responses as 
percentage of 
memi., crs 
111 
people gave broadly similar reasons under 'Other" to the 
effect that they felt that they should not take the benefits 
of union membership (usually seen in financial terms) without 
paying the union subscription 
them believing that the union could influence management in changes 
affecting jobs, as compared with only 34% of the professionals. 
A quarter of the members saw union membership as a means of gaining 
involvenent in Company decision-making, with again somewhat more of 
the non-professionals (27%) giving this reason than the professionals 
(22%). Only a small minority had wanted to influence the union 
towards moderation, although 25% of the professionals gave this as a 
reason for joining. The non-profossionals, though, were more concer- 
ned with security (30%) than the proressionals (22%), again 
suggesting that mobili V is an influencing factor. 
- 
T 
.. 
t was only possible to test for dependence between certain responses 
to Q. 18 and Q. 19 and other variables because of the need for adequate 
numbers. 
I The following reasons for joining ASKS were used: 
'change,, affe,,., ting jobs': people giving this reason for member- 
ship were morc likely than those giving other reasons to have 
given the Company a 'worse' rating for securitY (p=. 0391), 
promýotion prospects (p=. 0354) and cons i dorati on -From -'(-. op n1anage- 
S4 ment (p=. 0366). This strongly SUggests that such Laff see the 
union as a means of remedying the failure of their ev,,, ploýyer to 
fulfil various expectations. A lack of confidence in Lop 
managei, lent or a belief -iGhat they do not sufficiervikliy consider 
their eicployees' interesis appear-s to lead to support for all 
alteri-, ative source oJ' influence 
- 
the un-ion. 
The connection beti,., een union m2mbership and work expecilLations i-s 
confirmi-ed by thre fact tbat respondents joining the union -For 
this rep-son %-,, ere more likely to have expectations greatly 
exceeding achieverfients for promotion (p=. 04148), indicating again 
that pro; -iiotion prospects are the most crucial area of empleyee 
expectati ons. Ue, therefore have here quite clear evid:? nce that 
employees jqhose tý,, ork and career expectations are thwarted i,., ant 
to use union mei-,,, bership as a means of achieving so; 'Ne readjustment 
oi the balance of poý,,, er between themselves and their employer, so 
that their interests are protected when decisions are made in 
areas of 'managerial prerogative'. This is more important to the 
non-professionals than to the prof essi on: 
_Ils as the foriper were 
more likely to give this reason for joining ASTHS (p=. 0591). 
V. 'pay negotiations': those who gave this as a reason for member- 
ship were more likely to have not looked for another job in the 
The ccmparisons were made using only members (or non-members) so that, 
for example, in A. below, people giving pay negotiations as a reason 
for membership were more likely than people_giling other reasons (not: 
than non-members) to have not looked for another job. Thus, depend- 
ence cannot be extrapolated to apply to differences between members 
, 
and non-members. 
I' 
..  
- 
last five years (p=. 0236), which suggests MAP, longer service 
staff, whose concern about career prospects may have svm2what 
diminished. They were also more likely to have given the Company 
a 'worse' rating on promotion prospects (p=. 0488), suggesting 
particularly the non-professionals with their poorer experience 
of promotion. We can tentatively conclude that such staff may 
see the union as a means of achieving financial gain to compen- 
sate for reduced promotion chances. It appears therefore that 
those staff who cannot of choose not to leave the Company do not 
simply resign themselves to unfulfilled expectations, but hope 
that the union will at least maintain their financial demands. 
'involvement in decisions': those who gave this as a reason for 
joining ASTHS were marginally more likely to be against union 
involvement in security Q=. 0525). This suggests junior grades 
with the indication that the decisions such people had in mind 
were concerned with day-to-day aspects of their jobs akd the 
content of their work, rather than major policy decisions which 
can affect the number of jobs and therefore the security of 
employees. (Also, in Q. 12 and Q. 13, it was the older staff who 
were concerned about infomation on company policy. ) 
iv. 'increased security': there was no dependence between this 
reason for joining ASTMS and any other variable. 
The two most frequently given reasons for not joining ASTMS were 
objections to the union's political views and to the possibility of 
industrial action. Virtually no non-members took the opportuni V to 
suggest that the union's achievement were not worthwhile, although 3OZ 
objected to the way that the union is run. The only clue to explain 
this latter point is the comment that was made several times during 
the interviews to the effect that the leadership had become too remote 
from the rank and file members who were therefore unable to influence 
decision-making. This comment was, however, oily made by mombers, 
although it could be a more widespread feeling, especially after the 
announcement of the salary restructuring scheme. As the quesKon does 
not actually state the way the union is run 'in the Company', it could 
also he that people giving this reason simply do not like Clive Jenkins. 
ý -- D. Ij-- 
Q19. "If you are not a nei, -, ber of ASTMS, v., na-'t; are 
you, reasons for non-membership? " 
(please do not tick, more than three answers) 
I do not 'like thc! political, vie,, 
-, F, c o-F the union 5 
The union does not achieve anything 
,, 
iorth,. 0iile 3 
Union membership conflicts with my professional ---1 
re s 1-1 on s 41 bi 11 ties13 C-', / 
I recelve any henefits even though I am not a 
member 
I cannot be loyal to both the Company and the III/ 
union 
I do not like the t%, &v t1he union is run 30 
I have been asked/may be asý-ed to take action 
I"'hich is to me 63 0/, 
Other (please specify) M 73, 
responses as 
percentage of 
non-menibers 
Tests for dependence with other variables were made using the 
following reasons for non-membership; 
'political views': those who gave this reason for not joining 
ASTHS were more likely than those giving other reasons to be 
against union activity overall in the areas listed in Q. 15 
(p=. 0137), and especially in securi ty (p=. 0486), career 
structure (p=. 0062) and company policy (p=. 0109). It seems 
that a political antagonism towards union membership affects 
-both the personal decision to join and the degree of sympathy 
with a wider view of union activities. 
However, it is possible that objections to the political views 
of ASTMS were used as an 'acceptable' reason by some people to 
mask other reasons for non-membership, as many of the inter- 
viewees who-were enthusiastic ASTMS members professed a distinct 
lack of sympathy with upions in general whilst claiming that 
ASTMS in the Company did not have any undesirable union 
- 
'). ') fý 
- 
characteri. sti cs 
, 
such as niI itancy. 
'distasteful action': those who had not joined the union because 
they did not want to be drawn into any form of industrial action 
were marginally more likely -to believe that they would not be 
resigning from the Company (p=. 0524), which suggests older staff. 
There was also a significant dependence between this reason for 
non-n2mbership and several factors in the first four questions: 
these respondents were mire likely to have given a high. score for 
significance of their work in Q. 1 (p=. 0204), and high scores for 
responsibility for their own work (p=. 0173) and promotion 
prospects >. 0242) in Q. 21 which indicates that W professional 
employees were more likely to object to industrial action. 
'professional responsibilities': those who chose non-membership 
on the grounds of conflict with their professional responsibili- 
ties were more likely to have high expectations (pn. 0288) and to 
rate the Company 'worse' for working conditions >. 0424), -both 
of which suggest the more senior staff. 
iv. 'way union is run': there was no significant dependence between 
this reason for non-membership and any other variablo. 
(No tests for dependence between the reasons for non-ipeqmýership and the 
two occupational gi-OLIPS 
- 
professionals and non-prolessionals 
- 
were 
made, because it was felt that. there were too few non-prollessional non- 
members to gi ve rel i abl e resul ts. ) 
umm ary 121 ,I 
The employee-as -in Ithis company appear to be in favour of a considerable 
extension of' union involvement into areas which have previously been 
regarded as the prerogative of managemen-IL. 
- 
e. g. the Colmpzuny's career 
StI-LICtIJYe, promotion policies and opportunities, the content of jobs 
and overall company policy. As far as promotion and job content are 
---I 
- 
LLo- 
concerned, respondents had already indicated that their wpectations 
remained unfulfilled in these aiwas. The non-professionals, with their 
wider discrepancy between expectations and achievements, are more ready 
to support union involvement in matters of interest to them other than 
simply pay and conditions of employment. There was also found to be 
direct links between respondents believing the Company to be worse than 
other comparable employers on various issues 
- 
e. g. prozotion prospects, 
interesting work 
- 
and their wish to see unions actively involved in 
these areas. 
T the reasons given by respondents for thair membership of ASKS again 
indicated that many of them view the union as a way of achieving some 
of their expectations. Considerable support for union negotiations on 
pU emerged, but it was far from being the only major reason for 
joining the union. Many people wqnted the union to make manayemeA 
consider employees' interests in changes affecting jobs, and also sw. % 
union membership as a way of gaining some involvement in decisions 
concerning the Company. The matter of changes in jobs was particO arly 
important to the non-orofessionals 
- 
who have had to bear the greatest 
impact of computerisation and other significant changes in working 
procedures in recent years. 
There was strong evidence that union membership (connected with job, 
changes) was seen by staff as a means of remedying the non-fulfilment 
of their job expectations. Whilst this reason was given by slightly 
fewer than half of the respondents, it was given by 49% of the non- 
professionals who account for a vastly larger proportion (77%) 1 of 
the total employees in the Company than do the professionals. 
All interviewees were asked about unions in general and the role of 
ASTMS in the company in particular. They were not asked directly if 
they were union members although nearly all volunteeW this 
information in the course of their answers (about half Cc! 
professionals and the vast majority of the non-professionals were 
union members). 
lexcluding Officer grade and above. 
- 
Opinion about unions in general was fairly equally divid2d,. with about 
half indicating a lack of antagonism (although rarely positive 
approval). Of the other half who disapproved of unions, a very high 
proportion stated that the usual image of unions 
- 
and ASTH particulady 
militant image 
- 
was not carried over into union involvement in the 
company. There were only four people who expressed reservations about 
ASTMS' role in the company (as opposed to claiming that they, as 
individuals, did not need a union). These reservations involved alle- 
gations of incompetence in cowmunications; waakness ("almost reverted 
to being a staff association"); too much unnecessary argument on issues 
(for which management was also blamed), and centralisation or decision- 
making in the hands of a few branch officials. This last point was 
mentioned by several people, but was seen by iocst as an inevitability 
and not particularly resented. ASTMS received substantial praise for 
its negotiating successes in pay awards. 
There was one fairly , Pcent eVent involving th, 
- 
union on which 
11 --ich had been questions v., ere asked. This was the indL! St'ial action wh 
taken in November 1978 (i. e. about nine months before the Mterviews), 
in support of a pay claim, and whi. ch vv, as a vmrlk-to-rule. 
Obviously, only members were bound ky ASTMIS' instructions and this 
undoubtedly explains why the professionals appeared to have had much 
less involvement than the others. Overall, the intervieý-. lees were 
positive that there had been no ill-Feeling at the time iboti-: een rl-'eirlbers 
and non-members (both groups agreed with this), and that once the dis- 
pute had finished there was no lingering rancour against management. 
The general feeling was that the action had indeed been necessary and 
had not been forced on an un, w-lilling membership by the union. The 
amicable atmosphere throughout the period was probably sustained by 
the comparative lack of disruption to daily working routine which most 
intervie%-,, ees reported. The younger st taff seem to have taken a 
particularly light-hearted view, and several times referred to the 
action as 'a game' or 'a bit of a laugh'. 
- 
11,13 
- 
On the subject of union representation, the professionals were asked 
about the extent to which AST14S catered for their special interest (if 
any), whether a separate union for professionals would be preferrable, 
and whether there was actually a need for professionals to join a 
union at all. 
Opinion was split down the middle on whether professionals need a 
union, some claiming that they had just as much need (e. g. for negotia- 
ted higher salaries and the protection of securi V of employment) as 
the other employees. The others claimed that-prafessionais were valued 
and rewarded highly by their employer anyway and also had a much higher 
market value which enabled they to move elsewhere if they were dis- 
satisfied. Most of thos, who believed that professionals had a need 
for union representation also cited the union as a means for employees 
to make their views known to management on various issues concerning 
their jobs. 
Only three professionals liked I-he idea of a separate union catering 
for them alonte. The reasons most fraquently given against were 
tha. t there are too many differences betv., een the various professional 
groups, and that such a union %-., ould be too small to be effective 
, w, ithin any ona company. All exceot on. - declared that ASTI-IS did not 
cater for their special needs (seen primarily in terms of linancial 
differentials), and the usual reasons given in expliination for this 
were that the professionals were a numerically insignificant minority 
and were clearly woll-reuarded anyt%, ay. There was very little ind-i- 
cation of any resentment about ASTMS' attitude. 
COINCLUSIONS OF THE COMPANY A SURVEY 
Computerisation has had a massive impact on work in the insurance 
industry in the last fifteen years and has particularly affected staff 
in mainstream insurance departments, rather than the specialist profes- 
sional employees who merely rely on computers for certain back-up 
facilities. in addition, the economic pressure of the last two- 
decades has forced employers to minimise staff costs by restricting 
- TL2C - 
recruitment and shedding excess staff, and also by rationalising 
work so that bulk processes can be completed in the shortest possible 
time. These rationalisation programmes cannot readily be distinguished 
in their effects from the scope for work reorganisation which has beell 
facilitated by computers. 
The result frem the employees' point of view has been the loss of 
promotion prospects; reduced scope for the exercise of responsibili ty, 
initiative and dccision-makin'; recurring Qars about job securit 9 ty 
and an increasing lack of protection against unilateral management 
action. As employees are more readily replaced by machines, (and 
as the uniformity caused by rationalisation means that any one 
individual becomes less significant and replacements more readily 
trained), so the scope for managerial control over the organisation 
of work and job content has grown. Employees have less personal 
discretion over the performance of their work, so their power vis-a- 
vis their employer decreases. 
This was reflected in the survey evidence from Company A. TO 
professionals generally attributed to their work fewer signs of 
fragmentation and routinisation, whereas the Pon-professionals 
(especially the junior grades) clearly perceived Mir work as dis- 
playing many such signs, i. e. few simple tasks n2ening little thought 
or attention and being highly predictable. The impact of this on 
work expectations (derived from 'inherited'experience) was seen in 
the very high incidence of achievements having fallen far short of 
expectations on the whole range of job factors 
- 
responsibility, use 
of knowledge and abilities, interesting work and promotion. The 
non-professionals rated their achievement of responsibility and 
promotion significantly lower than did the professionals, and the gap 
between their expectations and achievements was significantly 
greater (especially relating to promotion). The variation in the 
responses of the professionals and non-professionals indicates that 
the bureaucratisation of work which has affected the latter's jobs 
is reflected in their p2rceptions of thQir achievements and the 
qualities of their work. 
Until about a decade ago, insurance employees showed little incli- 
nation to contest their employer's decisions. Salaries were 
generally very favourable with Valuable fringe benefits; security 
was absolute, and a steady career progression was assured for the 
conscientious employee. Theis appears to be currently very little 
discontent about salaries (confirmed in the survey evidence) although 
this was not the case ten years ago when rigid adherence to income 
policies reinforced the trend towards less than generous pay increasns. 
There is no doubt that ASTHS has been very effective in negotiating 
pay increases in those companies where it has achieved recognition 
and, as the major companies tend to pay very similar salaries, the 
negotiated increases in the unionised companies must have pushed up 
the level in the others. Company A, in particular, has been of 
significance as it had been the first of the major companies in the 
annual pay-round (renegotiating salaries each October), which set the 
trend within the industry. It his recently tired of bearing this 
burden and negotiated an 18 month pay settlement, thus placing itsel-I 
at the end of the queue in April. 
Security of employment has also not suffered as greatly as had been 
feared by some groups of empl oyees. Some companies, such as Company 
B, have introduced voluntary redundancy programmes on occasions, 
and many (including both Companies A and B) have had early retire- 
ment schemes. I know of no cases of compulsory rodundancy among 
the larger companies. Employers have therefore managed their reduced 
demands for labour without forcibly separating people from their 
jobs. Uhilst security has been an intermittent fear, it has not 
proved to be particularly justified. ASTMS negotiated a policy of 
'no redundancy' with apparent ease shortly after its recognition 
in Company A, and even voluntary redundancy was always considered 
a measure of last resort in Company B. 
Career progression is another m. atter altogether. !,! hilst the very 
able will still find their way, if not to the top,. then to fairly 
senior positions, the iiiajoritv of employees are no lonner aSSUred 
of' a steady clirib during a 30 or 40 year career. Plateaux are 
-')2 
reached at a comparatively low level, where staff can see many years 
stretching ahead of them with the chance of verT little further 
promotion 
- 
and work which is often less than inspiring. And yet 
it has been the prospect of. a career 
-a continuing improvemant in 
status, financial reward and responsibili Q- and the consequent 
identification with managerial philosophy which, 1 would argue, 
has characterised white-collar and professional employees' work 
ethic and expectations. 
-hat proM L. Certainly, the evidence from the survey in Corripany A is 4. mol ion 
is not only the most important area of enm-ployee xpectations but also 
that area which has been suffering most. The particularly 
promotion achieved by the non-professionals (in their own estimation) 
has already been noted; and altogether 32ýcof -ILhe respondents -felt 
that the Company offered worse promotion prospects than other similar 
large employers. Those who gave this 'worse' rFting were apparently 
reflecting their own experienceýof lcw, achievements and failed k'. -ork 
expectations. And yet the younger employees in -the early years of 
their set-vice still had high expectations of tile futura (especially, 
in lact, of promotion); clearly the experience of I; heir senfors, 'Clad 
not been an effective lesson for theni. 
The question to be asked is %.,, hether trade union mer-iibership, which hl. -. 
gr&v! n to such a great extent In -11-he insurance industry in the las! t 
low years, is in any way a response to the failure of expectations 
resulting from the deskilling of work and the decrease in career 
prospects. It has certainly riot been a lightly-taken decision. 
White-collar employees have always tended to stress cooperation with 
management as a means of achieving their objectives, but during the 
sixties and 'seventies there were signs that cooperation would 
werely facilitate the worsening of employees' work experience and 
prospects. 
As mentioned earlier, the intention behind union membership could take 
two forms. The union could be seen as a means of gaining greater 
extrinsic rewards (in the form of salaries and fringe benefits) to 
compensate for failure of expectations in other areas, or it could be 
seen as a means of restoring the more favourable traditional status, 
work and prospects of previous years. The experience of the last 
decade has shown that ASVMS appears to em. -phasise the foi-mer, whilst 
the evidence of the survey in Company A is that employees are moving 
towards demanding a restoration of earlier expectations by union 
involvement in areas of managerial prerogative. 
AF, mand. al Com-, pensation for Unfulijilled Expectations. 
89% Of the respondents in the Company A survcy bclieved that lthc 
union Should definitely be involved i'n nego-tiation-'s about PP_Y' 
and there -is some evidence that financial compensation for loss of 
promotion prospects is valued by at least some of the staff. 70% 
oi the respondents gave pay negotiations as one 01 their reasons F 
for having joined ASTMS, and this reason was more likely to be 
given by those who believed -that Conmpany A offered worse pro- 
motion prospects than other similar large companies. The 
professionals 
- 
with their higher achievements, especially in the 
sphere of promotion 
- 
were more likely than the non-professionals 
to believe that the company offered better salaries. In addition, 
t 1,110SE' W-11L11 low expectation'! > of their future proi-iiiotion prospects 
were more iikely than those with high expectations to believe 
that the up-ion should definitely be involved in decisions on pay 
and conditions of employril. ent. However, as such people were pre- 
dominantly older employees, this may be only a realistic 
recognition that their chances of improving their financial status 
through promotion is reduced because of their age (regardless of 
prospects generally), and that they will benefit primarily 
through negotiated pay increases. 
I would not, in any event, suggest that pay increases are seen by 
people as necessarily the only or completely satisf?, d. ory ccmpen- 
sation for losses in other spheres. Gouldner ( 1954 ) argues 
that the most legitimate expectations are those which are 
explicitly consented tol but that any human relationship involves 
expectations not mutually agreed in advance: If grievances con- 
cerning expectations are inhibited (by, for example, a parceived 
lack of legitimacy), then they may be displaced on to other 
issues. Thus, employees may be aggrieved at the reduction of 
promotion prospects and the diminubon of the intrinsic value of 
their work, but believe that they cannot legitimately (cr 
effectively) influence managements on these issues, whereas they 
can do so on areas of the employment contract, such as pay, which 
have been designated legitimate areas for collective bargaining. 
In such circumstances, employees are effectively adnering to 
traditional notions of managerial prerogative, al-It. hough the 
evidence of the survey is that such ideas are being extensively 
reassessed. There is virtually no indication of this it, earlier 
studies. However, economic demands when seen as a legitimate area 
for collective bargaining Could be the first stage in the, ýevelop- 
ment of the collective ethic and, once satisfied, may lead to 
demands for increased involvement in wider decisionis and ultimately 
to demands for self-management (Mallet, 1975). 
Whatever interpretation is given to employees' support for union 
negotiations of pay 
- 
i. e. as a first step to wider bargaining 
or as the only legitimate sphere for collective bargaining 
- 
it 
is clearly an important area. However, bargaining over pay is 
fairly readily contained within delimited boundaries and does not 
pose such a threat to managerial authority as bargaining in such 
areas as job content or promotion prospects. If employees do 
believe that their union should negotiate in these latter spheres 
in order to restore earlier rewards, then the challenge to 
management is considerable. 
B. Fulfilti-terit of Traditional ExpeCtations 
---------------------------------------- 
The survey results from Company A showed that promotion was very 
important to the majority of respondents, and that this is so 
among all ages and both professionals and non-professionals. 
Similarly, they have high expectations of the intrinsic nature of 
the work in terms of the demands that it makes on their skills 
and abilities, capacity to exercise responsibility and so on. 
Not only are these aspects important, but there is ample evidence 
that these employees believe that their employer is failing to 
fulfil these justifiable expeqtations. A minority of respondents 
in Company A were definitely opposed to union invivement in 
career structire and promotion prospects (11%) and in wort, 
content/job interest (21%). Barely half (52%) were opposed to 
union involveNent in company policy. Similarly, a fair proportion 
of union members joined because it would give them some involve- 
ment in decisions concerning the company (25%) and because the 
union obliged management to consider employees' interests in 
chinges affecting jobs (44%). This is ample evidence that 
employees are concerned that their union should protect their 
interests in 2reas which have previously been determined solely 
management's decision-making. 
This is not by itself, though, an indication that employees have 
joined the union because they A' sh it to negotiate an improvement 
in areas of traditional expectations 
- 
job content, career 
prospects 
- 
which are currently failing. The survey did, however, 
also reveal that those who believed that the company offered 
worse promotion prospects, security and consideration from top 
management than other similar companies were more likely than 
those who believed it was better to have joined the union for the 
protection, it gave them when management was considering changes 
to jobs. Such persons (i. e. those who rated the com pany 'worse' 
on these three -issues) were also miore likely to believe that the 
union should definitely be involved in decision-making about the 
career structure and promotion prospects. 
Perhaps most important is the evidence that the respondents whose 
expectations most exceed their achievements in the company were 
more likely than those with fewer unfulfilled expectations to 
favour union involvement in work content and job interest. 
Similarly, those whose expectations of promoticn most exceeded 
their actual achievements in this sphere were more likely to have 
joined He union in an attempt to make management consider 
employees' interests in changes affecting jobs. These respondents 
tended to be non-professionals and older rather than younger. 
That is, they were those mployees who have had more expnrience 
of the decline of promotion prospects, status and intrinsic Job 
satisfaction, and who do not have the protection afforded by 
professional qualifications. These are the individuals whose 
status aspirations are most likely to lead to alienation from 
their employer because their work has not led to the anticipated 
goals (Mills, 1951). 
, he failure of expectations in the crucial area Of PI-OMOT-210--11 
prospect, ) appears to have had a particularly significant impact 
on employee attitudes towards, and membership ol 
, 
their trade 
union. Loveridge (1972) noted the illiportance of %,,, hat, he termed 
'cultural lag', 
_i. 
e. the influence of inherited values after the 
time when they are justified by current experience. The high 
expectations of office work held by even the young staff, in 
Company A could hardly be justified by experience in a modern 
-ions regarding a commarcial company, but the traditional aspiralt, 
career and fulfilling work still persist. Loveridge calso 
identiNes rationalisa-t-ion of work as being the factor which 
shaLters expectations most, alt-hough the desire for prestige. among 
the emplcyces concerned is notdidnishedas a result. Given this, 
it is reasonable to assume thal. such employees will look for some 
means of recovering their earlier prestige, rather than adjusting 
their expectations. 
The primary barrier to be overcome before such employees move to 
fi the positive pursuit of their own interests is their idend. 
- 
caLion with management and tile ethic of cooperation noted earlier. 
When employees come to see their relationship with their employer 
as one of exploitation, however partial, then this combined with 
the injustice of failed expectations causes a readjustment of 
their traditional ethic. Blau (1967) suggests that power 
experienced as exploitation promotes antagonism. This can be 
seen in the context of a bargain between employee ad employer 
in which both parties contribute to and benefit from the contract. 
If, however, expectations regarding the fair return merited by 
investments are violated, then dissatisfaction with the contract 
and hostility towards the-other party ensues (Plau, 1964). 
In the wort, context with which vie are here concerned, the changes 
during the last decade could be readily perceived it, exploitative 
terms. Managerial control has been increased thrOUgh various 
techniques such as job regrazding (Loveridge, op. cit. ) and 
automation, which threatens the central expectations of the 
employee relating to prestine. This also enables management to 
consoiidate their power by the. 6pplication of rules: "people 
have po%-, er over other people insofar as the lattlers' behaviour 
is narrowly Jimited by rules whereas their own behaviour is not", 
(Crozier, 1964, P. 158). In this context, collective bargaining 
can at least pave the way to a more equitable distribution of 
power by imposing rules on managerial decision-making, even if 
usually in 
, 
restricted areas. The proMem rei-j-iains, though, that 
these areas (e. g. pay) are usually only secondary to the central 
focus of exploitation or grievance as perceived by employees. 
- I-Y I- 
CHAPTER 8 
A DISCUSSIO!, 11 OF rliE MAIIH ISSUES 
I ntrciducti on 
The theoretical background of this study and the empirical data have 
all been reviewed, and'it is now necessary to discuss some of the 
conceptual problems of this area of research and the major issues 
which have arisen. This chapter will therefore reassess the major 
ideas concerning white-collar unionisation and its recent rapid growth, 
distinguishing in the first place between aggregate or macro factors 
and those factors which apply at the institutional or micro level. 
A need to ask not only what factors and circumstances hava caused 
white-collar and professional unionisation, but also why such people 
have rejected existing forms of jollectivity, particularly staff 
associations, as has predominantly happened in the insurance 
i ndustry. 
And finally we must look at the connection between the causes Qf unioll 
membership and the subsequent activity of the union concerned. That 
is, what evidence is there that the issues subject to collective 
bargaining are those which caused the need for unionisation in the 
first place? 
The Process of White-Collar Unionisation 
The I iteraturp on white-COllal- Unionisation has exitensively investigatp-(] 
the significance of a large number of factors which may have had some 
impact on the 'Increase in union membership over the last decade. The 
more important of these issues were discussed in Chapter 4, and it is 
not my intention to again consider their individual relevance. 1 
wish, rather, to examine the types of factors involved and the specific 
ways in ahich each t,, p,, -; affect white-collar unionisaltion. J 
--0 
- 
/t) 
- 
As was mentioned in the introduction, these factors can be divided 
into two categories, which have their impact at the aggregate and 
the institutional level, To make this clear, we can say that those 
at the aggregate level affect all white-collar employees and normally 
have their basis in general economic and social changes or in 
governmental activity. Factors at the institutional level are seen 
as critical to one particular organisation or industry. For reasons 
which are explained shortly, it is not always possible to make such 
a clear-cut distinction and this dual categorisation is rather an over- 
simplification. An altetyative typology may he more useful. 
Some of the major issues which it has been suggested are of importance 
at the aggregate level are government policy; diminishing differentials 
between manual and non-manual workers; and decreasing status of 
white-collar -workers reflecting not only reduced differentials but 
also such things as the devaluation of jobs through the use of 
mechanisation and the greater employment of woman. The point about 
these factors is that they have had. a widespread impact on the 
general population of white-collar employees and have, it is suggested, 
made these people turn to trade unions in unprecedented numbers. 
Tha usefulness of such theories is restricted by their very 
generali ty. They do not explain why some groups of white-collal-* 
employees itill have not joined unions even though they are similarly 
affected by these factors. They do not explain why one insurance 
company has had a high level of union membership for ten years and 
why another very similar company has very few members, And their 
generality, which imputes shared values, expectations and moti- 
vations to vast numbers of people, is too simple and clumsy to be 
of great use in analysis or prediction. We come back to the 
conclusion stated much earlier 
- 
there must be other factors 
involved. However, I am not rejecting these aggregate factors as 
being of no relevance. 
A wide range of factors have been suggested as being of. significance 
at the institutional or local level, ranging from the sex of the 
employees concerned (usually with the suggestion that women are less 
likely to join unions) to their social and family background. 
Factors emanating from the work environment are often put forward, 
of %,,, Ihich promotion prospects (or the lack of them), the size of 
the organisition or work unit, and the impact of techn6logy are 
probably the most important, and which have been considered to be 
of significance in this research. 
It is often difficult to tell how certain factors should be 
categorised, as virtually all the most comon factors put forward 
for the growth of white-collar uninnisation in recent years could 
be considered in some way at both the aggregate and local levels, 
and are often inter-dependent. 
I therefore do not deny the importance of changes at the aggregate 
level, but suggest that it is misleading to refine and de-limit 
all these changes into one 'general theory' which purports to 
explain the growth of union membership. Too 
-many exceptions can 
always he identified and too many problems remAn unanswered. At 
the local level the argument is agdinst over-emphasis on individual 
factors rather the Tocusing of the mix or inter-dependence of 
factors, and has been" rehearsed at some length in Chapter 4. 
Having rejected this particular approach to the organisation of 
theories of white-collar unionisation, I will attempt to outline some 
alternative Was. I would suggest that factors could be divided 
again, but this time into four categories: 
a. Deterrent factors 
There are frequently one or more factors which militate against 
the effects of tha other categories, and lessen. or inhibit the 
move towards union membership. That is, whilst a group of 
empioyees may redlise that joining a union may serve their 
purpose, there may also b, 
-- 
factors v: hlich deter them from doing 
so, Such facitors may be. the fear, wh2ther justified or not, 
. 
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that careor prospects may be adversely affected by union 
membe. xsh-ip, or various misgivings about somp aspects of tile 
effect of -the union. oil organisational life. 
There are also a number of important deterrent factors which 
are not really part of the individual's conscious decision 
to join a Onion, but which affect the development of an aware- 
ness of the incentive factors and which also inhibit both the 
individual and collective will for action. Illustrations of 
these factors are the fragmented basis of work units in, for 
example, the distribution and vatailing industries, 
and the lack of prosp2cts and longer-term commitment to their 
jobs of many younger people, especially girls. 
Environmental Factors 
lhese factors do not in themselves create a need for unions - I 
among white-Collar employees or causc a drive to-viards unic. r.. 
-hip, but rathe mamber. c 
-r 
they remove some of the barriers -whic 
'h 
have previously stood in tile way and therefore create a morc, 
prop i ti-Ous environgm-ant. I -. 
-Iould include in this cat-, -, wy 
govern-nient action %,., hich favours u Mons, espQcially recent 
employment legisslation which has smoothed the path towards 
recognition in many Companies (aithough not inevitably 
- 
rememb, 
'ýr 
Grunwick). 
Also under this heading would come the facilitated union recruit- 
ment and reduced sense of isolation vihich comes with increased 
organisational size. This raises an important point, namely 
that a single issue 
- 
organisational size, in this case 
- 
may 
have a number of consequences which must be considered separately, 
rather than as a totally inter-dependent cluster. There could 
also be other changes at an organisational level which would not 
of themselves create a need for union but which would remove a 
hindrance. An exomple of this might be a change of management 
or man, ement policy to ok less antagonistic to unions. 
- 
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One final issue which needs to be raised in this category is the 
effect of the changing social norms about union mcmbership which 
mean that non-membership is no longer generally the standard for 
white-collar employees. Now clearly this is a chicken and egg 
situation because large numbers of people had to join unions 
before the norms shifted in favour of membership. Nevertheless, 
once this change has occurred, it has helped to eliminate 
resistance to unions among sane gro ups of empl oyees; So, for 
example, the staff of insurance companies which are not yet 
unionised cquld, at some future date, become so without the 
level of incentive or need which has been present in other 
companies. 
c. incentive Factors 
ffiese are tile factors which actually create the need foi- union 
membErship, and turn employees from individual act-ion or 
existing forms of colle C-4 vities such as staff associations. It Ls L 
is under this heading that I i-., ould put tile issues i-Illich have 
predominantly been the subject of study in this research, i. e. 
computerisation and tile overall rationalisat ý-ion of Jobs, and the 
effects of these on career prospects and job con-Cent. This is 
riot to suggest that these are the only factors which may provide 
the incentive for union membership, but only that I consider 
them to have been the most important in these companies. 
Threatened loss of, security of employmen-tt., reduced financial 
rewards and diflerentials and loss of or unfulfilled needs for 
involvement in decision-making are soma other factors which 
are undoubtedly of significance on occasions. 
I said that these are the type of factors which cause the need 
for union membership, but it would perhaps be more accurate to say 
that they create in employees a need for action and that union 
membership appears frequently to be the most appropriate action. 
- 
T 
Individuals may take other forms of action on their own 
initiative 
- 
from leaving the company or industry to obtaining 
qualifications to enhance their general prospects. (Many may 
attempt some form of individual action as well as acting to 
protect the collective interest. ) Other employeos (a minority 
these days for reasons to be discussed later) may reject 
collective action in the form of union membership and opt 
instead for an alternative in the form of an internal staff 
association. 
Catalyst factors 
- as a separate category because t I have -iden0lied thil Lhere 
frequently seens to be some 5dditional factor, apart from those 
mientioned, which either exploits the need which has axisen or 
simply acts as a catalyst arid lifts the perceived need into 
- 
collective action. This is oftea necessary because of the slicer 
corplexity of -transl&-ting collective will Into collective action, 
and because of the reluctance of many -to move in a new 
di rec tion. 
I shall now Very briefly 111 Mustrate this framework by its application 
to the two com. ppnies whilch were studied in this research. Some Of 
the deterrent 
-factors in both companies were those shared by 
virtually all white-collar and professional employees, i. e. the 
antipathy towards the ý,., ider objectives and ideology of the union 
movei,, ient and the traditional ethic among such employees of co- 
Op eraition with management. Additionally, in Company B, the greater 
number of administrative centres probably hindered the development Of 
collective action. In Company A, the presence of large numbers of 
young staff, predominantly female, has probably restricted union 
p4 membershi n the Reading Office, although we have already seen hoýq 
the same feature ir, the Hove office in Company B did not have this 
adverse affect on un-ionisation. 
-. 
-- 
The importance of environmental factors can be seen in the use which 
was made by ASTMS of employmentlegislation in its struggle for 
recognition in Company B. In Company A, the concentration of the 
majori Q of office staff into two very large units created a 
favourable arena for the events which led to unionisation. The 
presence of an active staff association with an independent-minded 
leadership in this Company also facilitated the move to a new, 
form of coliective action. None of these factors in themselves 
actually created a need for union membership; although other uffects 
of large work units undoubtedly did so. What they did achieve was 
the smoother move towards unionisation once employees had 
recognised a need for collective action. 
The incc-! n 
tive fact 
-ors are probably -the critical ones in these 
companiesz indeed, they are almost bound to be otherwise employees 
Lhe step of unionisation. It has been my would never take I 
objective to offer evidence thatAthe ef-Fects of computerisation 
and increased bureaucratic control thirough rationalisation h av ne 
been the major factors creating the need for collectivo action 
through a union. Thoy are not the only onces of signific-ance, 
though 
- 
fears about employment security (work mleasurefflent in 
Company A, voluntary redundancy in Company B and in both coimpanies 
early retirement and-lingering lears caused by earlier mergers in 
the industry) probably played a part. Also of some significance 
was the decline in comparative financial status, made partiCL11ariy 
obvious during periods of incomes policy. 
From these studies, I would single out', as catalyst factors t 'he 
m, anner, in which the management 6f both companies effected certa-in 
decisions, i. e. the implementation of viork measurement in Company 
A and the house purchase scheme alterations in Company B. The 
issues in Company A were of far greater significance, and therefore 
management's handling of them had a far greater affect and became 
a catalyst factor. In Company B, the mortage issue was ccmparativ. ely 
minor when seen in perspective, but it was the glimpses into 
-')4, Lý - 
management's changing attitude towards the staff which acted as a 
catalyst and caused a jump in union membership. In both cases, 
it was the handling of the decisions by management, rather than 
the substance of those decisions, which finally pushed many people 
into 1 decision about union membership. 
A further catalyst factor in both companies was the deliberate 
exploitation of the perceived need for collective action 
- 
Ke. 
the incentive factors 
- 
by certain groups or individuais. ASKS 
has frequently shown itself to be quick to grasp the opportunities 
offered by changes in white-collar employnent, and was woll able 
- 
through Clive Jenkins 
- 
to offer all the answers when the 
issues in Company A were in ferment. Without this, the matter of 
unionisation might just have receded in due course. The different 
circumstances in Company B, with*the very nebulous expression of 
issues, did not offer the same opportunities for tha catalytic action. 
in one smaller unit in the Compsy, the Hove Office, I think that the 
astute exploitation of simmering discontent among the young staff by 
one or two local union activists was the critical factor in 
achieving their comparatively high level of union membership at an 
early date. 
These last few paragraphs have been intended as illustration of the 
theoretical structure outline above. They cannot be an exhaustive 
analysis of these factors from this study simply becausc there is 
nol, sufficiently reliable data on most of them. Ho,,.,, ever, the data 
that has been given and the observations available are a sufficient 
-ant po; basis for this preliminary analysis. Two import Ants must 
be emphdSis-ed: 
i) various factors, both within and between categories, 
may vary in weight. or importance and cannot be seen 
simply in the form of a unionisation 'balance sheet' 
ii) the incidence of various factors -in time may be of 
considerable importance, serving to increase their 
impact if they coincide. 
With these two point-, irl mind, it cart ba sidd that an analy-sis of 
factors along the lines sugge. sted may assist in underst-anding 
Jon and predicting -its future devellopment.. the process of unionisat 
Before completing this section, one final issue needs to be raised 
which will'be dealt with in more detail in the final part of this 
chapter. This is the difficulty of translating many of the 
incentive factors 
- 
deskilling, loss of promotion prospects, non- 
involvement in decision-making 
- 
into issues which can boccie 
the substance of collective bargaining. it appears that ewphasis 
tends to be given to those factors which are considered legitina0-- 
in management/union negotiations, like security and pay, even 
though they may not have been the primary incentive factDrs. 
The Rejection of Staft Associations 
Staff Associations have existed in the insurance industry for very 
many years, some having originated in the earlier part of the 
century to ward off the influence of the Guild of Insuranec Officers. 
flo, a, though, there are very few companies which still have an 
active staff association. Of the ten largest insurance companies, 
only two have not recognised either ASTHS or BIN for collective 
bargaining, and both these two companies have had staff 
associations for a long time. The very clear trend has been ovcr 
the last decade that staff associations have given way to more 
orthodox trade unions. Indeed, in several cases, including that 
of Company A, the union concerned has gained recognition as a 
result of an invitation by the staff association to take over 
their interests. Why, then, have staff associations appaared to 
be unable to tackle the problems which have been caused by the 
changes in white-collar employment and have given way to unions 
in the protection of employees' Merests? 
- 
Staff associations are, by their very nature, restricted to the 
employees of one particular company and have been referred to as 
internal unions. In many cases in the insurance industry, this 
has meant a potential membership of over 5,000 
- 
6,000, which is 
larger than some of the small trade unions. Numbers of members 
alone cannot have fatally reduced their potential for action. 
Given a sufficiently high achievement of actual membership, and a 
realistic m2mbership subscription in linG with those charged by 
unions, an income would be generated sufficient to make the 
effective woyk of a staff association a viable proposition. 
One of the most frequent reasons put forward to explain the demise 
of staff associations is that, as they are restricted to one 
company only, they lack the strength of unions which draw their 
membership from numbers of companies or industries. There seems 
to be no inherent reason why this should be the case, A number uf 
very powerful unions 
- 
NUM, NUR for example 
- 
have members who 
work for only one employer. Co-ordinated and effective collectivG 
action can be taken by employees whose union or association 
extends no further than the company in which they work, A certain 
element of protection may be provided, and also additional pressure 
put on the employer through other companies, when Sher memhers 
of the same union outside the company can be persuadad to take 
sympathetic action. However, as this has not happened and, I would 
guess, is not likely to happen among the union membership in the 
insurance industry, it does not seem to be a particularly convincing 
argument. 
the protection of a WhilSL the membership as a v,, hole may not need 
-ending to other companies, the OfTiCia. IS of staff union ext 
le pos-i Ei associations may v; ell be in a more vulnerabl II on. The staff 
association itself is rarely likely to be a secure or attractive 
employer and the leadership would be most Akely to remain in WC Qq"rg,., e indusiry the employment of the company, as has happened1with a. staff 
7 
associations and indeed with company union officials. This would, 
- 
in the case ol' sta-)Ff associ. ations. qUi, tO possibly causc some fears 
in the everit of milit-ancy, alithough I think this has probably been 
staff over-estimated as a factor leading to the abandonment of S 
ass oci ati ons. 
Whilst there might not be any fundamental reasons why single- 
company unions or staff associations should not engage in effective 
collective bargaining, there have been substantial gains to be 
made from joining mDjor trade unions. The experience oF negotiating 
in a variety of organisations combined with the baqk-up facilities 
and infoymation available from research have been of considerable 
advantage to internal union officials. The sheer weight of 
Yesour6es is considerably in favour of unions like ASYMS. 
taff associations But this stAll does not explain the point that st 
have been ditched because they have been seen to be too weak and 
ineffectual, not simply because more resources are availaHe fr-or" 
a union. It has needed more than objective assessmients of 
resources to break through ideological barrier-s: Surrounding 
union m--mbership and recognition. And this -is precisely the 
significance of the step. Staff associations have raprnsen'--d 
values which have been challenged, and have base-d their activitty 
on an ethic which has been reassessed. Staff associatic; ns have 
traditionally represented a unitary perspective of the organ-is-ation 
and have been guided by the principle of cooperation wilth 
management. 
This is really the reason why staff associations have been doeimed 
inappropriate to deal with the issues %ý., hich have proi-rip-ted Unio', ". - 
isation. Their weakness has not been stiructurat or practical but 
has stemmcd froin an inappropriate value system. The transition 
from staff association to trade union has been in part a symbolic 
1 'arian act, representing the employees' rejection of the old autho-ML 
relationship. 
- 
-11 V-. Yý -
-tile staff assoc; ons, in the two, A brief revi. &V; of the acti, vi, tI. es of lati 
cwripanies in this Study will provide sciiie illustrations. T. 11 Compally 
AC-.. O fliaL. 
.. I V, - UIL. , A, the staff assoclatli'on leadership ded s o,,, ii naI 
and stronger form of organisation vias necessary after it wfas 
constantly rebuffed by noanagement on the important iSSUeS affeCting 
the staff. 
- 
Management refused to consult with the assnciation over 
the reorganisation of work or to engage in negotiations oll' any 
signif-icancc on salaries. Thýe force of many years of mwnbership 
apathy and management. non-engagenient, preveinted the associ ati on's 
development at this crucial Ploment into a form able to fight th-:: ý 
battles of the late sixties. ASTMS' militanq, apd agqressivenecýs 
and its proyen negotiating successes 
- 
rather than tt-s sizu or 
resources 
- 
were -the 'Key factors v,, hich made that union the 
attractive contender for a merger vvith the staff association. 
A very clear example of the traditional values pertaining to staff 
associations is found in the events in Company B. The staff 
association was formed by a few employees as a direct altarnative 
to ASTMS after the union began making membership gains. It 
explicitly emphasised co-operation with management, putting this 
forward as its primary advantage over ASTHS. Very little atOntior, 
was paid by its leadership to the process by which thý, y viould 
achieve their negotiating objectives, if indeed they ever really 
had any. The strongly contrasting attitudes of managey2nt to the 
staff association and the union reflects the values represented 
by each. 
The political climate was also not propitious for the foundation 
of a strong staff association at this We. The-Labour Government's 
'Social Contract' policies did not favour this type of institution, 
and ACAS was known to*be under considerable pressure from the 
trade unions to avoid Section II decisions which supported staff 
associations against the TUC unions. Additionally, managanent were 
effectively prevented from lending any form of tacit support to the 
association for fear of jeopardilnqits chances of achieving a 13 
1 
- 
certi. ficate of ijidependence. All th, 2s. e factoy, s against 
the grovith of the, staff asýsoci, ati, on i. -. ii Company B, although they 
were not insurmountable if Tt had had the 'jull support of the 
empl oyees. 
Bargaining on Incentive Factors 
The firs-1. section of this*chariter identifiý'd a large number-of 
factors of various dil"ferent types, which exert an -influence on 
hite-collar unionisation,, Only one type of faC"C'I- ! -ICtIJallV 'CrO&U, 'S 
an ncentive to take collective action in this % y, Tho arýument 
-ia 
in this thesis has been that increased rationallisation F 
compounded by computerisation, has had deleterious af-peuts on 
content and career prospects, and that this is a maJor area In 
v, 'hich employees v,, 
-ant - their union to take action. 
But what happens over issues lilke this', The union concerned is 
we'll awara of their impact on their aictual and potential memb-'s. 
The union has used conspicuous advertisements which stat-- sur-In 
lears clearly, the latest one of which features wh i 4. -C collars 
heaped in a dustbin. But the Ltie emphasis on --re has been very lft 
these issues once collective bargaining has been achieved, or even 
before that time. ASTMS' officials claimed to Company B mv,: ýnagcmi-nnt 
that they would be unlikely to gain large numbers of members before 
they were able to negotiate on mat-". Lifi -ers of pay. This was ident led 
by the union as being the reason why people join unions, 
The StUdy in Company A has shown that, i,., hi ist newiLiateu pay 
increases are an appreciated advantage o-I union recognition, they 
are very far from being 'the reason' why the employees in that 
Company joined ASTMS. Yet the immediate response c-F the union 
after recognition wass to concentrate its energies on pay negotiations 
and some very Substantial salary rises i.., ere rapidly negotiated 
(and very gratefully received by the staff). 
ISO 
- 
, 
ýuerp, l reasons. can be ideritified aý, to unions plight tend to 
adhere to the practice of negotiating on -matters like pay, rather 
than turning their atl-. entfon to other issues: 
First of all, it is easier. Salaries, holidays, firinge 
benefits and various other extrinsic asp_ýlcts of' eiz)ployment 
are issues v., hich are novi almost universally accepted as being 
proptýr areas for bargaining between managem, 
_, 
nt and union. 
The management's acceptance of the union's r4laft to represent 
the employees' in'. 11 1 'crests legitimates bargaining in thcse 
areas. These and similar topics aire niorihaily inClUded -in 
the procedural agreement and other issups regarding -'L-. he 
organisation of work, promotion policies and so on, are, 
im, plicitly or explicitly, designated as remaining within 
the sphere of manageria'! prerogative. Any al. tempt: to e, -, k'. erd 
bargaining boundaries 
-is therefore in direct conti, adiction 
to the p. rocedural agreemenit. 
Issues such as pay are also more simply dealt with by their, 
very nature as clearly specifiable and roducible to cash terms. 
The financial calculations on salary negotiations can actually 
become very complex, but the matter is comparatively unclouded 
by questioos of employees' rights and management's 
responsibilities. 
In addition, bargaining over an already well-developed 
innovation like computerisation has its problems, It is not 
a discrete phenomenon, but is a continuous process, the precise 
changes and Ofects of which are difficult to determine. The 
substantial number of staff engaged on computer-oriented 
work 
- 
although often some of the most active union 
supporters 
- 
obviously have considerable vested interests in 
further technological developments which might well conflict 
with the interests of other members. ASTMS has been tackling 
this area with Technology Agreements, which aim to restrict 
-"2_'' - 
nanagement frun implementiny changes without agremmt (_on 
the linas of a status quo clause), but has had diffivult-Y 
in gaining. theiV acceptance and in monitoring the effects of 
changes. 
Barjaining on pay also produces a 1-. angibfle result for 
presentation to all employees. Tha 'goods are produced on a 
regular basis, and all the evidence of Company A is 'HIML 
employees are well pleased wIth ASTINS' successes in pay 
negotia-Lions. INot only that, Lhut, the iSSLIO happily re- 
presents itself twelve months later., so that the union is 
engaged in a fairly continuous cycle of pay clLlims. Add 
InC I 
4 to this the fact that most employees have a natura 
nation to attach considerable importance to a. pay rise., and 
it is easy to see Mi.., other issues become submerged. 
iii) The legitimacy of pay as an issue for bargaining not only- 
facilitates these negotiations, but also viry effectively 
prohibits movement into other bargaining areas. The non- 
legitimisation of these other issues 
- 
like deskilling and 
restricted promotion prospects 
- 
is a tremendous barricr to 
any attempt to challenge management's authori V over them. 
Unions are no doubt perfectly aware of the difficulties in 
extending bargaining boundaries, and may recoil at the fear 
of failure. There may also be reservations about doing so 
in the sense that managerial prerogative as a concept may 
be upheld, although I suspect that that would be more likely 
with the local company union officials. 
With management being sure to resist any union attempt to move into 
the area of their current prerogative, and the union apparently 
unwilling to try, what hope is there that the issues identified as 
being important in this research will ever be the subject of 
negotiation? It is possible that the union is simply not aware of 
any widespread feeling among the staff about the need to 
- 
). U 
- 
negotiate on these Ovues, Perhapn-more detailed exanination of 
memGery" interests and needy 
- 
and the extent to which actibn 
would be supported 
- 
-might move the-union 
' 
in the direction of 
bargaining. Their job would be made more difficult, however, by the 
fact that the interests of the staff are all different on this sort 
of issue. We have seen from the survey results how responses 
varied among different groups, and the impact of computerisation 
varies considerably from departwent to department. Uniform support 
and interest, as there tends to be With a pay claim, could not 
therefore be expected, making co-ordinated action far more 
difficult. There may even be conNicts of interest wiLh, for 
example, premotion prospects apong one group being protected only 
at the expense of overall salavy levels. 
T 
In conclusion, therefore, it is afficult to foresee any realistic 
chances of successful bargaining in the wider area on work content 
and careers without a more activp and open consensus among employees 
about their own interests and priorities. In addition, managements 
are in a very strong position to defend their own bargaining power 
as the force of mutually agreed procedure, and custom and practice, 
considerably supports the present status quo. 
- 
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introducti oil 
This thesis has presented data from two major insurance coi,, panies Oil 
the Unionisation of white-collar and prof essi onal employces. Wi 141 1"t 
the studies differed in mc; 9iodology, and the industrial relations 
'cnrod in signif cant respe. kontext in each company difl, cts, there was 
a basically similar work- ethos and framework of reiationships bet-v,, een 
manageme, it and ei-iiployees. In this concluding chapter, both sLudies 
will be reconsidered and an axamination made of the extent to which 
the hylpothoses are SUpported by them. 
Recognition of the union in Company A was proipted almost a d2cado 
before the research bagan by a. series of events which had united 
employees in their determination to achieve more influence over 
certain Ocisions which directly affected their work. This particu- 
larly concerned changes, which impacted on work expectations, in the 
spheres of job evaluation, work rationalication and computerisation. 
'However, when union recognition was achieved, negotiation was 
limited to matters of pay and basic conditions of emiploynient, 
although it has since widened somewhat to various other aspects of 
personnel policy. Managerial prerogative W remained largely 
unrestricted in the spheres of company policy, working mAhods and 
career prospects (but with union involvement in the latter as it has 
been affected by the salary restructuring scheme). 
The study in this company was based on hypotheses concerning the 
effect on employees' work expectations of the increased bureau- 
cratisation of their Jobs, and the impact that this has had on 
employees: reasons for joining their trade union and their expect- 
ations of that union. Restated from Chapter 1, these were that: 
hanges in skill and PWOMOtion leve"s at vork have led to i, cIII 
unful-I illed employee expectati oils concerning Mich the pro-gress 
of thei r careers and the sui tabi Ii ty of the WOH, to be perf ormed. 
- 
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it) mnions are ýrk-, vjed Lýy employees an a meant of remedying 
their unfulfilled expectations, either 4y proyi-ding 
higher incmaes as a form of compensatich, or by putting 
pressure an management to fulfil thoss expectations. 
The description of events leading te union recognition in Company A 
highlighted the impact of the introduction of work measurement and 
computerisation, and the manner in which these decisions were 
handled by the Companl's manag6ment. The qucstionnaire survey 
indicated that the consequences of these decisions, and their effects 
on work content and career prospects, have had a long-term impact of, 
attitudes towards trade unicn membership and activity. 
The main results of the survey in support of these first. ttvm 
hypotheses can be sumim)-ised as follo%-,, s: 
a) A higher percentage of non, ofessionals, whoso Vork-has Wen 
most affected by computerisation and rationallsation, described 
their work as non-complex, predictable, nesdAg little 
thought and initiative and so on, than the professionals. 
This distinction became very pronounced among t1he junior 
grades. 
The non-professionals yated their work achieve!,, Pents significaptly 
lower than the professionals, particularly in the realms of 
promotion and responsibility. This again was most, in evidence 
arpong the junior grades. 
C) There was no significant overall difference beti..., een iihat 
the professionals and non-professionals fr---lt they had a righ-It 
to expcct-. from, the Company, indicating that there were 
similar expectations among all the employees it'. the Company. 
The exception was that the professionals expected to 
achieve hiolier promoo-Lion ard levels of responsibility, 
which was a realistic reflection of thfir greater opportunities 
in 
-the Co--ripany. 
ef I 
d) The qap b2t%,., e. cn. achi. evement-5. and Paxpectati, ons, wa-z , 
-, 
-I,. qni, fi, can'Lly 
greater within the non-professionals. 
e) Union inembership was ver. y considerably highr-r arnolog the non- 
professionals (8W than agiong the professionals (59", 
f) The non-professionals were significantly more likely to favour 
tqider union involvement in bargaining, particularly in care. er 
prospects and cor-opany policY. 
Those who believed that the company offered worse promoticn 
prospects, securi V and consideration from top management than 
other similar employers were the ones most likely to want Won 
involvement in matters affecting the career structure. This 
suggests that the demand for Union activi V is a direct 
response to areas of dissatisfaction. 
c 
h) Those whose expectations most exceeded their achievements 
were the ones most likely to favour union involvement in 
matters affecting job interest and work content. 
i) 44% of the respcind. ents had joined ASTMIS because, it -made 
management consider employees' interests in chanojes affecting 
jobs. These'people were more likely than those giving 
other reasons to have expectations of promotion greatly 
exceeding their achievements, and to believe that the 
Company is worse than others for promotion prospects. 
consideration from top management and sec"rity. 
25% of the respondents joined -the uoilon 'In o! -Ue-v --u gain 
more involvement in decision-making. 
k) 30Z of the. respondents, even given the opport-iini, ty to gi. ve 
three reasons for joining the unibn, did not consider pay 
negotiations to have been a significant factor. Those who 
did join for negotiated pay increases were more likely than 
those giving other reasons to believe that the Ompany is 
worse than others for the promotion prospects it offers. 
The non-prolessionals, especially the iLIFtior. sLaff, i-., ere 1111ore likely 
than the professionals, to describe their work, -in terms reflective 
of tfle fi,. ipact oil rationalisation and COMPUter-isatticin, and their 
achievements in terin- z of responsi bi Ii ty, use of ski II cs 21. c. 
also more likely to fall far short of their expectations. Thi s 
lends support to the hypothesis that the unfulfilled expectations 
are caused by di-FIFerences in the. %-., ork situation of ti-le two groups, 
which can be seen primay-i ly in terms, of the greater bureaucr-st 
control w! ie-lded over the non-profession-als, especially at a. 
junim- lc: wel, through rationalised working M2thods and the medium 
of computerilsation. 
There is also considerable evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that unions are viewed as a method of remedying unfulfilled 
expectations. The primary wish seems to be for the union to 
move into new areas of bargaining, although increased salary 
levels may be seen as a'foro of-compensation for losses elsewhere. 
In Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, Gouldner (1954) describes how 
one individual became hostile and disaffected when deprived by his 
employer of what he felt to be his just aspirations. It is this 
process, on a collective level, which has led to the initiation of 
union representation on such a widespread basis in recent years. 
The hostility is not a great deal in evidence in an overt form in 
the insurance industry; but in both the companies in this study the 
events leading to union recognition (and on some subsequent 
occasions) at least ceem to express a disinclination to conform 
-"i. - 
quietly to pr2cedented unilateral d2cisions. Examples are the 
attempts in both companies (especially at the Reading Office it) 
Company A and the Hove Office in Company B) to make tho effects of 
computerisation and rationalisation an issue for discussion between 
management and employers. 
Rlau (1067) offer, snwe evIdence that suggests that it is not a 
simple failure of expectations which causes disaffection. If 
rewards have become traditional then the recipients become 
dependent on the giver of them and their discontinuation becomes 
a punishment. Thus, it would be expected that disappointNent at 
the loss of career prospects and other rewards would be most 
keenly felt among those whose careers had spanned more rowarding 
times. Certainly, the non-professionals, whose jobs have been 
adversely affected by changes in working methods in recent years, 
wore far more likely than the professionals (who have not been so 
affected) to report that their qxpectations exceeded their actual 
achieAments. 
Howevkcr, it has also been StlqgeSted that the cffocts of tho 
failure of expectations is tempered by the krioi,,, ledge that everyone 
else is in the same boat (Pennings, 1970). His study (of an 
electronics company in the Netherlands) fou. nd t1hat eii--ployee-s in 
-hem- work groups where promotion prospects %,: ere good compared t 
selves with their seniors (i. e. Ihose who had already received 
promotion) and beC. 81TIP dissatisfied. Those in groups with poor 
promotion prospects used their peers for carflp3rison and shoi,., ed 
fewer signs of dissatisfaction. Penninýis also found ti)at peopie 
in high promotion units tended to emphasise individualistic 
values more than-those in the loý,,, er promotion units. As we have 
noted, the professionals in Compan,,; A (high promotion) showed 
significantly less interest in collective activity through 
the union than did the non-professionals (Iioý,., promotion). Being 
able to achieve their objectives through promotion on ar, 
individual basis, they had less need of a collective response 
to management's actions over the last few years, The non- 
professionals, on the other hand, have accepted that their 
powors as weaker members of the organisation are increased by 
collectivisation (Emerson, 1962). 
The second study, in Company B, examined the reactions of a manape- 
ment whose authority was challenged by a union seeking recognition 
for tollective bargaining, and the strategy by which that management 
sought to preserve its authority. Management was se2n to be con- 
cerned primarily with avoiding overt expressions of disaffection 
among the staff, and ensuring that the union's sphere of legitimate 
influence was limited to those areas of pay and conditions which had 
mostly been subject to consultative procedures for some years. Every 
effort was made by managcment to maintain control of both the actual 
process of reaching collectilve barga*ining and the conduct of--decis"'On- 
making after it had been achieved. This study considered the third 
main hypothesis, that a Company's management would resist, as* a 
threat to its authority, any intervention in matters such as those 
mentioned in connection with employees' failed expectWons (e. g. 
job content, promotion prospects) on the grounds that they are 
unchallengeably management's prerogative. 
The s. tudy of Company 
- 
B- , ý. hovýed the- e->, tc, nt t 01-i 0 wl * ýd col Iect iye harq a ýn inip 
i, t4,, ),, Iill was seen by the. 
-managenent as. a threat 4, -, o thci, r trad IkL, U authori týy ari-' 
the extent to which it was resi-sted. As -mentioned Wore, negotiations 
on pay and conditions of emplJoyment have read'Ily defined limits. 
negotiations on job cont&nt or promotion prospc! cts do not. Company B 
manaaement consistently refused to ccuntenap. cc discussions wilth the 
union on L_ 
_Ct4 
the impact of computerisation on the work. Once CrIlle. ve 
bargaining was in sight, they also made it clear that areas such as 
this would remain v, ithin management's sole discretion and took 
considerable care to enSL! i'e that the sole authority over these areas 
-., as 
enshrined in the procedural agreement. Hov., ever, once collective 
bargaining hcgins, 
-it become the means o, the accomipl-is'1111! ent of a 
succession o, goals as the original ones are achieved (BlaLI, 1955). 
Company A has reached the stage where the union is involved in 
negotiations of the restructuring of the salary and grading system. 
After 4 decade of collective bargaining, the sphere of negotiations 
has widened from the pay claim with which it all bcgan. It would 
probably be very difficult for any management to reverse the exten- 
sion of the sphere of bargaining once it had begun, and any major 
power struggle, if deemed necessary by management in order to 
reverse or halt the encroachment of uni6n involvement in areas of 
managerial prerogative, would contradict the ethic of mutuality and 
shared goals which still pervades white-collar hierarchies. 
Changes to tile SULLYStantive issues in collective bargaining in t'hC 
immediate 
-Future seem unlikely despite the inte-rest in this ar, "orlig 
employ, ees. It may be that pressu-12 for change will gather 
momentui-, i -if Lihe young staff, Who Still have high expectations 01' 
their future prospects and have failed _LLO see the significance 
of their older colleagues' disappointment, are . not prepared to 
F accept higher salaries as complete compensation lor all their 
losses of promotion, job interest and responsibility. It will'i 
)r (s nisr- Mis and devise sai- r ocý s then be up to the union to rf. Tog '! t! 
whereby mtore extensive bargaining can be sl)ccessfully introducad. 
11anagements of insurance companies like the two in thii. s study may 
then, ff they do not already, 'Ji-nd themsQlyes M the paradc-Xi. cal 
position of prompting strong union challenges to their atifEbority by 
t4 their attempts to increase their control through bureaucratisa lon. 
- 
i. e. the firagmientation and deskilling of jobs 
-and its impact on 
promotion prospects. The consequent failure of expectations and 
subsequent hostility, and the greater exp2rience of individual 
powerlessness found among lower hierarchical levels and among those 
performing routini-sed work (Kohn, 1976) will be more in evidence. 
If employee s cannot see the possibility of gaining greiter rewards 
by individual efforts, then their response may well be a more 
effective solidarity against their employer. 
--I(cA - 
Fox (1974) has argued that bureaucratisation increases thz feelings 
of distrust among employees, who perceive themselves as constantly 
under watch by management through the medium of rules and technical 
procedures. Such betrayal of the high-trust relationship between 
employees and their employer may lead to demands for collective 
actior to. restore earlier status. However, employers make the 
assumption that those in high discretion roles have goals shared 
with their employer which cannot be legitimately bargained over. 
The vicious circle therefore emerges of inorpased bureaucratisation. 
perceived by employees as a breakdown of the trust relationship, 
which is responded to with collective action through a union which 
is then seen by the employer as confirmation that the employees 
are not comnitted to high-trust relations and shared goals. Me 
circle is completed by reinforcement of the bureaucratic measures.. 
The evidence of this research in these two major insurance companies 
certainly indicates that employees are no longer prepared to submit 
to managerial prerogative over the most important aspects of their 
working lives. It does seem, however, that there is as yet no sub- 
stantial estrangement or breakdown of relationships between 
employees and employer. What it appears is required to forestall 
this is a return to the fulfilment of white-collar expectations and, 
in Fox's terms, high-discretion roles 
- 
to be achieved through joint 
employee (trade union) and management negotiations. 
- 
ltz)ý. 
- 
APPENDIX li 
Russell '; Ii. llei- 
- 
National 0-Ifficer, Finance, ASTMS, 12 April 1978 
Interviewer: 14hy do you '(. Iilnl-, whilCe-collar employecs join unions? 
Respondent: You've asked me why white-collar people join trade 
unions, and I would say thore are a number of reasons. 
Firstly, people look at the success 
- 
or it may be the 
alleged success 
- 
of manual unions; they're publicised, 
and they say 'Ne're being left behind, so let's do the 
same thing'. That's one thing, but another thing is that 
we2re living in a more complex society now, we're 
becoming more conscious of our interdependence 
- 
dusVen 
suddenly withdraw. their labour and we realise how impor- 
tant dustmen are. They do see trade unions not ohly Q 
a straightforward economic sense, but also as a useful 
political lobby. This is where we score very much as a 
union; people identify us as being spokesmen for whita- 
collar, middle-class people 
-I think we've clearly got 
that evidence. But they're peripheral reasons. The 
main one is this: we are living in a period of white- 
collar revolt. White-collar people are becoming cons- 
cious of their status, they no longer feel they're 
specially protected, and thercfore they are joining trade 
unions. Also, of course, remember the number of people 
employed in white-collar jobs is growing, creating in 
Marxist terms 
- 
I'm not a Marxist 
- 
but in those Lerms 
creating a new type of proletariat, a white-collar pro. 
- 
letariat. Another feeling behind it, and I thiqk it's 
all part of the white-collar revoltand that's this 
question of differentials. I'm not suggesting, although 
a lot of people do, that manual workers' earnings have 
gone up and overtaken the white-collar workers'. They 
believe that, but if you look at the chart the Depart- 
ment of Employment publish showing wages against 
salaries, you'll sEe that although somEtimes the lines 
narrow, if you draw a line. over the last 20 years, you 
wouldn't noticc a significant difforence. But what has 
changed, is not the actual salary-waga differential, but 
the conditions with it. At one tima the white-collar 
worker had certain distinct privileges 
- 
often he didn't 
earn as much as a manual worker if he worked in a factory 
on the clerical side 
- 
but he had wages when he was off 
sick, paid holidays, a pension. He had a degree of secu. 
- 
ri P of employment 
- 
whilst they might lay people off at 
the facto", they don't lay white-collar workers off. 
They were protected against the Fluctuations in trade. 
Now, of course, that's all gone 
- 
quite rightly so. All 
people got pensions now, most people get wages during 
sickness either by law or, in most cases, by negotiation. 
Certainly there are job security agreements, and probably 
less job security for white-collar people than manual 
people. If you t, ake an insurance company, if you work as 
a claims clerk, eventually you become quite important, 
perhaps as an underwriter 
-a very skilled job - but 
often only to that company, and certainly only to that 
industry. If on the other hand you're a driv2r, you can 
be a bus-driver, a mini-cab driver, a lorry driver 
- 
you're far more flexible. Or yon can go back and be a 
labourer. But in white-collar employment you vend to 
have much more specific skills. Job security has becomo 
very important. Another factor is partly tied up with 
the growth of white-collar employment 
- 
it's less dis- 
tinctive now. And, of course, also the growth of 
companies. Because there's a bigger white-collar work 
force, you become a very small fish in a big pool. As 
companies grow, you become a small fish in a big pool. 
At one time it might have been possible to know the 
managing director quite well 
- 
that's no longer true. 
All those factors have led to the growth of Wite- 
collar unions. I think something leads from this 
- 
why 
unions like ASTMS, which has had such an enormious growth, 
TGWU has a white-collar section, GMWU has a white-collar 
- 
secti. on. L think- the reason is this: people -"Chink, not 
that they're Letter, but that theyro exclusive 
- 
they've 
got different types of problems.. Therefore they look 
towards a uni'on whi. ch is run by people li. ke themselves. 
And another thing i. s that unions like us tend to be very 
decentral i sed. People 1.1ho WOUld resent getting direc- 
tives from their own national executive clan't get, them 
under our structure. We have company by company bargain- 
ing, each company has -its own committee 
- 
almost a union 
' Wit LL VO, i in a union. in fact, you might say the a`-ractions 
of a staff as sociation 
- 
or the apparent att-CaCtions of 
a staff association 
- 
with the clout of a union. And 
that's why a 10t of our, grawth recentll,, / has been by 
staff associations ni. orging with Lis. If they're 
genuinely independent 
.- 
they night not have been indlepen. 
- 
dept to start with 'Ibut of course le(riqlation has -ForcFU 
t Lhem into independence - once they do Uhat, then people 
start asking questions. The.,:, say, 'that's alright, but 
we can't run a research department-, %,., e can't get prafes- 
sional advice, vie can't make comparisons' 
-- 
all those 
things which you can do if y-cm, apply the economies o-F 
scale. They can be done by us. But to a very large 
extent, we do organise on a company by company basis so 
that you've got the apparent advantages of a staff 
association 
- 
which is this beliet th. -A y Oil ruil Your Own 
affairs, although I don't knolvi how you can run Your own 
affairs if you haven't got any clout 
.- 
but generally they 
do run their own affairs, and by being part of a big 
union, they'vo got thO clout. 
Interviei,., er: Within any one particular company, do you ever find that 
there are areas or departnierits 
-I was thinking perhaps 
in terms of line and staff departments 
- 
where you -Find 
more resistance to unionisation? 
Respondent: Yes, it's very difficult to say why that is, sometimes, 
because you can look at one company and find resis-Itance 
.- 
16S 
- 
one field and not another. If we talk about insurance 
for example, on the whole organisation seems easier amo ng 
Lhe insurance staff than among Sales P20ple 
- 
the field 
staff; There are probnbly reasons for this 
- 
the field 
staff tend to work in isolation. and also cf course it's 
easier for them to boost their earnings by working 
harder. That's probably what the boss says, but you can 
put yourself out and you do get that numerate recording 
of achievement 
- 
you know you've put your sales up so 
much and that gives satisfaction. They tend initially 
to be less inclined to join the union althangn, in all 
fairness, we've got very active members of the field 
staff, and in some cases the field staff is jcst as well 
organised as anybody else. But initially there is a 
resistance among those groups, and we generally find 
that where you've got composite companies, the life side 
- 
and that proba0y is because it's more sales orionted 
- 
is more resistant to trade unionism than the qenerat 
side, the accident side. 
Interviewer: What about professionally trained employees, like the 
accountants and law,, yers? Some companies have quite big 
groups of these. 
. 
Respondent: Acttuaries seem to join the union. Being an actuary is 
a skilled job, but the main field of employment must be 
in insurance 
-- 
in brokers or companies 
- 
they're the 
major employers. Now lawyers are a genuine profession. 
A lawyer 
- 
and I'm making this a very narrow definition 
of a profession 
- 
that is, can you screv., a brass platte 
to your door and operate? I-low a lot of people whio talk 
about prolessilonal status have to sell their labour to 
an employer 
- 
be employed people. So there ar en't many 
professions left. Now a 11alviyer is a professional - lie 
can break away, and so to some- extent there is control 
over the siLuation. The other thing, of course, with 
professional people is that they're very trade union 
- 
conscious 
- 
mcept that they don't call it a trade union 
- 
in the sense that they can control entry. You knou, the 
classic example of the young law student, the solicitor's 
clerk, who says that the examinations are quite impossi- 
ble and have no practical use 
- 
once they qualify, they 
talk about maintaining professional standards. Ahat 
they're really saying is 
- 
"I've climbed aboard 
- 
let's 
keep eve" one else out' 
- 
which, i suppose, is quite 
understandable really. So those people who have that 
sort of control over things are less likely to join. 
Not that they won't join, but they're less likely to 
join. But I don't think it's got much to to with the 
actuary's skill, and we've had a number of actuaries 
very, very active in the union, 
Intervi ewer: What about the departm. ents like ittine computer dep-a-i-trient, 
find perhaps -the O&M, department 
- 
departments 
-'Lhat might 
ba considered1he newer professions? 
Respondent: Well, computers are wonderful. Always organise the 
computer department, because if you pull the plugs out 
there, the place stops. Based on the principle, of 
course, of wanting to cause the maximum amount of incon- 
venience to the company with the minimuo cost to either 
the members or to the trade union as a corporate body 
- 
then organise the computers. Computer sieff are often 
very trade union conscious 
- 
in fact, there are a number 
of insurance companies where we got recognition first by 
organising the computer staff. I'm not suggesting we've 
used the computer staff as a lever for other groups 
-I 
mean as a direct lever 
- 
because I think that would be 
wrong. 
-eims Interviewer: Is this all grades, I nean operators tip to syst 
analysts? 
Pespondent: Yes, all grades. You generally seem to get one 
think on the whole it's been operators no)iwilly 
.-* ltýl 
- 
computer operators rather than systems analysts, although 
I can think of exceptions, and in one case Q was just tho 
girls who did the'cards. That was. the only all-female 
dispute, L can remember 
- 
at Lloyd's. That waz, [f YOU 
like, at the very end of the scale 
- 
it's a now skill, 
That's computers 
- 
what was the other one you mentioned? 
Interviewer: O&M departments. I was thinking of people out of the 
main stream. 
Respondent: Yes, coinmputer staff Join trade unions anyuay, where,,, er 
Tho th 
-e-J, --'va go+ a di-f-Terent approach becaus, f-hey 
see. themselvcs as computer. staff 
- 
nobody says, 'I'm an 
insurance person who Vlorks in computers', except of 
course insurance companies have quite a good record for 
training their oun computer staff and I think that's to 
their credit. 11hen you t"alk about O&M, I don't 1kno-.,., that 
I can give you an ansiler. Because they've gOt L 
elaborate grading system in computers, bUAL I don't Ihol, 
-,, 
that I could identify p--ople in O&M. Again, certdinly I 
gave a talk. to their inStitUtfý and it was full of our 
members 
-I seemed to be addressing our mL-mb. ý! -S all the 
time. But that doesn't give me a. true figure -I honestly 
identify therm. I can idon- don't know, because I can"t. 
tify computer staff because you know where they work, and 
as I say, they've got problems that are peculiar, to 
- career computer staff, they work shifts, they've got 
problems these days and limited opportunities unless 
and again, insurance companies haven't got too bad a 
record here 
- 
unless the time comes when they say to the 
computer programmer, 'That's Just part of your experience 
we'll give you another job to do 
- 
train you to. be an 
inspector or something like that'. It's one of those 
jqretched things i,., here you t. end to get old as an operator 
unless you can move up 
- 
after that, there isn't miuch 
for you. So they've got separate problems 
-a biggor. I- 
turnover 
- 
they're easy to identify. But with 0&1ý111 people, 
I'm afraid I can't help you because I can't readily 
.P 
identify them. 
Intervi ewer: That's 0K. But talking about computers haviý they 
affected other p2ople in the compainy vor-y much-,? 
Respondent: Well only in this sense 
- 
that if you organise the 
computers and you get something for them 
-I mean, 
nothing concentrates the mind like greed, does it? And 
if they see somebody else has got some achievement by 
some collective action and collective bargaining, then 
as I say, it concentrates the. mind. 
interviewer: But has computerisation affected the work Yuch. For, 
instance, you often hear it said that computarisation 
makes the work that much more boring 
- 
takes responsi- 
bility away and so on. Have you noticed this being 
mentioned when yoq've been recruiting? 
Respondent: It hasn't been mentioned 
-I dQn't say that doesn't mo; n 
it doesn't happen It's very funny because. the pdrti- 
cular field I'm talking about 
- 
which is largely finance 
it has not been a period of big shrinkages of staff 
or anything of that nature. Computers have como in and 
insurance has been an expanding induAry 
-I maan, with 
new pension proposals it's going to be bigger 
- 
so it 
has a steady labour force. Now it might have been, if 
it hadn't had an expanding business, a declining labour 
force which would have produced problems, aNd people 
might have noticed it. 1 think on the whole, it hasn't 
made jobs any more boring. The problem with insurance 
is that a lot of the jobs are boring 
- 
you can't escape 
it. In fact, they're not different to scientific 
employment. I mention this becauso I was an official 
of the Scientific Workers originally, and it always 
struck me that you had people 
- 
often highly qualified 
scientists 
- 
on research, who were doing absolutely 
boring, mundane jobs. The only difference was that you 
couldn't give the job to someone in the streEt because 
they wouldn't be able to spot the significance of some 
slight variation, some slight difference. But most of 
.-ý, qi - 
the wart was absDlutely boring and dull routine 
- 
just 
looking 
-Tor the exceptions and analysing Q. Now it's 
not quite the same in insurance, hut a lot of it is 
routine hut it's got to he intelligently applied. 
Because if you don't, you make mistakes which are obvious 
to a skilled technician, and it's unfortunately a foature 
of insurance. We always make that point when we tall, 
about increasing salaries. 
I ntervi ower: I'm inclined to agree. Are there any differences 
men a nd women as far as res i Stance It. o uni ons i 
concerned? 
Respondent: Vell, it seems to me that the leading force in unions in 
insurance comes fi,. om what I would call the career staff 
- 
but not necessarily the professional staff. Those 
people who've comp in with A-levels or taken the 
Institute of Insurance exams 
- 
but are maybe not going to 
go right to the top of the tree 
- 
they tend to be the 
backbone. Now there aren't so many women in that-Ate- 
gory yet, and I think that's the reason. MOW we like 
it or not, there are all these social barriers about 
women. 
- 
'you're only going to be here for a little while, 
you're going to get married and have babies' 
- 
wall 
that's the way women are brought up 
and for that reason they're going to be, almost inevi- 
tably, not career staff. I don't think it's really a 
difference between male and female, but it has a very big 
difference in the work. It's difficult to otyanise sec- 
retaries, it's difficult to organise shorthand-typists 
- 
they're the people who don't join. Although when you 
get into the career staff in insurance, yes, women are 
very good. We've got very good women members 
- 
if YCLI 
go to a conference of one of our insurance company 
groups, you'll see a reasonably high porcentage of women 
there as delegates and that type of thing. 
- 
interviewer: Not secretaries and typists, At you-mentioned you'd 
recruited some punched-card operators. Do the yoInger 
girls just not join normally because they rackon they're 
not going to stay long? 
Respondent: I don't knmi, wh, --tl-. hmr it's the younger airls or not. 
I ntervi e,, 
-., er. Younger men, then. Boys coming in just, - to do junior 
clerical work 
- 
aren't they interested. either? 
Respondent: Well, they tend to join eventually. You've got to remem- 
ber that most people 'join unions becaus2 most of themy 
are in and it's the done thing to do. it really depends 
who's the driving force. If you've got a good office 
rep 
- 
and most of 
* 
ours are very good indend 
- 
when some. 
- 
body comes in, they say: 'Well, Charlie, uelcome, m Irly 
none's Joe Smith i'm the group rep' 
- 
in fact we tell 
them to say this 'Most of them are in the union-here; 
perhaps you'd like me to leave you a form, or perhaps you 
would like to sign the form hereV 
- 
and the pepson does 
it without question, in most insurance companies we've 
got check-off. So it's the conventional thing to do, 
and where it's the conventional thing to do, people will 
join. Where the company is anti-union and all the rest 
of it, well one has a lot of pioneering work to do, and 
there's no doubt the active members do havc to make an 
effort and often go out on a limb. Those people are going 
to tend to be the career staff. 
Interviewer: In companies where 
- 
even though they may not be actively 
anti-union 
- 
but where there isn't a verýf big membership 
yet, do you find that the people you call career staff 
do show themselves to be afraid of their employers saying 
'What will the company say, %-., ill it. damage Pay carcer? ' 
Do you find this sort of thing? 
Respondent: Yes; we find that resistance quite a lot. I think less 
and less because of employment protection legislation 
- 
people are waare of it 
- 
and they think that is. less and 
I ess. Ho, in fi-nance you don't get it, v, )-uL tthcrc are 
other fields vihere you do 
- 
you sti. 11 get these fears. 
Even*today, someone rang me up and ti iey're intereýst4od 
- -a 
fairly minor i. nsurance company 
- 
'Can I see you qui-t-ly, 
and ilf you ring Fbaclv d0fll' -L Say -WhO 1-1101) are* S ri -. I-, e-LII 1 -111 g 
of that nature 
- 
it's by no means uncommon. Dut il, may 
be fear Of the company as a v; hole or it may bc-ý just fear 
of their ov: n part. -ICUlar boss.. 
Interviewer: What about insurance companies, say in the last ten 
years or so 
- 
have you noticed if there's been a level- 
ling off of promotion prospects, and that people have 
been thinking 'If Ym not going to rise up through the 
ranks, at least Ilm going to get compensation somehow, 
perhaps through money 
- 
perhaps if I join a union' 
C 
Respondent: Wel I, I can't go back ten years by aI ong t,. ray. T Fee 
Union oil Insurance Staffs been with us for seven and 
I've only been actively erigaged in insurance in the last 
four years. We tend, as a matter of policy, te move ou'r 
officials around. I suppose that's a good idlca, becausc 
it means I can bring ideas to an inidustry which has not 
d 
-, -V 1n ow we nt had a tradition of trade union ideas. P 
F somewhere else I'd be able to take a ICIL 01 Very gOOd 
ideas that have COME Out Of iIISLIrance. So I can't go 
-hat the back ten years, but 1 myself am convinced 
insurance industry is going for the wide based pyramid 
with a lot of people being just so many pairs of hands, 
with a rathersh'aliow peak at 1-he 1-op, and very few 
-ure. Not the sort people going 
... 
that type ol. St', --. ýCt 
of egg-shaped strucLure winich is col, -;:, Pon in a lot of 
industries with the bulk of the jobs somewhiere, near the 
bottom of the struc-Lure- 
- 
lbuL not a pyramid. I 
think they're tending to m,., ), re towards 
- 
or viere moving 
towards 
-a pyramid structure - and a pyramid with cl. 
very wide base. That ritight have been beCIIUSe there were 
- 
): ) I- 
difficultie; DettIng staff and you tended to employ a 
lot of pensioners in Wurance at one time ý and an awful 
lot of part-timars, who always give you a wide base on a 
pyramid. On a number of cases, we've actually challenged 
companies 
- 
Wye said there are a number of top jobs 
going and what's going to happen about this 
- 
and when 
they've produced figures, al-though everyone's got this 
impression, it doesn't seem to be backed up by statistics. 
Now I can't go deeper than that because I've only asked 
a number of companies, and it depends how you read 
things across and I've never checked it because it's 
been a straight-forward thing about the number of district 
managers' jobs going because they are closing district 
offices. The company say 'Yes, but look at their grades 
and you'll see weLve still got the same nuxbcr of people 
in that grade'. And whilst people feel that their 
opportunities are, going 
- 
and I think they may be right 
1 can produce no statistical evidence to back it. fri 
fact, any statistical evidence I've got proves otherwise. 
interviewer: Yes, I worked for an insurance company for nine. years 
- 
the (Company) 
- 
and I definitely got the -fee-ling that 
there-was frustration about promotion prospects. 
Respondent: There is frustration 
-I think you're probably right, 
but I can't prove this with facts. 
Interviewer: A lot of it seems to be vague feelings 
Respondent: A lot of things are vague feelings 
- 
as an absurd 
example, just after the war, people used to say things 
like 'Oh dear! You can't get maids any more! ' 
- 
people, 
I'm certain, who'd never had a maid in their lives. 
People actually believed, because there had been 
changes in society, that they were worse off 
- 
whereas 
that was absolute rubbish. People said things like 
'I suppose the moped came out for people who, before the 
- _1" 
war, would have been able to afford a car' 
- 
when all 
the statistics showed that a lot-more people after the 
war were able to afford a car. There was a long period 
of attitudes that things had got worse. People believed 
that they were a lot worse off, and I think this is 
maybe true 
- 
that people think 'the promotion prospects 
That's always true isn't it 
- 
the world must have 
been a very fine place when it was first open to ths 
public! 
Interviewer: The branch structure within companies 
- 
do you find that 
the people who are willing or even anxious to hold 
office, do you find that the people who are willing to 
take on the extra work, are a particular type of person 
- 
can you categorise them at all? 
Respondent: Finding people ta take office 
- 
yes; it's always Affi 
-- 
cult of course when things aren't going very well 
, 
14hen 
there's a certain amount of glamour, when the union's 
well organised, where it's part of the establishment 
- 
or a part of the anti-establishment, whatev2r you like 
to call it 
- 
it's easy to got peoplo to hold office. 
But I think there is a type of ptrson who holds union 
office, and I often make this point at meetings when 
someone says 'I'd like to do the job but I haven't got 
time'. Union office is always held by people who 
haven't got the time. Go around aid look at the people 
who hold office in the union 
- 
the world's run by very 
few people. It seems to be the same people who crop up 
running things. 
Interviewer: Do they tend to come from a particular level in the 
hierarchy? Do they tend to be young executives on their 
way up, or older people who've got stuck or any 
particular characteristics like that? 
Respondent: No, I've often asked that question myself. I can only 
give observations 
- 
I've never done a statistical 
*- 
analysi. s 
- 
b-ut, no, there doesn't seem to be any pat. tern 
whatsoever. 
. 
1n. inaurance they tend ti, ) b2 a liýttle 
younger 
-a generali. sation - particularly in recent 
years because while you had the old Gui. Id of Insurance 
Staff, the old boy who held office for Years and took a 
pride in being a ii-Ilember of a trade union 
- 
and I'm afraid 
a pride in saying 'Do you kno,.,.,, Pm the only person who's 
a member at my place' 
- 
r6ther a negative approach, bUt 
you did have that in the old 
-Guild. You've now got a 
more abrasive person who says 'I'm a member, and I'm not 
going to rest unt-il everybody else is* - an'd they -'Lend. 
'to be younger. And because I suppose the big groývith in 
insurance was unquestionably when they merged with ASPIS, 
which gave them that sort of over-the-hill buslness, and 
if you take that into account, that was a big field and 
obviously you tended to organise 
... 
those peopie who 
were going to joi, n but who'd never joined, those people 
to whom it was new. So there would be a tendency 'For 
them to be young, but it seems to me 
- 
and I'm thinking 
of one or two companies which were not organised seven 
years ago and are organised now 
- 
almost the saiii,, P. people 
held office then as do now. They were young n 
... 
the 
Interviewer: You wanted me to ask YOU dbout st-Iructure. 
Respondent: One of our biggest, problems is to get this idea across. 
Your experience in the(Coinpany) -is a simple one 
- 
the 
staff association came over and the structures remained 
the same. Normally when we organise t.,, e have a company 
structure like You had at the (Company) 
- 
that's our 
policy. Shall vie say insurance coii-, pany X- they may 
have got tvienty brancil-les and a head office. They wi II 
4 have a national conference once they're organsed at 
least once a year. Delegates from the branches, 
assuming they're big enough 
-- 
the company's branchas, 
not ours 
- 
and probably about seven delegates from their 
head office will meet once a year for the annual 
conference. -There will be a national committee probably 
conAsting of two repa from the branches. and two from 
the head office. 
- 
who would meet nonthly, run their own 
affairs. Ut this is a company based organisation, and 
that handles the. affaiis of the company. But as also 
nembers of ASTHSt they can't be in one big national 
branch because they can't get together 
- 
we've got a 
group structure, Now in insurance Company X they've 
got an office in Bradford that employs ten people 
- 
that will be a group within the company X company organi- 
sation of an ARMS group. So you'll have a secretary who 
will keep in touch and all that kind of thing. That 
group will also be part of an ASTMS branch 
- 
the Bradford 
insurance branch. The members of that branch will be 
part of the ASTHS local branch 
- 
not as a group but as 
ordinary members. For what I call the political 
-1 
don't mean party political 
- 
affairs of the union, like 
who stands for the Divisional Council, who stands for 
the National Executive, all those sort of things-are 
decided outside the company structure. When we get 
people who say 'I don't want to be in a branch where 
people from another company 
... 
we don't want 
. 
her,, telling 
us what to do' 
- 
'They won't tell you what to do because 
we've got a company strutture'. Hy job is as propagan- 
dist 
- 
I've never found a successful way of putting this 
across. I never know how to put it across 
- 
the 
national structure cannot tell the people in the company 
structure what to do. But obviously there are internal 
things like the subscription rates, and if you go to the 
annual conference, you'll find it's rather a dull affair 
because it tends to be dealing with those-business 
matters, whilst with a group that's talking about getting 
wages, the company organisation is far more lively 
because it's actually dealing with very real problems. 
Interviewer: This sort of structure is important to remember because 
you Men read in studies about people who don't want 
to join a union because they don't want to be dragged 
into other peoples' disputes 
... 
CIL:, 
- 
Respondent: You hear all this. rubbish 
- 
it's not peculiar to as, it's. 
true of nost unions 
-Vt what can you do? Somebody elae 
came to see Wa yestierday and he talked about. nanager!: ý 
joining trade unions. He said 'Oell, they object to 
paying the political levy'. I said 'They needn't contri- 
bute 
- 
it isn't compulsory'. The law of the land is quite 
clear about that. But there is somebody who is, in. fact,, 
training to be a personnel officer 
- 
he's more than half 
way through his course 
- 
so when you've got that sort of 
attitude, what the hell do you expect from others? 
Interviewer: To link one or two things together 
- 
you mentioned 
politics earlier on in passing. Do you find much politi- 
cal feeling 
- 
the feeling that 'we don't want to be 
involved because A the affiliation with the TUC' and that 
sort of thing? 
Respondent: Not the TUC, but I do think that particularly in inýLlrance 
you do get the sort of feeling 
-a resistance - because of 
our Labour Party affiliation. There's a simple answer to 
this 
- 
if you don't pay the political levy, you don't lose 
any rights as a meinber. If you object to paying its yot! 
can't vote on how the political fund is spent 
- 
which is 
reasonable enough. I would probably say that in insurance 
wa'have the lowest percentage of people paying the politi- 
cal levy. About half our membership pay the political levy. 
Interviet-mr: If I remember rightly, at the (Company) it was such that 
we had to contract in if vie %-., an-ted to pay. 
Respondent: Yes, that's no longer true, but at one time the insurance 
membership was contracted out and they had to contract in. 
Now they have the same status and have to contract out 
- 
existing members of course don't. 
lnterviewer: I wasn't sure whether that was just for the (ýornpany) at 
t- 2-ime. hat L. 
-. i_I I- 
Reapondent: It was, but the , pbsition at the noment in that. members 
of the 
- 
it's still tMe of the (Company) incidentally 
old insurance section, UIS. new members are. contracted in 
and they have to consciously contract out. 11 TEWY high 
percentage of them do. If you mention somathing like the 
nationalisation of insurance, well, we voted against it at 
the Labour Party Conference 
- 
but if it had been dependent 
on those people who pay the political levy, the chances are 
that it would have gone througy. And 1 don't see how 
people could complain about that because 
... 
only people 
who pay the political levy get a vote. But there is 
a resistance. People say 'Yes, we should be non-political'. 
Th2y don't really mean non-political 
... 
Interviewer: They Just mean their brand of politics. 
-4 Respondent: Exactly 
-, 
that's Ilght. 
Interviewer: I was reading recently, and several pieces of research 
seem to have come to the same conclusion, that a lot of 
white-collar or professional people on the surface appear 
to be anti-union 
- 
they refused to join a union. Men it 
was examined in more detail in fact they were anti-strike. 
They were perfectly happy to join a union if they weren't 
going to be broughtout on strike. They were quite 
prepared for some other forms of action 
- 
but they 
wouldn't go on strike. 
Respondent: Most people, I think 
- 
or most of our members 
- 
are anti- 
union. They're not anti their own union 
- 
it's always the 
other bloke's union that causes the trouble, remember. I'm 
convinced that most of our members are anti-union 
- 
they' re 
not anti-ASTHS, that's the difference, that's the sort 
of loyalty you get. I would have thought that most people 
shouldn't be anxious to come out on strike ! you don't 
join a trade union to strike, anyway, do you? 1 think the 
point is, what they are frightened of - And the whole 
- 
xlý- 
thing comes back to directives 
- 
they are frightened of 
being called out on strike. They are scared that they 
will be callen out against their will on strike. Now very 
often, of course, as you say they are prepared to take 
other forms of action 
- 
but again, not to be instructed. 
it's a perfectly understandable thing 
- 
nobody wants to 
be out on strike because you get all sorts of problems. 
You mightn; t get back ; gain 
- 
they might find they can do 
without you, or somathing like-that. There is this objec- 
tion, but it's tied up with this feeling that they're 
going to lose control of the situation by joining a trade 
union. Once that's overcome, then I think that they will 
do it. Often they become very strike-happy actually 
- 
we 
must turn down many more applications for dispute action 
than we endorse, because that's one thing that we do have 
control over. Our netional executive 
- 
whilst it cannot 
call a strike 
- 
it, can refuse to back one. We do so 
-i 
think our national executive takes what I would call a 
justifiably, intelligently, militant stand 
- 
and it will 
normally 
... 
The other thing that people have a fear of 
is that they're going to be called out on somebody else's 
strike 
- 
being called out in sympDthy. A lot of nonsense, 
isn't it? You've only got one employer, and it's bad 
enough taking on him, but if you take on somebody else; s 
.A it's an absurdity, because the last thing you want 
to do is to spread a dispute. My advice, for example, to 
-if the Company X was to go out on stri ke - my advi ce 
to our members in the CompanyY is not to come out in 
sympathy, but work a little bit harder. Because nothing 
will encourage the CompanyX management more to settle- 
ment than the belief that they might be losing business 
to the Ccmpany A By all means have a collection for 
your colleagues in the Company t and supplement their 
strike pay 
- 
this is whA 1 would much rather do. If you 
look at it from a tactical point of view, it's an absurdity 
to escalate a dispute 
- 
you ought to keep it on a very 
narrow basis. So what you're really dealing with again is 
another fear. Now obviously you can't be like that absurd 
.- 
CA 
- 
organisation, ProPessional Engineer's Association, was it 
called? 
- 
which had as rule numbcr one; Mn no account, 
will our wemb2rs strike'. Then they wondered why they 
couldn't even got recognition Qom the employers. Quite- 
honestly, what have you got to worry about then 
- 
if yotj 
write that in, you're giving away a constitutional right 
to withdraw your labour. But all right 
- 
people like it, 
people believe it 
- 
but this is an evolutionary phase. 
A lot of people go through the staff association phase 
-- 
it's rather like the chrysalis stage in one's natural 
development. j think some people have to go through this 
stage, and My find it doesn't work. it's all tied up 
witb the idea 'I'm certain if we made a good case 
This is one of the problems with white-collar employwenit 
- 
there is a beli&f very often, in the initial stages, 
that you can win a case solely by logical argument. if 
it's well presenteo and well put across, management will 
see a different point of view 
- 
it's quite pathNic-. 
Interviewer: Quite often they do see the different' point of view, bu. -j, 
if they, don't happen to like it 
... 
Respondent: Yes, exactly, but it. does not always change thair mind. 
There's plenty of case for wheeling and dealing 
- 
which 
is a thing that you do automatically 
- 
but thore is no 
basis for anything else. You've got to do something like 
that 
- 
sometimos you've got to say 'So far and no further' 
- 
and that's for people to make up their minds. Maybe 
they'll say Ae can't do anything about it', but that is 
the problem. You go to grammar school and you join the 
debating society and you're taught a bit of science 
- 
but 
people don't behave in a scientific manner, do they? 
I n-lbervi evier: And also J think 
- inayb2 it's a hangover frýra tile 
Paternalistic cl;. ýys - 1-hore's this feeling that 'management 
is really cin our side. looking after us'. I think there's 
still a lot of this feeling ab,.,,. --,. among white-collar and 
profe ssional staff. 
_ 
Re spd on tI don't. think so, these days 
- 
no. fvliostl people say 'Our 
are bas-'ý. ardt_sl 
, 
and you Say '14ell 
, 
Pioslll manage- 
m-ents, are bas-: Eards '. 'Ahý but YOU don't know our manage- 
v r.. ent- It Ii ey' rp aIo -IL-. o 'I i1dbas ta HISI'I thin!, what You've 
got to is this you can't get the truth by Just 
ia Tf you said ". 4hy dion't You joi., -I^! ' sking people questions. 
'I don' t "vo got a very some people %, Jll say Join 1jecausn 
. 
good relationship with my im-iiediate iiianager 
-I doWL think 
it's something I need to do, actually'. 11-11hat ie really 
mearis if 'J. haveWt got 'the bloody guts to do so: somýý- 
body might object -to it or the nellcgh,! Dours iifight t-hink ill-ls 
not very nice or I don't know hoi%- it will go tfl. -ý 
cricket club'. People Pre rarely hone. sI., I-,! itjh ILil-_, "Iselves. 
Intervievver: Is that a fairly cQ. u, -;; ion a. ".. titude 
- 
people Say'vir, thu" get 
on vmll with their managerrient? 
Respondent: it's dilf-Ficult to say because it depends how 011gani- 
sed you are. If you vi-ere tc do a survcy vihy people, don't 
join 
- 
people say 'Because there -is no tr5dot union in my 
place of worrk' 
- 
which is nonsc-nSf. sn you de-troy that 
one. 'Because I get on uell enough, vJith boss. 
Because I don't want to be called out on strike. Decause 
I can run my ovin affairs. Because I don't, need anyone to t
sLand up for me. Because i'm ruggedly independent'. And 
yet, take that person out of t1hat particular environment 
say, from a place where there's i-io trade union organi- 
sation 
- 
and put him in somewhere where it's the 
traditional thing to do, and he joins. Now, you also get 
the awkward character 
- 
and i've knovfli people v., ho've made 
a terrible fuss, the closed shop, they won't join, they 
won't do anything 
- 
they go and vlork somewhere else whe-re 
there's no trade union and they can't join one quick 
enough. There are some people who just like bcing odd- 
balls. They become quite far. 3tical trade unionists and 
want everyone out or, strike the following day. I'm anti- 
intellectual anyway 
-I think people base their actions 
_C lar more On W10tional rý! asons- than they do on intellectual 
.-), a I- 
ones 
. 
Interviewer: Do you find many people who join out of a principled 
belief in Crade unions", 
Respondent: Yes, I joined a union out of a principled boief. I was 
in distribution, which is a very badly organised industry. 
I never worked anywhere where there was a union when I 
got there 
-I improved the situation! 1 suppose that 
was principle or cussedness. ' You get a lot of people - 
less now but in the old Scientific Workers, you Qd c. 
lot of people who would join a union but didn't ever call 
on the unioh to do anything for them at any time. It was 
particularly true of the Scientific Workers, becaHse My 
thought that as scientists they ought to be in a trade 
union. There's plobably fewer members of that Qpe now 
we're a more abrasive sort of organisation. WVve got 
a lot of people who join 
- 
quite a lot of individual 
members 
- 
who never seem to make any use of the orgaPP 
sation. You might got someone ring up and say 'I'm 
changing my job 
- 
what's the place like? ' 1 remamber 
going to a meeting down in Sussex once 
- 
they wanted to 
join a union. I got them organised 
- 
set them up in a 
groupi in a branch 
- 
and they went on holding meetings 
for years. It went on for a long, long time, but 1 
don't think I ever saw them again. They must have been 
carrying on 
- 
they must have been discussing terms and 
conditions of employment with their management 
- 
but 
they never asked for so much as a scrap of information. 
I didn't hear of them until something went wrong 
-I 
think this time they couldn't reach agreement 
- 
and I 
came in. It's almost incredible. In engineering, you 
can conduct your own negotiations and procedures 
- 
you 
don't need the benefit of clcrgy all the tim3 
- 
but 
it's almost impossible-toim. aginepeopic who've been 
putting in claims without ever once ccming back and 
saying 'Is this. the right thing to doV or 'Can you, 
--e 
I') LIL 
- 
f 
advise we on -this? ' In fact, they didn't even negotiate 
, 
with management 
- 
the 
-y used to get an annual incroase 
and it seemed to satisfy them 
-- 
and that was- ft. They 
used to hold meetings 
- 
once a nionth lthey got out the 
correspondence 
- 
but t,,, hat they decided, I've no idea. 
It was only when SOMe SI-Xianger carm, ý in and' didn't. give 
them their annual revieu, 
- 
or didn't give thlem encugh of 
their annual review 
- 
th at T ever heard of them again. II 
Interviewer: You think of white-collar and professional people as being 
perhaps fairly right-wing in politics, and of this not 
being compatible with trada union organisation. One of 
the keenest trade unionists I ever met was a very keen 
Tory as well. 
Respondent: After all, Conservative Central Office are our mcmbers, 
aren't they? They come to our Conference. It's very 
-funny, because I think in fact-- one time you used-to Qefl* 
quite a lot of people who wouid be trade union membol-s 
and Conservatives 
- 
that there is no,.,; a breed of 
Conservative trade unionists. In fact, it Llhere was 
another Conservative administ-at-ion it v: ould Lie almost an 
- ch c 1, embarrassment- to them because poor old 111aggic That 
believes that these are the moderates 
-- 
and they aren't 
moderate trade unionists! Basically they ballieve that 
the capitalist system works 
- 
and viant to get a decent 
bit Out Of it. It's the social deruocrait who starts 
talking about 'We've got to have some social responsi- 
bility 
- 
we've got to take into account other factors and 
the general impact this would have on the %,,, hole of the 
nation's economy. ' The chairi-iian of irty branch is a very 
active Conservative and he's had wore bloody strikes 
than I've had hot dinners! It doesn't follow at all. 
One of our leading lights at Leyland is a vely active 
I+ Conservative 
- 
he's a Conservative councillor. 
certainly doesn't make -then, any less militai)-G, I can 
tell you that. Or it hasn't done. live had the 
- 
opportunity to observe this type of person when there's 
nearly always been a Labour administration, and whether, 
there'd be any difference when 
... 
Their point of view 
is that they believe in tho capitalist system and thev 
believe it's going to produce. the goodies. Margaret 
Thatcher is going to have problems with people like 
that. 
- 
A r) 1) r7 u. 1 t) T %ý' 'j-1 
Company A: Salary RestructurQg 
1he aim of the salary restructuring, which was introduced in Januar T 
1980, was described as being "to provide a salary scala which rewards 
individual Verformance and leads to an increase in the efficiency and 
effectivencEs of the business. " The previous grading system (see 
table 4, P. 1ý1) had, it was believed, resultqd in an excessive number 
of supervisory posts, dilution of authority and responsibility, 
excessive checking of work and over-lengthy lines of communication. 
An additional consideration was the necessity to proMe peopic with 
little aptitude or wish to be supervisors in order to pay them the 
salaries justified by their technical skills. 
rho ne,., i grade structure reduced the number of, levels (belcoi., Officer) 
to six, and combined executive, professional and data processing 
grades. 
Table Grade Structure resultilg from Company ; Salary Restru tLiri_, 
-. 
Old Grades New Grades 
E6 Di PG 6 
E5 D6 
1 
E4 D5 su 5 
E3 D4 
il 
E2 G6 D3 AG 1 
EI s5 D2 JG3 
ss G4 Dl 
G3 
12 
G2 
GI 
I 
Within each new grade, five salary-leyels were introduced (with the 
possibility of the missing levels 3 and 5 being introduced in due 
co ur's e 
Table- *-. '(,; Salary Levels after Company A Salary Restructuring 
I 
Level I 
I 
L 6 7 
sal ary the rate relating to 20% below 1023 belo,..,, for the 10"1 above 20% above the rate for j0 lb the job 
The new structure had provision*for progression through either 
technical skills or supervisory and managerial ability. This was 
achieved by the introduction K'job codes' which indicated the. main 
contribution of the post to the work of the department. Each 
Apartmant would have only one supervisory layer, and sone pincti- 
tioners could be of equivalent grade to the supervisors to whom they 
were reporting. 
Table It Job Codes after Comm A Salarv Restructurin 
New Silary Practi ti oner Managing and 
Grade (or Techni cal Supervi sory 
Job Codes Job Codes 
6 P6 
5 P5 1 S2 
4 P4 Si 
3 P3 
2 P2 
p 
APPI. -NI)TY t' 
The Chartered insurance Institute 
The Chartered insurance Institute (CH) received its Charter in 1912 
and the charter defines its objectives as: 
"(a) To provide and maintain a central organisation for the pro- 
motion and efficiency, progress ynd general development 
among persons engaged or employed in Insurance, whether 
members of the institute or not, with a view noL only to 
their own advantage but to rendering the conduct of such 
business more effective, safe and scientific, and securing 
and justifying the confidence of the public and employers 
by reliable tests and assurances Of thecompetence and 
trustworthiness of p; rsons engaged or employed in Insurance. 
(b) To devise and impose means for testing the qualifications 
of candidates for the certificates of the Institute 
... 
(C) To exercise pro'jesqional supervisions and control over -16he 
-ut 
. 
14 I -e, and to inulbers of 
4t. 
-he Insti4 -e h c. Ir 
and welfare, to further their advancement, and to promot -e 
whatever may lead to the fi,, iprovement of the sta-Lus of 
Insurance officials in gener-i-11 and the members of the 
Institute in particular. 
The current membership of the Institute (June 1979) is 51,704: 
Associateship and Fellowship is attained by examination and accounts 
for 55% of the membership. The remainder are either student members 
who have not yet completed the examinations or those who simply wish 
to support the Institute and make use of the services it offers to 
members. The Institute emphasises its role as an educational body 
contributing to the standard of professional expertise within the 
insurance industry; despite this, the burden of training lies with 
Extracted from The Charter and Bye-Iaws, CII, 1966. 
- 
'r, ý"l -- 
I companies, and CII qualifications are usually viewed as 11he different. 
a matter of personal initiative rather than an obligatory part uf the 
requirements of the job, although there are exceptions. 
The CH makes no attempt to negotiate with an employer on behalf of 
its members or to represent one of its mombers in an employmcnt dis- 
pute. Indeed, many of the most authoritative and influential members 
of the Institute are members of senior management in various companies 
- 
that is, people who would act on behalf of the employer in negotia- 
tions with a trade union. The identi V of the professional 
association is therefore closely tied to that of the companies in the 
industry, whereas the more traditional 'true' professional associations 
maintain a more independent stance. 
T 
, 
he crucial difference between the CII and some other professional 
associations is that it is not a licensing institution. Umpetence 
and qualification within insuronce work tend to be company-specific 
and orientod to the practices of the employer rather than universally 
C 
applicable spheres of knowledge, and the Institutj has no control 
oVer entry into the industo or promotion within it. 
C) rl 
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COMPANY B: THE CONSULT, "JIVE SYSTEM 
Until 1970, the only form of staff representation in Company B was the 
Staff Welfare Association. This had extremely limited terms of 
reference and was not in any way concerned with salaries or other tents 
of service. This state of affairs had existed since the Welfare 
Association wras formed in -11948, apparently without undue dissatisfaction 
on the part of either staff or managemn-16. However, a reassessment 
occurred in 1970 partly becau-se of the apparent inevitabil'" - IiiI k-ý, or Soale 
appear% crri,, of erriployment ieg-is lati. ion -vinich would, it ed, apply 9more 
specific rules to union recognition; both the Labour Governii! ent arid ti-le 
Opposition had plans for such legislation. A certain pressure %-,, as also 
building among the sta-if represeptatives of The 14elfare Association to 
1,4 extend its activities to such items as sala aes. All this led to a 
heightened awareness of staff representatioii aniony the sellior 111allage- 
of Com, painy B. mein It. 
Such a change -in attitude 
- 
or, at least, recognition that changes 
%,., ere becoming appropriate 
- 
was a fairly radical departure from tile 
sel f-acknowi edged patelrnalisi,, i which had previously characterlsed 
management style. A working party was formed -in August 1970 to 
exatiline alternative methods of staff representation. The "Outline of 
Proposals' for, the working party posed the choice for manageril-ant 
between either discussing matters with staff represent lves before -ati 
decisions were made or "proceeding as in the past and merely being 
prepared to listen to staff representatives afterwards, possibly 
introducing amendments later" 
- 
"recognising that it may not be long 
before we are lorced to the former". Ulhilst even the willingness to 
di-scuss manage, ý,, ent decisions was significant, clearly no fundamental 
changes were lip-iminent. In September 1970, the working party 
recommended the abolition of the Staff Welfare Association and the 
formation of, a 'Liaison Committee' to fulfil the 'conimunications' 
functions. Some dangers were foreseen in setting up the now body 
- 
it would be a "ready made organisation for ASTHS to take over" and 
would bring "the whole qucstion of tradc unionism before the staff". 
- 
During the next few months, the working party considered the practi- 
calities and the Industrial Society was consulted. The Industrial 
Society advised against the forfiiation of a staff association 
- 
which is 
what the 'Liaison Committee' amounted to; it would be "divisive'' 
because existing trade union members (at that time only very few, 
-and 
concentrate. d in one office) would not join. The management confirm2d 
that it "neither encourages nor deters" union membership and made the 
point that Were were not, of course, sufficient members to merit 
recognition. The 1. S. recommended instead a system of consultative 
committees. 
sidered all By January 1971, the working party felt that it had con., 
possibilities and offered three -Feasible courses of action: 
i) tell the staff to join a*trade union, 
A) set up a 'house union' (i. e. staff association), 
iii) organise a consultative'system along . the lines 
suggested by the I. S. 
The viorkina party was unanimously in. favour of the third option, but 
viith the proviso that "any precipit ate action to inform memberls of 
staff should be discouraged". 
The staff -. 
-. 
larc informed of the i-iorking party's conclusions eariy in 
February 1971; the management policy of 'neutrality' on trade- union 
mer., ibership was stated and also management's antipathy to a staff asso- 
ciation. The recommendations of the I. S. and the %-,, orking party were 
given in s=2 detail and the staff were asked to complete a question- 
naire asking lahether they agreed with the recommendations which 
fnanagernfýnt endorsed. It has SUbsequently been conceded that the 
announcement was heavily biased in favour of the consultative s\. 1stem, 
and did not offer the staff a truly free choice between the various 
options. Indeed, the questionnaire offered only one option 
-a 
consultative system. 
74.8% of the staff returned completed questionnaires, and 74.3% of the 
respondents agreed with the proposals for consultation. in reply to 
an optional question requesting reasons for disagreement with a consul- 
tative system, 8.2% of the respondents stated that they would prefer to 
be represented by an external trada union. Criticisms or the proposed 
consultative system 
- 
as obtained from the questionnaires 
- 
were 
concerned mainly with a fear that the new system would be ineffective 
and that wanagement would not alter their behaviour in any significant 
way. 
Having obtained staff support, the system was duly implemented, with 
consultative committees rapresenting various constituencies among the 
Company's staff which in turn sent delegates to a parent Staff 
Consultative Council (the SCQ The constitution specified that the 
objectives of the new Staff Consultative System were "to provide a 
means of communication and consultation between the management and 
staffs of the (Company) on all Matters of mutual interest''. 
The constitution also specified that the SCC "shall not replace the 
Aual 
management responsibilities and functions", the purpose of the 
Council being to "consider" matters referred to it by the committees. 
In August 1.071, the. first neeting of the Staff Consultative Council 
was held at which the Chainrian emphassised at some lengich the ultimate 
responsibility of management and the respon. ý. ibility of de-legates to 
serve the Company as %qell as their constituents. in this and the next 
few meetings, relatively non-contentious issues i,,, ere relerred for 
discussion from the coimmittees and Council mi-2etings uere used by both 
management and staff representatives to 'sound out' the other party's 
vi ews 
, 
and for the staff representatives to make requests for specific 
information. The s-% Laff side seerfied uncertain about the pUrPOSe Of tile 
new system and asked for- the marnagei-. qent view of MISUl-Lation in 
April 1972. Management described it as the process by which they 
could obtain "the views of staff on possible courses of action before 
management decisions are taken" and which "imiposes on management a 
responsibility to explain to Council the thinking behind any decision 
reached". 
- 
The first significant opportunity for the staff delegates to influence 
a management decision came at the timo of the mid-year review of terms 
and conditions of service in July 1972. A Terms of Service Standing 
Working Committee (TOSSUC) had been formed in October 1971 and a 
management item on its agenda in May 1972 advised that staff would 
shortly be informed of the mid-year review of salaries and fringe 
benefits. 
The staff side of TOSSWC recotmended a 12% Across the board' increase. 
If the'award was less than this amount, there was no point in improving 
fringe benefits; priorities wero stated for fringe benefits if they 
were to be considered. 
These recompendations were brought before the Council on 6 July, 
together with the official manaqement offer of 5% 'across the board' 
and certain increased fringe benefits. The staff delegates described 
the 5% as "niggardly", stated that a minimum of 81 was required to 
cover the increase in the cost of living, and commented that if-the 
TOSSWC staff delegates' recommendations were ignored, then they "could 
only express dismay and might feel the need to dissocjate themselves 
from a management decision which was decidedly unreflective of their 
recommendations". Management confirmed their right to do just this 
- 
it would be "contrary to the principles of consultation" if represen- 
tatives felt obliged to associate themselves with a management 
decision with which they disagreed. Managemant described their offer 
of 5% as "entirely defensible" but agreed that it did "ignore the 
vital element of staff reaction". Staff delegates remain2d unmoved 
and asked for an adjournment until such time as the Board had recon- 
sidered the amount available for distribution. 
ýe When the Council meeting was reconvened on 17 july, the management 
had increased the basic salary offer to 7% and also included the 
improved fringe benefits. This was accepted by the staff delegates. 
Even at this early stage in the consultative system, there was a 
certain element of negotiation; management seemed prepared to alter' 
their offer as a result of representations from the staff. However, 
r. ) 
a mere willingness by management to take staff opinions into account 
is not negotiation: it is- simply a more pragmatic forim of decision- 
making. But if management were sufficiently concerned. by the ill-till 
and deteriorating staff relations which could result if staff opinion 
was ignored, then staff could apply an effective Are of sanction and 
introduce an element of negotiation, albeit somewhat limited, into 
the primarily consultative procedures. This is how the consultative 
system developed; the staff did not act as an organised body but 
management attached sufficient importance to the systeN to yield (on 
occasions) to the pressure of adverse staff reactions to management 
deci si ons. 
This was attributable to more than a simple enthusiasm for consul- 
tation; in August 1976, management noted that "an interest in 
collective bargaining has increased at times then the consultative 
system has appeared to fail;, there was, for example, a rapid increase 
in ASTMS membership following publication of Lhe relocation proposals 
in 1972, and again when management declared its intention to reduce 
the value of the house purchase subsidy in 1974''. 
- 
APPENDIX 'r-, 
COMPANY B: BACI, GROUND ISSUES 
Since the early 'seventies, three iSSUes have affected the contc: xt, of 
employee 'relations at Company B: changes in the staff's house purchase 
facilities, relocation, and redundancy/ea) ly retiremmt. 
A. House Purchase Scheme 
The Company had, for some considerable number of years, operated a 
scheme whereby certain members of staff were able to borrow money for 
house purchase at concessionary rates of interest. By the early 
'seventies, the cost to the Company had become far greater than ever 
envisaged and this trend seemed Tikely to continue unless the conces- 
sionary interest rate was brought more in line with the market rate. 
Accordingly, in 1972, a two-tier-system was introduced: part of the 
loan at the original 3% and the remainder at 81% (the then marke! rate). 2 
There was no adverse staff reaction to these changes because a slight 
reduction in the availability of 3% loans was offset by a substantial 
increase in the total borrowing power. 
However, a further change to the scheme in 1974 aroused considerable 
feelings. A respite in income policy in July that year had prompted 
an tacross the board' salary increase, a detailed investigation of other 
aspects of remuneration having already begun. A change in the emphasis 
of remuneration was proposed; increased cash elements (e. g. basic 
salary, merit increases) would be funded by savings on non-cash items 
(e. g. staff restaurants, company cars, house purchase scheme). The 
mortgage subsidy represented the 'non-cash' area in which the Company 
had-the most fun6s tied up and the least control over future costs, and 
also gave employees considerable discretion over their own remuneration, 
I 
-il SO-P managemmt announced at a TOSS14C meeti ng that an i f1crease 
ol' 2'of (i. e. -ILO Ir%') cin the lo', -O; er inLeirest rate was being considered as 
a possible inethod of providing funUs for redistribution. Staf f 
delegates were assured that savings would be redistributed in full in 
.. 
-. > r) 
- ho 
the form of salary or merit increasea. At the next meeting, management 
appeared aggrieved (although surely not surprised) at the adverse 
reactions of staff who were concerned not just about an increase in the 
interest rate but also about the whole redistribution concept, fearing 
that it could be to their disadvantage. 
At a further meeting, management proposed to raise the interest rate to 
2% below the market rate (then 111) for all new loans. Existing mort- 
gages were guaranteed inaunity-from increases only until September 
1975. This provoked a storm of protest from the delegates and the 
staff they roported to. Not only were there objections to the increased 
interest rate, but it was considered unfair that those without mortgages 
at that time should be asked, in effect, to subsidise those already in 
the scheme. 
To understand the strength of filing, it must be remembered that 
mortgage facilities at concessionary rates of interest have long been 
considered a most important fringe benefit in insurance companies. 
Pith high housc prices and Aternst rates, they have come in recent 
times to represent considerable financial savings to the staff invulved, 
and an increase in the interest rate is tantamount to a reduction in 
salary. Indeed, there is a tendency 
- 
reinforced by years of unques- 
tioned operation of such schemes 
- 
for mortgage facilities to be 
considered as inviolable as basic salary and almost as fundamental to 
the employment contract. 
The inimediate and widespread reaction against the proposal appears to 
have been effective. Management announced that it had "taken note of 
the strong representation against establishing a new mortgage scheme" 
and instead, a recomýmendad increase of 1% (to 4%) in the lower rate of 
interest for all new and existing mortgages was to be placed before 
the Board. 
Management also wanted to establish the house purchase scheme as all 
item of remuneration within its discretion 
- 
especially as collective 
baygaining with a trade union seemed a distinct possibility for the 
future- 
Many people at all leyels. in the Company isolate this issue as marking 
the final departure from earlier paternalism. Managemant hoped to use 
. 
this opportunity to show'staff that their financial interests would no 
longer be safeguarded at the Company's expense; that is, the need to 
change attitudes about remuneration was considered as well as the need 
to save money. 
The issue is frequently referred to as a "failure of comnunication", 
(except by those few aware of Managament's objectives) and showed 
the Consultative System at its most cumbersome. There was a substantial 
rise in ASTHS membership at that time and pains were taken by manage- 
mant to ensure that the experience was not repeated, 
B. Relocatior 
The Company's plans for relocation could hardly have had a less aus- 
-art as far as employee relations was concerned. In thb picious st 
Sunday Telegraph of 2 JanuarY 1972, various management changes in tile 
Company were reported, and staff were also-able to read that the 
"planning department are giving some thnugjl-ý- to the longer teril, future. 
Their conclusions could result in the 1,400 Staff in thu Queen 
Victoria Street F.; ýadquarters moving out and the office let". This 
inevitably led to speculation among staff who had not p,, --oviousiy 
knoi-In of any such plans, and managemant admitted that a "Critical look" 
t that it was "much too early to was being taken at accommodakion, but 
anticipate the outcome". 
Alter more than a year of uncertainty, a relocation plan was outlined 
(in FebrUary 19,13). 
Decisions: about relocation were considered bY management to be strictly 
within their prerogative, and consultation was restricted to communi- 
cation afteF the decision had been made. Indeed, it was 
' 
felt that 
the "financial argument -for relocation is so strong cis to preclude the 
possibility of making the decision dependent upon the agreement or 
otherwiGe of s taff representatives". It was agreed though, that 
- 
-ý 11 
- 
management should "take Council into W confidence as fully and as 
early as possible before announcements are made so that assurances can 
be given on the policy to be followed and explanations made regarding 
the reasons for moves". 
Whilst the Consultative Council was never intended to consider matters 
of policy, Management does not appear to have fully appreciated the 
extent to which the consultative system had raised expectations about 
the degree of participation in all matters concerning jobs. No 
question affects jobs more than relocation, and the twelve months near 
silence on the subject must have cast a shadow over the aura of 
! progressive' employee relations prompted by the SCC. 
DiscussioH then began at Council on a 'relocation package' i. e. tenns 
under which staff would be moved. The objective of staff represen- 
tatives was obviously to obtain he most financially advantageous deal, 
The management view was that "the principle of the scheme was to put 
staff in the same relative finahial position after relocation as. 
prior to it; there was not intended to he an element of 'compensation'". 
Announcements were made regularly on the progress or otherwise in tho: 
search for sites and the timetable for moves, and a generous relocation 
'pacQage' was agreed. 
I 1974 became the year'of upheaval, with most of the planned relocations 
taking place within a comparatively short time. In general, it was 
seen as a time of uncertainty although by nc means all of those 
involved were opposed to their particular moves. 
C. Redundancy 
By the late 1960's, the acceleration in the rate Of mergers and take- 
overs and the widespread concern with cost-effectiveness and rationa- 
liSat-ion had made 'executive redundancy' a topic of anxious discussion. 
This was as true in Ccmpany B as in other major insurance companies, 
although týere did not appear to be any concrete justification. There 
had not previously been redundancies among the Company's office staff 
- 2o - 
but mianagement decided ilm 1971 that a statemen.. of policy Cil-, redundancy 
%!,, ould help to allav Jears. Arcordlingly, in September that year, staff 
were told that the Compamy was "anxious to avoid redundancies" and tflat 
none were anticipated in the foreseeable future. 
However, about a year later the subject was again discussed by manage- 
mant as staff were apparently still concerned. It was decided that d 
Redundancy Plan should be formaliscd as a contingency measure, and at 
a Council meeting in October 1§72 staff representatives were told that 
Heven the most considerate and best regulated employers must now and 
a gain find themselves in a situation where so= redundancies will 
occurn. At the same time, the decision was made to restyict recruit- 
ment severely during the following summer pending a manpowar study. 
During 1973, management considerea various methods of reducing staff 
levels. Methods of eliminating jobs were divided into two calegories 
- 
redundancy and early retirement, 
- 
both of which could be either com- 
pulsory oi- voluntary. Daspite the pains which had been taken to-- 
reassure staff about employment security, the initial proposals 
excluded voluntary measures as this could result in the loss of 
valuable staff. A Severence Schema covering both redundancy and early 
retirement was implemented from july 1973, and subsequently linked to 
the Relocation Package as compensation for those unable or unwilling 
to move. During 1974 and 1975, schemes for voluntary redundancy and 
early retirement were put into operation. 
The operation of the various redundancy and retirement schemes must 
be seen-in conjunction with the Cost Containment policy which was 
operated as entirely a management undertaking. A request by staff 
delegates for a representative on the 'Task Force' was refused on 
the grounds that it was solely a management committee. The cost 
containment exercise extended to all areas where spending could be 
restricted including, of course, staffing levels- During 1975, 
severe limitations on promotion ware introduced, the policy being 
to promote only if a vacancy cculd not be filled by transfer. This 
heralded the end of tho era when promotions were fairly plentiful and, 
together with the deliberate elimination of jobs by non-replacement, 
- 
? ýolvr - 
irmust have indicated 't, o many employees that theiiý career. ýý were 
drastically curtailed. Management were aware of this and in February 
1977 made a statement to Council regretting that "the rapid expansion 
of businass, which had provided many career opportunities a few years 
ago, had reachad a plateau and it was not realistic to expect a return 
to the same level of career development within the foreseeable future". 
In was partly to tackle this problem that a revised redundancy scheme 
was drafted in 1976. The original scheme had appealed more to older 
members of staff by relating benefits to years of sarvica; one of the 
intentions of the new scheme was to attract youngEr staff aad thus 
creato a better age distribution by reducing the bulge at the younger 
VMS. HOWEver, the costs involved meant that the scheme was never 
irliplemented, especially as the pressure for cutting staft levels 
by that tiaiie beginning to ease. Also, of course, ASTIMS" %---ioulldi certainly 
have Sei7ed on the introduction of a redundancy schým-- as a LISCfL! l 
recruilting platillon-n. 
EfIBERSM P CUMPANY 13: STAFF NUMBERS: ASTJIS AIND STAFF ASSOCIATION 
A. Average number of employees 
Each week. during: 1974 6,762 (including 466 part-W2) 
1975 6,347 (including 474 part-time) 
1976 5,912 (including 496 part-time) 
1977 5,541 (including 411 part-time) 
1973 5,403 (including 421 part-time) 
1979 5,383 (including 453 part-time) 
(from Annual Report and Accoun-ts 
B. ASTIMS membership 
1972 July 
1975 ar Ch 
1976 September 
1977 june 
1977 August 
1977 December 
1978 March 
1978 April 
1978 May 
1978 June 
1978 July 
1978 August 
1978 September 
1979 April 
-70 ) 
1,300 CLAIMED BY ASTHS (unve-rified') 
1.: OOo 
1,200 
911 ACAS SURVEY 
710 
729 
828 
1,024 ON CHECK-OFF LISTS1 AINOTHIER 100 
1,128 PAYING SUBSCRIPTIONS DIRECT TO AST[IS 
1,23-1 
1,333 
1,359 
1,513 
C. cStaff Association IMarr-bership 
December 1975 297 ANNUAL RETURN SUBMITTED To CERTI- 
December 1976 
- 
592 FICATION OFFICER 
August 1977 
- 
437 ACAS SURVEY 
December 1977 
- 
430 ANNUAL RETURN SUBMITTED TO CERTP 
FICATION OFFICER 
b. PPFNr)TY 11-1 
ASSURANCE SOCIETY LTMITED 
U. K. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS POLTICY 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. Insurance is a labour-intensive busines, and consequently the 
Society is very conscious of its dependence on its staff. It has a 
long tradition of good staff relations and its principal corporate 
objective recognises the importance of maintaining this position. The 
term "employee relations" specifically covers consultation between 
management and staff, communication to staff by management, and staff 
representation. The policy summarised below is part of a wider frame- 
work of personnel poli cy which embraces training, career development, 
assessment of performance, rEmuneration, terms and conditions of 
employiiient, disciplinary and grievance procedures, social and leisure 
facilities. 
STATEMENT OF POLICY 
Main objective 
2. The Society"s employee relations policy and practice should contri- 
bute to its corporate objective and command the confidence of 
employees. I 
Principal figeans of achieving objective 
3. It has consistently been the Society's policy to support employee 
relations arrangements which have the clear backing of a majority of 
staff. This will continue, subject to any statutory requirements. 
4. The Society attaches considerable importance to good communications 
iýLS Eff0l-tS LO Lh. and consultaLion and will maintain provide bo' 
- 
Wi 
- 
Ave CV S-taff Consult-at 
--- 
-uncil 
5. The Society intends to maintain the Staff Consultative Council as 
the established formal channel for consultation between staff and 
ipanagemant. 
6. The Society is always prepared to consider changes in the constit- 
Ution of the Staff Consultative Council following discussion with staff 
representatives. 
Righ-l'-s of sta-Iff Lo belonq to trade unions 
7. EveU member of the Society's staif has the right to belong to and 
take part in the activities of an independent trade union. 
Future of representation 
8. The Society regards ail UK staff as a single entity for the purposes 
of representation and seeks to avoid a multiplicity of employee 
relations arrangements. 
9. The Society will from time to time reassess the views of staff on 
representation, and will pay particular attention to the audited 
membership figures of any body seeking to represent staff. 
Attitude to trade unions 
10. The Society does riot discourage independent trade unions from 
seeking to represent the interests of its staff. 
11. Requests from. an independent trade union for facilities to hold 
meetings, collect subscriptions or communicate iviith its members on 
the Society's premises will be considered on the basis of achieved 
membershi p. 
- 
'iw)" 
- 
12. No such facili, ty wiTI be granted that has the effect of 
suggesting to staff generally that the Society has not accepted their 
wishes as expressed at a representation ballot. 
- cod2s of practice "titude to Ilegislation and Goverrim- 
. 
At an4 
13. The Society will continue to observe any statutory requiremants 
relating to industrial relations. It will endeavour tc observe the 
spirit of Codes of Industrial Relations Practice established from 
time to time through the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS) or other official body to the extent that My are appikable 
to insurance companies. 
r 
20 November 1975 
F- 
'i PDF NI F) TV 
col"NIANY B: THE STAFF ASSOCIATION 191GII COURT CASI- 
A preliminary hearing was arranged for Wednesday, 5 January 1977. The 
writ was brought in the name of the staff association chainkan, with 
ACAS as the-first defendant and the Company joined as second defendant. 
The preliminary hearing on 5 January was adjourned, with ACAS making 
representations for a speedy hearing as the case threatened the whole 
of its recognition work. The Company had decidled on 4 January to 
suspend distribution of the questionnaires until the outcome of the 
hearing was khown. ASTMS, incidentally, only knew that a writ had 
been issued by reading about it in the Sunday Times on 2 january and 
had to telephone the Company after the New Year holiday to Main the 
date of the hearing. They then applied on 10 January to be joined as 
a further defendant but failed I their first application. 
A considerably longer adjournment than anticipated was caused by-the 
illness and subsequent death of the Judge, but the Company was finally 
advised at the end of February that the hearing was to be on 
23 April. At the beginning of the hearing the Company requesLed to be 
removed as second defendant in consideration of an agreement not to 
issue the questionnaire in its current form; the requast was granted. 
ASTHS was admitted as a further defendant. 
The case for the staff association rested on three points: 
- 
that on a "true cons truct"I or, of the Employment P rote o'k'. i On Act, 
ACAS could recommend the staff association for recognition even 
though no Section IL reference had been 
- 
that ACAS had failed to consult the staf-, -' association about the 
questi onnai re; 
- 
thatt 
-Ithe "form of the questionnaire was not such as 
., 
iculd elicil-I 
the true opinions of the employees and was therefore no-'L. a lawful 
exercise of their discretion". 
-1.1ci - 
They relied very heavily on the evidence of Noii; ian Ilainag-Ing 
Director of Gallup Polls, who had been asked by Paul Nicalson in 
November for an opinion on the questionnaire. His affidavit was the 
only expert evidence offered at the hearing; ACAS did not submit any 
independent evidence to challenge that given by Webb. The Judge 
considered himself bound to pay considerable attention to Webb's 
evidence, in which it was stated that the questionnaire "disqualifies 
ACAS from finding out relevant factsr and that "the emphasis on ARMS 
only 
... 
runs the risk of destroying any conclusions obtained from it". 
AS was not cross-examined and an expert from ACAS was precluded 
from giving evidence on the grounds that he was a party to the case. 
ACAS's submission was that it was "directed by the Act, to inquire 
into a quite specific and defined recognition isssuie" 
- 
Lhe "d-ecisi"'n 
by the Service ý-., hether or not to reco; rniend recognition of AST111S by
the (Company) 
... 
is the sole iýsue to he decided"ý If th_- staff 
association was rir; entioned as an alternal. M. ASTMIS on the Ave + 
,u s+ior, - 
naire then ASTMS could argue t1hat t1he Service was misusing their- 
Section II reference to enquire into a separate issue, if. e. support 
jur- another organisation. ACAS relied heavily on the distinction 
between a union which had made a Sect-ion II -reference (ASTMIS) and one 
v., hich had not (the SA), claiming that it ý%, as not 'Lbe function of the 
Service to decide between the two 
- 
the staff association could make 
its own Section 11 reference any time it wished. Counsel for ACAS 
also pointed out that if the staff association %,, ras mentlioned on the 
questionnaire, employees might be misled into thinkitIg that. ACAS could 
recommend its recognition 
- 
which was not so. Counsel for the staf, 
association suggested at one point that the staff association believed 
that neither it nor ASTMS should be granted recognition. This cornment 
caused some consternation in Court, with the Judge asking why the SA 
had itself earlier claimed recognition. The reply was that -the claim 
had been rejected and therefore could no longer be regarde d as being 
'on the table'; presumably an explanation of its real tactical purpose 
Could indicate that the staff association was rather too dilettante 
in its activities as a trade union. 
Tile Judge dismissed th-2 ) irst tvx points. of the ST -S, C '10 tI Ft ffF,., 0fa1. 
.II 
case: 
ACAS could not rocumimond-the staf, association for recognition 
as it had not made a Section I! refere. 1ce; 
ACAS I : )i G ýad fulfilled all its dU4,, ies o-F con, 
-Iltation with the s-aff 
associ ati on. 
However, the Judge found the third point most convincing. ACAS had 
a duty to discover all the relevant facts and "one of the most 
crucial facts i's the degree of support among employees for other 
unions". This could not be accomplished by the use of the proposed 
questionnaire and therefore ACAS had failed in its duty. The AM 
associa-lk. ion had won the case. 
It seems quite cleat, 'that ACAS had not expected to lose; and the 
verdict put much of its recognition work in severe doubt. Th e 
Service considered an appeal for a short timie and asked the Conijjxny r 
to destroy 
-the offending ques-ilionnaires. Needless to say, AST14S was 
not aqused. Some 15 months after the submission of their reference, 
they had achieved nothing 
- 
indeed, had lo-st ground as the Staff 
association had gained a legal right to benefit from the reference. 
- 
I. 
- 
APPENDI. X 'S 
. 
PROCEDURAL AGREEMEI-IT BETWEEN MMPANY B AND ASTIMS (P-xtracts) 
General Principles and Objectives: 
2.4 The (Company) and the Association each recognises the inter- 
dependcnce of the parties and agree that those matters as 
specified in Appendix II which have a general application to 
all the (Company's) staff or an identifiable group of the 
(Company's) staff and which, for this reason, are determined 
centrally by the (Company) shall be the subject of prior 
consultation or negotiation between the parties as may he 
appropriate at the Joint Consultation and Negotiation Committee. 
Resolution of Disputes/Differences: 
10.4 Until all stages of the foregoing procedures have been exhausted 
both the (Company) and the Association will avoid any action 
that could interrupt or interfere with normal working 
conditions. 
Appendix J! (Matters to be agreed by consultation/negotiation 
between management and union): 
1. Remuneration scales including rates of overtime payments. 
2. Hours of %,., ork. 
3. Holidav entitlement. 
4. Pension and Life Assurance Scheme. 
5. Permanent Healthl Insurance Scheme. 
6. House Purchase Scheme. 
7. Disciplinary Procedure. 
8. Role of the Association Office Representatives. 
9. Redundancy Benefits. 
10. Maternity Leave. 
11. Relocation Schewa. 
- 
?, Ila, 
- 
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